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The overall objective of this study is to support the Commission in assessing the need to 
revise its current guidance to National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) regarding regulatory 
incentives for deploying Very High Capacity Networks (VHCN). Current guidance is 
primarily provided in the Next Generation Access (NGA) and the Non-discrimination and 
Costing Methodologies (NDCM) Recommendations. The results of this study can serve as 
an evidence base for the development of a new recommendation. 
The study employed a mixed-methods approach, based on desk research, surveys of EU 
NRAs and network operators, interviews, case studies in 10 Member States, and full-day 
workshops with NRAs and with other stakeholders. 
The study focuses on six key areas. The analysis of the approach towards pricing flexibility 
and price regulation shows that the costing methodology advocated in the NDCM 
Recommendation is widely supported by stakeholders. Cost orientation is imposed by many 
NRAs for access to one or more NGA wholesale products. However the use of the pricing 
flexibility, though still limited, is growing. There is substantial variation in the implementation 
of non-discrimination obligations, but very few NRAs perceive causal links between non-
discrimination and incentives to invest in very high capacity network deployment. The scope 
of physical infrastructure access obligations imposed on operators with significant market 
power (SMP) varies across the EU, but the guidance on transparency and pricing seems to 
be followed by nearly all NRAs. Operators use a mix of cooperative arrangements and 
commercial agreements for wholesale broadband access. Most of these arrangements and 
agreements have been taken into account during the market reviews. The number of NRAs 
that differentiate remedies geographically is limited so far. Although the use of geographic 
differentiation varies greatly among NRAs, it is likely to be used increasingly for ‘fine tuning’ 
remedies. The NGA Recommendation brought consistency in the overall approach to 
migration from copper to fibre, but not in the details of its implementation. 
Our results suggest that many aspects of the current Access Recommendations remain fit 
for purpose, but that further refinement is needed. The study led to recommendations on a 
number of issues, including but not limited to: the use of pricing flexibility overall; the “copper 
anchor”; the Economic Replicability Test (ERT); volume discounts and long term pricing; 
flexibility and measures to protect facilities-based competition; the price band; pricing of 
SMP civil engineering infrastructure; calculation of the next generation access / VHCN risk 
premium; choosing between Equivalence of Input (EoI) and Equivalence of Output (EoO); 
the Technical Replicability Test (TRT); dealing with information asymmetry; effective access 
to legacy ducts; improving the quality of databases and ordering processes; aligning the 
successor recommendation with the Broadband Cost Reduction Directive (BCRD); 
conditions warranting an out-of-cycle review of the SMP obligations; NRA engagement in 
forming cooperative arrangements; geographically differentiated market definition versus 
differentiated remedies; the recommended notice period for migration to fibre; possible 
departure from the principle of cost-orientation for legacy services in the context of migration 
to fibre-based networks; and the degree to which NRAs should oversee the migration 
process. 
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Cette étude a pour objectif principal d’appuyer la Commission dans son évaluation de 
l’opportunité de réviser les orientations qu’elle a adressées dans le passé aux autorités 
réglementaires nationales (ARN) en ce qui concerne les incitations réglementaires au 
déploiement de réseaux à très haut débit (VHCN). Ces orientations figurent principalement 
dans les Recommandations sur l’accès réglementé aux réseaux de nouvelle génération 
(NGA) et las recommandations sur des obligations de non-discrimination et des méthodes 
de calcul des coûts (NDCM). Les résultats de cette étude pourront servir de fondement 
factuel pour l’élaboration d’une future recommandation, appelée à remplacer lesdites 
recommandations. L’approche méthodologique utilisée pour l’étude est mixtes : elle 
combine des recherches documentaires, des enquêtes auprès des ARN et des opérateurs 
de réseau de l’UE, des entretiens, des études de cas dans 10 États membres et des ateliers 
d’une journée complète avec les ARN et les autres parties prenantes. 
L’étude porte sur six domaines phares. L’analyse des approches de flexibilité et de 
régulation tarifaire montre que la méthode de calcul des coûts préconisée dans la 
recommandation NDCM est largement acceptée par les parties prenantes. L’orientation 
vers lees coûts est imposée par de nombreuses ARN pour l’accès à un ou plusieurs produits 
d’accès de gros NGA. Toutefois, l’utilisation de la flexibilité tarifaire, bien qu’elle soit encore 
limitée, est en augmentation. La mise en œuvre des obligations en matière de non-
discrimination varie considérablement, mais très peu d’ARN perçoivent des liens de 
causalité entre l’imposition d’obligations de non-discrimination et les incitations à investir 
dans le déploiement de réseaux à très haut débit. La portée des obligations en matière 
d’accès aux infrastructures physiques imposées aux opérateurs puissants sur le marché 
(PSM) varie d’un État membre à l’autre, mais les orientations de la Commission en matière 
de transparence et de tarification semblent être suivies par presque toutes les ARN. Les 
opérateurs utilisent une combinaison d’accords de coopération et de contrats commerciaux 
pour l’accès en gros à haut débit. La plupart de ces accords et contrats ont été pris en 
compte par les ARN lors de leurs analyses de marché. Le nombre d’ARN qui différencient 
géographiquement les mesures correctrices imposées est jusqu’à présent limité. Alors 
qu’aujourd’hui l’utilisation de la différenciation géographique varie considérablement d’une 
ARN à l’autre, une telle différentiation est susceptible d’être utilisée de plus en plus pour 
‘affiner’ des mesures correctrices. Enfin, il appert que la recommandation NGA a favorisé 
une plus grande cohérence dans la régulation parles ARNs de la migration de la paire cuivre 
vers la fibre, bien que les détails de mise en œuvre continuent de diverger. 
Nos résultats suggèrent que de nombreuses orientations des recommandations actuelles 
en matière d’accès restent adaptées aux objectifs du Code des communications 
électroniques européen (CCEE), mais qu’il est dans certain cas nécessaire de les mettre à 
jour. L’étude contient à cet égard des propositions sur un certain nombre de questions, y 
compris, mais sans s’y limiter, les suivantes: l’utilisation de la flexibilité tarifaire et ses 
conditions; le produit de référence pour le réseau en cuivre; l’essais  de reproductibilité 
économique (ERE); les remises sur quantité et les accords de tarification de l’accès à long 
terme; la flexibilité et les mesures nécessaires afin de protéger la concurrence fondée sur 
les infrastructures; la fourchette de tarifs; la tarification de l’accès aux  infrastructures de 
génie civil des opérateurs PSM; le calcul de la prime de risque incluse dans le tarif d’accès 
de gros aux réseaux de nouvelle génération/VHCN; le choix entre l’imposition de 
l’équivalence des intrants (EoI) ou de l’équivalence des extrants (EoO); l’essai de 
reproductibilité technique (ERT); le traitement de l’asymétrie de l’information; l’accès effectif 
aux fourreaux existants; l’amélioration de la qualité des bases de données et des processus 
de commande; la prise en compte par la future recommandation de la directive sur la 
réduction du coût du déploiement de réseaux de communications électroniques à haut débit 
(BCRD); les conditions justifiant un examen hors révision quinquennale des mesures 
correctrices relatives à la PSM; l’implication des ARN dans la mise en place d’accords de 
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coopération; le définition du marchés différenciés géographiquement par rapport à la 
différentiation géographique de mesures correctrices; le délai d’information préalable 
recommandé en cas de migration vers la fibre optique; l’abandon éventuel du principe de 
l’orientation vers les coûts de l’accès à la paire de cuivre dans le contexte de la migration 
vers les réseaux fibre optique; et la mesure dans laquelle les ARN devraient superviser le 
processus de migration. 
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Recommendation 49. The successor recommendation could encourage NRAs to engage in the 
migration process by proactively promoting a multi-stakeholder process that seeks to ensure that 
alternative operators are well aware of the plans of the SMP operator and that stakeholders have 
ample opportunity to find solutions to the challenges of the migration that are in line with overall 
societal welfare. As in other aspects of broadband policy, the potential advantages of such a multi-
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PART I: INTRODUCTION AND DEVELOPMENTS IN 
BROADBAND DEPLOYMENT 
1. Introduction 
Objectives and scope of the study 
The overall objective of this study is to support the Commission in assessing the effects of 
Next Generation Access (NGA)1 and the Non-discrimination and costing methodologies 
(NDCM)2 Recommendations, as well as exploring the need to revise the guidance in the field 
of access regulation. The results of the study will provide an evidence base for the 
development of a new recommendation. The revision of Recommendations would, in the 
context of the implementation of the European Electronic Communications Code (EECC)3,  
provide up-to-date for the promotion of the deployment of very high capacity networks (VHCN) 
through appropriate regulatory incentives. 
The study explores, on the one hand, the implementation of the current Recommendations: 
• whether and how they have been followed by EU National Regulatory Authorities 
(NRAs); 
• what are the reasons for existing deviations; 
• what was the EU value added; 
• to what extent the implementation of Recommendations contributed to fostering 
competition and investment in VHCN. 
On the other hand, the study explores what guidance to NRAs on the design of remedies would 
be appropriate for the purpose of achieving EECC objectives, taking into account the 
emergence of network competition and whether in particular, for the areas where no network 
competition can be expected in the short term, the current recommended approaches still fit. 
The study will list a number of policy options that could be taken up within the eventual recast 
of the 2010 and 2013 Recommendations. The conclusions of this assessment are summarised 
in the form of a number of key findings presented during workshops with NRAs and other 
stakeholders in April/June 2021. 
Geographically, the study focuses on the EU with coverage of all 27 Member States and an 
in-depth analysis of 10 selected Member States via case studies. The scope of the study is 
also bounded in terms of regulated access products. As was the case under Point 5 of the 
NDCM Recommendation and Recital 3 of the NGA Recommendation, the study covers 
remedies that can be imposed on operators found to have significant market power (SMP) in: 
 
1 European Commission (2010), Recommendation on regulated access to Next Generation Access Networks, 
20 September 2010 
2 European Commission (2013), Recommendation on consistent non-discrimination obligations and costing 
methodologies to promote competition and enhance the broadband investment environment, 11 September 2013 
3 Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the 
European Electronic Communications Code. 
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• the market for wholesale network infrastructure access (Market 3a in Recommendation 
2014/710/EU and Market 1 in Recommendation 2020/337) 
• the wholesale broadband access market (Market 3b in Recommendation 2014/710/EU 
and no longer listed in Recommendation 2020/337) 
• any markets susceptible to ex ante regulation identified by NRAs during a market 
analysis which substitute them and cover the same network layers.4 
The principles relating to the imposition of EoI of the NDCM Recommendation have now been 
enshrined in Article 70 EECC (in conjunction with recital 185 EECC). It would be good 
administrative practice if, as BEREC advocates in its response to the targeted consultation, a 
new Recommendation succeeding the NDCM Recommendation would state whether the 
guidance must also be followed by NRAs imposing non-discrimination obligations on SMP 
operators in the current Market 2 (RRM 2020). We do not consider that this question is relevant 
for the assessment of either reviewed Recommendation. However, when drafting the forward-
looking proposals, we take this aspect into consideration when possibly relevant, but the data 
collection and analysis exercise mainly focused on the wholesale local and central access 
markets. 
The background for the review of the Recommendations and the study 
The 2002 EU Regulatory Framework5 as amended in 2009 and the EECC require national 
regulatory authorities (NRAs) to define and analyse relevant markets susceptible to ex ante 
regulation, and to determine whether any operators have SMP6 in these markets. If an NRA 
identifies an operator(s) as having SMP, it must impose appropriate remedies (see Box 1 
below) on this operator to ensure sustainable competition on wholesale and related retail 
markets. The analysis of relevant markets and the assessment of dominance should be based 
on the principles of competition law. Moreover, the EECC (recital 29) states that SMP 
regulation should be withdrawn when competition law alone suffices to safeguard the 
competitive process7. 
 
4 “This includes, inter alia: (i) access to the civil engineering infrastructure; (ii) unbundled access to the copper and 
fibre loops; (iii) unbundled access to the copper sub-loop; (iv) non-physical or virtual network access; and (v) 
wholesale broadband access (bitstream services) over copper and fibre networks (comprising, among others, 
ADSL, ADSL2+, VDSL and Ethernet).” Point 5 NDCM Recommendation. 
5 Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 November 2009 amending 
Directives 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, 
2002/19/EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities, 
and 2002/20/EC on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services, which is applicable since 
21 December 2020, carries over the main requirements of the amended Directives, which it replaces. 
6 According to Article 14 of Directive 2002/21/EC (“Framework Directive”) “an undertaking shall be deemed to have 
significant market power if, either individually or jointly with others, it enjoys a position equivalent to dominance, that 
is to say a position of economic strength affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of 
competitors, customers and ultimately consumers”. 
7 Recital 29 EECC reads “This Directive aims to progressively reduce ex ante sector-specific rules as competition 





Box 1. Regulatory toolbox 
The regulatory toolbox, as amended by the EECC, includes the following remedies: 
• mandating access to the SMP operator’s network and associated facilities; 
• mandating access to CEI as a self-standing remedy; 
• non-discrimination obligations (i.e. the SMP operator must allow external service 
providers access to its networks on terms and conditions ‘equivalent’ to those 
applicable to the providers within its own undertaking); 
• cost accounting obligations (i.e. requiring the SMP operator to use a specified cost 
accounting system, among others, to facilitate calculating controlled wholesale 
prices); 
• price control obligations (i.e. the SMP operator must provide access seekers 
regulated wholesale products (particularly network access) at controlled prices (e.g. 
cost-oriented or linked to the SMP operator’s retail prices)); 
• obligations in terms of transparency; 
• in exceptional cases, mandated functional separation; and 
• making commitments from SMP operators binding. 
The framework leaves a margin of discretion to NRAs when designing their remedies. 
This discretion is needed to allow NRAs to take into account the specific circumstances 
of the national market. However, to ensure a certain level of harmonisation, the EECC 
gives the Commission a number of tools to foster consistency in the application of 
regulatory remedies across the EU: 
• the internal market procedure (since 23 December 2020, the Article 32 and 33 
procedure;8) 
• the issuance of guidance by the Commission (since 23 December 2020, Article 38 
Recommendations). 
Source: Visionary Analytics based on the provisions of the EECC (incl. Title II, Chapters I-V). 
When the EECC became fully applicable on 21 December 2020, it introduced the promotion 
of connectivity, access to and take-up of VHCN as a new objective of the regulatory framework, 
alongside the promotion of competition, the development of the internal market and the 
interests of Union citizens. This additional objective requires reconsidering both the 2010 NGA 
Recommendation and the 2013 NDCM Recommendation to ensure that these rules remain 
applicable in a dynamic policy and market environment; and incentivise VHCN investments 
while also promoting competition. The market environment has also changed dramatically as 
a consequence of huge amounts of investments required to replace the copper local loop by 
fibre and the emergence of players other than the historic telecom incumbents that are 
deploying FTTH loops in certain geographic areas. Therefore, there is a need to reassess the 
two Access Recommendations. 
 
8 Until 21 December 2020 known as the Article 7 procedure because the procedure was set out in Article 7 of the 
Framework Directive. 
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Some provisions of the EECC overlap and sometimes slightly depart from the advocated 
approaches under the NGA Recommendation, notably the obligations on NRAs to ensure that 
the decommissioning or replacement process in the framework of migration includes a 
transparent timetable and conditions, including an appropriate notice period for transition, and 
establishes the availability of alternative products. However, the latter suggest strict 
equivalence between legacy and new products, including with respect to price, while the former 
simply require the products to be of at least comparable quality. In addition, the EECC does 
not define the length of the notice period. Another difference concerns access to CEI, which 
can now be imposed as a self-standing remedy – possibly as the only access remedies where 
it would be sufficient to address competition problems – and the fact that symmetric access 
can be imposed beyond the first concentration point. Thus, it should be acknowledged that the 
underlying principles of the EECC differ to an extent from those provided in the NGA 
Recommendation. The EECC has also enshrined approaches that were only promoted in the 
NDCM Recommendation until its adoption. This concerns in particular promoting price 
flexibility when the necessary conditions are met and highlighting that Equivalence of Input 
(EoI) is in principle the surest way of achieving effective protection from discrimination, where 
such an approach is proportionate. In parallel, the EECC foresees the possibility of ‘fair and 
reasonable pricing’ for wholesale-only operators, while the new VHCN elements subject to co-
investment meeting the conditions of Article 76 cannot, in principle, be subject to any regulatory 
obligation. 
Another reason to review the working of both Recommendations is that a decade after their 
adoption one can and should review whether the recommended approaches have been 
followed by the NRAs and thus whether the Recommendations led to higher regulatory 
consistency across the EU to help understand how they have actually been applied. 
Recommendations under Article 38 EECC aim to provide regulatory predictability to market 
players and foster consistency among approaches used by NRAs, thus allowing stable 
business planning. Ultimately, the objective of ex ante regulatory intervention is to create 
benefits for end-users by making retail markets competitive on a sustainable basis, allowing 
European citizens to access performant networks and enjoy choice and attractive prices 
(consumer benefit). The effect of the recommended approaches must primarily be assessed 
in relation to this ultimate objective. 
Given the discussion above and in the context of the transition from the previous regulatory 
framework to the EECC, we consider that a recommended approach from either 
Recommendation may be inefficient when there are no indications of their effects in achieving 
the objectives or it loses relevance due to legislative changes (e.g. adoption of the EECC). 
Data sources 
The study is based on a mixed-method approach and relied on the following methodology: 
• Desk research, which focused on: 
a) EU and national legislation, including national market reviews and Article 7 
documents; 
b) Other studies and reports, especially those prepared by BEREC, as well as 
academic literature on the related topics; 
c) Stakeholder responses to the Commission’s targeted consultation. 
• Surveys of NRAs (25 responses) and operators (18 responses) working in the EU-27. 




• Case studies, which provided in-depth analysis of market and regulatory developments 
in 10 EU Member States: Belgium, Cyprus, Czechia, France, Germany, Ireland, 
Lithuania, Poland, Spain and Sweden. Each case study relied on extensive desk 
research and three to five interviews with representatives of NRAs and market players. 
• Two full day workshops with stakeholders, which sought to assess preliminary findings 
and suggested ways forward. 
a) A workshop with NRA representatives was organised on 15 April 2021 and 
attracted over 110 participants from European NRAs; 
b) A workshop with stakeholders (market players, academics and experts in the 
field) was held on 9 June 2021 and had over 70 attendees. 
The study team also thanks external experts Dr Alexandre de Streel, David Rogerson, Alain 
Maton, Nicolai van Gorp and Paul de Bijl for thought-provoking discussions, insights and 
comments on the drafts of the report. 
Structure and contents of the report 
The report is structured around three overarching questions: 
• How has the economic and policy context evolved since the adoption of NGA and 
NDCM Recommendations and what are the likely future developments in the 
broadband market? These questions are discussed in Part I: Introduction and 
developments in broadband deployment (Chapters 1 and 2). 
• How have the NGA and NDCM Recommendations been applied and what are their 
impacts? The evidence is presented in Part II: Retrospective analysis (Chapters 3-10). 
The assessment is structured around six topics: 
a) Price regulation; 
b) Non-discrimination obligations; 
c) Access to civil engineering infrastructure; 
d) Cooperative or sharing agreements; 
e) Geographic segmentation of remedies; 
f) Migration from copper to fibre. 
• What should be the key strategic directions for the future, so that the successor 
Recommendation is more effective, efficient, and coherent in light of the objectives 
expressed in the EECC, in particular sustainable infrastructure-based competition, and 
more in line with the market evolution? The suggested ways forward are discussed in 
Part III: Forward-looking analysis (Chapter 11). 
Table 1 below outlines the structure of the report. 
Table 1. Structure of the report 
Chapter Focus 
Part I: Introduction and developments in broadband deployment 
Chapter 1 Introduction defining the objectives and scope of the study, background for 
the review of Recommendations and the structure and contents of the report 
Chapter 2 Broadband in the EU and economic background of the broadband regulation, 
including a general overview of EU policy developments 
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Part II: Retrospective analysis 
Chapter 3 Overview of the main provisions of the NGA Recommendation and their 
implementation 
Chapter 4 Overview of the main provisions of the NDCM Recommendation and their 
implementation 
Chapter 5 Assessment of the implementation of the recommended approach towards 
price regulation (incl. the possibility of including an NGA-specific risk 
premium) 
Chapter 6 Assessment of the non-discrimination obligations (Equivalence of Input and 
Equivalence of Output) 
Chapter 7 Assessment of the regulation of civil engineering infrastructure and relations 
between asymmetric SMP regulation and symmetric access 
Chapter 8 Assessment of the principles that NRAs should follow in the assessment of 
cooperative or sharing arrangements between operators aiming to foster the 
deployment of new fixed networks 
Chapter 9 Assessment of the geographic dimension of regulation, in particular regarding 
the geographic segmentation of remedies 
Chapter 10 Assessment of the regulatory incentives to foster migration from copper to 
fibre 
Part III: Forward-looking analysis 
Chapter 11 A suggested way forward 
Annexes List of references, summaries of NRA and stakeholder workshops 





2. Broadband deployment, economic incentives and EU policy 
This chapter provides a concentrated introductory overview of the broadband situation in the 
EU, the economic logic of regulation and general EU policy developments before turning to a 
detailed discussion of the NGA and NDCM Recommendations in Chapters 3 and 4, 
respectively. Chapter 2 is intended to provide the context of the analysis, while in-depth issues 
are discussed in the chapters that follow. Nonetheless, the information here is important to 
understand the needs addressed by the study, the policy developments since the adoption of 
the NGA and NDCM Recommendations (e.g. Communications on the Gigabit Society and 
Digital Decade), the background of assessment of the Recommendations (Chapters 5-0) and 
the possible ways forward that are suggested (Chapter 11). 
a. The problem has evolved since the Access Recommendations were 
enacted 
The Commission requested this study in order “… to assist the Commission in evaluating the 
effects of the NGA and NDCM Recommendations in the market and regulatory context 
foreseeable in the medium-term and assessing the need to revise the guidance provided in 
the field of access regulation. The outcome would inform a potential initiative for a new 
recommendation, which would [together with other instruments such as the RRM and the 
BCRD] provide consolidated up-to-date guidance to promote the deployment of VHCN through 
appropriate regulatory incentives in line with the Code.” 
Our assessment of the effects to date, those foreseeable in the medium term, and the 
implications for revised guidance all need to be understood in conjunction with the ongoing 
evolution of: 
• Overall EU policy goals as regards the digitalisation of the EU as a whole; 
• The changes in focus embodied in the EECC itself in comparison to the previous RFEC; 
and 
• Changes that are already visible in electronic communications markets in the EU 
Member States, including changes that are visible since 2018 when the EECC was 
enacted. 
To begin with, EU policy over the past 20 years has reflected the strong desire to progressively 
increase the capability of EU communication networks as a crucial underlying element in 
strengthening the productivity, sustainability and global competitiveness of the EU (see 
Sections 2.b and 2.h). Communications networks are a key enabler that can contribute to 
broad spill-over effects into the broader society and economy. The shift in focus from the goals 
of the Digital Agenda for Europe (DAE),9 which seem quite modest by today’s standards, to 
the Gigabit Society10 represented a significant raising of the bar. In 2021, the Commission’s 
Digital Compass communication11 notes that “achieving gigabit connectivity by 2030 is key.” It 
calls for all European households to be covered by a gigabit network by 2030 (versus 59% 
today), with all populated areas covered by 5G (versus 14% today). These strategy 
 
9 European Commission (2010), A Digital Agenda for Europe, COM(2010) 245. 
10 European Commission (2016), Connectivity for a Competitive Digital Single Market - Towards a European Gigabit 
Society, COM/2016/0587 final. 
11 European Commission (2021), 2030 Digital Compass: the European way for the Digital Decade, COM(2021) 118 
final. 
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pronouncements are backed by a number of concrete measures, including notably the 
Recovery and Resilience Fund (RRF),12 which requires that 20% of the funding of up to 
EUR 672.5 billion (2018 prices) be applied to promoting digitalisation and addressing its 
consequences, and explicitly identifies various forms of VHCN and 5G as candidates for 
funding. 
Secondly, promotion of “connectivity and access to, and take-up of, very high capacity 
networks, including fixed, mobile and wireless networks” became an explicit policy objective 
with the adoption of the EECC (Article 3), and with it, a shift to “efficient infrastructure-based 
competition” (see again Section 2.h). This was accompanied by a shift in focus to make greater 
use of access to passive civil engineering assets rather than active network services. The 
Access Recommendations already represented a step in that direction, but the EECC took the 
process further. Some of our suggestions in this chapter seek to take this process still further. 
Thirdly, progressively more high-speed broadband has been deployed within the Member 
States (see Section 2.c). The Access Recommendations were enacted at a time when this 
process was still at an early stage. Moreover, the nature of high-speed broadband deployment 
and with it the nature of competition is changing – with the progressive increase in consumer 
demand and willingness to pay (WTP), facilities-based network operators who are willing and 
able to compete head to head at wholesale level with SMP operators have emerged in many 
Member States (for instance, in Italy and Ireland). In Spain, Portugal and France, the use of 
SMP CEI has played a crucial role in the emergence of facilities-based competition. 
In parallel with this shift in emphasis in the EECC, the number of regulated markets (i.e. 
markets susceptible to ex ante regulation) has been progressively reduced from 18 to 2 in 
successive versions of the Relevant Markets Recommendation (RRM) as a response to 
improving competitive conditions in the Member States. 
Our task here, based on our assessment of the performance of the current Access 
Recommendations to date and in light of the goals expressed in the EECC and more recent 
policy instrument such as the Digital Compass13, is to identify possible ways in which a 
successor recommendation might be made more effective, efficient, coherent and more in line 
with EU added value than the current Recommendations. This is very much in line with spirit 
of the EU’s long-standing core principle of Better Regulation: “Evaluate first!” 
b. From NGA to VHC and new enhanced networks 
The definitions of NGA and VHC networks are not as straightforward as could be initially 
expected because they cover more than just specific types of technologies. Technology 
neutrality also plays an important role, especially given the variation among Member States. 
This section discusses the NGA and VHCN concepts as they are understood in the EU 
documents, then turns the discussion towards how NGA and VHCN coverage varies across 
the EU. We look at them in two contexts: 
• The Digital Agenda for Europe, due to its relevance at the time when Access 
Recommendations were adopted, and because the targets that were set for 2020 and 
the degree to which they have been achieved can be discussed. 
 
12 Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 February2021 establishing the 
Recovery and Resilience Facility. 




• New developments in connectivity targets set out in the more recent documents, as 
they are highly relevant for the successor recommendation. Specifically, the new 
recommendation should take into account the developments in strategic direction that 
came through the Communication Connectivity for a Competitive Digital Single Market 
– Towards a European Gigabit Society (2016),14 the Communication Shaping Europe’s 
digital future (2020),15 and the Communication Digital Compass: The European Way 
for the Digital Decade (2021)16. 
 
From NGA to gigabit 
The policy since the adoption of the NGA Recommendation has evolved significantly to date 
with multiple instruments, including most recently the Digital Compass: The European Way for 
the Digital Decade (2021)17, setting the most recent policy target that all European households 
must be covered by a gigabit network by 2030 (versus 59% as of 2020), and for all populated 
areas to be covered by 5G wireless services by 2030 (compared to 14% in 2021).18 
The new recommendation must contribute to achieving these policy targets. The experience 
from the NGA and NDCM Recommendations helps us to understand the prospects for success 
of the successor recommendation. We therefore begin the discussion of the change in policy 
targets with the Access Recommendations moving on until the Digital Decade/Digital Compass 
Communication to show the changes that took place and that the new recommendation should 
consider. 
The NGA Recommendation defines NGA networks as “wired access networks which consist 
wholly or in part of optical elements and which are capable of delivering broadband access 
services with enhanced characteristics (such as higher throughput) as compared to those 
provided over existing copper networks. In most cases, NGAs are the result of an upgrade of 
an existing copper or coaxial access network”19. Although the definition is technology-neutral, 
the Commission Staff Working Document accompanying the NGA Recommendation 
specifically speaks about NGA penetration in terms of FTTH/B, VDSL and EuroDOCSIS 3.020. 
The definition of NGA networks as connections capable of delivering a service speed of at 
least 30 Mbps reflects the main objective of one of the key areas of the Digital Agenda for 
Europe, namely, to “increase European access to fast and ultra-fast internet. The 2020 target 
is internet speeds of 30 Mbps or above for all European citizens”21. By the end of June 2019, 
the objective was achieved by several Member States, but not all. For example, Lithuania and 
France reported NGA coverage lower than 70%, with France reporting the lowest coverage of 
 
14 Connectivity for a Competitive Digital Single Market – Towards a European Gigabit Society, COM/2016/0587 
final, p. 2. 
15 Shaping Europe's digital future, COM/2020/67 final 
16 2030 Digital Compass: The European Way for the Digital Decade, COM/2021/118 final 
17 Ibid. 
18 Annex to 2030 Digital Compass: The European Way for the Digital Decade, COM/2021/118 final, p. 2. 
19 Recommendation on regulated access to Next Generation Access Networks, 20 September 2010 
20 Commission Staff Working Document Accompanying document to the Draft Commission Recommendation on 
regulated access to Next Generation Access Networks (NGA) C(2010) 6223, p. 10 
21 Digital Agenda: Kroes to present Digital Agenda for Europe as at 31 May, EU Telecoms Council, MEMO/10/223, 
28 May 2010, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_10_223 
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the study, with only 62.1% of households passed22 (see Figure 1). On the whole, as of 2020, 
more than 86% of EU citizens enjoy access to NGAs with speeds of 30 Mbps and above23. 
Figure 1. NGA Coverage in EU Member States in 2019. 
 
Source: IHS Markit, Point Topic (2020) Broadband Coverage in Europe 2019. 
Note: NGA coverage includes VDSL, VDSL2 Vectoring, FTTP, DOCSIS 3.0, DOCSIS 3.1. The data reflects the 
situation in mid-2019 and significant changes could have appeared since then. 
 
The second target of the Digital Agenda for Europe was that at least a half of European 
households should be subscribed to connections of 100 Mbps or above24. The Digital Economy 
and Society Index Report (DESI) “… assesses the availability as well as the take-up of basic, 
fast (Next Generation Access – NGA providing of at least 30 Mbps) and ultra-fast broadband 
(at least 100 Mbps)”25. Thus, the ultra-fast broadband corresponds to the mentioned second 
target of the Digital Agenda for Europe. The Communication Connectivity for a Competitive 
Digital Single Market – Towards a European Gigabit Society (2016) extended this target by 
setting the strategic objective for 2025, when all European households should be covered by 
at least a 100 Mbps connection. 
There are substantial differences between the Member States regarding the availability of 
ultra-fast broadband (see Figure 2). The EU average is close to 70%, but the differences 
between the countries at the top and at the bottom of the ranking are quite significant. The 
2019 data shows that Malta is the only Member State to have achieved the  100% ultra-fast 
broadband coverage. It is followed by Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Denmark 
with ultra-fast broadband coverage above 90%. On the other hand, Croatia, Greece, and 
Bulgaria had coverage below 50%. 
  
 
22 IHS Markit, Point Topic (2020) Broadband Coverage in Europe 2019, final report, SMART 2019/0020, p. 10, 
available at : https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/broadband-coverage-europe-2019 
23 Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI) 2020. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/news/digital-economy-and-society-index-desi-2020 
24 Digital Agenda: Kroes to present Digital Agenda for Europe as at 31 May, EU Telecoms Council, MEMO/10/223, 
28 May 2010, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_10_223 
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Figure 2. Ultra-fast broadband (connections of 100 Mbps or higher) coverage in EU 
Member States in 2019 
 
Source: IHS Markit, Point Topic (2020) Broadband Coverage in Europe 2019. 
Note: the data reflects the situation in mid-2019 and significant changes could have appeared since then. 
More recent EU policy developments with connectivity targets also focused on gigabit speeds: 
• Connectivity for a Competitive Digital Single Market – Towards a European Gigabit 
Society (2016), in addition to 100 Mbps coverage of all European households sets the 
strategic objective for 2025, when gigabit connectivity should be provided “for all main 
socioeconomic drivers such as schools, transport hubs and main providers of public 
services26 as well as digitally intensive enterprises;”27 
• Shaping Europe’s digital future (2020) discusses technology works for people relying 
on the EU 2025 Connectivity targets set out in the Gigabit Society Communication and 
the key actions in this field (such as accelerating investments, cybersecurity, the Digital 
Education Action Plan, etc.);28 
• Digital Compass: The European Way for the Digital Decade (2021) sets the level of 
ambition that all EU households be covered by a gigabit network by 203029. 
The new recommendation will have to take into account these developments and contribute to 
achieving the expected targets. The current situation in terms of the Digital Decade target is 
shown in Figure 3 below. Only Malta has already reached the 100% target, while Latvia and 
Romania lagged behind with no gigabit coverage at all by mid-2019. The EU average was 
32.4%, less than a third of the 2030 target. Thus, it is important that new policy measures and 
guidance facilitate rapid transition. 
 
26 Covering, e.g. primary and secondary schools, train stations, ports and airports, local authority buildings, 
universities, research centres, doctors' surgeries, hospitals and stadiums. 
27 Connectivity for a Competitive Digital Single Market – Towards a European Gigabit Society, COM/2016/0587 
final 
28 Shaping Europe's digital future, COM/2020/67 final 
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Figure 3. Gigabit (connections of 1 Gbps or higher) coverage in EU Member States in 
2019 
 
Source: IHS Markit, Point Topic (2020) Broadband Coverage in Europe 2019. 
Note: the data reflects the situation in mid-2019 and significant changes could have appeared since then. 
However, the new recommendation must account for the targets established in more recent 
policy instruments in order to make sure that the expected gigabit speeds are delivered. We 
must therefore consider the definition of VHCN in the EECC, as elaborated by BEREC, when 
discussing the most appropriate remedies to cover these new requirements. The new 
recommendation should also keep an eye on the still more ambitious goals of the Digital 
Compass.30 
Very high capacity networks (VHCN) 
While the VHCN concept covers different technologies, it is not fully technology-neutral31, as 
its starting point refers to specific technologies/architectures (namely, fibre to the building or to 
the antenna) and performance criteria are defined based on that starting point. Thus, VHCN 
can also be seen in terms of criteria in addition to connection speed, as shown further in this 
section. EECC sets out that NRAs “shall take into account the need to promote competition 
and long-term end-user interests related to the deployment and take-up of next-generation 
networks, and in particular of VHCN”32. As per the EECC, VHCN are electronic 
communications networks: 
• either consisting “wholly of optical fibre elements at least up to the distribution point at 
the serving location”;33 
 
30 2030 Digital Compass: The European Way for the Digital Decade, COM/2021/118 final. 
31 It could also be noted that while technology neutrality is an important principle, it is not a policy end in and of 
itself. Article 3.4 notes that “national regulatory and other competent authorities shall […], inter alia […] apply Union 
law in a technologically neutral fashion, to the extent that this is consistent with the achievement of the objectives 
[…]” 
32 Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the 
European Electronic Communications Code, Article 74. 
33 Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the 
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• or “capable of delivering, under usual peak-time conditions, similar network 
performance in terms of available downlink and uplink bandwidth, resilience, error-
related parameters, and latency and its variation”34. 
These definitions mean that in addition to the wholly optical fibre networks (FTTH/FTTP 
architectures), fixed VHCN may include other NGA architectures that meet the performance 
criteria. 
The EECC entrusts BEREC with the task of providing further guidance “on the criteria that a 
network is to fulfil in order to be considered a very high capacity network, in particular in terms 
of down- and uplink bandwidth, resilience, error-related parameters, and latency and its 
variation,”35 with the guidelines adopted on 1 October 202036. The guidelines consider a fixed 
network37 to be a VHCN if it satisfies either of the following criteria: 
• it is a fixed-line connection with fibre rollout at least up to the multi-dwelling building 
(FTTB); OR 
• it is capable of delivering services to end-users under usual peak-time conditions at 
specific quality of service levels (QoS) including: 
a) Downlink data rate ≥ 1 000 Mbps; 
b) Uplink data rate ≥ 200 Mbps; 
c) IP packet error ratio (Y.1540) ≤ 0.05%; 
d) IP packet loss ratio (Y.1540) ≤ 0.0025%; 
e) Round-trip IP packet delay (RFC 2681) ≤ 10 ms; 
f) IP packet delay variation (RFC 3393) ≤ 2 ms; 
g) IP service availability (Y.1540) ≥ 99.9% per year. 
These QoS criteria are technology-neutral. They could apply for instance to NGA architectures 
that combine, on the one hand, copper with DSL technology or coax with DOCSIS 3.1 and, on 
the other, optical fibre. However, in order to compute the VHCN coverage in the case of the 
second condition listed above, only those areas should be included where networks are 
capable of meeting thresholds listed above in peak-time. 
DESI used a proxy for VHCN when estimating VHCN coverage. It includes the combined 
footprint of FTTP and DOCSIS 3.138. This approach deviates in particular from the EECC 
definition in order to enable easier data management and improved comparability. It is more 
straightforward to use for measuring the indicator. 
Following the proxy used by DESI for VHCN (FTTP and DOCSIS 3.1), there is substantial 
variation among the Member States in terms of the availability of VHCN (see Figure 4). While 
 
34 Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the 
European Electronic Communications Code, Article 2. 
35 Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the 
European Electronic Communications Code, Article 82. 
36 BEREC (2020), BEREC Guidelines on Very High Capacity Networks. BoR (20) 165. Available at: 
https://berec.europa.eu/eng/document_register/subject_matter/berec/download/0/9439-berec-guidelines-on-very-
high-capacity-n_0.pdf  
37 Given the scope of the study, we do not further discuss the criteria for wireless networks. 
38 Webpage ‘Digital Economy and Society Index Report 2020 – Connectivity’, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/connectivity 
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the EU average remains at 44%39, the differences between the countries at the top and bottom 
of the ranking are quite significant. As of 2020, Malta is the only EU Member State that has 
achieved 100% coverage of VHCN (through FTTP & Cable DOCSIS 3.0). It is followed by 
Denmark with 93% and Luxembourg with 92% coverage, respectively. On the other side of the 
spectrum is Greece, where only 7% of households have FTTP or cable coverage40. 
Figure 4. Overall fixed VHCN coverage in EU Member States in 2019 
 
Source: IHS Markit, Point Topic (2020) Broadband Coverage in Europe 2019. 
Note: VHCN coverage includes FTTP and DOCSIS 3.1 coverage. The data reflects the situation in mid-2019 and 
significant changes could have appeared since then. 
 
c. Broadband in EU Member States 
In terms of coverage by specific technologies, Member States vary greatly. For example, while 
the EU average for DOCSIS 3.0 and DOCSIS 3.1 is 45.5% and 19.2% respectively, Malta has 
achieved full coverage of its population with these technologies. On the other hand, many 
Member States do not utilise the DOCSIS 3.1 technology at all, and Italy and Greece have 
virtually no coverage of either DOCSIS 3.0 or DOCSIS 3.1. The situation is comparable in the 
case of VDSL and VDSL 2 Vectoring adoption, where the EU average stands at 59.2% and 
28.2% respectively. Cyprus, Belgium and Ireland have the greatest coverage of VDSL 
technology, providing almost universal access to the population, while the Czech Republic, 
Austria and Germany are the leaders in VDSL 2 Vectoring availability above 60%41. 
Meanwhile, Portugal has no VDSL technologies at all. The tables below illustrate the 




39 It should be noted that the EU-27 average is higher than 44% as of 2020, since DESI calculations also include 
the United Kingdom (with a low 10% average) despite it no longer being an EU Member State. 
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Figure 5. DOCSIS 3.0 and DOCSIS 3.1 coverage in EU Member States in 2019 
 
Source: IHS Markit, Point Topic (2020) Broadband Coverage in Europe 2019. 
Note: the data reflects the situation in mid-2019 and significant changes could have appeared since then. 
Figure 6. VDSL and VDSL 2 Vectoring coverage in EU Member States in 2019 
 
Source: IHS Markit, Point Topic (2020) Broadband Coverage in Europe 2019. 
Note: the data reflects the situation in mid-2019 and significant changes could have appeared since then. 
The adoption of FTTP technology also varies among the Member States. On average, just 
around one third of EU households have access to an FTTP connection. In this respect, the 
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(76.6%), while FTTP coverage in Belgium and Greece is below the 10% threshold42. Figure 7 
below illustrates the stark contrast among Member States as of 2019. 
Figure 7. FTTP coverage in EU Member States in 2019. 
 
Source: IHS Markit, Point Topic (2020) Broadband Coverage in Europe 2019. 
Note: the data reflects the situation in mid-2019 and significant changes could have appeared since then. 
The situation described by the FTTH Council resembles the data provided in the Broadband 
Coverage in Europe (2019) study, but with some differences. Lithuania and Latvia are the top 
EU Member States in terms of technological adoption (94% and 95.6% of households are 
covered respectively). Still, most other Member States do not provide the majority of their 
households with access to this technology. Just 10% of German and 30.6% of Italian 
households have homes equipped with FTTH/B technology43. This variation is very clear even 
among the countries that are typically bulked together for other purposes (Central and Eastern 
European, Mediterranean, or EU6 countries), which is clearly visible on the map below. 
While there is variation in the data, this might also come from different definitions. IHS Markit 
and Point Topic define FTTP coverage to be when “a household […] can be connected now to 
a fibre service without requiring the construction of new fibre infrastructure and is available to 
be connected within reasonable time and cost limits.”44 Meanwhile, the FTTH Council defines 




43 FTTH Council Europe (2020), Markets as at September 2019 
44 IHS Markit, Point Topic (2020), Broadband Coverage in Europe 2019, p. 193. 
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Figure 8. Households with FTTH/B coverage in Europe in 2019. 
 
Source: FTTH Council (2020) Markets at September 2019. 
As shown, EU Member States vary not only in terms of the general coverage of NGA or VHC 
networks, but also in technologies used to provide broadband services and their regional 
coverage. Nonetheless, one of the most important dimensions when discussing the NGA or 
VHCN rollout is availability in rural and hard-to-reach areas. The problems of the “new” digital 
divide and poor connectivity could negatively affect the further development of the Digital 
Single Market. An analysis of ICT market trends indicates that the provision of many products, 
services and applications in the Digital Single Market will only be sustainable where optical 
fibre networks are deployed up to a fixed or wireless access point close to the end-user46. The 
Commission pointed out in 2016 that rural NGA coverage has been increasing slowly in several 
countries such as Germany, France, Italy, Austria and Finland, thus increasing the risk of a 
growing urban and rural digital divide47.  
Figure 9 illustrates the variation in NGA coverage in urban and rural areas in Member States 
in 2019. While certain smaller Member States tend to have good coverage, other countries still 
face the challenge of providing services to rural areas. The numbers are even smaller for 
VHCN rollout in rural areas, thus raising questions on how it could be improved and how 
guidance provided in the Access Recommendations could encourage deployment in such 
areas. 
 
46 Connectivity for a Competitive Digital Single Market - Towards a European Gigabit Society, COM/2016/0587 final. 
47 Ibid. 
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Figure 9. Rural and overall NGA Coverage in EU Member States in 2019  
 
Source: IHS Markit, Point Topic (2020) Broadband Coverage in Europe 2019. 
Note: the data reflects the situation in mid-2019 and significant changes could have appeared since then. 
While the urban-rural division is very important, when considering broadband coverage and 
accessibility from the perspective of regulatory incentives for deployment, there is also regional 
variation within the Member States (which can also be affected by non-uniform population 
distribution in a country with certain regions being more urban than others). While in certain 
Member States the distribution is quite uniform, it is not so in others. The variation in broadband 
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Figure 10. Share of households with broadband access in Europe in 2019-2020.  
 
Source: Based on Eurostat data, indicator TGS00048. Note: data for FR, IT, CH and MK are taken for 2019, as 
data for 2020 was not available for these countries. Data for the remaining countries reflects the situation in 2020. 
The general variation of VHCN coverage, differences in technologies and penetration of rural 
areas suggest that there may be economic challenges to uniform high-speed broadband, as 
discussed further in the text. 
d. Solving the challenge of high-speed broadband deployment 
The variation in broadband deployment among and, especially, within Member States 
illustrates the fundamental challenge in achieving coverage of the full national territory with 
VHCN, or more generally with broadband of high quality, which is that there are very few 
countries worldwide where commercial incentives alone would suffice to motivate network 
operators to make sufficient investments throughout. Without one form or another of public 
policy intervention, network operators would tend to deploy to the most profitable parts of the 
country, and would leave the rest with broadband of poorer quality. 
Costs tend to be higher in low-density rural areas, and lower in high-density urban areas, 
because the average length of each line (and therefore the unit cost of deploying it) tends to 
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be less when the density of customers is high48. In most countries in the world, the willingness 
to pay (WTP) on the part of consumers is not as great as the unit cost of covering the lowest 
density areas with VHCN. This implies that the country as a whole would not be covered if 
matters were left solely to market mechanisms49. 
Public policy measures are called for in order to unlock the relevant societal benefits. Any 
possible solutions are subject to the EU principle of proportionality, which is to say that they 
must be targeted to the problem, and no more intrusive than necessary. The range of public 
policy measures that can be employed are thus a direct consequence of the fact that revenues 
will tend not to cover costs (including the cost of capital) for the most expensive portions of 
the national territory. With that being said, the main options to correct the mismatch of costs 
and returns are: 
• Driving down the cost (and risk) of deployment; 
• Adjusting regulation to allow higher revenue for network operators (with a primary 
focus on SMP operators for the purpose of this study); 
• Providing public subsidies so as to make the business case at least marginally 
profitable, leading “to the rollout of a new infrastructure which would not have been 
there otherwise, thus delivering additional capacity and speed”50 in the high cost 
portions of the national territory. 
Introduction of clear guidance via policy means may also provide a clear and predictable 
framework for investments, making it easier for the operators to plan their activities and 
estimate costs and return on investment more accurately. Current European broadband policy 
is in fact using all of these tools, but not all of them are relevant to this study. 
Numerous measures in the EECC and other EU policy instruments seek to drive down 
broadband deployment costs. The Broadband Cost Reduction Directive (BCRD) is primarily 
concerned with exactly this. Although the Article 72 EECC SMP Civil Engineering 
Infrastructure (CEI) provisions are mainly about promoting competition, they can also play a 
role in cost reduction. Article 57 EECC provisions to facilitate small cell deployment are not 
specifically relevant to this report, but they are in the same direction. 
The pricing flexibility that is a central feature of the NDCM Recommendation seeks to solve 
the incentives problem by providing additional flexibility to the SMP operator, while 
avoiding significant retail price increases because flexibility is granted only when a 
demonstrable retail price constraint is in place. Pricing flexibility helps the SMP operator in 
many ways. It would provide the SMP operator more opportunities to ensure cost recovery 
(including cost of capital) by adapting prices to demand (e.g. penetration pricing in the 
beginning, higher prices when demand picks up, etc.) 
 
48 See Attila Mitcsenkov et al. (2013), Geometric versus Geographic Models for the Estimation of an FTTH 
Deployment, March 2013, Telecommunication Systems 54(2):113-127 and FTTH Council (2012), Creating a bright 
future, the Cost of Meeting Europe’s Network Needs, July 2012. 
49 “Due to economics of density, the deployment of broadband networks is generally more profitable where potential 
demand is higher and concentrated, i.e. in densely populated areas. Because of high fixed costs of investment, unit 
costs increase significantly as population densities drop. Therefore, when deployed on commercial terms, 
broadband networks tend to profitably cover only part of the population. (…) Where the market does not provide 
sufficient broadband coverage or the access conditions are not adequate, State aid may therefore help to remedy 
such market failure”, communication from the commission, EU Guidelines for the application of State aid rules in 
relation to the rapid deployment of broadband networks (2013/C 25/01), point 38. 




The long evolutionary arc of regulation of electronic communications over the past decade has 
sought to achieve results along these lines in different ways at different times, but they are 
variations on a theme. For each of these approaches (typically implemented through targeted 
deregulation), solutions had to be found so as to ensure (1) that the deregulated SMP firm 
would not practice anti-competitive discrimination, and in particular that it would not favour its 
own downstream activities over those of competitors; and (2) that it would not charge excessive 
prices, however defined. In the case of separation, for instance, the first of these problems was 
solved because there was no longer an integrated downstream retail operation that might be 
favoured. 
Returning to the NDCM Recommendation, it sought to provide more flexibility to SMP 
operators while also limiting the risk of retail price increase by (1) ensuring non-discrimination 
by means of mechanisms such as Equivalence of Input (EoI), and (2) preventing excessive 
pricing primarily by means of the Economic Replicability Test (ERT), which is a form of the ex 
ante Margin Squeeze Test (MST). 
The EECC represents a further development. The wholesale-only provisions, for instance, 
solve the problem of preventing the SMP network operator from favouring its retail operations 
by recognising the existence of various models and prescribing the relevant regulatory 
adjustments. 
It is important to remember that this study deals only with a number of specific tools that entail 
regulation of electronic communications, but they need to be understood as part of a 
constellation of measures. There are other tools that could be employed to increase the 
deployment and use of networks (e.g. stimulating demand (avoiding impediments to demand) 
by means of education, demand aggregation, or subsidies to certain classes of consumers are 
all relevant here) so as to increase their incentives to build out VHCN. These measures fall 
within the broader policy realm rather than only regulation, and are out of scope for the current 
study. There is nonetheless an obvious need for joined up policy. 
Many aspects, including the setting of objectives, constitute industrial policy. Subsidies are 
subject to state aid rules and thus fall under competition policy. Training for the public is largely 
an educational competence. 
Finally, the misalignment of incentives can be addressed by means of providing public 
subsidies. State aid rules must be understood as playing a complementary role to the 
regulatory tools covered in this report, but they are outside of the scope of what we will cover 
here. 
e. Different media and regulation 
This study is not just about FTTP/FTTH. For our purposes, it is important to understand the 
evolution of broadband as a whole, because different forms of broadband can have the 
potential to substitute for one another in varying degrees, even though they are typically 
imperfect substitutes at best. The degree to which two broadband services substitute for one 
another is an empirical question that is highly dependent on the specific characteristics of the 
products and markets involved. 
Variation in technology cannot be ignored. Indeed, the EECC itself recognises this explicitly in 
Article 3(4)(c), which calls on NRAs to “apply Union law in a technologically neutral fashion 
[emphasis added]” However, the same article goes on to state that this should be applicable 
“to the extent that this is consistent with the achievement of the [other objectives identified in 
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Article 3 EECC]”. Thus, while technological neutrality is important, it should not hinder the 
implementation of the EECC objectives. 
Aside from this, market developments of these alternative media are important in 
understanding the competitive landscape, and how they interact with the regulatory elements 
of the EECC and Recommendations. 
Cable has played a substantial role in the deployment of high-speed broadband in the EU (and 
is, for comparison, the majority broadband provider in the US and Canada). Cable coverage 
and adoption in the EU are, however, quite diverse, with essentially full coverage in the 
Netherlands, Belgium and Malta, but none at all in Italy or Greece (see Section 2.b). 
Experience in the EU suggests that where cable competes effectively, it can serve as a catalyst 
for competition, providing benefits for all; conversely, Member States such as Italy, where cable 
is totally absent, seem to have experienced slow growth of FTTH. 
Most remedies were originally designed for copper telecoms networks. They have 
subsequently been modernised (partly through these Recommendations) in recognition of 
VDSL, vectoring, FTTP/FTTH, and to a limited extent cable/HFC. 
Much of EU regulation and the literature pay insufficient attention to cable. In North America, 
however, cable is the majority broadband provider. In the EU, cable likewise represents a 
substantial fraction of NGA and (with the shift to DOCSIS 3.1) has the potential to represent a 
significant fraction of VHCN, even if not all DOCSIS 3.1 and cable can be considered VHCN. 
In 2012, in the era when the Recommendations were enacted, cable networks using DOCSIS 
3.0 accounted for 74% of NGA coverage and 57% of NGA subscriptions.51 In 2019, cable 
provided 29% of NGA fixed broadband subscriptions, and represented 19% of fixed broadband 
subscriptions, even though cable passed only 46% of all EU homes (and the cable footprint is 
not growing significantly).52 
Despite the fact that cable was the majority provider of NGA in the EU at the time, the 2010 
Digital Agenda for Europe53 contains only a single reference to cable as a legacy technology. 
Cable is barely mentioned in the NGA Recommendation. In the review of the economics 
literature in Section 2.f, only three papers54 out of some 17 pay significant attention to cable. 
One can debate whether the regulatory “benign neglect” of cable in the past was a defect. In 
many of the Member States, cable has functioned as a competitive catalyst for competition, 
not as an SMP operator (see Section 2.f). Coverage varies enormously across the Member 
States – cable has essentially full coverage in the Netherlands, Belgium and Malta and plays 
a substantial role in urban areas in some eastern Member States such as Hungary, but is 
altogether absent in Italy and Greece. 
Historically, there was little regulation of cable in the EU for various reasons: (1) it is often 
included in market analysis in terms of effects on competition, but rarely included in the 
 
51 European Commission (2013), Broadband lines in the EU: situation as at 1 July 2012; Communications 
Committee Working Document. 
52 Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI) 2020: Thematic chapters. 
53 COM(2010)245 final. 
54 Namely Wolfgang Briglauer, Carlo Cambini, Michał Grajek (2018), “Speeding up the internet: Regulation and 
investment in the European fiber optic infrastructure”, Telecommunications Policy;; Nardotto, M., Valletti, T., & 
Verboven, F. (2015). “Unbundling the incumbent: Evidence from UK broadband”, Journal of the European Economic 




definition of the relevant market55; (2) efforts to impose remedies on cable have sometimes 
been blocked by the courts because they rely on proving joint dominance with telecoms; 
(3) cable tends to have much less coverage than the historic telecoms incumbent in most 
Member States, with the exception of BE, NL and MT; and (4) conventional remedies such as 
ULL cannot be directly employed with cable; however, alternatives such as Point-to-Point 
Protocol over Ethernet (PPPoE) can be used in practice. Today, some Member States (and 
EEA members and accession countries) apply remedies in some markets to cable.56 
f. Geographic aspects 
As noted above, both the RFEC and EECC implicitly recognise that national markets differ 
from one another. There are also substantial differences within the Member States, which are 
now explicitly recognised in the EECC. Specifically, Article 67(3) EECC says: “National 
regulatory authorities shall, taking the utmost account of the Recommendation and SMP 
guidelines, define relevant markets appropriate to national circumstances, in particular relevant 
geographic markets within their territory by taking into account, inter alia, the degree of 
infrastructure competition in those areas, in accordance with the principles of competition law.” 
The discussion on the geographical aspects of regulation is also addressed in the 
Recommendation on the Relevant Markets and the Guidelines on market analysis and the 
assessment of significant market power under the EU regulatory framework for electronic 
communications networks and services. The Recommendation on the Relevant Markets notes 
that NRAs “should define a basic geographic unit as a starting point for assessing competitive 
conditions” and the unit should be of an appropriate size and able to reflect network structure 
(Rec. 37). Accordingly, NRAs should define the scope of the markets by aggregating units with 
a similar competitive situation (Rec. 38). Point 3 of the Recommendation stresses that “the 
assessment of competitive conditions should be forward-looking and should be based, inter 
alia, on the number and characteristics of competing networks, distribution of and trends in 
market shares, prices and behavioural patterns.” Furthermore, differentiation of both markets 
and remedies is possible. As noted in the Explanatory Note to the Recommendation on the 
Relevant Markets, “segmentation of remedies may be used to address less significant or less 
stable variations in competitive conditions, including by adjusting remedies periodically or 
punctually, without thereby undermining regulatory predictability.” 
Supply side differences among and within the Member States that are relevant to this analysis 
include (1) the degree of coverage by telecommunications networks, which were historically 
copper-based; (2) the degree of coverage by cable television infrastructure capable of 
supporting high-speed broadband, (3) the length of copper sub-loops in telecommunications 
networks, (4) the degree of population dispersion, (5) suitability of passive infrastructure 
(especially ducts and poles) for deployment of VHCN, and (6) possible challenging topography 
(such as mountains or islands). 
 
55 E.g. Luxembourg (case LU/2019/2137-2138), However, some NRAs found that cable networks exercised a 
pricing constraint in Market 3b. E.g. in France (Cases FR/2020/2277-2278-2279-2280) and in Hungary, in the latter 
because there was a commercial wholesale offer for broadband access based on cable (see Case HU/2011/1190-
1191). 
56 BEREC (2020), BEREC Report: Regulatory Accounting in Practice 2020, BoR (20) 210. The report states that 
three NRAs regulate cable; the corresponding table shows Belgium, Denmark, Hungary, as well as Liechtenstein, 
North Macedonia, Norway, and Serbia. 
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Also relevant but mostly not covered in this report are differences in demand side aspects such 
as consumer WTP for services, ability to pay (e.g. GDP per capita), and the degree to which 
residents of the Member State are at home with digital technology. 
Conditions may be fairly uniform in some Member States, while they can differ greatly across 
the national territory in others. Whether this is best addressed (when necessary) through 
differentiation in market analysis versus through differentiated remedies is taken up in 
Chapter 11. 
g. A review of key economic literature regarding broadband 
deployment in the EU 
Before going into the assessment of the Access Recommendations and especially proposing 
the way forward, it is necessary to provide an economic background covering the relevant 
issues. The economic literature on deployment, adoption and use of broadband is extensive. 
In this section, we provide brief summaries of only a few of the contributions that are most 
relevant to this study. For a comprehensive survey of recent literature, see Abrardi and 
Cambini (2019).57 Our review in this section draws on their work and benefits greatly from it. 
There is no real debate among experts today as to the value of the economic and societal 
welfare benefits that flow from widespread availability of broadband. In a concise literature 
survey, Cambini (2018)58 identifies numerous credible results, such as: 
• Röller and Waverman (2001)59 estimate that an increase of 10% in the broadband 
penetration rate leads on average to an increase of 2.8% of GDP growth (21 OECD 
countries). 
• Koutroumpis (2009)60 estimated that the average impact of broadband infrastructure on 
GDP was 0.63% (for 15 countries in the European Union, in the period 2002–2007). 
• Czernich et al. (2011)61 estimated that a 10% increase in the broadband penetration 
rate could be expected to result in a 1-1.5% increase in annual GDP per capita. 
We concur however with the observation in Abrardi and Cambini (2019)62 that there are “few 
studies that explicitly account for speed, and the incremental economic benefits of (ultra-)fast 
fibre technologies, and whether these benefits justify the deployment costs is still under 
debate.” 
The CGE analysis that appears in Annex V of the Impact Assessment that accompanied the 
legislative proposal for the EECC63 is rarely cited in the academic literature, but it is worthy of 
consideration. It seeks to quantify the impact that an “accelerated fibre” or a “full fibre” scenario 
would have on EU GDP in comparison with the business as usual “status quo” scenario, and 
 
57 Laura Abrardia and Carlo Cambini (2019), “Ultra-fast broadband investment and adoption: A survey”, 
Telecommunications Policy. 
58 Carlo Cambini (2018), “Broadband and regulation – How can better research help?” 
59 Röller, L. and L. Waverman (2001), “Telecommunications Infrastructure and Economic Development: A 
Simultaneous Approach”, American Economic Review, Vol. 91/4, pp. 909-923. 
60 Koutroumpis, P. (2009), “The economic impact of broadband on growth: A simultaneous approach”, 
Telecommunications Policy, Vol. 33/9, pp. 471-485. 
61 Czernich, N. et al. (2011), “Broadband Infrastructure and Economic Growth”, The Economic Journal, Vol. 
121/552, pp. 505-532. 
62 Op. cit. 





finds a GDP gain of up to 0.95% for the “full fibre” scenario in 2025. This would represent a 
very substantial benefit, particularly when one considers that it is annual rather than a one-
time gain. At the same time, one must not forget that the investment needed to reach that point 
is substantial – the European Investment Bank estimated in 2018 that achievement of 
European Gigabit Society goals in 2025 would cost some EUR 384 billion by 2025 under the 
most likely assumptions (versus EUR 192 billion for a modest deployment, or EUR 428 billion 
for a still more ambitious deployment).64 For comparison, consider that EUR 384 billion 
corresponds to 2.8% of EU-27 2019 GDP of some EUR13.9 trillion, suggesting that the break-
even point will be reached in just a few years. 
Martin Cave’s 2006 paper on the “ladder of investment”65 represents a key contribution that 
has been important in the historic evolution of EU regulatory policy. In it, he argued 
persuasively that “the objective of one-way access regulation should be to generate 
sustainable infrastructure-based competition where feasible, and that the twin objectives of 
promoting competition and promoting investment and innovation can be achieved by providing 
access opportunities for competitors which are appropriately calibrated over time. These are 
designed to encourage competitors to ‘climb the ladder’ of infrastructure investment, by 
installing progressively less replicable assets.” The goal was, however, to “restrict mandatory 
access to a limited period” after which it would no longer be necessary. The shift that had 
already taken place from simple resale to bitstream access seemed to support the ladder of 
investment theory. And indeed, many of the Member States observed a shift from bitstream 
access to LLU. If the rungs of the ladder were appropriately placed, the argument in Cave 
(2006) was that the shift from bitstream to ULL, and from ULL to full facilities-based 
deployment, should be feasible based on incentives for network operators.66 
The ladder of investment is explicitly recognised as a guiding principle in BEREC Common 
Positions on remedies (for instance the 2012 Common Position on remedies for bitstream 
access BoR (12) 128). In particular, the principle that infrastructure competition should be 
encouraged at the deepest feasible level of the network continues play a strong role. 
Subsequent developments have necessitated a reassessment of the ladder of investment. 
Numerous experts came to question whether the last step (to facilities-based deployment of 
fibre by competitors) was taking place, or whether it was even feasible, at least where no 
usable CEI is available and in less dense areas. For many years, there were concerns that the 
last rung of the latter was placed too high – only in recent years has facilities-based competition 
(other than cable) seriously taken hold in Member States such as Spain, Portugal, France, 
Ireland and Italy, typically due to good availability of civil engineering infrastructure and/or 
cooperative arrangements. 
By 2014, Cave himself was acknowledging the problem clearly.67 With the ladder, is “the 
process … expected to culminate in complete independence from the incumbent’s assets and 
 
64 European Investment Bank (2018), “A study on the deployment costs of the EU strategy on Connectivity for a 
European Gigabit Society”. These figures presumably correspond to the EU-28, not the current EU-27. 
65 Martin Cave (2006), “Encouraging infrastructure competition via the ladder of investment”, Telecommunications 
Policy. 
66 See Ilsa Godlovitch, Christian Hocepied et al. (2020), Future electronic communications product and service 
markets subject to ex-ante regulation: Recommendation on relevant markets: Final Report; and European 
Commission (2020), Explanatory Note Accompanying the document Commission Recommendation on relevant 
product and service markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in 
accordance with Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 
establishing the European Electronic Communications Code. 
67 Martin Cave (2014), The ladder of investment in Europe in retrospect and prospect”, Telecommunications Policy. 
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full end-to-end competition?” “It seems unrealistic or even irrational to expect that, outside 
certain densely populated urban areas, the wireline local loop will be fully replicated, especially 
if that expectation extends to the complete set of local loop unbundlers, which in some 
exchanges might number as many as a dozen.” With that in mind, Cave (2014) goes on to 
compare the approaches considered or taken in the 2010 and 2013 Recommendations, and 
to consider whether access to civil engineering infrastructure is more promising than bitstream 
access as a future policy. This represents a significant departure from his initial 
conceptualisation of the ladder of investment in 2006. 
Among classic regulatory approaches, there has been a long-standing debate as to whether 
regulatory goals are better promoted by setting the price of unbundled copper loops low versus 
high. Seven or eight years ago, there were concerns that the LRIC price for copper loops would 
increase because of (1) a declining customer base for copper-based network services, thus 
fewer customers among whom to spread the already sunk costs,68 and (2) increasing global 
prices for metallic copper, which under a Modern Equivalent Asset (MEA) approach would 
imply once again a higher LRIC price. Some worried that this would harm competitive entry. 
One could also argue on policy grounds that the wholesale price of LLU for copper loops should 
be lower than pure cost orientation would suggest in order to motivate SMP operators to 
upgrade their networks to fibre (if they can also expect that there will be no intrusive fibre 
regulation, and that they will be permitted to switch-off their copper networks freely). However, 
it would also reduce incentives for alternative operators to invest in fibre. Moreover, by lowering 
the cost and thus the price of copper-based broadband, it might increase the price difference 
between copper-based and fibre-based services, thus reducing the incentive for consumers to 
switch to fibre-based services. 
The balance of opinion in the literature has generally shifted in the opposite direction; however, 
it must be said that at least four distinct economic effects have been identified, and they do not 
all push in the same direction. Bourreau, Cambini and Dogan (2012) identified three distinct 
effects associated with higher prices for wholesale legacy network access that can influence 
operators’ incentives to invest in NGA networks. Briglauer, Cambini and Grajek (2018) 
identified a fourth effect, corresponding to the fourth bullet in the list that follows.69 
• Replacement effect: Entrants can be motivated to accelerate their investment in the 
new higher quality infrastructure when the legacy access charge is high. This is 
because the higher wholesale price flows through into higher retail prices, thus 
reducing the price difference between lower quality and higher quality services at a 
retail level and increasing the relative attractiveness of the higher quality services. 
• Wholesale revenue effect: Whenever an SMP operator invests in an unregulated 
higher quality network, they risk cannibalising their wholesale revenues from the lower 
quality legacy network. 
• Retail-level migration effect: A lower wholesale access price to the legacy network 
implies lower retail prices for the services that rely on the legacy network. In order to 
encourage customers to switch from the legacy network to the higher quality network, 
the operator making the upgrade may have to make additional investments in order to 
further differentiate their high-quality services from lower quality legacy services that 
have now become less expensive. 
 
68 See for instance Karl-Heinz Neumann and Ingo Vogelsang (2013), “How to price the unbundled local loop in the 
transition from copper to fiber access networks?”, Telecommunications Policy. 
69 Wolfgang Briglauer, Carlo Cambini, Michał Grajek (2018), “Speeding up the internet: Regulation and investment 




• Reduced competition effect: Assuming that entrants are at a cost disadvantage 
relative to the SMP operator, and if there are two facilities-based network providers 
(e.g. an SMP telecoms operator and a typically unregulated cable operator), then a 
higher regulated wholesale access price for the lower quality legacy network of the 
SMP operator tends to result in higher retail prices for legacy-network-based services, 
and reduces the competitiveness of entrants. This implies a higher opportunity cost of 
investing in a fibre network for the non-SMP provider of a facilities-based network. 
Hence, an increase in the wholesale access price raises the profitability of both 
facilities-based networks because of a reduced competitive constraint from entrants. 
 
Briglauer, Cambini and Grajek (2018)70 go on to claim that regardless of whether an incumbent 
dominates broadband investment or not, the incumbent’s incentives to invest depend on the 
relative strength of the retail-migration and the wholesale revenue effects. When the retail-
migration effect dominates, the impact of higher access prices on investment is expected to 
be positive. Conversely, when the wholesale revenue effect dominates, the impact of higher 
access prices on investment is expected to be negative. 
Related work by the same authors deals with incentives for consumers to switch from a lower 
quality legacy network to a higher quality fibre-based network. Briglauer and Cambini (2018) 
find that an increase in the regulated unbundling price for the legacy network of some 10% 
increases investment in fibre-based networks in the range of between 2.9% and 6.4%, and 
increases fibre-based adoption in the range of 0.7%–1%. That the increase in coverage 
(presumably somewhat proportionate to investment) is greater than the increase in adoption 
reflects a consumer response to increased prices. The same paper finds very little response 
to access pricing for legacy networks in the newer EU Member States in the east, probably 
because their legacy copper-based broadband tends to be much less developed than that in 
western European Member States. This is one of many indications that “one size fits all” 
broadband policies are unlikely to be appropriate in the EU. 
A number of papers express some scepticism as to the impact of regulation in general, and 
cost-based pricing in particular, on deployment of high-speed fibre-based networks in the EU. 
Briglauer, Ecker, and Gugler (2013)71 find that service-based competition decreases 
deployment of high-speed broadband, while infrastructure-based competition can either 
promote or discourage deployment in an “inverted U-shaped” relationship (which is strongly 
reminiscent of the relationship between innovation and competition that appears in Aghion et 
al. (2002)).72 
This notion of the “inverted U-shaped relationship” also appears in Fourie and de Bijl (2018).73 
They found that the relationship between service-based DSL competition and fibre penetration 
follows an inverted U-shaped curve: when the competition in the DSL sector is either severe 
or weak, there is a low degree of fiber penetration; conversely, a moderate degree of 
 
70 Ibid. 
71 Wolfgang Briglauer, Georg Ecker, and Klaus Gugler (2013), “The impact of infrastructure and service-based 
competition on the deployment of next generation access networks: Recent evidence from the European Member 
States”, Information Economics and Policy, Volume 25, Issue 3, September 2013, pp. 142-153. 
72 Aghion, Philippe; Bloom, Nicholas; Blundell, Richard; Griffith, Rachel; Howitt, Peter (2002) “Competition and 
innovation: An inverted u relationship”, IFS Working Papers, No. 02/04, Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS), London, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1920/wp.ifs.2002.0204. 
73 Fourie, Helanya, de Bijl, Paul W.J. (2018). “Race to the top: Does competition in the DSL market matter for fibre 
penetration?” Telecommunications Policy, vol. 42,778-793, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.telpol.2017.11.003  
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competition may positively influence fiber penetration. “The scale of these effects however 
varies with the openness of the DSL market: operators’ incentives to invest in fiber appear to 
be more sensitive to changes in DSL competition if there is extensive [LLU].” 
On the other hand, Calzada, García-Mariñoso, Ribé, Rubio, and Suárez (2018) 74 found a 
strong positive relationship between LLU competition and fibre deployment by the SMP 
incumbent. Conversely, they found that bitstream competition had a negative effect on fibre 
investment, presumably because bitstream poses only a limited retail threat to the SMP 
operator, while the wholesale replacement effect plays a larger role than with LLU. 
Unsurprisingly, they found the SMP operator was more likely to invest in cities where cable 
was present. Interestingly, they found that market size and population density had a positive 
effect on deployment, while the level of unemployment and the percentage of elderly 
population had a negative impact. 
Nardotto, Valletti, and Verboven (2015)75 found that LLU in the UK had a positive effect on 
broadband penetration in the early years, but not in more recent years. On the positive side, 
they found that unbundling had a positive impact on the quality of the broadband service 
offered. They also found that competition from cable operators had a positive impact on both 
the penetration and speed of broadband offered by other network operators. 
A number of papers explore different risk-sharing and co-investment mechanisms. Inderst and 
Peitz (2012),76 for instance, analysed cost-sharing agreements between an SMP operator and 
an entrant. They found that long-term contracting in advance reduces duplication of 
investment, and may increase coverage; however, this comes at the risk of reduced 
competition. 
Cambini and Silvestri (2012, 2013)77 likewise find that risk-sharing can lead to greater welfare 
than partial regulation (i.e. regulation only of the legacy, not of the high-quality network 
irrespective of the presence of SMP) or full regulation (of both the legacy and the new fibre-
based high-quality network), especially where demand uncertainty is high. 
The Bourreau, Cambini, Hörnig and Vogelsang paper (2019)78 is a particularly useful work that 
integrates many different aspects of the theory. We have found it to be valuable reference for 
this study. The authors model a national territory with diverse average cost of deployment in 
different regions; diverse willingness to pay (WTP) among individuals; no direct subsidy; and 
no special measures to reduce deployment costs. A clear initial observation is that, in terms of 
maximising coverage, a monopolist cannot be beaten; however, the drawbacks are clear, 
including (1) high retail prices, thus limited consumer surplus; (2) low consumer demand as a 
result of the high prices (due to the price elasticity of demand); (3) little incentive to innovate; 
and (4) a lack of consumer choice. Conventional cost controls can never reach as high a level 
of total deployment because profits would be dissipated. 
 
74 Joan Calzada, Begoña García-Mariñoso, Jordi Ribé, Rafael Rubio and David Suárez (2018) “Fiber deployment 
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They go on to provide a detailed assessment of the use of risk premiums to achieve greater 
deployment than would be possible under a purely competitive system with no public policy 
intervention. It is worth noting that most of their analysis would apply equally well to any 
regulatory system that offers pricing flexibility. In EU regulatory practice, the rationale for the 
NGA risk premium is to compensate the SMP operator for NGA-specific risks (the presence of 
which is debated these days). Their quantitative results would in fact hold for any premium, 
whether based on risk or not, but our interest here is in understanding the quantitative 
implications of the risk premium.79 An interesting corollary of their thinking is that, if this is the 
real reason for a risk premium, then it is somewhat superfluous where the high-speed fibre-
based network has already been built out (except as a matter of regulatory commitment and 
credibility). 
Reasoning from this thought model, they find that risk premiums can indeed expand the 
fraction of the national territory that the SMP operator will be motivated to cover with high-
quality broadband. The fraction covered can never be as great as that which a monopolist 
would choose, but the gain is achieved without permitting monopoly pricing and its attendant 
drawbacks. Specifically, they find in comparison with the ideal monopolist that “additional 
margins on top of the cost-based access charge can restore coverage incentives even in the 
most costly areas. This comes at the price, though, of increasing the entrant’s marginal cost, 
reducing ex post entry and consumer surplus in the newly covered areas.” 
They go on to analyse co-investment arrangements, as well as long-term contracts. For co-
investment (dealt with as access arrangements in the paper), they find that they “do not distort 
ex post market outcomes. The incumbent’s coverage increases strongly, though, but not all 
the way to monopoly coverage.” 
A few papers touch on geographic market differentiation and geographic differentiation of 
remedies. The survey paper by Abrardi and Cambini (2019)80 notes succinctly that “competition 
among high-speed broadband networks is likely to emerge only in specific regions of a country, 
mostly in dense metropolitan areas, while in the rest of the country infrastructure competition 
will probably not materialise. Large swathes of the country will most likely be left with only one 
high-speed network, while urban areas might be covered by two or more. From a regulatory 
point of view, this calls for a transition from country-wide uniform measures to a more locally 
tailored regulation, with different ex ante access rules across areas depending on the degree 
of infrastructure competition.” 
The previously noted Bourreau et al. (2019) paper provides complementary insights about the 
need for a geographically differentiated approach. Note that even though the discussion here 
is in terms of risk premiums, many of the same considerations would apply to pricing flexibility 
in general. “[D]ifferent access schemes are optimal depending on the type of area to be 
covered: Access options are preferable to risk premiums where they are feasible, i.e. where 
the sum of profits without an extra access margin exceeds investment cost, because they do 
not distort ex post market outcomes. More outlying areas can only be covered using risk 
premiums, which carry a cost in terms of achievable total surplus. To make this more intuitive, 
 
79 They express it as follows: “As a first extension to standard access charges we consider the imposition of an 
additional margin just set high enough to make the incumbent invest in uncovered areas. This can be understood 
as a risk premium that compensates the incumbent partially for the risk it is subjected to ex post by the uncertain 
entry decision. We find that this margin can be set at a level that both makes the incumbent invest and safeguards 
some (though less) entry.” 
80 Laura Abrardia and Carlo Cambini (2019), “Ultra-fast broadband investment and adoption: A survey”, 
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consider various types of countries that differ in their geography. In relatively flat countries, 
such as Belgium and the Netherlands, our results show that access options are the preferable 
solution to coverage issues. On the other hand, in countries where deployment costs increase 
steeply outside of urban areas (mountainous countries such as Italy and Switzerland), access 
options are not feasible (investment costs cannot be covered without adding an extra margin 
to the access price) and risk premiums need to be used instead. In other countries that have 
both types of areas, such as France and Spain, the adoption of a mix of instruments is called 
for.” 
h. Evolution of the EU broadband policy 
The challenges in the broadband market and the need for policy intervention via regulation 
that have been discussed throughout this chapter have been taken into account by European 
policy makers. Over the last decade, EU electronic communications policy has largely focused 
on delivering greater competition, lower prices and more choices for businesses and 
consumers81. The Commission acknowledged that the “widespread availability of affordable 
and secure broadband communications networks is a key condition for realising the growth 
and job-creation potential of the European Union – an objective that lies at the heart of the 
renewed Lisbon strategy”82. The importance of ensuring high-quality connectivity came to the 
forefront only later, as one of the key principles in the Europe 2020 strategy through the Digital 
Agenda for Europe document in 2010. The Gigabit Society (2016) is especially important, since 
it sets new goals for fast networks in Europe for 2025, further expanded with goals until 2030 
in the European Way for the Digital Decade (2021). Changes in policy also mean updated 
targets, replacing the ones that were relevant when the NGA and NDCM Recommendations 
were introduced. The current target is for gigabit coverage to all European households by 2030. 
It is an important development for the new recommendation. However, it is important to briefly 
review the overall EU policy evolution. Figure 11 illustrates the key milestones in the gradual 
evolution of EU policy in this area.  
 
 
81 Connectivity for a Competitive Digital Single Market – Towards a European Gigabit Society, COM(2016) 587 
final,14 September 2016, p. 23. available at: http://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=17183  
82 Report on the outcome of the Review of the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications networks 
and services in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC and Summary of the 2007 Reform Proposals, COM(2007) 





Figure 11. Evolution of the EU regulatory framework for electronic communications with 
respect to broadband (not including termination), 2002-2021 
 
Source: Own elaboration. 
The 2010 NGA Recommendation sought to coordinate diverging approaches of the NRAs 
when dealing with the dilemma between extending access-based competition to fibre 
infrastructure elements newly deployed by the incumbent operators, and providing incentives 
to the deployment of such networks. However, the NGA Recommendation clearly balances in 
favour of the former goal and seeks primarily to avoid incumbent investment in fibre networks 
that might reduce the level of competition and consumer choice. Chapter 3 provides a more 
detailed overview of the NGA Recommendation. 
The NDCM Recommendation of 2013 fine-tuned the approach set out in the NGA 
Recommendation by promoting stricter application of the non-discrimination rules (technical 
replicability, EoI) while ensuring stable wholesale copper access prices and expanding the 
circumstances which should lead to the (non)imposition of regulated wholesale access prices 
for NGA services. The cost modelling parts recognised that the balance between the regulated 
wholesale access prices for copper LLU and for fibre unbundling was a crucial element in the 
speed with which incumbents would phase out legacy infrastructure. The NDCM 
Recommendation is discussed in detail in Chapter 4. 
Both Recommendations followed a parallel road to the Digital Agenda for Europe, which was 
part of the Europe 2020 strategy, setting, among other objectives, the goal of providing NGA 
(30 Mbps or more) for all by 2020. The progress towards these goals is discussed in 
Section 2.a. 
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In light of further market and technology development, new goals have been proposed. They 
are especially relevant for the new recommendation, as it will need to contribute to achieving 
the aims. In 2016, the European Council called for very high capacity fixed and wireless 
broadband connectivity across Europe, and set the gigabit targets for 2025 (in the Gigabit 
Society Communication). Accordingly, it was declared that gigabit connectivity should be 
provided “for all main socioeconomic drivers such as schools, transport hubs and main 
providers of public services83 as well as digitally intensive enterprises” and at least a 100 Mbps 
connection should be provided to all European households by 2025. The goals were further 
updated in the Digital Decade Communication in 2021, the connectivity target in the latter 
document being that all EU households are covered by a gigabit network by 2030. Therefore, 
the new recommendation must provide guidance facilitating the intended market evolution. 
Adoption of the EECC and Digital Decade Communication has implications for further 
applicability of the NGA and NDCM Recommendations, as outlined in Chapter 1, leading to 
the need to review the application, effects and future-orientation of these Recommendations. 
The strengthened focus and new connectivity targets need to be taken into account in parallel 
to the market and technology development to ensure that the policy mix helps achieve the set 
targets. The NGA and NDCM Recommendations are discussed in detail in Chapters 3 and 4 
respectively, before assessing their implementation to date and suggesting ways forward. 
  
 
83 Covering, e.g. primary and secondary schools, train stations, ports and airports, local authority buildings, 




PART II: RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS 
3. The 2010 NGA Recommendation 
The main purpose of the NGA Recommendation (Point 3) is “to foster the development of the 
single market by enhancing legal certainty and promoting investment, competition and 
innovation in the market for broadband services, in particular in the transition to next-
generation access networks (NGAs).” It contains guidance on: 
• remedies that can be imposed (for instance, for access to civil engineering 
infrastructure, access to the unbundled fibre loop, or wholesale bitstream access); 
• general principles that should apply to the pricing of these remedies. 
a. Context 
In the 2010s, the Commission used its powers to intervene in market regulation after noting 
that NRAs were “developing regulatory responses to the challenges raised by the transition 
from copper to fibre-based networks”.84 In particular, this concerned remedies that they 
imposed in two wholesale broadband markets: 
• the market for passive network access, including unbundled access to the copper local 
loop infrastructure (Market 4 of Recommendation 2007/879/EC on relevant markets) 
and virtual unbundled local access (with high optic-fibre content); 
• the market for active network access, in particular bitstream access to the existing 
wholesale product (Market 5 of Recommendation 2007/879/EC on relevant markets). 
The Commission anticipated significant changes in demand and supply “at both the wholesale 
and retail level following the deployment of NGA networks”85 and sought to prevent 
inappropriate divergence of regulatory approaches, while allowing NRAs to properly account 
for national circumstances. 
A major concern was that the EU was lagging behind in terms of fibre deployment. The 
Commission noted that in terms of fibre deployment global competitors, including Japan, South 
Korea and the United States, were achieving better results. Incumbent operators in the EU 
claimed that the regulation applicable to fibre investments for these global competitors was 
less intrusive and that they had no interest in investing in fibre in the EU as long as they were 
obliged to provide regulated cost-oriented access to competitors. Indeed, access obligations 
limit the ability of investors to reap the benefits of their investment because access seekers 
can use the investment without bearing any related risk. Thus, for a number of years, the SMP 
operators asked for regulatory forbearance to ensure a business case for their investment in 
fibre. The Commission however rejected ‘regulatory holidays’ as a means to deal with the so-
called investment ‘hold up’ risk. Instead, the NGA Recommendation is strongly oriented 
towards access-based competition and asks NRAs to extend cost-orientation remedies to new 
fibre elements. 
 
84 NGA Recommendation, recital 3. 
85 Idem, recital 5. 
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Box 2. Policy before the NGA Recommendation 
A good illustration of the preventive steps taken by the Commission is the “fast tracked” 
infringement procedures against Germany, when it considered whether to grant Deutsche 
Telekom “regulatory holidays” back in 2007, with EU Telecom Commissioner Reding 
arguing that “the granting of regulatory holidays to incumbent operators is an attempt to 
stifle competition in a crucial sector of the economy, and in violation of the EU telecom 
rules in place since 2002”86. Such a preventive approach was subsequently endorsed by 
the EU Court of Justice in 200987. However, while the Commission won the case, it was 
not on the question whether ‘regulatory holidays’ were against EU law, but on the scope of 
the exclusive powers to be granted by Member States to independent NRAs. Before 
exempting a ‘new market’ from regulation, the relevant NRA should follow the referred 
procedures which give it the discretionary power to define and analyse a market and 
consequently, a legislator cannot grant regulatory holidays. In 2009, the Spanish NRA 
granted such a regulatory holiday to the SMP operator (for broadband speeds above 
30 Mbps) and the Commission could not block the remedy, despite the serious doubts 
expressed on 13 November 2008 in case ES/2008/805 (Wholesale broadband access 
market). This context is important to understand the approach advocated by the NGA 
Recommendation. As the analysis by Alexiadis and Cave states, “the prospect of an 
incremental unravelling of ex ante regulation as a result of the deployment of NGA 
networks no longer appears to be a realistic policy possibility. If anything, the role of ex 
ante regulation will become even more intrusive in an NGA environment”88. 
Source: Visionary Analytics based on the sources in the footnotes. 
The context89 that surrounded the NGA Recommendation at the time of its adoption explains 
why only three years later the Commission complemented the 2010 guidance with advocating 
pricing flexibility for NGA access in the presence of a retail price constraint when strict non-
discrimination obligations are imposed. 
b. Main remedies recommended 
The essence of the NGA Recommendation is that where ex ante price regulation is applied, 
access prices should be cost-oriented. This approach should also apply to access to new fibre 
elements, but with several specificities: 
• When setting regulated access tariffs, NRAs should factor in a risk premium 
incorporated in the regulated weighted average cost of capital (WACC). As the NGA 
Recommendation states, “NRAs should, where justified, include over the pay-back 
period of the investment a supplement reflecting the risk of the investment in the WACC 
 
86 IP/07/237, Commission launches “fast track” infringement proceedings against Germany for “regulatory holidays” 
for Deutsche Telekom, 26 February 2007. Available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_07_237 
87 Judgment of the Court (Fourth Chamber) of 3 December 2009, Federal Republic of Germany v 
Commission,(Case 424/07). 
88 Alexiadis, P. & Cave, M. (2010) The European NGA Recommendation: the Banal, the Controversial and the 
Inconclusive, Intermedia, 38 (4) p. 47. Available at: 
https://www.cerre.eu/sites/cerre/files/Intermedia_Vol_38_No4_2010_MC_PA_NGA.pdf 
89 “The goal of harmonisation has clearly lost out. On a philosophical note, perhaps that was always the destiny of 
this document, given the multiple network topologies that account for the “NGA” world and the varied patterns of 




calculation currently performed for setting the price of access to the unbundled copper 
loop”90. 
• NRAs should consider additional mechanisms to share the investment risk between 
investors and access seekers and to foster market penetration such as long-term 
access pricing or volume discounts for large numbers of lines91. 
The Recommendation adds that to “foster predictability, NRAs should properly specify in 
advance the methodology they will follow to identify the imputation test, the parameters to be 
used and the remedial mechanisms in case of established margin squeeze”92. Moreover, 
according to the Recommendation, to maintain effective competition between operators not 
benefiting from the same economies of scale and scope and having different unit network 
costs, a ‘reasonably efficient competitor test’ will normally be more appropriate than the 
‘equally efficient competitor’ test used under the Competition law. 
In parallel, the NGA Recommendation asks NRAs to take into consideration co-investment in 
FTTH. NRAs should examine, in the course of their market analysis, whether, in light of the 
level of infrastructure competition resulting from the co-investment, identifying an operator with 
SMP is warranted in terms of the geographic area covered by the co-investment. In this 
context, NRAs should also examine whether the co-investors install sufficient duct capacity for 
third parties to use and grant cost-oriented access for such capacity93. 
When competitive conditions diverge between different areas in a geographically defined 
market, but those differences are not sufficient to justify defining a sub-national geographic 
market, NRAs have the flexibility to impose differentiated remedies and access products.94 
According to BEREC, Belgium, France, Denmark, Spain and Italy impose differentiated 
remedies on SMP operators in Markets 3a, 3b or both.95 
Points 13-17 of the NGA Recommendation contain recommendations concerning access to 
civil engineering infrastructure and to the terminating segment, in particular to the in-house 
wiring, of the SMP operator. NRAs are invited to: 
• seek information from SMP operators on whether and where ducts and other local loop 
facilities are available for the purpose of deploying NGA networks; 
• ensure that the SMP operator provides access under the same conditions to its own 
downstream arm and to third-party access seekers. 
Annex II of the Recommendation sets out in detail what constitutes the principle of 
equivalence. 
This being said, the Recommendation did not deal exhaustively with the civil engineering and 
in-building wiring bottlenecks, because it could legally only recommend measures that can be 
taken following an SMP finding in Markets 4/2007 and 5/2007. Mandatory access to civil 
engineering from utilities other than electronic communications network operators is not 
 
90 NGA Recommendation, Annex I, point 6 
91 Idem, Recital 24; point 25 and Annex I, point8. 
92 Idem, Recital 26. 
93 Idem, Point 28. 
94 NGA Recommendation, point 9. 
95 BoR (20) 210, Figure 63, p. 68. 
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covered. This ‘gap’ was addressed in 2014 by the Broadband Cost Reduction Directive 
(BCRD). 
Finally, the NGA Recommendation seeks to ensure that all NRAs put in place a transparent 
framework for the migration from copper to fibre-based networks. NRAs should ensure 
that the systems and procedures put in place by the SMP operator, including operating support 
systems, are designed to facilitate the switching from alternatives to NGA-based access 
products96. Migration measures should be limited to a five-year time horizon. A shorter time 
period is nonetheless possible when: 
• there is an agreement on an appropriate migration path between the SMP operator and 
operators using regulated access; or 
• fully equivalent access is provided at the point of interconnection. 
In parallel, NRAs must ensure that SMP operators design support systems to facilitate the 
switching of competitors to NGA-based virtual products. 
In effect, the NGA Recommendation is strongly focused on the promotion of access-based 
competition, especially by promoting price control with a cost orientation adjusted for 
investment risk. One of the challenges that the NGA Recommendation responded to was the 
diverging approaches used by NRAs when dealing with the dilemma between extending 
access-based competition to fibre infrastructure elements newly deployed by the incumbent 
operators, and providing incentives to the deployment of such networks. The document clearly 
weighs in favour of the former goal. 
  
 




4. The 2013 NDCM Recommendation 
The NDCM Recommendation was adopted in 2013 and aimed to: 
• fine-tune the approach set out in the NGA Recommendation by promoting stricter 
application of the non-discrimination rules (e.g. technical replicability, EoI) while 
ensuring stable wholesale copper access prices; 
• expand the circumstances which should lead to the (non-)imposition of regulated 
wholesale access prices for NGA services. 
 
a. Context 
In 2013, the NDCM Recommendation slightly modified the recommended approach by 
providing an alternative to the cost-orientation pricing remedy. According to the 
Recommendation, NRAs should introduce pricing flexibility when they enforce strict non-
discrimination remedies and in the presence of competitive constraints described in the 
Recommendation. 
The Commission adopted the recommendation “on consistent non-discrimination obligations 
and costing methodologies to promote competition and enhance the broadband investment 
environment”97 following its finding that “the approach of NRAs when imposing on SMP 
operators access price-setting as well as non-discrimination obligations [revealed] (…) 
significant variations which were not always justified by differences in national circumstances, 
despite (…) publication of the NGA Recommendation by the Commission”98. For example, 
“existing provisions of the NGA Recommendation foresee the setting of a risk premium for 
access prices to the fibre network in order to duly reward the access provider for the risk 
incurred. However, it appears that it has not been extensively applied so far by the NRAs”99. 
The NDCM Recommendation recognised that the balance between the regulated wholesale 
access prices for copper LLU and for fibre unbundling was a crucial element in defining the 
speed with which incumbents would phase out legacy infrastructure. The price of copper as a 
metal was increasing at the time, which implied possibly higher LRIC costs. There were also 
calls for a lower LRIC copper cost in order to accelerate the deployment of fibre. 
The Commission eventually chose “regulatory transparency and predictability and the need to 
ensure stability without significant fluctuations when setting cost-oriented access prices, both 
when developing the costing methodology (…) (the ‘recommended costing methodology’) and 
when implementing it once it is finalised” (Point 38). The recommended approach was meant 
to “lead to stable copper access prices and a Union average monthly rental access price for 
the full unbundled copper local loop within a band between EUR 8 and EUR 10 (net of all 
taxes) expressed in 2012 prices (the price band)” (Point 41). A 2020 study by BEREC finds 
that at least 15 NRAs applied NCDM paragraphs 30-37 (on BU LRIC+ cost orientation) 
(against only 7 NRAs in 2016), while 5 NRAs made use of the transitional regime established 
 
97 European Commission (2013), Commission Recommendation on consistent non-discrimination obligations and 
costing methodologies to promote competition and enhance the broadband investment environment, 2013/466/EU 
98 Impact Assessment accompanying the Recommendation on consistent non-discrimination obligations and 
September costing methodologies, SWD(2013) 329 final, p. 11. 
99 Idem, p. 41. 
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by NCDM paragraph 40, allowing them to continue applying other cost methodologies if 
leading to similar outcomes100. 
In the context of stabilised access prices to copper generation access, the pricing flexibility for 
fibre-based wholesale access was an attempt to increase the profitability of deploying the 
alternative without wrecking the competitive structure. 
b. Main recommended approaches 
The NDCM Recommendation first outlines the scenarios in which established competitive 
safeguards should lead to NRAs deviating from the general principle of imposing cost-oriented 
wholesale NGA access on SMP operators as expressed in the NGA Recommendation and in 
which cost-oriented wholesale access to NGA broadband may not be necessary and can 
be lifted. Box 3 lists the conditions under which the price regulation is not needed 
Box 3. Conditions under which cost-oriented wholesale access to NGA Broadband may 
not be necessary 
• The SMP operator is subject to strict non-discrimination obligations, in particular 
through Equivalence of Input (EoI) requirements. 
• Alternative operators can replicate NGA offers from SMP operators economically 
and technically. 
• Adequate costing methodology is applied to legacy copper prices and civil works. 
• NGA network pricing is subject to a demonstrable retail price constraint either 
through regulated access to the legacy network where it is subject to cost 
orientation in accordance with the recommended costing methodology (‘copper 
anchor’) or by retail offers provided based on an alternative network. 
Source: NDCM Recommendation. 
Where NRAs impose price control obligations on an SMP operator, according to the NDCM 
Recommendation: 
• NRAs must use the ‘bottom-up long-run incremental costs plus’ costing methodology 
(BU LRIC+). This applies to both copper and NGA networks (point 30). This 
methodology accounts for (point 31) the variable costs (incl. investments) of a 
hypothetical efficient operator in building a modern efficient NGA network and a 
supplement for common costs. 
• The ‘modelled’ NGA network should not necessarily consist wholly of ‘optical elements’ 
(optical fibre) and it should be hosted in existing civil engineering assets while all other 
civil engineering assets will have to be newly constructed. 
 
The NDCM Recommendation asked the NRAs to implement the BU LRIC+ methodology by 
no later than the end of 2016 (Point 39). Alternatively, NRAs may continue applying other 
costing methodologies as long as these methodologies (Point 40): 
 




• were used at the time when the NDCM Recommendation was adopted; 
• meet the objectives of BU LRIC+ (particularly the creation of incentives for investment 
in NGA networks); 
• reflect the shift from a copper to an NGA network if the cost methodology is not 
modelling an NGA network; 
• take into account that certain civil engineering assets will probably not be replicated; 
and 
• guarantee stable, transparent and foreseeable copper network access prices. 
The NDCM Recommendation anticipates that the implementation of the recommended 
methodology would lead to an average monthly rental access price for the copper local loop 
of EUR 8-EUR 10 (price band) expressed in 2012 prices (Point 41). For this reason, only the 
NRAs of Member States, where the access prices for the full unbundled copper local loop fall 
outside the price band (e.g. Poland: EUR 5.34/month, Finland: EUR 14.37/month)101 should 
recalculate the access prices on the basis of BU LRIC+ “as soon as possible” to ensure 
implementation by the end of 2016. 
One of the main objectives of the NDCM Recommendation is indeed that the regulated monthly 
copper ULL rental prices would remain within the recommended price band. The wholesale 
access prices of legacy infrastructure could otherwise be strongly affected by volume effects 
and make future pricing unpredictable. Such volume effects result from decreasing demand in 
copper wholesale access and lead to higher unit costs (i.e. the same cost base of copper must 
be distributed between fewer lines). Therefore, the shift to NGA products might lead to higher 
copper prices. Accordingly, the NDCM Recommendation asks NRAs to ensure that their 
costing model includes both copper and fibre lines. Otherwise, just moving traffic volume to 
other infrastructures would inflate unit costs102. If the copper access price is consistent, the 
copper anchor without a direct wholesale price obligation can be introduced. 
At the same time, the NDCM Recommendation considers that the monthly wholesale prices 
for unbundled copper loops regulated with ‘copper anchor’ will provide a competitive constraint, 
making a wholesale access price obligation for NGA networks no longer warranted103. Box 4 
below spells out the assumptions behind the use of a copper anchor. 
 
101 Full LLU Monthly Rental charge in October 2011 according to the Digital Agenda Scoreboard 2012. 
102 BoR (19) 240, p. 44 
103 Commission SWD of 11 September 2013 accompanying the Recommendation on consistent non-discrimination 
obligations and September costing methodologies, SWD(2013)330 final, p. 4. 
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Box 4. Assumptions of the copper anchor application 
The application of the copper anchor is based on three assumptions: 
1. For the time being, copper and NGA-based networks remain in the same product 
market. The functionalities of access over one (copper) or the other (NGA) are 
sufficiently close for end-users to remain on the legacy copper product if prices of 
the new access product become too high. This means that users focus on the 
premium of the NGA price (compared to copper) rather than on the absolute price. 
2. The prices of the copper retail products that constitute such a price reference reflect 
the cost-oriented copper access prices.104 
3. The cost-orientation obligation applied to the legacy copper access product of SMP 
operators is determined on the basis of the current costs of modern equivalent 
access and can act as a strong constraint on NGA pricing if properly imposed. 
Source: Visionary Analytics. 
In the case of a copper-fibre overlay, the demand for wholesale fibre network access in the 
absence of regulation on NGN will be influenced by the relative price of the copper network. 
This effect is due to the interplay between the ‘wholesale revenue effect’ for the SMP operator 
and the ‘business migration effect’ for access seekers105. 
Meanwhile, a copper anchor without direct cost orientation for NGA networks allows network 
operators and access seekers to share some of the risks by differentiating wholesale access 
charges according to the level of the access seeker’s commitment. The examples could 
include: 
• making access prices contingent on capacity reservations (rather than usage) is a 
particular way of balancing the risk between the investor and access seekers;106 
• an Option to Delay Pricing Rule (ODPR) which “sets the access price (in each period) 
equal to the difference between the optimal regulated monopoly retail price and the 
incumbent’s retail costs.” Under ODPR, the incumbent earns either the minimum payoff 
required to induce investment in the first period, or the (lower) minimum payoff required 
to induce investment in the second period.107 
At the same time, “abridgement of regulatory obligations seems to be a rather simple and 
effective means to foster investments,” though such an approach “may involve some loss of 
static efficiency (and possibly also dynamic efficiency) in comparison to cost-oriented 
regulation. Departure from cost-based pricing may lead to higher prices for consumers, and 
therefore should be undertaken only when necessary to induce investments that are to the 
benefit of consumers and would otherwise not take place”108. However, when drafting the 2013 
NDCM Recommendation, the Commission omitted to include specific guidance on these 
alternative (not purely cost-based) approaches to regulation, such as a threat of regulation, or 
 
104 Impact Assessment accompanying the Recommendation on consistent non-discrimination obligations and 
September costing methodologies, SWD(2013) 329 final, p. 45. 
105 Costing methodologies and incentives to invest in fibre, CRA (2012) p. 58. 
106 Idem p. 41 
107 Idem p. 42 




regulatory abridgement (‘regulatory holidays’), without excluding their use by NRAs where the 
circumstances justify it109. 
A third objective of the NDCM Recommendation is to harmonise non-discrimination 
obligations imposed by NRAs on SMP operators (Points 6(g) and (h)). The general principle 
is that NRAs should impose Equivalence of Inputs (EoI), meaning that the SMP operator must 
provide network access to external and internal service providers on ‘the same’ terms and 
conditions and using ‘the same’ systems and processes. Where EoI is used, price controls 
may not be needed (see the discussion below). The SMP operator may itself commit to 
following the EoI approach voluntarily. In the absence of a voluntary commitment, the NRA 
should assess “whether it would be proportionate to require SMP operators to provide relevant 
wholesale inputs on an EoI basis” (Point 7). The decisive factor in this regard is whether the 
competition benefits of EoI outweigh the compliance costs110 or not. When carrying out this 
proportionality assessment, the NRA must take into account the fact that (Point 7) compliance 
costs are often lower for NGA networks than for existing copper networks. Where EoI is 
disproportionate, NRAs should opt for Equivalence of Output (‘EoO’) (Point 9). EoO means 
that the SMP operator must allow external and internal service providers to have network 
access on ‘comparable’ terms and conditions but can use different systems and processes to 
ensure this. 
The baseline expectation is that access seekers have network access to the extent that they 
can ‘technically replicate’ the operator’s new retail product (i.e. they can offer retail products 
in a comparable form). Therefore, where EoI has not yet been fully implemented (Point 11), 
the NRA or the SMP operator must test the technical replicability demonstrating that the retail 
price exceeds the network access tariff to the extent sufficient to ensure that its common costs 
and downstream costs are covered. Regarding the test: 
• Where the NRA conducts the test, it must require the SMP operator to provide details 
on the new retail products ‘with sufficient notice’ prior to their launch. 
• Where the operator itself conducts the test, the NRA should ‘validate’ the test results 
(Points 14 to 16). 
In case the test fails, the NRA must oblige the SMP operator (Points 17 and 18) to amend the 
network access product in a way that ensures its technical replicability and, in the meantime, 
cease or delay the provision of the retail product pending compliance with the requirement of 
technical replicability. 
Where the SMP operator is subject to a non-discrimination obligation consistent with EoI or, 
alternatively, obligations relating to technical replicability of retail products if EoI has not been 
fully implemented, and its retail products fulfil the economic replicability test, the NDCM 
Recommendation asks NRAs to remove the stringent NGA cost-orientation obligations if the 
following requirements are also met (Points  48 and 49): 
 
109 “The conditions set out in points 48-57 should not be seen as the only circumstances under which NRAs can 
decide not to impose regulated access prices for NGA wholesale inputs. Depending on the demonstration of 
effective equivalence of access and on competitive conditions, in particular effective infrastructure-based 
competition, there may be additional scenarios where the imposition of regulated wholesale access prices is not 
warranted under the Regulatory Framework” (point 58). 
110 Point 7 refers to ‘compliance costs’ which refer to the costs of the SMP operator. However, this does not mean 
that under the NDCM Recommendation, NRAs should disregard the costs borne by access seekers (who may often 
have to adapt their own processes in case the SMP operator changes its internal processes) when performing their 
proportionality assessment. 
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• in the case of active NGA access products, a competitor must be provided with 
sufficient upstream and regulated passive (or similarly functioning active) access 
products, or alternative infrastructures must be available, creating a demonstrable retail 
price constraint; 
• in the case of passive NGA access products, the SMP operator offers copper access 
at cost-oriented, controlled prices (the above-mentioned price anchor), or there are 
alternative infrastructures that exercise a “demonstrable retail price constraint.” 
The NDCM Recommendation also acknowledges that price control for NGA wholesale 
products may not be warranted in other situations. In particular, NRAs can also remove price 
controls on NGA access products where there is ‘effective equivalence’ of access and 
‘effective infrastructure-based competition’ (Point 58). 
The NRA can at any time reintroduce them or impose penalties if the SMP operator fails to 
fully implement an agreed EoI (Point 54). Along with the removal of price controls, the NRA 
should (Point 55): 
• monitor the investment and competitive environment for NGA networks and 
• obtain information from network operators about their NGA rollout plans. 
The NDCM Recommendation considers that the two-pronged approach above (i.e. stricter 
application of non-discrimination and costing methodology) will ensure that: 
• on the one hand, those seeking access to NGA access products under the flexibility 
regime have equal access to the incumbent operators’ networks through tougher non-
discrimination rules; 
• on the other hand, investment incentives for NGA are in place (i.e. pricing flexibility for 
NGA wholesale access). 
The ability of NRAs to remove price controls increases the scope for stimulating demand for 
fast broadband services by way of a dynamic pricing policy. 
Finally, the NRA should differentiate its regulatory practice within geographical markets and 
remove price controls in areas where said conditions have been fulfilled ("regional regulation") 
(Point 50). This can be done by: 
• defining sub-national geographic markets or 
• imposing differentiated remedies and access products where it cannot be concluded 






5. Implementation of the recommended approach towards 
price regulation 
a. Summary of findings 
The NGA Recommendation contemplates remedies that NRAs should adopt to address the 
risk that incumbents would seek to monopolise new broadband services provided over legacy 
infrastructure (including civil enginieering infrastructure) and thereby limit consumer choice. 
Adopted three years later, the NDCM Recommendation seeks to bring about a consistent 
application of pricing and non-discrimination remedies by NRAs that find SMP in Markets 
1/2020 and 3b/2014, while at the same time incentivising NGA deployment by SMP operators. 
NRAs mandate a series of wholesale access products to preclude the concerned SMP 
operators from using their market power in these markets and refusing to deal with access 
seekers. The mandated access products are: 
a) Local loop unbundling service on copper network (ULL) 
b) Sub-loop unbundling on copper network (SLU) 
c) Shared access service on copper network 
d) Fibre local loop unbundling (fiber LLU). FTTH can be deployed according to different 
types of architecture (Ethernet Point-to-Point (P2P), Gigabit Passive Optical Network 
(GPON) over P2P, GPON over Point-to-multipoint (P2MP) and Wavelength Division 
Multiplexing PON), of which some are technically more difficult to unbundle.  
e) Virtual Unbundled Local Access (VULA) on Fibre to the Cabinet Network (VULA 
(FTTC111)) 
f) VULA on Fiber to the Home Network (VULA (FTTH)) 
g) Dark fibre in access network, i.e. an ancillary service mandated on the SMP operator 
consisting of the provision of a dark fibre, often as an alternative access to ducts in the 
absence of space (e.g. for backhaul to reach street cabinets in the case of sub-loop 
unbundling). 
h) Duct access on access network 
i) Bitstream service at central access on legacy infrastructure (copper from the central 
office) 
j) Bitstream service at central access on FTTC and FWA infrastructure 
k) Bitstream service at central access on (FTTH) infrastructure 
 
111 Fibre-to-the-cabinet (FTTC): An access network structure in which the optical fibre extends from the exchange 
to the cabinet. The street cabinet is usually located only a few hundred metres from the subscriber’s premises. The 
remaining part of the access network from the cabinet to the customer is usually copper wire but could use another 
technology, such as wireless."  Source: www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0013/63220/nga_glossary.pdf  
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Mandated access to the terminating segment (i.e. to the wiring and cables and associated 
facilities inside of buildings or up to the first concentration or distribution point) is advocated in 
Point 18 NGA Recommendation. However, in line with the definition of Art. 61(3) EECC, such 
access could in principle be imposed as a symmetric remedy. 
The products listed from d) to h) and j) and k) are NGA/ VHCN access products. Table 2 shows 
which NRAs mandate SMP operators to provide these wholesale access products and whether 
they impose a non-discrimination obligation and price controls on top of the access obligation. 
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Source: BEREC RA 2020 Survey, Figure 61, p. 67 
The advocated costing methodology set out in the NDCM Recommendation in case NRAs 
should impose price controls is widely supported by stakeholders, despite some of them 
suggesting a possible need for improvement and on the frequency of review of the parameters 
of the cost models used.  
Many NRAs do not (or no longer) apply NGA specific risk premia, while the few NRAs applying 
risk premia follow the guidance of the NGA recommendations. Some explicitly do the 




Moreover, the recommended price band has ensured the stability of the monthly wholesale 
rates for ULL across the EU. However, we have noted a growing divergence between the 
regulated maximum rates for LLU set across the EU. These divergencies reflect national 
differences, but also result from differences in the application of the costing methodologies 
used.  
The use of long-term pricing agreements and volume discounts varies. Only a few NRAs report 
volume discounts being applied by the SMP operator on the price of regulated wholesale 
access products and no NRA reports specific evidence of a link between volume discounts 
and investments in VHCN. On the other hand, a significant number of NRAs report the use of 
long- term pricing agreements in their respective Member States with some agreeing that these 
discounts support VHCN deployment. 
At the time of the adoption of the NGA Recommendation, imposing pricing remedies was seen 
as generally the most appropriate way to deal with a finding of SMP, entailing market power to 
fix tariffs. The NDCM Recommendation, however, advocated a more nuanced approach: in 
certain circumstances, pricing flexibility should be viewed as the default option.  Currently, cost 
orientation continues to be imposed by many NRAs for access to one or more NGA wholesale 
products, however the use of the pricing flexibility proposed by the NDCM Recommendation, 
though still limited to date, is taking up. The NRAs concerned tend to follow the guidance 
provided and believe that the guidance provided in the NDCM Recommendation will likely 
continue to be adequate to deal with the future technological and market evolution. NRAs 
applying the recommended pricing flexibility (or those that applied a margin squeeze test 
instead of cost orientation), consider the approach to have contributed to promoting an efficient 
investment in NGA/VHC networks, leading to an increase in NGA/VHC networks and a better 
quality of service for end-users. 
The use of the ERT recommended by the NDCM Recommendation faces certain challenges. 
NRA approaches regarding the transparency of the process of designing the test vary and are  
sometimes alleged to be unsatisfactory. The process through which the effectiveness of the 
ERT is monitored varies strongly and is in some Member States allegedly ineffective. 
Moreover, the timing of the execution of the tests and of their follow up also diverges 
substantially. 
The study shows that a copper anchor continues to be potentially relevant in many Member 
States. However, different anchor products may be appropriate across the EU in the future 
given the diverging market evolutions in the various Member States. 
Finally, only a few NRAs that have designated an operator as having SMP on the market for 
wholesale local access have departed from cost orientation beyond the scenario of ERT, 
effective non-discrimination remedies, and retail price constraints as envisioned in the NDCM. 
For example, a few NRAs have imposed ‘fair and reasonable’ pricing obligations on SMP 
operators for wholesale broadband access products.  
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Starting from the theoretical assumption that access obligations, coupled with cost based price 
controls, can have a stifling effect on investment in NGA network elements112, the NDCM 
Recommendation advocates pricing flexibility for NGA products where sufficient competitive 
safeguards are put into place (non-discrimination, ERT, pricing constraints coming from the 
regulated legacy product (the so called ‘copper anchor’) or alternative networks retail 
constraint). This approach is now reflected in EECC (Art. 74.1, third paragraph). It provides 
that NRAs must “consider not imposing or maintaining [price controls], where they establish 
that a demonstrable retail price constraint is present” and that other obligations “including, in 
particular, any economic replicability test imposed (…) ensures effective and non-
discriminatory access”113. 
The Economic Replicability Test (ERT) advocated by the NDCM Rec is imposed in the 
absence of price control obligations. It is an ex ante margin squeeze test.  In this report, we 
use the term ‘ERT’ only for that specific margin squeeze test to distinguish it from other ex ante 
use of a margin squeeze test, which we refer to as an ex ante MST. We refer to the use of a 
margin squeeze test by the national competition authority as an ex post MST. In this regard, 
BEREC NRA survey data concretely demonstrate that NRAs make extensive use of ex ante 
MSTs, but only a few use the ERT as an alternative to price control in the sense meant by the 
NDCM (because only a few of them implement pricing flexibility).  
However, BEREC does not use the same distinction in its regulatory accounting reports 
because it considers an ERT to be two-sided in nature, ‘It can be used as a price control 
remedy [Art. 74 of the EECC] or as a non-discrimination remedy [Art. 70 of the EECC]’114. For 
this reason, BEREC lists ERT as a specific form of price control (a subcategory of the “retail 
minus” category in their classification)115. In the same vein, BEREC includes price caps in the 
category of cost orientation because price caps are generally derived from cost computations. 
Nevertheless, a price cap may be set taking into account other parameters. E. g., an NRA may 
permit a price cap computed116 on the basis of the Internal Rate of Return (IRR) that is 
potentially achievable by the fibre investor, based on an estimation of the CAPEX and OPEX 
considered to be relevant by the NRA. For practical reasons, the study covers ERT in this 
chapter without prejudice to its legal qualification (instead of discussing it in the chapter relating 
to the guidance on non-discrimination). 
A more complex decision is classifying a conditional price remedy such as the ‘fair bet’ 
approach now applied by OFCOM for wholesale FTTH access. From the perspective of the 
five-year market reviews, such a rate of return remedy cannot be considered to be a pricing 
remedy. At the same time, the NRA limits the cumulative returns that the SMP operator is 
entitled to make over the lifetime of the investment, which spans over successive review 
 
112  “Cost oriented access to an NGA network might introduce an asymmetry between the access provider and the 
access seeker. If the demand for the NGA product turns out to be less than expected, the infrastructure owner 
would bear the entire cost. On the contrary, if the take-up of NGA products is higher than expected the access 
provider would share the revenues with the access seeker. The downside risk of the investment are, therefore, born 
by the access provider whilst the upside benefits are shared. Such regulatory approach grants the access seekers 
for free the highly valuable option to wait and make a better informed and less risky decision to invest. Therefore, 
there is a risk that regulation negatively affects incentives to deploy an NGA network”, Impact Assessment, 
SWD(2013) 329 Final, p. 40. 
113 EECC, Art. 74.1. 
114 BOR (20) 210, p.16. However, the wording of Art 74 EECC suggests that the relevant legal basis is Art 70 EECC. 
115 However, this classification is legally not accurate given that Art.70 EECC refers to ERT in the context of 
equivalence of access. 




periods. Where the NRA finds that the cumulative returns over the lifetime of the project are 
likely to exceed the percentage deemed necessary to compensate for the upfront risk and 
provide a fair bet117, the NRA will impose eventually a price cap.118 Once again, legal 
qualification does not correspond to business reality for the investor, for whom such an 
announced future intervention constitutes a constraint on its pricing, at least in cases where 
the investment is successful.  
The price control designates the approach that NRAs adopt in order to set tariffs of regulated 
services. Table 3 below provides an overview of all price control remedies. 
Table 3. Overview of price control remedies 
Remedy 
type 












• Cost oriented price 
cap alone 
• Ex-ante retail MS 
test 
• ERT (Economic 
Replicability Test) 
• ‘Fair bet’ (UK) 
• Price cap set on 
the basis of DCF 
(NL) 
• Price cap 
based on 
benchmarking 
Combination • MST as a 
complement to cost 
orientation 
• Fair pricing 
computed starting 
from cost of 
provision (BE) 
• Non-abusive pricing 
(DE) 
   
Source: Partly based on BoR (20) 210. 
The Margin Squeeze test is currently applied by NRAs mainly as a tool complementary to price 
control119, and defines a strict level of parameters within which NRAs presume that alternative 
operators have enough scope for fair competition. Annex II NDCM Recommendation lists the 
specific characteristics that an MST must fulfil to be considered adequate to test Economic 
Replicability (ERT). Contrary to the case for ex-post MST, NRAs may, among other things: 
• make “adjustments for scale to the SMP operator’s downstream costs in order to 
ensure that economic replicability is a realistic prospect” and 
• identify “flagship products” among the retail products instead of a full product by product 
assessment.120  
 
117 "Fair bet“ does not involve a “claw back” in case the investor earned returns above the cost of capital. The 
assessment is performed at the time of investment. The question is whether at that time the expected return is 
equal to the cost of capital, taking into consideration compensation for the additional downside risks that were faced 
when the investment was made, but may not have materialized. 
118 OFCOM illustrates the approach with the flexibility given to Openreach to price FTTC Vula from 2008/2009 when 
it started its investments until March 2018 when OFCOM imposed a charge control on wholesale access up to o 40 
Mbps. See OFCOM. Regulatory certainty to support investment in full-fibre broadband, Strategic Policy Position, 
24 July 2018, p.26, available on: https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0025/116539/investment-full-
fibre-broadband.pdf  
119 BoR (20) 210, p.18. 
120 NDCM Recommendation, Annex II. 
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In addition, given that parameters are set by NRAs on the basis of assumptions on market 
evolution (take up, evolution of prices) as opposed to actually achieved market outcomes, an 
ERT will therefore not necessarily exclude the ex post occurrence of margin squeezes under 
Competition law. At the same time, an ERT will constrain wholesale prices more than an ex 
post MST would under Competition law, because ERT may disregard the economies of scale 
of the SMP operator to a certain extent and may require a margin for the provision of retail 
services that are provided only marginally by the SMP operator. 
This chapter examines successively the implementation of the following eight recommended 
approaches: 
1. Guidance on cost orientation of wholesale access 
2. Guidance on the price band 
3. Guidance on the application of an NGA specific risk premium 
4. Guidance on the criteria put forward for the assessment of long-term access pricing 
and volume discounts 
5. Guidance on the implementation of an economic replicability test (ERT) 
6. Guidance on the “copper anchor”  
7. Guidance on other circumstances in which pricing remedies are not appropriate 
8. Guidance on pricing remedies other than cost orientation 
c. Guidance on cost orientation of wholesale access 
Provisions concerned 
The following provisions are relevant: 
• Under Art.74.1 EECC, NRAs may ‘impose obligations relating to cost recovery and 
price control, including obligations for cost orientation of prices (…) for the provision of 
specific types of interconnection or access, in situations where a market analysis 
indicates that a lack of effective competition means that the undertaking concerned 
may sustain prices at an excessively high level, or may apply a price squeeze, to the 
detriment of end-users.’ 
• Point 25 NGA Recommendation states that ‘the price of access to the unbundled fibre 
loop should be cost-oriented.’ 
• Point 30 NDCM Recommendation directs that ‘where cost orientation is imposed as a 
remedy, where appropriate, proportionate and justified (…) NRAs should adopt a 
bottom-up long-run incremental costs-plus (BU LRIC +) costing methodology which 
includes a bottom up modelling approach using LRIC as the cost model121 and with the 
addition of a mark-up for the recovery of common costs.’ This model estimates ‘the 
current cost that a hypothetical efficient operator would incur when building a modern 
 
121 In an incremental costs methodology, only costs that would not be incurred if the incremental service was no 
longer produced by the operator are considered. This results in a cost accounting that does not correspond to the 




efficient network’ based on an economic and/or engineering model (analytical cost 
model). The network concerned is described in the NDCM Recommendation (recital 
32) as an NGA network, which “consists wholly or partly of optical elements (…) and 
should be capable of delivering the Digital Agenda for Europe targets in terms of 
bandwidth, coverage and take-up”. Investment costs should be calculated “on forward-
looking basis (i.e. based on up-to-date technologies, expected demand, etc.)” (recital 
30), meaning that ‘current costs’ must be used instead of ‘historic costs’.122 
The recommended methodology aims to provide a clear framework for investment by providing 
an appropriate “build or buy” signal to alternative operators, and to establish predictable and 
stable regulated wholesale copper access prices. However, NRAs can deviate from the 
guidance provided they duly justify the choice of their alternative methodology in light of the 
policy objectives and regulatory principles of the Regulatory Framework and where the NRA 
considers that this is required on grounds related to the findings of the market review 
concerned, in particular the specific characteristics of the market of the Member State in 
question123. 
Did the NGA and NDCM Recommendations bring about a consistent application of SMP 
cost orientation remedies across the EU? 
a) Cost orientation 
Table 4 shows which EU NRAs imposed cost orientation for NGA access and access to ducts 
in the access segment in 2020. Nine of the 23 NRAs that replied to the online survey question 
stated that they had previously imposed pricing remedies other than cost orientation on the 
wholesale products currently under cost orientation. 
 
122 Contrary to the 2009 Recommendation regarding the regulation of MTRs/FTRs, the NDCM Recommendation 
does not provide guidance on the depreciation method, except in the case of re-usable civil engineering (RAB). 
However, the guidance provided in the 2009 Recommendation (that “The recommended approach for asset 
depreciation is economic depreciation wherever feasible”) appears valid also beyond cost modelling for the purpose 
of narrowband termination. Most European NRAs have followed this reasoning, adopting the Economic 
Depreciation approach in the development of their costing models. These countries include Spain, France, UK, 
Belgium, and Portugal, among others. 
123 Judgment of 15 September 2016 in Case C‑28/15, KPN, EU:C:2016:692 
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 Source: BEREC RA report 2020 (BoR (20) 210), p. 70; Italics are used to indicate own research. 
Table 4 confirms that when VULA FTTC becomes a key access product, it is typically treated 
the same as ULL services, with the same price control and costing methodology approach. At 
the same time, ERT was used by up to 5 NRAs130 in 2020 in the framework of pricing flexibility. 
Finding 1. A limited number of NRAs made use of the pricing flexibility proposed by the 
NDCM Recommendation. 
Moreover, Table 4 shows that for several regulated wholesale NGA access products, a 
significant number of NRAs do not impose pricing remedies, contrary to legacy access 
products which are still price regulated by nearly all NRAs. 
The first explanation of the apparent divergence from the NGA Recommendation is that, at the 
time of its adoption, the approach advocated by the NGA recommendation to mandate cost-
 
124 The category ‘dark fibre in the access segment’ refers to ancillary services mandated to the SMP operator 
consisting in the provision of access to dark fibre, often as an alternative to access to ducts (e.g. for backhaul to 
reach street cabinets in the case of sub-loop unbundling). 
125 VULA is not mandated and not provided in Lithuania. 
126 Ibid. 
127 For L2 BSA, the NRA applies a mix of LRIC+15% and a set of margin squeeze tests. 
128 The NRA decided to implement ERT instead of price control obligation except for co-location and passive 
infrastructure. Commission did not comment on it: Case SK/2017/1962, no-comments letter of 21 February 
2017(C(2017) 1351 final). 
129 Art.8 of the ‘règlement’ ILR/T19/4 of 13 March 2019 ‘portant sur la définition du marché pertinent de la fourniture 
en gros d'accès central en position déterminée pour produits de grande consommation (marché 3b/2014), 
l’identification de l’opérateur puissant sur ce marché et les obligations lui imposées à ce titre’ does not distinguish 
between legacy and NGA. 
130 Overall, the number of NRAs using ERT is increasing. In general, BEREC interprets the increase in the number 
of NRAs applying ERT by considering that, “This suggests that ERT is increasing at least for the VHCN wholesale 
product as a price control method and is used as a substitute with respect to cost orientation – in line with the 




oriented SMP access to NGA networks131 conflicted with the NGA regulation policies 
developed by some NRAs (in particular in France and Spain).  For example, the Spanish NRA 
had already decided by 2008 not to impose obligations on the SMP operator to provide 
wholesale broadband access at a speed above 30 Mbps. The adoption of the 
Recommendation did not convince the NRAs concerned to reconsider their policies. One year 
after its adoption, the French regulator disregarded the Recommendation and did not impose 
asymmetric wholesale fibre access remedies at all, going even further than the Spanish 
regulator. In its Comments Letter of 26 May 2011, the Commission called on the Spanish NRA 
to “re-assess the need, in line with Article 8 of the Access Directive as well as Recommend 22 
and Recommend 31 of the NGA Recommendation”, to impose such remedies. however the 
Spanish NRA preferred to maintain its approach. When the Spanish regulator revised the 
regulation of Market 3a (Market 4/2007), it sought nevertheless to align its remedy with the 
NGA Recommendation by segmenting Market 3a geographically and exempting the SMP 
operator from providing virtual fibre unbundling (local ‘NEBA’) only in the 66 municipalities that 
were deemed to be sufficiently competitive. The Commission nevertheless responded that this 
approach could give rise to strategic investment behaviour by the SMP operator to ensure 
deregulation and might not be in response to market conditions and signals. However, the 
Spanish NRA maintained its approach. 
Moreover, while Points 48 and 49 of the NDCM Recommendation state that NRAs, “should 
decide not to impose or maintain regulated wholesale access prices” where conditions for ERT 
are fulfilled, NRAs are always able to depart from recommendations when justified by specific 
national circumstances.  
More generally, remedies must be proportional by accounting for other competitive conditions. 
In this regard, BEREC found that when competition and demand side conditions are more 
favourable (low SMP market share in combination with higher NGA service penetration), NRAs 
start replacing strict cost orientation and apply ERT. BEREC’s 2019 Regulatory Accounting 
Report showed a correlation between fixed broadband (take-up) penetration and 
corresponding FTTP coverage and pricing remedies that were applied (see Figure 12). 
 
131 Beyond access to the terminating segment regarding which the NGA recommendation advocates symmetric 
access obligations (Point 18 of the NGAR) 
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Figure 12. The relationship between fixed penetration and FTTP coverage 
 
Source: BoR (19) 240. 
The X-axis represents penetration, while the Y-axis marks corresponding FTTP coverage. The 
access product examined is VULA FTTH (or fibre LLU in case no VULA product is regulated 
by the NRA). BEREC identifies four clusters ranging from cluster 1 (characterised by low 
penetration and low coverage) to cluster 4 (higher coverage and corresponding penetration 
rate). BEREC notes that, “In the latter case, the most common approach is to not regulate (or 
allow flexibility for) the FTTP product (this is in line with the Commission Recommendation on 
costing methodology). At the same time, stricter obligations on price regulation of the FTTP 
wholesale product are more frequent in cluster 1, where both coverage and take-up are lower; 
in this case a BU-LRIC approach is the most frequent”.132  
Finally, some anecdotal evidence heard during interviews suggests that some NRAs consider 
the flexibility option as more resource intensive than cost orientation. The purpose of the ERT 
is to establish obligations such that it is no longer necessary for the NRA to impose cost 
orientation obligations or to construct a BULRIC+ model. If an NRA chooses to take this route, 
it also has to impose obligations related to Equivalence of Inputs and Technical Replicability 
when EoI has not yet been fully implemented. This makes the whole package relatively 
onerous for smaller NRAs. Furthermore, the NDCM Recommendation requires that the ERT 
should be conducted “no later than three months after the launch of the relevant retail product 
and will conclude … within four months from starting the procedure”133. These timelines, and 
the fact that a re-run of the ERT could be required each time the flagship product offer is 
modified, or new bundles are susceptible to becoming flagship products, make the ERT 
potentially quite resource intensive.  
A further argument was found in that a cost orientation obligation provides a greater price 
certainty for market participants compared to a lower price certainty for access seekers under 
ERT as the latter cannot anticipate changes to wholesale prices that the SMP operator may 
have to implement to ensure that its new retail offers pass the ERT134. At the same time, when 
 
132 BoR (19) 240, p. 31. 
133 Point 56, NDCM Recommendation. 




ERT is applied after the launch of a new retail offer (under the NDCM Recommendation this 
may occur up to three months after a change is introduced in the commercial offer of a retail 
flagship product) introduces uncertainty for the SMP operator, inasmuch as the NRA might 
disagree with some aspects of the SMP operator’s ERT analysis and thus disallow a wholesale 
price that has already been in effect for many months. 
b) Costing methodology 
NRAs should, in principle135, apply a harmonised costing methodology to determine wholesale 
prices for access to the legacy copper network and related civil works of the operator with 
significant market power. The costing methodology should be based on a bottom-up long run 
incremental cost-plus model including a mark-up for common costs (BU-LRIC+). The valuation 
of a reusable civil engineering infrastructure should take due account of the depreciation of 
assets. 
In its 2020 RA report, BEREC highlights that the recommended cost base CCA is by far the 
most often used methodology for all markets. In the access market (market 3a), a preference 
can be found for LRIC/LR(A)IC. In general, when LR(A)IC/LRIC is chosen as the main 
category, the most common approach is Bottom-up.  
BEREC found that a cost orientation/price cap applied with BU/TD-LR(A)IC+ is the most 
frequent combination in cases where competition in the broadband market is at an intermediate 
stage (i.e. SMP retail broadband market share is between 40% and 50%). On the other hand, 
the use of cost orientation in combination with FDC (CCA/HCA) is more frequent in less 
competitive markets136.  
Several NRAs deviate in terms of the cost allocation method and use LR(A)IC instead of LRIC. 
LR(A)IC is also a modelling approach used for estimating the cost of service, but includes 
common and joint costs in the final cost of service, while LRIC does not. This is the reason 
why LRIC is combined with a mark-up for these costs. In addition, the German and Polish137 
NRAs are currently using a top-down model, instead of the recommended bottom-up 
approach138, while the Croatian NRA uses a top-down approach for CEI pricing139. 
  
 
135 Point 40 of the Recommendation indicates that NRAs may continue to use the methodology they applied at the 
time of entry into force of the recommendations, provided that it meets the objectives of the recommended costing 
methodology and satisfies certain criteria.  
136 BEREC RA report 2020 (BoR (20) 210) 
137 Commission Comments of 24.5.2019 concerning Cases PL 2019/2160-2161 
138 BEREC RA Report 2020 (BoR (20) 210) 
139 All other wholesale access prices are calculated using the BU approach. See No-Comments Letter of 8.2.2021 
in Case HR/2021/2295, p. 2. 
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Table 5. Use of LRIC, LR(A)IC and FDC in Member States 
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Source: BEREC RA report 2020 (BoR (20) 210) and own research (in italics). 
The Dutch NRA applied still another approach to cost allocation. In March 1999, NRA (OPTA) 
issued guidelines on access to the ULL, which were carried over in subsequent years146. The 
guidelines determined that tariffs are calculated on the basis of the Embedded Direct Costs 
(EDC) model. EDC includes only the directly allocated costs of a service, not including any 
share of common costs. This reflects the incremental cost of providing the service on top of all 
of the other services. In relation to the cost base that should be used, OPTA’s guidelines 
determined that there should be a gradual transition period from a tariff based on historical 
costs to a tariff based on current costs147. It was decided to have a transition period of five 
years. Eventually asked by the Commission why BU-LRIC+ had not been considered, the 
 
140 The category ‘dark fibre in the access segment’ refers to ancillary services mandated to the SMP operator 
consisting in the provision of access to dark fibre, often as an alternative to access to ducts (e.g. for backhaul to 
reach street cabinets in the case of sub-loop unbundling). 
141 The Commission Decision of 29.11.2016, in cases PT/2016/1888 and PT/2016/1889 mentions that “if MEO fails 
to guarantee that the price under the reference offer will not increase, a BU LRIC+ model will be used; otherwise, 
the current costing system will be kept” (footnote 26, p.5.). 
142 VULA is not mandated and not provided in Lithuania. 
143 Ibid. 
144 The French NRA in its Decision n 05-0834 states that the method “permet un lissage de l'effet des cycles 
d'investissement, ce qui favorise une plus grande stabilité des tarifs et une meilleure visibilité pour le secteur. En 
outre, elle introduit une différence méthodologique moindre par rapport à l'ancienne méthode pratiquée” 
(ARTE0500123S, JORF no. 19 of  22 January 2006). 
145 See NRA decision available at: 
https://www.anacom.pt/streaming/relatorioSCAMEO2018.pdf?contentId=1594181&field=ATTACHED_FILE). 
However, the Commission noted that the “costs of assets corresponding to ducts and poles will be based on the 
regulatory net book value of the accumulated depreciation, indexed by a suitable price index, taking into account 
an appropriate depreciation period”. See Commission recommendation of 29 November 2016, in cases 
PT/2016/1888 and PT/2016/1889 footnote 27, p. 6. 
146 See EDC-rapportage KPN voor tariefbesluit ontbundelde toegang FTTH, 21 September 2016 available at: 
https://www.acm.nl/nl/publicaties/publicatie/16319/EDC-rapportage-KPN-voor-tariefbesluit-ontbundelde-toegang-
FttH  
147 Europe Economics, Pricing Methodologies for Unbundled Access to the Local Loop, Final Report, May 2004, 
p.90. In 2001, Logica argued nonetheless that this “however leads to immediate ‘ghost costs’ and excess profits 
and thereby a discriminatory cost advantage for the incumbent. The incumbent’s actual costs would in normal 
practice be calculated using Historic Cost Accounting while making only a small CCA allowance for local loop 




Dutch NRA argued that the EDC methodology is appropriate for determining the short-term 
regulatory costs of existing networks. The Commission did not comment on this point148. 
Fully distributed Cost (FDC) is susceptible to lower value yields than LRIC, as shown by the 
price hikes of ULLs’ monthly charges which could be observed in the countries that switched 
to the latter (see Table 6). 
Table 6. Monthly ULL chargers in selected countries 
Country FDC (euro/month) LRIC (euro/month) Variation 
Denmark 8.29 10.28 24.00% 
Greece 8.1 8.66 6.91% 
Italy 8.49 9.28 9.31% 
Sweden 14.11 15.28 8.29% 
UK 7.48 11.19 49.60% 
Source: Giancarlo Ferraiuolo, The European approach for regulating prices in fixed access markets (with a focus 
on the Italian case): Costing/pricing methodologies vs incentives to investments, PowerPoint presentation, Amman 
(Jordan), 18- 19 June 2019, Slides 34 and 35. 
In Italy, the pricing difference was the result of changes in the following cost components: 
network costs: +21.38%, maintenance costs: -20.48% (taking into consideration the inflation 
rate) and marketing costs: -1.87% (taking into consideration the inflation rate). 
The NRAs which continue to apply FDC in the current market 1/2020 justified their deviation 
from the recommended approach as follows: 
• The Lithuanian NRA justified continuing the use of its FDC-HCA model instead of 
developing an LRIC+ model based on the need to apply the same methodology for 
costing remedies on copper LLU and NGA access. The NRA deems FDC-HCA more 
appropriate to price-regulate copper LLU and, more importantly, duct access, because: 
(i) The SMP network was built a long time ago and, in light of the "build or buy" 
decision, the SMP's assets indexed by their current value would provide an 
enormous income compared to the current one. 
(ii) 50-80% of the total cost is the cost off long-term asset depreciation.  
(iii) Current prices in Lithuania are very low compared to the overall EU level. 
(iv) Implementation of an LRIC model in Lithuania would increase the level of 
wholesale service prices, leading to an increase in retail prices as well.  
RRT was most concerned that using BU-LRIC+ would increase the price of access to 
ducts, which is troubling since this is the main product alternative that operators use to 
deploy their own networks at increasing volumes149. It was the RRT’s view that the civil 
engineering infrastructure in particular (on which the deployment of alternative 
infrastructure largely depends) would not be re-created and therefore, should not be 
measured on the basis of its current value (as is the case in the BU-LRIC+ model.) In 
2019, the Commission called on the NRA to closely analyse the evolution of wholesale 
access prices and their impact on the market because an FDC HCA model is unlikely 
 
148 Commission Decision of 14.12.2016 concerning Case NL/2016/1947: Wholesale local access provided at a fixed 
location in the Netherlands – remedies, 14.12.2016. However, in case 2015/1794 EC had "invited ACM to re-
consider the relevance of using a BULRIC+ approach in the next review, consistent with the Commission's 2013 
Costing and non-discrimination recommendation". 
149 RRT Market analysis (3a/2014) No. LD-1926 of 19 July 2019 
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to send the appropriate “build or buy” signals, in particular “when pricing access to 
legacy assets that may have been substantially depreciated, but which could be 
replicated in the competitive process, such as technical equipment or the transmission 
medium”.150  
• In 2013, the Latvian NRA clarified in response to the Commission's request for 
information that their applied cost model was based on an FDC CCA approach. The 
model yielded a cost-oriented price of € 8.34 per month for LLU. However, the NRA 
announced a new model for the calculation of cost-oriented prices for the next review 
period151. 
• The Estonian NRA explained that a top-down historical cost FDC model is less 
burdensome to the regulated communication company and for the regulator compared 
to the current cost accounting method and that it guarantees that the regulated 
communication company will recover its investment costs152. In 2021, the Commission 
repeated its criticism that had already been made in the previous market analysis that, 
“TD HC FDC can have potential negative effects, in particular with regard to the 
promotion of competition and deployment of very high-capacity networks”153. 
Cost modelling of a hypothetical efficient NGA network 
Point 32 NDCM Rec says that when “modelling an NGA network NRAs should define a 
hypothetical efficient NGA network, capable of delivering the Digital Agenda for Europe targets 
set out in terms of bandwidth, coverage and take-up, which consists wholly or partly of optical 
elements”. Recital 41 NDCM Rec indicates, “An FTTH network, an FTTC network or a 
combination of both can be considered a modern efficient NGA network”. However, the modern 
equivalent assets of 2013 no longer correspond to state of the art assets in the 2020s. 
Obviously, changing the assumptions of the model could lead to wholesale access price hikes, 
as illustrated by the Finnish 2017 notification, about which the Commission raised serious 
doubts under the Art.32 procedure (then Art.7)154, or decreases in price. In particular, the 
Commission objected against the assumption in the BU-LRIC model of an ubiquitous fibre 
presence that would lead to unjustified higher price caps. The Finnish NRA subsequently 
withdrew its notification and amended its assumption on a fibre roll-out to better reflect reality. 
In particular, the revised model no longer assumed full fibre deployment within SMP areas. 
Instead, the model’s cost accounting focused on areas where fibre networks were available. 
As a result, the cost base in the model was reduced and SMP operators like Telia and DNA 
had lower price ceilings imposed on them than earlier due to the change in the cost accounting 
assumptions155. The Commission did not comment on the revised method156.  
However, other NRAs use models which factor in a progressive evolution to full FTTH 
coverage. E. g., the 2013 model used by the Spanish NRA integrates an estimate of the 
 
150 Commission Decision of 15.7.2019 concerning Cases LT/2019/2183 and LT/2019/2184, p.9. 
151 Commission Decision of 12.8.2013 concerning Cases LV/2013/1487 and LV/2013/1492: Markets for wholesale 
(physical) network infrastructure access at a fixed location and for wholesale broadband access in Latvia, p.5. 
During the subsequent market review, the NRA explained that the new model has not been developed yet, but that 
it was developing an ERT. The Commission urged the NRA to accelerate the development of such a cost model, in 
line with the NDCM Recommendation (comments letter of 19 July 2018 in Case LV/2018/2097). 
152 Commission Decision of 24.5.2017 concerning Case EE/2017/1980-1981. 
153 Opening of Phase II investigation of 16.4.2021 in Cases EE/2021/2310 and EE/2021/2311, p.13. 
154 Commission Decision of 3.7.2017 concerning Cases FI/2017/1991-1992.  
155 JM Economics, “Ficora sticks to BU LRIC in fibre access regulation”, 21st December 2017. Available at: 
https://www.jmeconomics.fi/ficora-sticks-to-bu-lric-in-fibre-access-regulation/  




evolution of both FTTH coverage (passed homes) and FTTH service demand (connected 
homes)157. Moreover, no efficient operator will deploy fibre to cover 100 % of 
homes/businesses, while less expensive alternative technological solutions exist. E. g., in 
France, the plan “France Très Haut Débit” considers ‘marketable’ connections to be 100% of 
main residences, 20% of secondary homes and 100% of business premises. In France, there 
were more than 3.1 million holiday homes in 2019, which means that French authorities 
consider the FTTH coverage objective to be on the order of 92%158. 
In addition, as far as the pricing of LLU is concerned, the guidance that NRAs should adjust 
the cost calculated for the modelled VHC network to reflect the different features of wholesale 
access services that are based entirely on copper, should be carried over. NRAs should 
continue estimating the cost difference between an access product based on e. g. FTTC/FTTH 
and on an access product based entirely on copper by replacing the optical elements with 
efficiently priced copper elements where appropriate in their VHCN engineering model. 
Rephrasing the MEA that NRAs should model, would, nonetheless, emphasize the duty of 
NRAs to regularly update the prices of key access products and services such as the prices of 
regulated access to ducts and poles, which e.g. in Portugal date from 2006 and 2010 
respectively, and to local copper loops, which in Portugal date from 2010159, 
Finding 2. The costing methodology put forward in the NDCM Recommendation is widely 
supported across various stakeholders and countries. However, Recital 41 NDCM Rec 
refers to modelling the hypothetical efficient NGA network in the 2013 context referring to 
DAE. In defining the appropriate technology/level of performance “depending on the 
access technology and network topology that best fit national circumstances”, NRAs do not 
yet pay much attention either to the VHCN notion or the 2030 policy targets (just as the 
NDCM). In that regard, the reference to FTTC does not appear very future proof. At the 
same time, the remainder of the approach advocated in Point 37 remains to be fit for 
purpose.  
On other points, some comments suggest the possible need for improvement i.e. regarding 
guidance on the valuation of re-usable assets on a regulatory asset basis (RAB) and on 
the frequency of reviews of the parameters of the cost models used. 
Costing methodology for the pricing of access to CEI 
The Recommendations do not give specific guidance on the pricing of CEI, beyond the 
requirement in the Annex I NGA Recommendation that, “NRAs should regulate access prices 
to civil engineering infrastructure consistently with the methodology used for pricing access to 
the unbundled local copper loop”.  
As a matter of fact, most NRAs follow this guidance. The Croatian NRA appears to be using 
FDC for the pricing of CEI, but in the framework of symmetric access obligations and thus 
outside the scope of the NGA Recommendation. The Spanish NRA, which has been 
 
157 Methodology available at: 
https://www.cnmc.es/sites/default/files/editor_contenidos/Telecomunicaciones/Modelos%20de%20coste/2018022
1_Modelo%20BU-LRIC%20red%20de%20acceso.zip  
158 Quoted in Iliad’s October 2020 response to the public consultation on ARCEP’s draft market review ARCEP’s 
Draft Decision ‘setting a tariff framework for access to the copper local loop for the years 2021 to 2023’. 
159 Commission Comments of 18.2.2021 concerning Case PT/2021/2294. 
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determining its regulated prices of access to the civil engineering infrastructure since 2011 
(based on Telefonica’s 2008 cost accounting i.e. top-down approach), has recently decided to 
apply a bottom-up model (BU-LRIC+) also for the pricing of access to the civil engineering 
infrastructure160. 
Impact of the application of the recommended cost orientation approach by NRAs 
Cost orientation is perceived as a key tool for ensuring a competitive market by a substantial 
share of the NRAs that responded to the online survey. Out of 21 NRAs responding to the 
question, 12 NRAs consider that the retail broadband market shares of alternative operators 
increased due to cost orientation, while 7 NRAs think that the entry of new alternative operators 
in retail broadband markets was facilitated. Many NRAs also consider the cost orientation to 
promote consumer welfare. Out of 20 NRAs responding to the question, 10 NRAs indicated 
that lower end-user prices, an increased selection of service providers and an increase in 
NGA/VHCN coverage were the result of cost orientation. Eight NRAs also think that it improved 
QoS for the NGA/VHCN connections that were provided. Only 4 NRAs perceived no impact of 
cost orientation on consumer welfare. 
For copper LLU, most NRAs apply a cost orientation alone/LRIC-LR(A)IC/CCA approach. 
However, market players and some NRAs warned that if the costing methodology of the current 
NDCM Recommendation will continue to be applied in coming years, the stability and 
predictability of copper access prices might be endangered. As the copper market continues 
to inevitably shrink, there is a risk that the LRIC model has overstated the appropriate price of 
copper access because fixed costs are distributed among a smaller number of users161. WIK 
Consult explains that “the [LRIC] standard was developed for an expanding market (with 
regards to investments and maintenance of the network). It is difficult to apply (…) the cost 
standard for an expanding market for a shrinking demand like for the service of copper access. 
(…) When demand is shrinking, the economies of scale melt away leading to increased costs 
per user which will particularly hit alternative network operators and access seekers and make 
a margin squeeze possible. Given the problems that come along with the LRIC standard, it is 
worthwhile to investigate existing alternative pricing approaches”162. “An alternative to LRIC 
based pricing can be the short-run incremental cost standard (…). In the short run, not all costs 
are to be viewed as variable, therefore the SRIC do not incorporate fixed costs and are 
therefore much better able to reflect the marginal costs which form the basis for the producing 
operator’s decisions in the short run. Short-run costs mostly consist of the operational costs of 
the network as well as the repair maintenance. Fixed costs are sunk and therefore do not affect 
short run decision making”.163 
Another issue raised was the interpretation of the concept of Point 33 which requires the NRAs 
to value all assets constituting the RAB of the modelled network on the basis of replacement 
costs, except for the reusable legacy of civil engineering assets. According to some comments 
both from an NRA and an operator, limiting the exception only to civil engineering assets is 
overly restrictive, in particular in cases of upgraded cable networks which were not deployed 
in ducts but nevertheless are largely re-used to provide VHCN services. This criticism was also 
made regarding Germany. A German operator164 complained that, due to the very limited 
 
160 Commission Comments of 21.5.2021 concerning Case ES/2021/2316, p.3. 
161 An NRA’s response to the online survey.  
162 WIK-Consult (2020), Copper switch-off, fibre take-up and ULL tariffs in France, 9 April 2020, p.86. 
163 Idem, p.88. 
164 Operator’s Response to the Targeted Consultation: “Die Bundesnetzagentur hat die NDCM-Empfehlung zwar 
angewendet, sie hat allerdings bei der Anwendung gegen die Vorgaben der Empfehlung verstoßen. Aus diesem 





usage of ducts in Germany, the vast majority of costs used for the calculation of ULL tariffs are 
valued at current costs165, and that has led to a significant price hike. Vodafone concurs, “due 
to various effects (rising civil engineering cost, decreasing utilisation of copper network) access 
cost of ULL rose by 11% in 2019”166. The concern is that the regulator’s cost modelling 
methodology does not properly reflect the decreasing value of the access products. The Greek 
NRA avoided this pitfall when setting access prices to the SMP operator’s NGA FTTC-based 
vectoring network by assuming in its cost model that all civil engineering assets in the 
distribution/drop part are reusable, although in practice the SMP operator did not deploy ducts. 
The NRA justified its methodology with the argument that an efficient provider would make 
maximum use of the existing copper network (laid in-ground) to implement the FTTC 
architecture. However, current costs (replacement costs) are used for calculating cabling 
costs.  
In addition, certain NRAs expressed criticism regarding the execution of the cost-orientation 
remedy. E. g., Vodafone claimed that in Portugal, “the prices for access to ducts and poles are 
not effectively cost-oriented”167, and expressed concern about “ANACOM consistently failing 
to consider economies of scale when setting cost-oriented prices”168. Similar criticism 
regarding the setting of cost-oriented prices was expressed by LKTA in the case of Lithuania 
(see Box 5). 
 
6734/16, die betreffenden Entgeltgenehmigungen aufgehoben. Vor diesem Hintergrund ist eine Bewertung der 
Folgen der Anwendung der NDCM-Empfehlung nur mit Einschränkungen möglich.“ Der Ansatz, im Rahmen der 
TALEntgeltbestimmung Wiederbeschaffungs- und keine historische Kosten anzusetzen, hat zu einer deutlichen 
Erhöhung der TAL-Entgelte geführt. 
165 In German. Entgelt für die Teilnehmeranschlussleitung (TAL). The market review is available at: 
https://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/Sachgebiete/Telekommunikation/Unternehmen_I
nstitutionen/Marktregulierung/Marktanalysen/Festlegung_Markt3a_ME2014.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3  
166 Vodafone response to the Targeted Consultation, Q15. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Ibid. 
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Box 5. Stakeholder views on implementation of cost orientation for pricing access to 
ducts in Lithuania 
Regarding the implementation by the NRA of the guidance provided in Point 31, LKTA 
(Lithuanian Cable Television Association169) has expressed concerns over the depreciation 
costs used to set the rates of access to CEI. According to their own calculations, the 
majority of the SMP operator’s infrastructure was built in the 1960s, so they assume that 
this infrastructure has been fully depreciated over time. However, costs are increasing 
annually and LKTA does not understand the logic behind the calculations. Their cost model 
has not been published. There is also some discontent from the market for the inclusion of 
protective cable pipes into the calculation of costs for the duct network. After a dispute 
regarding entry to a building and after it was included into the scope of the access 
obligation, it became apparent that Telia had used cable pipes for entry to the building as 
opposed to regular ducts. Cable pipes are much smaller in diameter than ducts (which are 
110 mm). After entry to the building became part of the duct network, Telia started to 
include these costs for all cable pipes (since they used them as entry to the building). Telia 
also deployed fibre in these protective pipes. However, RRT has explained that any ducts 
that can be used by any ANO to deploy loops are part of the telecommunications physical 
infrastructure and there are no grounds for excluding such protective tubes from the scope 
of an access obligation (and thus from the associated costs) 170. LKTA regrets the lack of 
transparency around the pricing methodology implemented by the NRA. LKTA notes that 
it is difficult to understand the rationale behind the access price without being able to see 
the methodology of calculating the price. E. g., they note that in Telia’s public regulatory 
reports there are inconsistencies in the way costs are allocated (e.g. the same service is 
allocated according to different criteria over the years, and it is unclear why this is done). 
LKTA notes that Telia has complained that the access product concerned has not been 
profitable for them for years, and only last year has this product returned a profit. However, 
the price had not changed for about 9 years and LKTA claims that there were no substantial 
changes in the market during that time. 
Source: Case Study of Lithuania. 
Sustainability of the current guidance  
NRAs are generally supportive of carrying over the current recommended cost methodology 
to the new recommendation. BEREC says that this cost methodology “should be applied 
irrespective of the technology of the new and enhanced network deployed/to be deployed. As 
long as cost models take into account the costs and asset life associated with a particular new 
technology, the appropriate economic signals will be sent and operators with SMP will be 
adequately compensated. Hence, there is no requirement for differentiating between new 
technologies in cost methodologies”171. The Hungarian NRA concurs172 that BULRIC+ 
 
169 Lithuanian Cable Television Association (LKTA) unites operators of telecommunications networks that offer 
cable television, Internet and other services, represents and protects their legal, economic, commercial and other 
interests in different state and business institutions. LKTA represents all of the largest alternative operators, such 
as Cgates, Init, Balticum, 5cc centras, Splius, Telecentras, among its 32 members. 
170 RRT, summary table of comments received from the public consultation on WLA market analysis, 12.06.2019. 
171 BEREC (2020), BEREC Response to the Targeted consultation on the revision of the Commission’s access 
recommendations, BoR (20) 169, Q22. See also response to Q21: “(recommends. 30 – 47) are still relevant state-
of-the art principles as it provides the appropriate build or buy signals that can promote efficient entry and maintain 
incentives to invest in new and enhanced networks, in particular VHC networks” 





represents a technology-neutral approach, and an investor’s decision should not be distorted 
by different cost methodologies.  
The majority of NRAs that replied to the online survey reported having used at least some parts 
of the current Recommendation when setting their regulated prices (see Table 7). Only three 
NRAs responding to the question indicated that they did not use the guidance at all.  
Table 7. Use of guidance of the Recommendation 
Guidance used No. 
Guidance on estimating the current cost that a hypothetical efficient operator would incur to 
build a modern efficient network173 
16 
Guidance on defining a hypothetical efficient NGA network, capable of delivering the Digital 
Agenda for Europe targets set out in terms of bandwidth, coverage and take-up, which consists 
wholly or partly of optical elements 
15 
Guidance on valuing all assets constituting the Regulated Asset Base (RAB) of the modelled 
network on the basis of replacement costs, except for reusable legacy civil engineering assets. 
15 
Guidance on valuing reusable legacy civil engineering assets and their corresponding RAB on 
the basis of the indexation method 
15 
Guidance on setting the lifetime of the civil engineering assets, i.e. at a duration corresponding 
to the expected period of time during which the asset is useful and to the demand profile 
14 
Guidance on locking-in the RAB corresponding to the reusable legacy civil engineering assets 




Source: Online survey of NRAs.  N = 21. Note: this data includes responses from all NRAs responding to the 
question irrespective of their approach towards price regulation. 
Nonetheless, some NRAs identified shortcomings in the cost orientation approach174: 
• One NRA notes that in order to develop a theoretical approach for the LRAIC method, 
one needs to use the SMP operator's information. However, for fibre it is hard to 
validate whether the information provided by the operators is representative of its true 
costs. Therefore, there is the risk of Type I and Type II errors: computing prices that 
are too low and limiting future fibre roll-outs or, alternatively, setting prices that are too 
high that in the end hurt the welfare of the end-customer. 
• Another NRA addresses the difficulty of calculating efficient cost-oriented prices for 
multiple operators. This may require burdensome data collection. At the end of 2020, 
the Supreme Administrative Court annulled ex ante price caps calculated for fibre 
products with the LRIC+ model. This was done partly on the grounds that the NRA 
should have further investigated possible differences in digging costs. 
• Under Recital 36 NDCM Recommendation, the current costs of Reusable legacy civil 
engineering assets in the BU LRIC plus model are calculated using the indexation 
method. Such assets will not require further investment or renewal and will not 
represent a significant incremental cost to the SMP operator. The indexation method 
uses historical data on acquisition prices, accumulated depreciation (amortization) and 
disposal of assets, as historical data are available in the accounts of major enterprises 
(statutory accounting as well as accounting for regulatory purposes), financial 
statements and publicly available price indices, such as e. g. the retail price index. The 
 
173 NRAs which did not deem the guidance useful said that they (1) did not impose cost orientation, (2) used another 
model, (3) modelled only a copper-based network or (4) did not provide any explanation at all. 
174 The bullet points below summarize anonymous NRA answers to the online survey. 
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index is applied to the regulatory asset base, which is the historical cost less 
accumulated amortization. This value in the reference period continues into 
subsequent periods and is adjusted by an index, while the residual value of assets 
decreases annually until the total depreciation of the asset. This procedure ensures 
that assets that have already been fully depreciated by a major company will no longer 
be included in the cost of physical access to the infrastructure175. An NRA flags that 
such indexation176 of reusable legacy civil engineering assets is not necessarily 
straightforward. It is unclear on which data such indexation should be based. One 
cannot use the data from the SMP operator in a bottom-up model because a bottom-
up model is totally independent of the cost accounting data of the incumbent. The NRA 
therefore suggests not to take reusable legacy civil engineering assets into 
consideration if they were fully depreciated and, in cases where they were not fully 
depreciated, to use net replacement values based on the assumption that this will lead 
to the same results as a depreciation and interest yield of indexed RAB over the 
remaining time. 
• In case a margin squeeze test is applied on top of cost orientated wholesale access 
tariffs, the outcome could be that the SMP operator is prevented from launching 
attractively priced retail offers or alternatively would have to forebear a normal margin 
and decrease wholesale access prices below the regulated cap, distorting the make or 
buy decision of access seekers. In response to the online survey, one NRA suggested 
that this situation may be addressed by setting cost-oriented prices as price caps, 
allowing the SMP operator to propose lower prices in its reference offer. However, this 
would not take away the risk of distorting the ‘build or buy’ signal that regulated access 
prices seek to provide. 
As previously mentioned, operators’ comments focus more on the concrete application of 
BULRIC by the NRAs. A specific issue is the impact of Point 33 NDCM Rec which recommends 
that NRAs value all assets constituting the RAB of the modelled network based on replacement 
costs, except for reusable legacy civil engineering assets. This guidance leads to divergent 
access pricing between countries without legacy ducts and those with them. Are these 
divergences justified? We have seen that the Greek NRA applies an approach that addresses 
this problem. 
One comment noted that models used may become obsolete over time due to network 
evolution or lack of updates (including demand and volume). Accordingly, cost models should 
be aligned with current network topology bearing in mind that the copper switch off is going to 
progress. The comment related to the interpretation of Points 46-47 NDCM Recommendation 
stating that NRAs must maintain cost models in order to promote regulatory predictability by 
ensuring stable access prices over at least two appropriate review periods and NRAs should 
only update the data input into the costing methodology when conducting a new market review. 
The wording is indeed ambiguous. What exactly is covered by ‘cost models’? Does the term 
include the weighting used? Moreover, now that the time period between market reviews has 
been increased to five years, should NRAs still wait for the subsequent market review before 
updating their data?  
 
175 Method as summarized in SK NRAs market analysis of 2014 relating to Market 4/2014. 




d. Guidance on the price band 
Provisions concerned 
• Point 41 of the NDCM Recommendation anticipates “that, in light of access prices in 
Member States observed and bearing in mind the potential for limited local cost 
variations, the application of the key features of the recommended costing 
methodology, i.e. being based on a modern efficient network, reflecting the need for 
stable and predictable wholesale copper access prices over time, and dealing 
appropriately and consistently with the impact of declining volumes, and of the 
methodologies used pursuant to Point 40, is likely to lead to stable copper access 
prices and a Union average monthly rental access price for the full unbundled copper 
local loop within a band between EUR 8 and EUR 10 (net of all taxes) expressed in 
2012 prices (the price band)”. 
Impact of the pricing of copper LLU 
According to the international comparison provided by the French NRA in its latest market 
review177, monthly prices in several Member States remain below the band178. However, there 
are substantial differences even if looking only at the tariffs set above the EU average. 
 
177 Décision No. 2020-1493 of 16 December 2020, p.20. 
178 On 27 July 2013, the Commission had issued serious doubts against ULL tariffs resulting from a margin squeeze 
test applied by the Austrian NRA because they do not send the appropriate “build or buy” signals. Moreover, the 
Commission feared that very low access prices are also likely to impede the SMP operator's efficient investment 
and innovation in new and enhanced infrastructures (such as e.g. fibre to the cabinet). See Commission Decision 
of 25.7.2013 concerning Cases AT/2013/1475-1476, p. 8. 
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Figure 13. Monthly LLU prices in selected European countries 
 
Source: Cullen International quoted in Decision Nr 2020-1493 of 16 December 2020, p.21. 
Among the larger European countries, monthly tariffs are the highest in Germany. However, 
the difference with the pricing in France or Spain is most likely due to the fact that few ducts 
are used in Germany and consequently their cost-model mostly uses current costs in the 
absence of significant re-usable assets. 
Table 8. Monthly fees and other key parameters in largest current (and former) EU 
Member States 
 France Germany UK Italy Spain 
Fixed BB penetration, 2019 29.8m 35.1m  26.8m 17.5m  15.3m 
Market share SMP operator, 2019  40%-45%  61% 34% 44% 40% 
Share xDSL in BB market, 2019  67%  72% 77% 72% 17% 
GDP/inhabitant (EU-100%), 2019 106  121  105  95  91  
Monthly fee (€/month), 2020 €9.46 €11.19 €8.50 
(£7.54)  
€8.79 €8.60 
Source: ARCEP, Décision no. 2020-1493 of 16 December 2020, p.21. 
The difference between, on the one hand, the monthly rates in France and, on the other, in 
Italy and Spain, is more difficult to explain. The Commission accordingly drew the attention of 
the French NRA to the fact that the latter’s new cost model estimated a price band for copper 
based LLU appreciably above those calculated previously (an increase of around 16%), only 
partly compensated by the revised, lower WACC (decreased from 7.6% to 4.8%). The 




costs (i.e. regardless of WACC) were indeed reflecting the actual cost of deploying the relevant 
infrastructure179. 
Sustainability of the current guidance  
Point 41 of the NDCM recommendation was clearly conceived as a transitory measure, which 
has achieved its objective by now. Open Fiber therefore believes that the price band should 
be removed gradually over the next market analysis cycle. It argues that allowing the ULL price 
to increase will, on the one hand, stimulate the take up of VHCN services and, on the other, 
send appropriate price signals for investors in VHCN networks180. 
However, the objectives that NRAs must pursue according to Point 42 of the NDCM 
Recommendation are regulatory transparency and predictability as well as the need to ensure 
price stability without significant fluctuations, while, at the same time, guaranteeing the SMP 
operator adequate remuneration and providing the right ‘build-or-buy’ signal181 to entrants. The 
last objective will become increasingly obsolete in a context where copper networks are being 
switched off. In addition, the ‘build’ option only exists where there is an economic case for 
parallel deployment of fibre infrastructures, which is often not present in the absence of usable 
civil engineering. One can assume that ULL (or sub-loop unbundling) will be used less and 
less in areas where FTTH deployment is economically viable, as opposed to less dense areas 
where, in the absence of subsidies, xDSL may remain a key NGA technology. 
At the same time, the objectives of “regulatory transparency and predictability as well as the 
need to ensure price stability without significant fluctuations”182 continue to be of utmost 
importance. The guidance Points 31 and 32 NDCM Recommendation that the cost model must 
be based on a modern efficient network, reflecting the need for stable and predictable 
wholesale copper access prices over time, and dealing appropriately and consistently with the 
impact of declining volumes, will remain fully relevant as long as the legacy copper networks 
are not fully switched off, which is not likely to occur in the near future. The recommended 
approach should avoid volume effects that are the result of a decreased demand for copper 
wholesale access and that lead to higher unit costs (i.e. the same cost base of copper must 
be distributed between a smaller number of lines), would inflate unit costs183, and would lead 
to price hikes. 
One operator advocates that, in this regard, NRAs should fix an “appropriate ceiling for ULL 
prices fully independent of current cost developments and usage of copper lines”184. Such 
ceiling could be set on the basis of short-run incremental cost (SRIC)185. 
 
179 Commission Comments of 4.12.2020 concerning Case FR/2020/2284, p. 7. 
180 Written feedback to the stakeholders’ workshop of 9 June 2021. 
181 Recital 27 NDCM Recommendation. 
182 Recital 44 NDCM Recommendation 
183 BoR (19) 240, p.44  
184 Vodafone response to the Targeted Consultation, Q15. 
185 J. Eisenach and B. Soria (2017), Balancing incentives for the migration to fibre networks, A report by NERA 
Economic Consulting for Vodafone Group Plc. 
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Finding 3. The recommended price band has ensured the stability of the monthly wholesale 
rates for ULL. However, one notes a growing divergence between the regulated ULL 
maximum rates set across the EU. It is not clear whether this evolution reflects only national 
differences or is due to the application of the costing methodology used. 
 
e. Guidance on the application of an NGA specific risk premium 
Provisions concerned 
• Under Art. 3.4 EECC, the NRA shall “(d) promote efficient investment and innovation 
in new and enhanced infrastructures, including by ensuring that any access obligation 
takes appropriate account of the risk incurred by the investing undertakings (….), while 
ensuring that competition in the market and the principle of non-discrimination are 
preserved”. 
• Art.74.1 EECC provides that “where the NRAs consider price control obligations to be 
appropriate, they shall allow the undertaking a reasonable rate of return on adequate 
capital employed, taking into account any risks specific to a particular new investment 
network project”. 
• The NGA Recommendation puts forward that NRA should assess the risks incurred 
and include where appropriate a higher risk premium to reflect any additional and 
quantifiable risk incurred by the SMP operator (NGA Rec. Annex I, pt. 3).  
• Annex I, pt. 6 NGA Recommendation lists the criteria to be taken into account by NRAs 




 Box 6. Criteria set out in Annex I NGA Recommendation 
Investment risk should be rewarded by means of a risk premium incorporated into the cost 
of capital. The return on capital allowed ex ante for investment into NGA networks should 
strike a balance between on the one hand providing adequate incentives for undertakings 
to invest (implying a sufficiently high rate of return) and promoting allocative efficiency, 
sustainable competition and maximum consumer benefit on the other (implying a rate of 
return that is not excessive). To do so, NRAs should, where justified, include over the pay-
back period of the investment a supplement reflecting the risk of the investment in the 
WACC calculation currently performed for setting the price of access to the unbundled 
copper loop. The calibration of revenue streams for calculating the WACC should take into 
account all dimensions of capital employed, including appropriate labour costs, building 
costs, anticipated efficiency gains and the terminal asset value, in accordance with Recital 
20 of Directive 2002/19/EC. 
NRAs should estimate investment risk, inter alia, by taking into account the following 
factors of uncertainty: (i) uncertainty relating to retail and wholesale demand (ii) uncertainty 
relating to the costs of deployment, civil engineering works and managerial execution (iii) 
uncertainty relating to technological progress (iv) uncertainty relating to market dynamics 
and the evolving competitive situation, such as the degree of infrastructure-based and/or 
cable competition and (v) macroeconomic uncertainty. These factors may change over 
time, in particular due to the progressive increase of retail and wholesale demand being 
met. NRAs should therefore review their situation at regular intervals and adjust the risk 
premium over time, considering variations in the above factors. 
Criteria such as the existence of economies of scale (especially if the investment is 
undertaken in urban areas only), high retail market shares, control of essential 
infrastructures, OPEX savings, proceeds from the sale of real estate as well as privileged 
access to equity and debt markets are likely to mitigate the risk of NGA investment for the 
SMP operator. These aspects should also be periodically reassessed by NRAs when 
reviewing the risk premium. 
The above considerations apply in particular to investments into FTTH. Investments into 
FTTN, on the other hand, which is a partial upgrade of an existing access network (such 
as e.g. VDSL), normally have a significantly lower risk profile than investments into FTTH, 
at least in densely populated areas. In particular, there is less uncertainty involved about 
the demand for bandwidth to be delivered via FTTN/VDSL, and overall capital requirements 
are lower. Therefore, while regulated prices for WBA based on FTTN/VDSL should take 
into account any investment risk involved, such risk should not be presumed to be of a 
similar magnitude as the risk attaching to FTTH based on wholesale access products. 
When setting risk premia for WBA based on FTTN/VDSL, NRAs should give due 
consideration to these factors, and should not in principle approve the pricing schemes 
(…). NRAs should publicly consult on their methodology to determine the risk premium. 
Source: NGA Recommendation, Annex I. 
Did the NGA Recommendation bring about a consistent approach? 
According to BEREC’s Regulatory Accounting report 2020, 14 NRAs imposed pricing remedies 
on VULA (FTTC) and 17 on VULA (FTTH). The Dutch NRA imposed pricing remedies for both 
types of wholesale access, but its decision was eventually annulled by the Appeals Court. 
BEREC’s RA 2019 report noted that “12 NRAs estimate a risk premium for NGA FTTH 
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services, 5 NRAs apply this risk premium also to the FTTC network without differentiating the 
final value with respect to the one applied for NGA. Two NRAs apply a decomposition 
approach, three NRAs use a benchmark approach and three NRAs use methodology mainly 
based on the outcome of a DCF calculation.”186  Some NRAs computed an NGA specific risk 
premium but do not use it in practice (e.g. the Czech NRA187). The following Table 9 provides 
an overview of the situation in 2019 and is further updated by our research. 
Table 9. Pricing remedies and/or ERT and NGA specific risk premium applied 
Wholesale product Countries imposing pricing remedies or 
ERT 
NRAs allowing NGA 
specific risk premium 
VULA FTTC 
Cost orientation 
(BULRIC+ for LRAIC) 
DK188, CY, DE, EL, HR, HU, IE, IT and LV DK 
MST/ERT AT, SK, SI SI 
Other FI  
VULA FTTH 
Cost orientation 
(BULRIC+ or LRAIC) 
DK, PL, CY, EL, HR, HU, IT189 and LV DK, PL, IT190 and HR191 
MST/ERT AT, ES, SI, LU192, MT, SK SI193 
Other FI, BE BE194, FI 
Fibre unbundling 
Cost orientation 
BULRIC+ or LRAIC 
DK, PL, EE, HU, IT, LT195 DK, PL, IT 
MST/ERT LU, SE, SK  
Other FR196 FR 
 
186 Annex I, p.52 
187 CTU regulation no. OOP 4 of Feb. 2019 
188 Commission No-Comments Letter of 22.11.2019 concerning Case DK/2019/2212: Setting maximum network 
access prices according to the LRAIC method for 2020 
189 NRA decision: https://www.agcom.it/documents/10179/15564025/Delibera+348-19-CONS/1fe1fd57-1b27-
4755-bfd6-89455e12ce09?version=1.0  
190 The Italian NRA follows the NGA Recommendation’s guidance to include a supplement reflecting the risk of the 
investment in the WACC calculation currently performed for legacy products  “(…) riconoscendo all’operatore SMP 
un premio di rischio aggiuntivo che deve essere incorporato nel costo del capitale”. 
191 NRA decision 11 Oct 2019. The NRA is using a benchmark, taking into account its limited resources. The NRA 
computed the average of the risk premia in France to be 2%, Italy 3.20%, Denmark 2%, Czech Republic 1.41%, 
Slovenia 2.50%, Luxembourg 2.50%, the Netherlands 2%, Poland 1.25% and the United Kingdom 0.9% and arrived 
at 1.97%, which is then added to the legacy WACC of 6.28%. 1.97% is lower than the previously applicable 
premium. The decrease was justified by the NRA because the additional risk premium should reflect the risks related 
to demand, i.e. the risks related to the use of broadband access services at NGA speeds (speeds higher than 30 
Mbps). The NRA noted in this regard a significant increase in the use of NGA speeds in Croatia – at the end of 
2018, about 330,000 users used NGA speeds, which was a significant increase over previous three years (more 
than five times). 
192 The risk premium is set in Art. 3.(1) of NRA Decision 16/206/ILR du 14 juin 2016:  “Pour les produits et services 
régulés sur les marchés pertinents des communications électroniques fixes, l’Institut arrête le coût moyen pondéré 
du capital en termes nominaux avant impôts à 7.10%. (2) Pour les éléments de réseau fixe de nouvelle génération 
(NGA), l’Institut fixe le coût moyen pondéré du capital en termes réels avant impôts incluant une prime de risque à 
7.71%”. The risk premium is calculated on the basis of a benchmarking. 
193 Commission No-Comments Letter of 29.06.2021 concerning Case SI/2021/2326. 
194 The Belgian NRA applies a higher WACC (8.77% instead of 7.12%) for FTTH, but regulated access is subject 
to ‘fair pricing’ rather than strict cost orientation. 
195 Risk premium is allowed, but the SMP operator did not request it. There is zero take-up of fibre unbundling. 
196 The NRA decision no. 2020-1446 of 15 December 2020 does not impose fibre unbundling or VULA beyond the 
obligation to negotiate reasonable demands to serve specific needs of the business sector. However, France has 
implemented a symmetric FTTH framework (applicable to all FTTH operators) for access to the terminating part of 
the FTTH network (from the first concentration point onwards. The risk premium is taken into account for the setting 
of the WACC that is used in the case of dispute resolution (negotiated access must comply with the principles of 




Source: Data published in the BEREC 2019 RA report, Annex I, Figure 61, p. 52 complemented with data from 
BEREC RA report 2020 (BoR (20) 210 and own research, NRAs allowing NGA specific risk premium not indicated 
in the BEREC report are in italics. 
The FTTH specific risk premium, whether calculated as the difference between the project 
specific WACC for the FTTH business of the relevant companies and their WACC calculated 
for their other businesses or as an additional premium based on a benchmark, is between 
0.90% and 3.20%. Added to the legacy WACC, this gives a WACC specific for FTTH between 
6% and 11%, which is very high compared to interest rates observed on the general market. 
However, these figures are partly influenced by the high-risk premium (4.81%) in Spain which 
is no longer applied. 
Finding 4. Six of the ten NRAs imposing cost orientation on VULA FTTH access and/or 
fibre unbundling do not (or no longer) apply NGA specific risk premia. This raises the 
question as to why. A closely related question is the impact of such NGA specific risk 
premia on wholesale access prices. 
Consistency in the application or not of an NGA specific risk premium 
NRAs appear to follow two different approaches (that can be combined in certain cases): 
• The approach recommended by the NGA Recommendation which is “to include (…) a 
supplement reflecting the risk of the investment in the WACC calculation currently 
performed for setting the price of access to the unbundled copper loop”197, as the 
Belgian and the Italian NRAs do. 
• Any other additional margin added on top of the legacy WACC to encourage 
NGA/VHCN investments, e.g. based on international benchmarks as the Luxembourg 
and Polish NRAs do. 
However, any method which in practice reflects a genuine estimation of the project specific 
investment risk could be deemed to be in line with the guidance provided. It relates more to 
the factors of uncertainty that should be taken into account than to the specific method applied. 
Conversely, the application of an additional margin on top of the WACC in order to support 
fibre investment (e.g. to allow for sufficient upside potential in investment returns compensating 
for the downside potential) would be at odds198 with the criteria in Annex I of the NGA 
Recommendation. Such an additional premium would encourage or accelerate NGA 
investments for the purposes of achieving various policy goals, such as a minimum level of 
NGA network penetration. They refer with that concept to any “premium granted to encourage 
or accelerate NGA investments for the purposes of achieving various policy goals, such as a 
minimum level of NGA network penetration.”199 
 
197 Annex I, NGA Recommendation 
198 The Commission recalled that “it might be more appropriate to take account of the investment risk in the 
calculation of the cost of capital, instead of an additional mark-up to the cost oriented prices” (Commission 
Comments letter of 25.02.2021 concerning Case BE/2021/2301, p.7). 
199 Dan Harris, Richard Caldwell, Lucia Bazzucchi, and Francesco Lo Passo (2016), Review of approaches to 
estimate a reasonable rate of return for investments in telecoms networks in regulatory proceedings and options 
for EU harmonization, the Brattle Group. 
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The authors distinguish such purpose from two other possible reasons “for providing a WACC 
premium for NGA network investments”: 
• Compensation for a higher systematic risk (in comparison to legacy networks) – that 
is, risk that is correlated with the broader macroeconomic environment, and which 
investors cannot address by diversifying their investments. Harris et al (2016) go on to 
recommend that “the WACC should only compensate for systematic risk”. 
• Compensation for non-systematic risk – these are project specific risks such as cost 
and technical risks. Non-systematic risks should, according to the authors, be dealt 
with, but in careful modelling of project cash flows rather than the WACC. For example, 
a number of demand and cost scenarios should be modelled to account for the risks 
associated with these parameters. The final return for the project should be calculated 
using data that has fully accounted for the spread of possible outcomes, from those 
better than the base case assumptions to the worst. This also includes an estimation 
of the effect of regulation on an expected return (e.g. the truncation introduced by price 
caps). 
Finding 5. The few NRAs applying risk premia follow the guidance of the NGA 
Recommendation. Some explicitly do the computation themselves, while others use 
benchmarks. 
Possible gaps: appropriateness of an additional premium, on top of the project specific 
WACC  
In line with the mentioned examples, a slight majority of NRAs responding to a question in the 
online survey (11 out of 19) consider that there can be cases where a ‘premium on top of the 
project specific cost of capital could be justified, for instance to allow for sufficient upside 
potential in investment returns compensating for the downside potential. However, it is 
necessary to distinguish such an additional premium clearly from the WACC to avoid any 
confusion with the risk premium on which the NGA Recommendation provides guidance. 
Echoing the responses from the 11 NRAs, Oxera says that VHCNs are exposed to a number 
of risks “that are not fully reflected in the asset beta which, if not properly accounted for in the 
regulatory framework, could sufficiently impede investment and/or result in a regulatory failure 
to allow investors the opportunity to earn a ‘normal return’. That is, while the WACC estimated 
through the CAPM contains an allowance for systematic risk, it does not include any allowance 
for specific risks. These risks are assumed to be diversified and so, in theory, investors do not 
need to be rewarded for bearing them. However, implicit in the CAPM methodology is an 
assumption that investors are allowed to keep the full upside of their investments and bear the 
full downside of outcomes affected by specific risks. Hence, for diversification to lead to cost 
recovery it is vital that upsides are retained as well as downsides. This means that a further 
allowance for risk has to be considered separately from and in addition to the WACC estimated 
by the CAPM. While some regulators have recognised that investment decisions are also 
materially affected by non-systematic risks, and some attempts have been made to take into 
account a ‘risk premium’, in our opinion, none has truly grappled with the issue in a satisfactory 
manner”200. 
Nevertheless, an NRA raises the question whether such an additional premium on top of the 
project specific cost of capital could be justified outside of specific geographic areas “where 
 




deployment of NGA networks is very expensive (because there are only a few potential 
customers)”201.  
Another NRA flags in this regard an operational issue: “it might be difficult to draw lines 
between different kind of projects, which ones are allowed to get risk premium and which ones 
not”202.  
Orange considers that such premia should additionally have a function to offer an incentive in 
the framework of a political action203, such as coverage objectives. 
Possible gaps in the guidance relating to the project specific WACC  
The NGA Recommendation (Annex I, Point 6) stresses that “investments into FTTN, which is 
a partial upgrade of an existing access network (such as e. g. VDSL), normally has a 
significantly lower risk profile than investment into FTTH, at least in densely populated areas. 
In particular, there is less uncertainty involved about the demand for bandwidth to be delivered 
via FTTN/VDSL, and overall capital requirements are lower”. Consequently, the requirement 
for a higher WACC for FTTC investment is much less obvious than it might be in the context 
of FTTH. Therefore, the finding that only a minority of NRAs calculates an NGA specific WACC 
for the computation of NGA access prices also reflects the fact that in countries where NRAs 
impose cost orientation as a pricing remedy, the high speed broadband services of the SMP 
operators are mainly still copper-based and that the NRAs concerned deem it reasonable to 
apply the same WACC for FTTH as for other copper-based services204. Today, an NGA risk 
premium for FTTC deployment is in any case no longer justified according to Sky Italy205. 
Moreover, Hungarian NRA opines that there is no "compelling need to introduce special other 
risk elements”206 since industry risks are covered by the Beta which together with relevant 
Equity Risk Premium (ERP) covers the systematic risk. The “telco’s Beta reflects that they are 
investing the majority of their CAPEX into Fibre (NGA, VHCN) and the related potential risk is 
thus reflected in the market prices (perhaps investing solely into copper might be considered 
a much higher risk in the current market situation)”207. The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
underlying the WACC is “based on the efficient market hypothesis, so the risk is assessed in 
the financial markets reflecting all available information and expectations, therefore, all risks 
(systematic) are objectively factored into the market price”208. The Hungarian NRA furthermore 
stresses that a technology neutral approach is required to avoid any potential distortion from 
setting a potentially inappropriate risk premium209.  
ECTA calls into question the need to further allow risk premia given “that the uncertainties 
listed in paragraph 2 of section 6 in Annex I NGA Recommendation have been lifted by now. 
Retail and wholesale demand for improved connectivity at home has clearly materialized and 
 
201 An NRA’s response to the online survey. 
202 Therefore, the NRA does not estimate certain fixed risk premium level, rather the higher risk has been calculated 
in WACC by higher asset beta value compared to legacy infrastructure. An NRA’s response to the online survey. 
203 Orange response to the Targeted Consultation, Q16. 
204 As the Irish NRA did: see ComReg Document 20/96 point 7.98: “ComReg notes further in respect of FTTC that 
Eircom’s FTTC service is primarily a copper-based service and it is reasonable to apply the same WACC for FTTC 
as for other copper-based services”. 
205 Stakeholders’ workshop, 9 June 2021. 
206 Hungarian NRA response to the Targeted Consultation, Q16. 
207 Idem, Q17. 
208 Idem, Q16. 
209 Idem, Q22. 
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has translated into a higher uptake of FTTB/C (as well as DOCSIS and VDSL), even though 
many customers remain satisfied with the speed of their current connection. The costs of 
deployment/civil engineering and managerial execution are well known, since over 34% of EU 
homes are now covered by FTTB/H”210. According to Bouygues Telecom,211 in France, there 
is hardly any risk of deploying FTTH given that le Plan France Très Haut Débit has detailed 
the deployment phases of full fibre coverage and set the date of 2025 for full optical fibre 
coverage. No additional premium on top of the standard ERP can be justified.  
At the same time, 15 of the 23 NRAs replying to the question in the online survey consider the 
NGA and VHCN networks to possibly carry an additional investment risk compared to the 
legacy infrastructure. However, this raises the question of where the line should be drawn. 
Operators like Liberty Global argue that VHCN operators face similar demand uncertainty 
across various technologies212. This raises the next question as to whether premia should be 
reserved for certain types of VHCNs. 
 A second explanation for the limited number of NRAs calculating with an NGA specific WACC 
is the use of pricing flexibility instead of a price control obligation. In such cases, there are 
fewer reasons to apply a higher WACC because the assets relevant for the FTTH (or FTTC) 
economic replicability obligation are not a part of the access network but relate to the 
downstream retail activity. Therefore, these assets are not subject to a risk premium. Moreover, 
the SMP operator is free to determine the wholesale charge for a FTTH rental as long as it 
does not cause a margin squeeze and the question of the application of a WACC premium to 
a FTTH rental therefore does not arise213. BEREC also recalls that NRAs may consider it 
appropriate to not impose or maintain price controls and instead allow price flexibility in case 
an ERT is in place, leaving it “to the SMP operator to find a way to deal with any risks specific 
to a particular new investment network project”214. This is the preferred option of several 
operators, which remind us that if “economic replicability is applied instead of cost-oriented 
prices, there is no need for such predictability nor for a risk premium nor an application of the 
“fair bet principle”. The SMP operator will adjust retail and wholesale prices in order to cope 
with market dynamics”215. However, two NRAs using ERT without a price control obligation for 
certain wholesale access products responded to the online survey that they nevertheless 
applied a higher NGA WACC216. 
A more fundamental criticism comes from Tony Shortall (Telage consulting)217 who argues that 
both the use of risk premiums and option values are part of an outdated regulatory approach, 
based on the presumption that there is no meaningful prospect of entry and that the SMP 
operator should therefore be incentivised to invest. Today, the main question is how to 
incentivise infrastructure competition. Where there is a prospect for meaningful entry, any price 
regulation will undermine ANOs’ incentives to invest. The risk related to maintaining the old 
approach is the crowding out of investment in alternative networks. This view is strongly 
supported by Open Fiber218, which advocates that SMP operators should, in areas where there 
 
210 ECTA response to the Targeted Consultation, Q17. 
211 Stakeholders‘ workshop 9 June 2021. 
212 Liberty Global response to the Targeted Consultation, Q19. 
213 As noted by the Irish NRA in Comreg Document point 7.95, p.110. 
214 BEREC (2020), BEREC Response to the Targeted consultation on the revision of the Commission’s access 
recommendations, BoR (20) 169, Q16. 
215 Vodafone response to the Targeted Consultation, Q19. 
216 None of the respondents specified, but they may use the higher NGA WACC to determine the discounting rate 
they use in their calculations. See e.g. Luxembourg NRA’s Regulation ILR/T19/2 of 13 March 2019 Art.24 “ (…) Le 
taux d’actualisation utilisé correspond au coût moyen pondéré du capital (WACC), fixé et pré-rempli dans l’outil de 
calcul par l’Institut”. 





is a credible scenario for the deployment of an alternative infrastructure, never be allowed to 
apply wholesale access prices below cost levels increased with a sufficient margin to 
remunerate investment risk. 
Implementation issues 
Sky Italy219 considers the current guidance to be flawed. In order to decide whether to compute 
NGA risk premia NRAs should: 
• First, determine where it is needed, whether: (i) the NGA risk premia allowed delivered 
(some of) the intended outcomes in terms of fibre deployment and (ii) what are the side-
effects on the market. The Bourreau study says that the risk premium can incentivize 
investment, but it also says that it distorts retail pricing. Sky Italy claims that today there 
is enough data to analyse this empirically, including in Italy. Italy has one of the higher 
NGA risk premia for FTTH in the EU. However, factual evidence shows that the 
emergence of infrastructure competition rather than the NGA premium boosted VHCN 
coverage. 
• Second, there should be no NGA risk premium in the presence of risk mitigating factors, 
such as public subsidies or co-investment. 
• Third, the methodology should be granular enough to reflect the real extent of risks. 
For example, the Italian NRA makes a real options computation based on hypothetical 
investment plans, distinguishing between the risks according to different geographies 
with different densities and subsequently summing up the outcomes to a national 
average. However, if the SMP operator deploys its fibre overwhelmingly in denser 
areas with lower risk, the risk actually incurred by incumbent will be lower than the 
figure computed by the model. Sky Italy considers that the only way to address such 
flaw is to calculate the granting of the NGA risk premium based on concrete deployment 
commitments from the SMP operator instead of hypothetical willingness to invest. This 
is the only way to compute the real risk that the SMP operator incurs. 
The need to differentiate NGA WACC according to different geographic deployment areas to 
reflect potential different risks is also advocated by Orange220. The French operator SFR,221 
supported by a report from Frontier economics, pleads for the differentiation of NGA risk premia 
not only according to the areas covered, but also accounting for the different risk profiles of the 
investors. The company challenged in court dispute settlements by                                                                                                                                                                                                                           
the NRA222 in which the latter refused such differentiation and aligning the tariffs requested by 
XpFibre223 on the (lower) tariffs applied by the incumbent operator Orange. It argues among 
other that the methodology to determine the NGA risk premium should not be based on a 





221 Case study interviews. 
222 Décision no. 2020-1498-RDPI du 17/12/2020, available at: https://www.arcep.fr/uploads/tx_gsavis/20-1418-
RDPI.pdf  and Décision no. 2020-1168-RDPI du 05/11/2020 available at https://www.arcep.fr/uploads/tx_gsavis/20-
1168-RDPI.pdf  
223 Independent infrastructure operator that emerged following the takeover of Covage by SFR FTTH. 
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ETNO224, Orange225 and Deutsche Telekom226 point to a more fundamental problem where the 
legacy WACC is used as a benchmark or basis for the VHC WACC calculation227. The legacy 
WACC calculation as recommended by the Commission is based on a purely historic 
perspective of ERP which goes against the forward-looking nature of CAPM. Using purely 
historic data leads to a significant underestimation in countries where the effects of quantitative 
easing are the most visible. Moreover, the legacy WACC calculation combines the EU ERP 
with national risk‑free rate which allegedly creates methodological inconsistency and results in 
underestimated expected returns on EU equity markets as it reduces national risk differences 
to differences in government credit ratings. In addition, the Commission notice would wrongly 
assume that legacy assets can be refinanced under terms comparable to those of the past five 
years, while in fact these assets have been developed and financed in much older periods. As 
a result, the resulting cost of debt may underestimate the actual legacy debt related to these 
assets228.  
Impact of the application of NGA specific risk premia 
The Italian operator Open Fiber points out that in Italy “risk premia initially led to very high 
prices for FTTH services and very low investments in new infrastructures. The market entry of 
a competitor (i.e. Open Fiber) led to a sharp reduction in prices (at levels that did not take into 
account any risk premium) and an increase in the investment in new infrastructures both of the 
incumbent and the new entrant”229. 
However, the level of risk premia calculated by NRAs may be the result of national estimation 
methods more than a result of the (broad) principles set out in the NGA Recommendation. 
Harris et al (2016) noted that NRAs have not applied a consistent methodology to estimating 
the NGA network WACC, which “leads to different NGA WACC premia in different MSs” and, 
in addition, “some included in the WACC a compensation for both systematic and non-
systematic risks. For example, the risk of a cost overrun on any given NGA project is a non-
systematic risk that should not be included in the WACC. Some NRAs also seem to have 
increased the WACC to provide incentives to invest in NGA networks”230. Table 10 below 
illustrates the different approaches to a risk premium taken by different NRAs at that time, with 
updates for situations in FR, NL, and PL. 
Table 10. The lack of consistency was illustrated by the following overview of 
approaches by NRAs 
MS NRAs’ approaches to risk premium 
IT To estimate the risk premium of NGA networks, the NRA followed real option theory taking 
into account the "option premium" relative to the "wait and see" and "flexibility" alternatives 
respectively. The "wait and see" option rewards the investor for uncertainty about future 
market dynamics, while the “flexibility” option rewards the incumbent for being obliged to 
guarantee open access to the network (once built) to alternative operators in case of high 
demand rates. According to the NRA, these risks are not measurable through the beta, and 
the two options premia cannot be summed together. To price both options, the NRA has used 
standard financial techniques, such as the Black-Scholes model, the Cox model, and the 
 
224 Written comments subsequent to the Stakeholders’ workshop of 9 June 2021. 
225 Stakeholders’ workshop of 9 June 2021. 
226 Ibid. 
227 Set in the Commission 2019/C 375/01 of 6.11.2019 Notice for legacy assets. 
228 The criticism of the methodology by ETNO is detailed in the ETNO Statement on the WACC Notice of the 
European Commission of 21 January 2021, available at: https://etno.eu/library/positionpapers/420:etno-statement-
wacc-ec.html#_ftnref1  
229 Open Fiber response to the Targeted Consultation, Q17. 
230 Brattle Group (2016). Review of approaches to estimate a reasonable rate of return for investments in telecoms 




MS NRAs’ approaches to risk premium 
Market Asset Disclaimer (MAD) technique, which allow for simulating the value of an asset 
that has not yet been realized yet and therefore cannot be exchanged on the market. The 
assumptions include: take-up rates, average revenues by client, the technology used, capital 
costs, and the probability distribution for each variable. Taking into account different scenarios 
for the length of the option contract and the payment method, the NRA has estimated an NGA 
premium of 3.2%, including both options (i.e. “wait and see”, and “flexibility”). 
FR 
 
The NRA applied a premium to both FTTP and FTTC in the period 2018-2020. The premium 
was calculated in a DCF framework as the add-on to the discount rate such that the NPV of a 
fiber based network project is zero231. Arcep considers a 2% risk premium beyond WACC in 
its non-normative pricing model for a typical co-investment, and 5% – for a typical line rental. 
NL 
 
The NRA applied a 2% premium on the WACC for FTTP until 2019. The NRA eventually 
removed price controls for fibre access services. Therefore, no premium has been applied 
since 2020232. 
PL The NRA determines the risk premium based on benchmarks including those of other EU 
countries233. Cost oriented access in that country is only imposed outside of the 51 districts 
that were found to be competitive234.  
Source: Brattle Group (2016). Review of approaches to estimate a reasonable rate of return for investments in 
telecoms networks in regulatory proceedings and options for EU harmonization. Final Report, as well as sources 
indicated in footnotes. 
Harris et al (2016) are of the view that NGA networks face higher systematic risks (i.e. risks 
that correlate with the broader macroeconomic environment and that investors cannot address 
by diversifying their investments) than legacy networks due to the following three main 
reasons235:  
• Capital leverage 
• Long-lived investments with payoffs extending far into the future 
• Demand for NGA services is likely to be more sensitive to income 
As previously noted, it adds that “non-systematic risks236 must be dealt with, but in a careful 
modelling of project cash flows rather than the WACC. For example, a number of demand and 
cost scenarios should be modelled to account for the risks associated with these 
parameters”237.  
Annex I, Point 6 of the NGA Recommendation lists factors of uncertainty that NRAs should 
take into account when assessing the specific risks of NGA deployment. Some of these factors 
might have both systematic and non-systematic components. For some of those, the 
 
231 Brattle Group (2021), Cost of Capital: Beta and Gearing for WFTMR 2021, 12 March 2021, p.75. 
232 Ibid. 
233 Commission Comments of 22.05.2021 concerning Case PL/2021/2314. 
234 The competitive districts are those (i) counting at least three operators are active in the retail broadband market; 
(ii) with Orange Polska’s retail market share in terms of subscribers below 40%; (iii) a minimum of 65% premises 
having access to infrastructure of at least three operators; (iv) not more than 10% premises have no internet access. 
Of the total of 3,099 districts in Poland, these criteria are met in 51. In these districts (i) there were on average 16 
operators providing retail broadband services; (ii) Orange Polska had an average share of 13.8% in terms of 
subscribers; (iv) the average level of network triplication was 72.5%; and (iv) the average service availability was 
98.4%.UKE decision DR.SMP.6040.1.2019. 
235 Brattle Group (2016). Review of approaches to estimate a reasonable rate of return for investments in telecoms 
networks in regulatory proceedings and options for EU harmonization. Final Report. 
236 Defined as “project specific risks such as cost and technical risks”, p.95. 
237 Brattle Group (2016). Review of approaches to estimate a reasonable rate of return for investments in telecoms 
networks in regulatory proceedings and options for EU harmonization. Final Report, p. 96. 
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systematic component is more obvious (e.g. demand) than others (e.g. costs, although labour 
cost might be affected by the overall market performance). 
Eleven NRAs also stated that the guidance on factors of uncertainty in the NGA 
Recommendation on the risk premium was useful for their WACC estimation. Not surprisingly, 
the majority of the 19 NRAs responding to the question find that a relevant factor is uncertainty 
relating to demand (see Table 11 below). The other factors of uncertainty were considered 
relevant by a smaller number of NRAs.  Two other factors were also mentioned:  
• Regulatory risk and financial risk 
• COVID pandemic, which is likely to impact the dynamics of markets, both in terms of 
retail demand and also in investments (for NGA expansion) 
At the same time, one respondent stressed that the deployment risk varies geographically and 
is due to the high cost of reaching the last 10% of the population because households in rural 
areas are spread out. This translates into low density and long distances, increasing the cost 
of deployment. Thus, alternative financing beyond risk premia should be contemplated for that 
market segment. 
Table 11. Listed factors of uncertainty identified by NRAs as being relevant in their 
respective national market 
Factors of uncertainty No. 
Uncertainty relating to retail and wholesale demand 14 
Uncertainty relating to market dynamics and the evolving competitive situation, such as the 
degree of infrastructure-based and/or cable competition 
10 
Macroeconomic uncertainty 10 
Uncertainty relating to the costs of deployment, civil engineering works and managerial 
execution 
8 
Uncertainty relating to technological progress 8 
Other 2 
None 2 
Source: Online survey of NRAs. N = 19. Note: this data includes responses from all NRAs responding to the 
question irrespective of their approach towards price regulation. 
Possible gaps in the guidance on factors of uncertainty and their implementation 
Factors of uncertainty invoked should be based on evidence to avoid providing an undue 
economic rent to SMP operators. The FTTH Council reminds us that “It is notoriously difficult 
to price access in an appropriate manner and bright line decisions on access are far more 
effective in eliciting investment”238. Open Fiber is also flagging the risk of granting rents: “(…) 
in the presence of infrastructural competition, the application of a risk premium should 
represent extra remuneration for the incumbent. In case of competition, the VHC network price 
will be fixed by the fair competition itself”239.  
Possible other gaps in the current guidance as regards the frequency of reviews 
Oxera flagged the issue of the periodicity of market reviews – the recommended risk premium 
approach does not contemplate setting a premium for the whole lifetime of the investments, 
which extends beyond the period covered by market reviews. TDC NET argues that risk premia 
“should not be reviewed ex post for existing investments made under the assumption that there 
would be a risk premium. (…) For an investment to be a fair bet, the operator should be allowed 
 
238 FTTH Council response to the Targeted Consultation, Q17. 




to enjoy some of the upside benefits when demand turns out to be high or costs low (i.e. be 
allowed returns higher than the cost of capital) in order to balance the probability that it will 
earn returns below the cost of capital if demand turns out to be low or costs high. The fair bet 
principle will be useful to incorporate in a revised recommendation because the risk premium 
must be seen in the light of the lifetime of the asset. The investor would have assessed possible 
outcomes and set the return requirement accordingly. Should the return turn out to be in the 
better end of the possible outcomes, NRAs should not consider removing or revising the risk 
premium (…) Fair bet means that the risk premium stays in place until it has been proven that 
the return is better than the pre-investment best case scenario”240. Orange241 also argues that 
pricing conditions should be transparent and clear from the beginning as well as stable over 
the lifetime of the investment. Updated parameters should only apply to new investments and 
with sufficient notice (legal certainty). 
Although the Irish NRA does not accept an NGA risk premium in comparison to the legacy 
WACC, the NRA stated its preferred approach of no “retrospective application”. Any “changes 
made to a specified regulated price following the updated WACC and the review of other 
parameters would apply on a forward looking basis“242.   
The concern that too-frequent reviews undermine investment incentives seems to be valid. 
Even so, at some point in time, investors can be assumed to have achieved a reasonable 
return on their investment – they cannot be entitled to supra-competitive profits forever. 
Adjustment to current circumstances must eventually be made, but how often remains to be 
seen. 
f. Guidance on the criteria put forward for the assessment of long-
term access pricing and volume discounts 
Provisions concerned 
• Annex I, Point 7 of the NGA Recommendation specifies how to assess pricing in cases 
of long term contracts with upfront commitments. In addition, Annex I, Point 8 of the 
NGA Rec. foresees a possibility for volume discounts. 
• Recital 188 EECC provides that “in the event that price controls are considered to be 
appropriate, such terms and conditions can include pricing arrangements which 
depend on volumes or length of contract in accordance with Union law and provided 
they have no discriminatory effect”. 
Did the Recommendation bring about consistency between the practices of NRAs 
across the EU? 
Ten NRAs report that long term access pricing is applied by the SMP operator for the pricing 
of regulated offers, while only five report volume discounts243. Among other considerations, 
some NRAs report reviewing such pricing based on the guidance. Subjecting volume discounts 
to the scrutiny of the NRA is supported by Italian alternative operators.  For example, the AIIP 
association argues that “since the aim of such discounts was to reduce investment 
 
240 TDC response to the Targeted Consultation, Q19. 
241 Stakeholders’ workshop of 9 June 2021. 
242 ComReg Document 20/96 Point 7.46, p. 98 
243 Online survey data. 
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uncertainties and the WACC has the same aim, according to AIIP, there is no need to consider 
long term pricing and volume discounts”244. 
How effective are volume discounts? 
The views on the impact of volume discounts on the deployment of NGA networks are divided, 
with some convinced of their usefulness to promote fibre deployment and some expressing 
strong doubts. The latter view corresponds to BEREC’s Opinion on the original Draft NGA 
Recommendation, where BEREC stated that “volume discounts are rather an instrument to 
foster penetration (“penetration pricing”), so reducing costs leads to the fact that scale is 
reached more quickly and gains are shared with access seekers. However, this applies not 
only to new infrastructures, but generally. (…) The level of investment risk is only impacted to 
a limited extent, if any, by the presence of volume discount schemes to the extent that the 
investment has already taken place prior to the volumes being purchased”245. 
Finding 6. Only a few NRAs report volume discounts being applied by the SMP operator 
on the price of regulated wholesale access products. No NRA reports specific evidence of 
a link between volume discounts and investments in VHCN. 
 
Long-term access pricing 
Long-term pricing is reported to have an impact on NGA deployment, at least in some Member 
States. An NRA found that long term pricing agreements provided crucial support for NGA 
rollout246. The FTTH Council regrets the limited usage of such pricing schemes247. 
However, where conditions of long term pricing must be vetted by NRAs, volume discounts, 
according to an operator, “should be handled flexibly based on commercial agreements and, 
if applicable, be monitored by the NRA in each individual case, instead of an NRA setting out 
“minimum volumes” by area. The conclusion that volume discounts lose their justification in a 
 
244 AllP response to the Targeted Consultation, Q32.  
245 BEREC’s response to the Targeted Consultation, Q17, which refers partly to BEREC’s Opinion on the original 
Draft NGA recommendation (BoR (10) 25 Rev1_final) which stated, “In contrast, BEREC considers that the main 
objective of volume discounts is not to reduce the risk of the investment as in the case of upfront commitments, but 
to stimulate network penetration rate and lower per end user unit costs. The reduction in unit costs occurs because 
in network industries there is a negative relationship between market penetration and the cost per connection: the 
higher the penetration, the lower the cost per connection. This means that, in order to minimise cost per connection, 
a supplier of NGA access will want to expand the network volume by encouraging buyers to purchase more lines. 
The introduction of volume discounts schemes is one way of incentivising buyers, whereby part of the achievable 
benefits of scale of the investor is shared with the operators purchasing access. However, this reasoning does not 
only apply to FttH as stated in Annex I. 18. In BEREC’s view, the level of investment risk is only impacted to a 
limited extent, if any, by the presence of volume discount schemes to the extent that the investment has already 
taken place prior to the volumes being purchased. Potentially there could be an indirect impact on investment risk 
to the extent that an investor has certainty prior to the investment taking place that volume discounts will be allowed 
in principle, whereby the investor could expect that network penetration rates and total turnover will be higher than 
in case when such discounts are ex ante prohibited”. 
246 An NRA’s response to the online survey, 
247 FTTH Council response to the Targeted Consultation Q32, “Lower prices would be charged for long-term 
agreements with volume guarantees because the access seeker takes on some of the risks associated with 
uncertain demand and willingness to pay. Higher charges for short-term ‘pay as you go’ access services would then 
compensate the access provider for bearing greater levels of risk. However, such differentiated charging options so 




more mature market appears counterintuitive, given the benefits of volume commitments for 
both sides and the continuous risk of investing in a multi-platform environment”248.  
Finding 7. A significant number of NRAs report the use of long-term pricing agreements in 
their respective Member States. Some say that these long-term commitments have 
supported NGA deployment. 
 
Possible gaps 
The Polish NRA notes the difficulty of accounting for “such long-term pricing and volume 
discounts in the case of FTTH (…) in the ERT tool”249. An NRA argues that factoring in long-
term pricing and volume discounts in the ERT could result in squeezing out smaller operators, 
since it is usually large operators that have such volume discounts or long-term pricing. The 
NRA therefore favours using the regular price and not long-term pricing in ERT250. 
Oxera advocates that “a clear framework should be set out in order to reflect the differences 
in risk in a fair and robust manner, and to avoid price differentials resulting in distortions to 
competition or anti-competitive foreclosure (…) Furthermore, additional guidance will be 
needed to ensure that any price differentials do not result in distortions to competition. In 
particular, where access prices may vary between different access seekers, there must be 
sufficient additional protection in the form of obligations not to engage in a margin squeeze”251. 
In the case of vertically integrated operators, Oxera pleads for a “clearly defined ex ante 
economic replicability test”252. Oxera also says that further guidance would be welcome on 
what assumption should be made in any ex ante economic replicability test regarding the level 
of volume commitment that an equally or a reasonably efficient operator (EEO/REO) could 
make in the presence of volume commitment discounts.  
Conversely, some operators plead for more flexibility and advocate a case-by-case 
assessment253. ETNO254 argues that the ERT should not prevent the SMP operator from 
sharing some of the investment risk by differentiating wholesale access prices according to the 
access seekers’ level of commitment by limiting long term pricing discounts. 
By contrast, ECTA argues that as there is no longer an investment risk in deploying 
FTTN/VDSL, even in less densely populated areas, the possibility for applying considerations 
to long-term access pricing and volume discounts should be removed. However, it also 
“considers that the criteria set out in these sections for assessing long-term access pricing and 
volume discounts contain important safeguards against abusive practices by SMP operators 
notably by addressing the danger of these operators charging their retail arms lower than 
 
248 Deutsche Telekom response to the Targeted Consultation, Q32. 
249 UKE response to the Targeted Consultation, Q32.  
250 A comment during the NRA workshop. 
251 Oxera response to the Targeted Consultation, Q32. 
252 This concern is shared in an operator’s response to the Targeted Consultation: “langfristige Zugangspreise sowie 
Mengenrabatte nur dann zulässig sind, wenn über einen angemessenen Zeitraum eine hinreichende 
Gewinnspanne zwischen Vorleistungs- und Endkundenentgelten besteht, die einem effizienten Wettbewerber den 
Markteintritt im nachgeordneten Markt ermöglicht“. 
253 Telefonica response to the Targeted Consultation, Q32. Meanwhile, Orange responding to Q32 of the Targeted 
Consultation stresses that “prices must be flexible” and that guidance on the topic will also be provided by BEREC 
as regards co-investments under the Code. Orange therefore pleads to avoid overlaps. 
254 ETNO response to the Targeted Consultation, Q10. 
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regulated prices, including prices below cost. These criteria should therefore be maintained. 
ECTA suggests that individual elements (e.g. the setting of single discount levels) should see 
a thorough evaluation in view of current NRA practices”255. 
g. Guidance on the implementation of an ERT  
Provisions concerned 
• The NDCM Recommendation (Points 48 and 49 as well as Recital 67) provides that 
NRAs should remove cost-orientation obligations where the SMP operator is subject (i) 
to a non-discrimination obligation consistent with Equivalence of Input (EoI) or to 
alternative obligations relating to the technical replicability of retail products in cases 
where EoI has not been fully implemented, (ii) obligations relating to technical 
replicability and (iii) obligations relating to economic replicability, if two additional 
requirements are met: 
a) In cases of active NGA access products, a competitor is provided with sufficient 
upstream and regulated passive (or similarly functioning active) access 
products, or alternative infrastructures are available and create a demonstrable 
retail price constraint 
b) In cases of passive NGA access products, the SMP operator offers copper 
access at cost-oriented, controlled prices, or there are alternative 
infrastructures that exercise a demonstrable retail price constraint. 
• Moreover, the NDCM Recommendation provides guidance on how to design and 
conduct the ERT (in particular in Point 56). 
• Under Art. 74, EECC NRAs shall consider not imposing or maintaining a cost-oriented 
price obligation where they establish that a demonstrable retail price constraint is 
present and that access and non-discrimination obligations imposed (including, in 
particular, any economic replicability test imposed) ensure an effective and non-
discriminatory access. 
• In parallel, Recital 193 EECC embodies the underlying rationale for price flexibility, 
which was until then only provided in the NDCM Recommendation: “to prevent 
excessive prices in markets where there are undertakings designated as having 
significant market power, pricing flexibility should be accompanied by additional 
safeguards to protect competition and end-user interests, such as strict non-
discrimination obligations, measures to ensure technical and economic replicability of 
downstream products, and a demonstrable retail price constraint resulting from 
infrastructure competition or a price anchor stemming from other regulated access 
products, or both”. 
• In December 2014, BEREC issued a guidance paper on the regulatory accounting 
approach to the economic replicability test (i.e. ex ante/sector specific margin squeeze 
tests)256 to assist NRAs from the regulatory accounting point of view on how to 
understand and deal with the relevant provisions of the NDCM Recommendation. 
• In parallel, CRA issued a report on ‘Economic Replicability Testing for NGA Services – 
A consistent and proportionate approach to promote efficient investment and safeguard 
 
255 ECTA response to the Targeted Consultation, Q33. 




competition’257 commissioned by ETNO. This report does not contain guidance 
supported by the Commission or BEREC, but we mention it nonetheless because a 
number of issues raised by CRA were repeated on the occasion of the Targeted 
Consultations and in response to the online survey. 
A word about terminology 
A word about terminology is in order. In this chapter we use the term ERT to refer to an ex 
ante margin squeeze test used to implement pricing flexibility, in the sense meant by the 
NDCM. We refer to any other ex ante use of a margin squeeze test only as an ex ante MST. 
We refer to the use of a margin squeeze test by the national competition authority as an ex 
post MST. 
BEREC NRA survey data concretely demonstrate that NRAs make extensive use of ex ante 
MSTs, but only a few use the ERT as an alternative to price control in the sense meant by the 
NDCM (because only a few have implemented pricing flexibility). In Figure 14, BEREC 
compares 2020 survey results to those of 2019. 
Figure 14. NRAs applying a retail ex ante MST as a complement to price control versus 
those applying ERT to enable pricing flexibility (comparison of 2019 to 2020). 
 
Source: BEREC (2020), “BEREC Report: Regulatory Accounting in Practice 2020”, BoR (20) 210. 
Did the guidance from the NDCM Recommendation lead to a consistent application?  
As mentioned above, only a limited number of NRAs use an economic replicability test in in 
the absence of price control obligation. The NRAs concerned seem to apply the remedy in line 
with the guidance provided. “Since 2014, ILR allowed the SMP operator to perform an ERT for 
its NGA wholesale access products if he respects an equivalence of inputs model (non-
discrimination remedy) and if he publishes a technical replicability test (transparency remedy). 
ILR’s experience showed that the regulated copper anchor wholesale cap worked on the retail 
market and that alternative operators are now switching their activities from copper LLU and 
bitstream services to fibre unbundling. The SMP operator also continued its fibre roll-out while 
using the pricing flexibility for its wholesale access prices (in both ways, heightening and 
 
257 CRA report of 18 March 2015, available at: 
https://www.etno.eu/datas/publications/studies/FinalCRAreport_18032015.pdf  
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lowering access prices). The experience gathered by ILR showed that the combination of all 
the regulatory measures (ERT, EoI, technical replicability test and copper anchor) lead to a 
well-balanced and predictable regulatory framework for the stakeholders in terms of 
competition, non-discriminatory access and fiber roll-out”258. Meanwhile, “for FTTH VUA and 
Bitstream, in line with the main objectives of the NDCM recommendation, ComReg took a 
more flexible approach whereby the incumbent is subject to a Wholesale and Retail Margin 
Squeeze Test along with a Price Floor. ComReg decided to continue to allow the SMP 
Operator pricing flexibility on FTTH-based VUA, subject to the obligation not to cause a margin 
squeeze. It was noted that, given cost and demand uncertainties, the FTTH price was likely to 
be very sensitive to the FTTH service take-up rate, such that an incorrect forecast could distort 
future market developments. If the price is too high, it may deter actual or potential purchasers 
of FTTH-based VUA from purchasing, and if the price is too low, the SMP Operator and, 
indeed, other infrastructure investors may reduce their investments in FTTH. ComReg 
considers this approach to have had a positive impact. Roll out of high capacity networks has 
continued (in Ireland) at pace over the last number of years over a number of different 
platforms. Multiple operators continue to invest in NGA/VHCN including the incumbent. 
ComReg considers that competition has been promoted at both retail and wholesale levels”259. 
In Spain, since 2018, “the SMP operator who sets the prices for [WBA] freely, with the only 
restriction of meeting the ERT”260. The Polish NRA says that “economic replicability tests taking 
account of the principles derived from NDCM Recommendation are currently under design”261. 
However, the test will be implemented as a non-discrimination remedy and applied on top of 
the cost-orientation obligation262. These comments should nevertheless not obfuscate the fact 
that in most cases, the access products subject to ERT were previously not subject to pricing 
remedies. Pricing flexibility is therefore not necessarily a successor remedy of pricing 
remedies. In the online survey, 8 NRAs responded that the guidance on the implementation of 
ERT provided in the NDCM Recommendation is likely to continue to be adequate to deal with 
future technological and market evolution, while only 3 disagreed (11 others could not answer 
the question). 
Finding 8. Where NRAs apply flexibility, they tend to follow the guidance provided and 
consider that the guidance provided in the NDCM Recommendation will likely continue to 
be adequate to deal with future technological and market evolutions. 
Effects of the application of ERT by NRAs 
BEREC points out that while “pricing flexibility is an important factor for investing in new 
technologies, (…) other conditions must be met too to make a business case for the 
operator/investor, namely the willingness to pay of users (demand side) as well as a general 
environment conducive to investment, i.e. general economic conditions and competitive 
pressure (supply side). Pricing flexibility alone is not enough”263.  
In general, there is indication that in countries that applied the recommended pricing flexibility 
or those which previously applied only a margin squeeze test, NRAs consider that the 
 
258 BEREC (2020), BEREC Response to the Targeted consultation on the revision of the Commission’s access 
recommendations, BoR (20) 169, Q9. 
259 Idem, Q11. 
260 Idem, Q11. 
261 UKE response to the Targeted Consultation, Q6. 
262 Case study interviews. 
263 BEREC (2020), BEREC Response to the Targeted consultation on the revision of the Commission’s access 




approach has contributed to promoting efficient investment in NGA/VHC networks, leading to 
an increase in NGA/ VHC networks and better quality of service for end-users. The competitive 
safeguards accompanying pricing flexibility have effectively protected competition according 
to several NRAs264. 
Finding 9. NRAs applying the recommended pricing flexibility or those that applied a margin 
squeeze test instead of cost orientation, consider the approach to have contributed to 
promoting efficient investment in NGA/VHC networks, leading to an increase in NGA/VHC 
networks and better quality of service for end-users. 
Possible gaps 
Among the NRAs applying margin squeeze tests, a number of difficulties in designing the tests 
and possible gaps in the current guidance were suggested:  
• The Polish NRA advocates clarifications to the NDCM Recommendation (Annex II) 
regarding the implementation of the Discount Cash Flow (DCF) approach to the ERT 
tool and the issue of including in the ERT tool quantity discounts or long-term 
agreements on prices concluded between the SMP operator and entities access 
seekers265. 
• The Lithuanian NRA experienced some difficulties in implementing the test, because 
there were debates about some parts of the test itself. Stakeholders report that there 
are still debates ongoing regarding interpretation of the various parameters of the 
test266. Telia reports that the lack of clarity on the interpretation/calculation of the 
parameters negatively impacts regulatory certainty and competitive environment. Telia 
indicates that the Access Recommendations as well as BEREC guidelines lack more 
specific information on the conditions for ensuring equal competitive grounds, e.g., 
whether it is sufficient that an ANO has a return on investment equal to the SMP 
operator, and whether ANOs service provided over Telia’s wholesale access product 
must be as profitable as the service provided by the SMP operator267. An alternative 
operator reports being very concerned with the pricing of wholesale central access – 
they claim it is not possible for them to provide a competitive retail price using bitstream. 
They have noticed that when Telia launched a promotional offer early 2020, the prices 
of wholesale central access were aligned only in the Autumn of 2020, leaving them 
subject to a margin squeeze for several months268. 
• One NRA reports that all aspects of the NRA's margin squeeze model have been 
debated and subject to redesigning with SMP operator. In addition, since individual 
discounts are not part of the test margin squeezes cannot be ruled out. Moreover, 
margin squeezes on products other than the flagship products are still possible, says 
the NRA269. 
 
264 Online survey responses. 
265 Polish NRA response to the Targeted Consultation, Q10. 
266 Case study interviews. 
267 Written answer provided by Telia on 29.04.2021. 
268 Case study interviews. 
269 For that reason, in the response to the Targeted Consultation, Q10, Open Fibre advocates to abandon the 
‘flagship product’ approach which “allows the SMP operator to use a different strategy for other promotions that are 
no classified as "flagship products" in order to avoid the replicability test”.  
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• An NRA claims that, in its country, MSTs are not practicable because some retail prices 
are so low as the result of competition between network owners in major cities that 
there is not a sufficient margin between the regulated cost-oriented wholesale price 
and the retail price. 
• Another NRA claims that some products, like co-location, are less suitable for ERT 
since the SMP operator itself does not buy them. 
• Still another NRA reports that different contractual conditions of the constituting 
elements of bundles created difficulties for classifying of bundled offers, for example, 
when the bundles contain services provided by third parties (e.g. Amazon or Netflix). 
The lack of verified information beyond replies to requests for information from the 
operators on the costs of such services renders the outcome of the margin squeeze 
test uncertain. In the same vein, the NRA raises the issue of information limits provided 
by alternative operators for making adjustments to the EEO test. The NRA also makes 
a point about the convergence of fixed and mobile networks, which will be driven by 
5G deployment. Network convergence will affect retail markets and, as a consequence, 
could require updated guidelines, in order to take into account the costs faced by a 
converging (fixed and mobile) operator at wholesale level and innovative offers 
including fixed and mobile services in bundle with other services at the retail level. 
• An NRA also reported that adjustments to the EEO test were challenging due to 
difficulties in defining the appropriate efficiency level and possibly due to the need to 
recalibrate data from operators. Other considerations linked to bundled products (e.g. 
valuing the mobile services) also make the exercise more difficult. 
• Issues were also identified regarding hybrid retail bundles encompassing unregulated 
products and applying adjustments to EEO costs. 
• An NRA also suggested that modelling an equally efficient operator (EEO) may be 
problematic if other operators cannot achieve the same efficiency as the SMP operator. 
• According to Annex II NDCM Recommendation, “the reasonably efficient scale 
identified by the NRA should not go beyond that of a market structure with a sufficient 
number of qualifying operators to ensure effective competition, bearing in mind also 
competition from other platforms”. However, a ‘sufficient’ number can be lower than the 
optimum number. The NRAs should have the possibility, when designing their ERT, to 
give enough economic space for more operators, and in particular new entrants.270 
• According to an NRA, factoring in long-term pricing and volume discounts to determine 
the wholesale prices used in the ERT may squeeze out smaller operators, as it is the 
large operators that mainly use long-term pricing and volume discounts.271 However, 
the concrete effects will depend on specific market circumstances. 
According to Deutsche Telekom, regulation using retail pricing as a parameter necessarily 
affects the commercial room of manoeuvre of the regulated operator in the market for very 
high capacity broadband services. At the current market stage, the willingness to pay for VHCN 
is limited on the retail market. Every operator should accept reduced margins in this early 
adopting stage of the market. Therefore, restricted replicability in VHCN during the first years 
of an investment should be allowed272. 
 
270 A comment during the NRA workshop. 
271 A comment during the NRA workshop. 




Moreover, Deutsche Telekom points to the following elements which it considers as having 
merit for consideration273: 
• Relevant downstream costs:  
a) Economies of scale are a key factor for efficient downstream costs. When 
adapting the parameter of the EEO, the ERT should consider at most the 
downstream costs of an operator with a sufficiently large scale274.  
b) Economies of scope: give NRAs the flexibility to exclude common costs from 
relevant costs within the ERT275. 
• Relevant Wholesale inputs and the relevant reference prices: Risk and demand sharing 
commercial models as well as co-investment models should be fully incorporated in 
and actively promoted by the ERT. These are crucial to enable the spread of VHCN in 
particular. 
• Relevant Retail products: Any new guidance on the ERT should maintain and enhance 
the focus on flagship products276. The focus on flagship products helps to maintain the 
feasibility of the ERT. Ideally the ERT focuses on one flagship product which can serve 
as an anchor for the market. 
• Relevant time period277: VHCN investments mean a considerable capital outlay by the 
investing operator. Therefore, the multi-period analysis should be expanded to better 
reflect the investment cycle. Due to long refinancing periods, the average lifetime of 
customers on a VHCN should be the minimum threshold, with flexibility to exceed this 
period. 
As regards the Regulated wholesale inputs, Telefónica278 considers that the NRA should 
consider “all the most relevant regulated inputs used or expected to be used in a forward-
looking perspective so that the wholesale input is aligned with the competitive situation and 
with the geographic analysis. The foreseen updated Recommendation should encourage 
NRAs to define a wholesale reference input, taking into account the level of competition in the 
different geographic areas (considering the presence of infrastructure competition in such an 
assessment), and therefore consistent with the market analysis”. 
 
273 Idem, Q10. 
274 ECTA response to the Targeted Consultation Q10 completely disagrees and advocates using the retail costs of 
“a generic (alternative) operator which does not (yet) have the scale of the SMP operator”. 
275 In the same vein, the Telefonica response to the Targeted Consultation, Q10 advocates that in those countries 
where infrastructure competition is bearing fruit, ERT should factor this into the cost calculation. Network operators 
have an overall network cost lower than if they were simply using regulated access i.e. they are well below the 
regulated VULA price. 
276 Telefonica concurs in its written feeback to the Stakeholders’ workshop: “The future Recommendation should 
clarify that NRAs must not aggregate retail products into baskets that do not represent any specific offer. Such 
practices have led to significantly inconsistent regulatory standards across Member States”. 
277 Telecom Italia response to the Targeted Consultation, Q10 says that the relevant time period should be at least 
36 months, as has already done in several European countries. 
278 Written feedback to the Stakeholders’ workshop of 9 June 2021. 
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Dealing with retail product bundles 
The issue of difficulties when dealing with bundled offers is also raised by one operator279: how 
to fix the parameters of an ERT in cases where bundles include a mobile component, since 
the incremental mobile cost is mainly a variable cost. (Similar considerations would 
presumably apply to other unregulated components of a flagship bundle.) Moreover, the 
operator considers that using an average ARPU over the customer's lifetime does not reflect 
a typical business practice, which is to apply discounts at the beginning of the contract. 
We note divergent approaches to bundles. For example, the Croatian NRA carried out280 until 
2019 the ERT separately both for each relevant retail product sold in isolation and for bundles 
(portfolio assessment). Since 2019, only a product-by-product assessment is conducted. 
When unregulated retail services are included in a bundle and these retail services are also 
offered as standalone products (e.g. SAT TV, mobile broadband internet access), the retail 
price of the standalone products is deducted from the revenue of the bundle. For unregulated 
services that are not offered as standalone products (e.g. IPTV content out of a basic package), 
the cost is estimated using the LRIC+ method (and adjusted for a 15% market share 
assumption)281. In Luxembourg, where the bundle involves products from other markets which 
may or may not be available to competitors, the revenues and costs of such additional services 
are removed from the economic replicability calculation or are simply not included282.  
The NDCM Recommendation does not specify the level of aggregation of retail products to run 
the ERT for each flagship product individually or for a portfolio of flagship products identified. 
In 2014, BEREC283 had identified that a majority of NRAs applied both product-by-product and 
portfolio approaches (the aggregation of products approach was used in particular by OFCOM 
at the time284). In assessing both approaches, BEREC recognises that there may be efficiency 
gains that could be achieved through a portfolio approach because it provides more pricing 
flexibility for the incumbent at the retail level. On the other hand, a product-by-product approach 
ensures that each retail product is replicable instead of only the portfolio of products as a 
whole. BEREC does not favour or exclude one or the other approach. 
In 2014, the Commission commented on the ERT aspects of Luxembourg NRA’s Article 7 
submission, expressing the concern that it “would risk overly limiting the flexibility and amount 
to a de facto ex ante price regulation”285 and could be disproportionate. However, no similar 
comment was made to Croatia or Slovenia. Conversely, the Commission commented286 on the 
initial proposal of the Maltese NRA to apply a fully aggregated test, stating that this approach 
could disadvantage access seekers that only compete with some flagship products, as well as 
new entrants or small-scale access seekers. 
 
279 Iliad response to the Targeted Consultation, Q10. Telecom Italia in response to the Targeted Consultation Q10 
concurs: “the ERT obligation [sh]ould be imposed only in non-competitive areas and where the price control 
obligation is withdrawn”. 
280 MST methodology adopted in July 2014 (Case HR/2014/1624) and modified in November 2016 (HR/2016/1930) 
281 Commission No-Comments Letter of 8.112019 concerning Case HR/2019/2206 
282 The method can be illustrated as follows: if a broadband internet subscription is priced at 40€/month and 
telephony as standalone is sold at 30€, whereas the bundle price is 63€, a rebate of 7€ is identified. 4/7 of this 
rebate is allocated to the internet broadband subscription and 3/7 to the telephony. See ILR, Principles and 
methodology of the margin squeeze testing approach (economic replicability test) in Luxembourg.  
283 BEREC (2014), Guidance on the regulatory accounting approach to the economic replicability test (i.e. ex 
ante/sector specific margin squeeze tests), BoR (14) 190, 5 December 2014, p. 24  and p. 36. 
284 In Malta, the aggregate test is supplemented by specific tests for standalone residential and business broadband 
products 
285 Commission Decision of 4.04.2012 concerning Case LU/2014/1633. 




An NRA also noted that while the product-by-product and portfolio approaches are mainly 
discussed in light of retail products, it may also be relevant for the wholesale side of ERT, 
especially if there is differentiation between urban and rural areas in the wholesale but not the 
flagship product. How to approach such situation is not clear from the guidance.287 
Which wholesale price should be used when long term and volume discounts are 
available?  
A key parameter to determine the wholesale prices used for the test is the scale adjustments 
applied by the NRAs when applying the Similarly Efficient Operator (SEO) standard. The lower 
the level at which the assumed market share is fixed, the more this will decrease the margin 
of the SMP operator to share investment risks by granting discounts linked to volume and long-
term commitments, given that such discounts will always need to leave sufficient economic 
room for (smaller) alternative operators preferring to order line by line.  
According to the Croatian NRA288, several NRAs tend to apply drastic scale adjustments, as 
outlined in Table 12. 
Table 12. SEO market shares of selected countries 
Country  SEO market share 
Greece  16% 
Norway  20% 
Luxembourg  15% 
Cyprus  20% 
Belgium  15% 
Ireland289 25% 
Source: Commission’s no-comments letter of 8 November 2019 in Case HR/2019/2206, p.3 
Should a price floor be considered?  
Open Fiber290 argues that current guidance does not take into proper account the need to 
provide incentives to invest and to guarantee not only a competitive retail market, but also a 
competitive wholesale market. They see a need for the introduction of a specific wholesale 
replicability test where alternative operators have already made investments or are about to 
start them. Such a test should identify an efficient minimum wholesale price on a case-by-case 
basis. The wholesale replicability test should guarantee a higher remuneration for FTTH 
services compared to services based on copper or hybrid solutions. They argue that the 
Commission should set the principles of the wholesale replicability test291. However, rather 
than a wholesale MST, the measure advocated seems rather to be a wholesale price floor. 
With similar concerns in mind, another operator recalls “that the proper functioning of an ERT 
has yet to be assessed in the context of co-investment schemes, given its potential detrimental 
 
287 A comment during the NRA workshop. 
288 Quoted by the Commission in its No-Comments letter of 8.11.2019 concerning Case HR/2019/2206, p.3. 
289 Comreg, Pricing of Eir’s Wholesale Fixed Access Services: Response to Consultation Document 15/67 and Final 
Decision,  
290 Supported by the FTTH Council, response to the Targeted Consultation, Q10. 
291 Open Fiber response to the Targeted Consultation Q10 provides a best practice: the Italian NRAs Del. 
348/19/CONS, which encompass “a replicability wholesale test in order to prevent any anticompetitive behaviours 
in terms of prices /margin squeeze at the wholesale level, ensuring competitiveness on the market and encouraging 
the wholesale migration from the legacy copper network to fiber network. However, AGCom has not set any specific 
criteria and methodologies for the application of the wholesale test”. 
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impact on either VHCN roll-out incentives or retail markets’ take-up”.292 Oxera293 concurs that 
price floors may be justified to avoid the risk of predatory or discriminatory pricing which could 
affect infrastructure rivals. They say that the UK NRA has adopted an approach based on 
these principles when it prohibited Open Reach from offering geographic discounts on its 
superfast broadband wholesale services and required providing at least 90 days’ notice of the 
introduction of certain commercial terms (such as volume discounts) that might prevent retail 
ISPs from using competing networks, thereby stifling investment and allowing Ofcom to assess 
those deals before they took effect. According to Eurofiber294, in this regard price floors are an 
underused regulatory tool despite their usefulness to promote infrastructure competition. 
In Ireland, the NRA imposed295 a wholesale MST between the FTTH Wholesale Local Access 
product (VUA) and Wholesale Central Access (FTTH bitstream) products (MST2 in Figure 15 
below) in order to encourage investment. The aim is to allow other access seekers to invest 
with confidence in their own core network facilities and purchase the WLA product without fear 
that (once their own costs are added) they will be undercut by the WCA product. The SMP 
operator must notify VUA price decreases to the NRA three months prior to changes and 
publish them two months in advance, while the NRA must be notified of price increases four 
months prior to changes and be published two months in advance.  
Figure 15. Regulation for FTTH products 
 
Source: Tera Consultants, Report on the determination of appropriate costing and pricing methodologies for VUA 
and NGA Bitstream, September 2018, p. 73. 
In France, in order to ensure an economic space between CEI access and dedicated fibre 
access in market 2/2020, a wholesale MST (obligation de non-éviction) was mandated in 
 
292 Orange response to the Targeted Consultation, Q10. 
293 Stakeholders’ workshop 9 June 2021. 
294 Ibid. 
295 Comreg Decision D11/18, 19/11/2018, Pricing of wholesale broadband services - Wholesale Local Access 
(WLA) market and the Wholesale Central Access (WCA) markets, Response to Consultation Document 17/26 and 
Final Decision,  point 5 ‘Wholesale Margin Squeeze Obligation’, p.365 and Commission Decision of 10 October 




certain areas (‘copper areas 2’)296 until the last market review297 - the green arrow in Figure 16 
below.  
Figure 16. Wholesale MST in France 
 
Source: ARCEP, Decision no 2020-1448 of 15 December 2020, p.88. 
Currently, the French NRA still applies a wholesale MST on high quality access based on 
FTTH for services provided to business customers between passive access provided by the 
SMP operator and its wholesale active offers298. In France, the NRA distinguishes mass-
market products that serve residential customers from mass-market products that serve 
business customers. For the former, the NRA does not impose additional access obligations 
on the SMP operator other than the symmetric obligations that apply to all operators (in 
principle up to the first concentration point). For the latter, the SMP operator (Orange) must, 
among other obligations, continue to make available a wholesale resale access offer (Offre de 
gros en marque blanche) on its FTTH infrastructure that operators serving only business 
customers can commercialise at retail level. This obligation is coupled with the aforementioned 
wholesale MST299. 
In Italy, NRA requested the SMP operator, when seeking to grant discounts on the regulated 
wholesale prices set in the market review to seek the prior approval from NRA300, despite 
doubts expressed by the Italian competition authority301. 
 
296 Areas in which LLU had been implemented less than 7 years before and where at least one of the operators 
using ULL was offering wholesale bitstream in competition with the SMP operator. 
297 ARCEP, Decision no 2020-1448 of 15 December 2020, p.85. 
298 Idem, p.92. 
299 “obligation de pratiquer des tarifs non évictifs par rapport aux offres activées qu’un opérateur efficace pourrait 
proposer sur la base des offres passives proposées (…)”, Décision n° 2020-1446 of 15 December 2020, p.147.  
300 Art. 49 Delibera N. 348/19/CONS, Approvazione di offerte con riduzione di prezzo wholesale, available at: 
https://www.agcom.it/documents/10179/15564025/Delibera+348-19-CONS/1fe1fd57-1b27-4755-bfd6-
89455e12ce09?version=1.0 However, Open Fiber notes that it “has not set any specific criteria and methodologies 
for the application of the wholesale test, unlike it did for the retail one” (Targeted Consultation, Q10). 
301 “L’AGCM inoltre rileva che il fondamento normativo di tale test di prezzo non è l’obbligo di non discriminazione, 
come dimostrano le circostanze relative alla concorrenza tra operatori che si autoproducono l’intera catena 
impiantistica dei collegamenti FTTH. L’AGCM rileva che in tali circostanze la definizione di una soglia minima di 
prezzo ex ante potrebbe determinare anche rischi di distorsione della concorrenza, in quanto potrebbe comportare 
un incremento dei prezzi per i concorrenti e per i consumatori, limitando al contempo la capacità competitiva di un 
solo operatore. L’AGCM poi evidenzia che le eventuali variazioni in diminuzione dei prezzi dei servizi wholesale 
liberamente adottate da TIM rispetto all’OR sono rare e, come tali, efficacemente assoggettabili allo scrutinio 
antitrust” (Delibera N. 348/19/CONS, p. 73). 
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The Czech NRA302 applies a wholesale MST, called an ‘economic space test’, which aims at 
ensuring an appropriate margin between the wholesale broadband local access price and 
bitstream prices. The test is disaggregated303 into two groups (i) NGA local access (FTTx and 
VULA and (ii) non-NGA services (copper LLU).  
Considering that alternative operators are increasingly deploying broadband infrastructures, 
other NRAs may follow this trend and raise the risk of an emergence of varying methodologies. 
Transparency of the process and monitoring 
The Italian association AIIP argues that the ERT should be carried out by NRAs in a 
transparent way304 and in a procedure open to the incumbent’s competitors. Moreover, the full 
test should be published. ETNO305 recalls the importance of regulatory stability and certainty: 
the NRA should not modify its methodology or those parameters employed in the test 
retroactively306 while full transparency in the methodology applied by NRA must be a pre-
requisite prior to the implementation of the test. 
In response to a BEREC consultation, an Italian operator listed307 elements of the transparency 
that the consultants from Oxera deemed necessary in order to allow stakeholders “to challenge 
the methodology and to help the NRA in monitoring its compliance”: 
• How a reasonable return on capital is accounted for in estimating downstream costs 
• How regulatory accounts and the reference offer are used to measure network costs 
related to the non-regulated component of the test 
• What the different levels of aggregation (or “families” in the DCF portfolio test) are 
• What revenues and costs are included in the wholesale, non-regulated and retail 
components in each test 
• How the NRA verifies the accuracy of the forecast data provided by the test 
• What actions or regulatory remedies are envisaged in case the SMP operator fails one 
or more parts of the test. 
 
302 Following the legal separation between the wholesale arm (CETIN) and retail arm (O2) of the SMP operator, the 
latter has an interest in maximizing its sales of services with a higher added value by O2 at the expense of the sales 
of wholesale services by CETIN. The economic space test between pricing on both markets is designed to 
guarantee appropriate price levels in both markets. Source: ČTÚ Decision REM/3a/05.2018-03 of 15 May 2018. 
303 NRA does not use a portfolio approach because of the low level of use of FTTH deployment of fibre networks 
and generally NGA networks in the provision of wholesale services. An aggregate assessment of economic 
replicability would thus be predominantly influenced by the prices of services for access via copper lines and thus 
could mask the possibility of disproportionately high prices for emerging FTTH based access. 
304 AllP response to the Targeted Consultation, Q10. Vodafone response to the Targeted Consultation, Q10 also 
considers that “a more efficient and consistent use of the economic replicability test requires more transparency in 
the moment of designing the tool”. Telefonica response to the Targeted Consultation Q10 agrees: “The calculations 
applied in the process followed by NRA to determine feasibility of a retail product must be accessible and 
transparent in order to let SMP operator to double-check calculations while avoiding discretional and unjustified 
changes in the parametrization. Aligned with this, the SMP operator might have in advance all the information, 
methodology and parametrization of the ERT in order to perfectly assess how those changes in retail offers might 
impact in the result and accordingly in variations over the wholesale price”. 
305 ETNO response to the Targeted Consultation, Q10. 
306 It is also in line with Telefonica’s response to the Targeted Consultation, Q10. 
307 Contribution to the Public Consultation on the Draft BEREC Guidance on the regulatory accounting approach to 





Finding 10. NRA approaches regarding the transparency of the process of designing the 
ERT/MST vary and transparency is alleged to be unsatisfactory by some operators. 
Transparency should address a number of key factors imbedded in the methodology, such 
as verification of forecast data accuracy, measures in case of failure, etc. 
Monitoring is another aspect where substantial differences exist across the EU as noted by the 
Albanian NRA in 2018308 based on data from Cullen International (provided in Table 13). One 
can assume that the situation has not evolved substantially since the data were collected for 
Table 13. 
Table 13. Approaches to ERT monitoring 
MS Periodicity Deadline 
for NRA 
decision 
What happens if the test fails? 
AT NRA examines compliance once per 
year. The SMP operator must inform 
ANOs in advance to allow them to 
replicate A1TA retail offers: four 
weeks before introducing new prices 
(including promotion discounts), in 
other cases 8, 12 or 16 weeks. 
Not 
applicable 
Adjustment of retail and/or wholesale 
prices. NRA may set wholesale prices 
and/or order operator to stop charging 
retail prices that cause price squeeze. 
BE Ex ante as part of the approval of 
wholesale tariffs. Ex post after the 
launch of a new retail product that 
likely will be considered a flagship 
product. 
Unspecified Adjustment of retail and/or wholesale 
prices at the discretion of the operator. 
(Principle 15 of BIPT PST guidelines) 
HR Before launch of retail offer 8 working 
days before. 
Reduced from previously applicable 






Adjustment of retail and/or wholesale 
prices. The NRA would issue an 
obligation for the SMP operator to allow 
for a sufficient margin, by either 
increasing the retail price or decreasing 
the wholesale price. If the SMP operator 
proceeded to launch the offer, HAKOM 
would revoke it. 
HAKOM decision of Jan. 18, 2017 
required HT to stop offering bundled 
offers that do not comply with the 
updated PST test within 8 days from 
receiving the decision. 
DK After launch of retail offer 
Every 6 months ERST will identify the 




Adjustment of retail prices. The SMP 
operator is, however, allowed to lower its 
prices to meet those of its competitors, 
even if it results in a price squeeze on 
flagship products. After the competitors 
have raised their prices, the SMP 
operator must adjust its retail prices 
within 2 months to eliminate a price 
squeeze. 




Adjustment of retail prices. TIM would 
need to notify a modified retail offer. 
 
308 AKEP, Rregullimi i tarifave të sipërmarrësve me FNT në tregun me shumicë të aksesit dhe origjinimit të 
shërbimeve celulare, 1 October 2018. 
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MS Periodicity Deadline 
for NRA 
decision 
What happens if the test fails? 
AGCOM can extend the deadline 




Within 12 months after the PST 
obligation has been imposed on the 
SMP operator. Within 3 months after 
the SMP operator has published its 
access reference offer or changed its 
access tariffs. Within 3 months after 
the SMP operator has announced 
changes to the flagship product or its 
tariffs. If SPRK wants to check 
whether or not the operator's access 





to wait for 
NRA 
decision 
Adjustment of retail and/or wholesale 
prices at the discretion of the operator 
NL Before launch of retail offer. 
KPN must do the test before product 
launch. 
Every quarter a report has to be sent 
to ACM. ACM may investigate in 
cases of 







to wait for 
NRA 
decision. 
Adjustment of retail and/or wholesale 
prices at the discretion of the operator. 
PT Before launch of retail offer. 





to wait for 
NRA 
decision 
Adjustment of retail and/or wholesale 
prices. The incumbent may choose to 
adjust retail and/or wholesale prices but 
in practice adjusted the 
wholesale price. 





Adjustment of retail and/or wholesale 
prices. 
The NRA can also revise remedies or 
regulate prices set in the market review. 
SI Before and after launch of retail offer. 
14 days before. 
In addition, every year a report has to 
be sent to AKOS. AKOS may 






Adjustment of retail and/or wholesale 
prices. 
AKOS may demand that an offer is 
blocked until wholesale prices are 
adjusted to allow 
replicability or the offer is modified. 
Source: AKEP, Rregullimi i tarifave të sipërmarrësve me FNT në tregun me shumicë të aksesit dhe origjinimit të 
shërbimeve celulare, 1 October 2018. 
Moreover, BEREC highlights the importance of follow-up activities: NRA must monitor “the 
evolution of existing flagship products (price modifications, temporary discounts, incorporation 
of new bundled services, etc.) as the mapping of those is complex and subject to change over 




revise the result of replicability analysis according to updated information more rapidly”309. This 
aspect is not contemplated in the current NDCM Recommendation310. 
Beyond monitoring, an effective and timely enforcement of compliance is also important. For 
example, a Lithuanian operator reported that while the SMP operator launched a promotional 
offer retail early 2020, the prices of wholesale central access were aligned only in the Autumn 
of 2020, leaving ANOs subject to a margin squeeze for several months311. A Spanish operator 
stated that modification of wholesale prices ex post does not compensate for the damage done 
in terms of customers lost due to aggressive competition and suggested introducing sanctions 
to SMP operators for unfair competition (excessive wholesale pricing) in cases where the ERT 
has not passed312. 
Finding 11. The process through which the effectiveness of the ERT is monitored varies 
strongly and is in some Member States allegedly ineffective. Moreover, the timing of the 
execution of the tests and of its follow up also diverge substantially. 
Comments received pertaining to MST in general 
In practical terms, the ERT as defined by the NDCM Recommendation is an MST. Just like 
any MST, it requires assessment of the relevant: 
• Downstream costs  
• Cost standard  
• Regulated wholesale inputs concerned and the relevant reference prices 
• Retail products 
• Period for running the test 
Therefore, the responses to the online survey relating to the implementation of MSTs in general 
are also relevant for the ERT. 
NRAs report that while implementing an MST is a complex process, the challenges can be 
overcome. Some NRAs have long experience in applying MSTs, such as the Spanish NRA 
which has applied an economic replicability test to the SMP operator’s broadband products 
since 2007. The NRA used this accumulated experience to the design and implementation of 
 
309 BEREC (2020), BEREC Response to the Targeted consultation on the revision of the Commission’s access 
recommendations, BoR (20) 169. Vodafone response to the Targeted Consultation Q10 also flags that “there should 
be more importance given to monitoring and control of promotions carried out by SMP operators and its effect in 
the market”. 
310 Guidance on ‘follow up’ is also advocated by Telefonica (response to the Targeted Consultation, Q10), which 
stresses that “In Spain every 6 months the NRAs carries out a revision of the assessment of the ERT already in 
place and Telefónica is facing the NRA is willing to modify the criteria and parameters applied to those products 6 
months before such update and then leading to an unbearable degree of uncertainty regarding the suitability of the 
retail offers already in place. Once a retail offer has successfully passed the ERT it could not be entitled to fail such 
test later on or at least it could not be assessed having not passed the test retroactively”. 
311 Case study interviews. 
312 Case study interviews. 
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the current ERT313. An NRA314 (supported by BEREC315) nevertheless advocates that the 
power of NRAs to request information about non-regulated products when they are included 
in a broadband bundle should be explicitly stated in the Recommendation. 
Diverging comments received from NRAs in response to the online survey reflect the different 
execution of MSTs across Member States316. BEREC reports confirm a wide variation among 
NRAs’ MSTs. For example, this is the case on how NRAs apply their ERT to bundles and/or 
promotions. Another major point of divergence is whether an ERT should be performed on a 
product-by-product basis or on a portfolio approach317. The portfolio approach is often used by 
the competition authorities, whereas a product-by-product approach is better suited for 
stimulating access by alternative operators.  
Should regulated access products subject to cost orientation be exempt from MST?  
An operator318 argues that when an economic replicability test covers wholesale products 
subject to cost-orientation this boils down to imposing retail obligations through the back door. 
The operator advocates guidance that ERT may not be applied in parallel with cost orientation 
remedies319.  
In Belgium, an operator expressed concern that the application of MST on top of the current 
‘fair pricing’ regulation is cumbersome, as both processes are very heavy in terms of 
operational follow up and could lead to adverse effects on the market. In their view, these are 
measures unnecessary doubling the regulatory burden320. 
 
313 BEREC (2020), BEREC Response to the Targeted consultation on the revision of the Commission’s access 
recommendations, BoR (20) 169, Q9: “CNMC approved its methodology for the ERT in March 2018. This 
methodology is highly comprehensive and considers issues such as wholesale volume discounts, long-term access 
agreements, the determination of flagship products, the regulatory treatment of bundles or the consideration of 
temporary discounts. It also sets clear procedural mechanisms to be applied in case a flagship product does not 
meet the replicability condition. Together with other regulatory instruments, the ERT has enhanced the incentives 
to roll out NGA infrastructures”. 
314 An NRA response to the online survey. 
315 BEREC (2020), BEREC Response to the Targeted consultation on the revision of the Commission’s access 
recommendations, BoR (20) 169, Q10 states that the revised recommendation should provide “explicit support for 
the gathering of information (especially the information related to the costs of the non-regulated components) in 
these cases, as this is essential to carry out the replicability analysis of broadband bundles”. 
316 Telefonica comes to the same conclusion in its response to the Targeted Consultation, Q10: “Though flexibility 
to adapt the application of the ERT to national or regional circumstances should be up to the NRA choice, it is also 
true that current heterogeneity when applying these general recommendations might create imbalances among 
Member States”. The Luxembourg NRA has a document "Principles and methodology of the margin squeeze testing 
approach (economic replicability test) in Luxembourg" describing how the ERT was implemented in Luxembourg 
as a possible best practice that could be used to increase consistency among varying national approaches. 
https://assets.ilr.lu/telecom/Documents/ILRLU-1461723625-790.pdf 
317 ETNO response to the Targeted Consultation, Q10 also advocates for guidance of the Commission on whether 
an alternative operator should be able to replicate every retail product or an economic approach to replicability 
based on a broad product portfolio. ETNO requests the more flexible option. ECTA response to the Targeted 
Consultation requests the opposite: “Apply to all SMP operator access products (rather than only flagship products), 
giving specific attention to full and reliable coverage of B2B and B2B2C scenarios (in addition to B2C scenarios). 
This is necessary in order to protect and promote effective competition for services to businesses and to public 
administrations in addition to the residential market”. 
318 EIR response to the Targeted Consultation, Q10. 
319 Orange and ETNO in response to the Targeted Consultation Q10 support the criticism and also advocate that 
in the presence of price-regulated NGA wholesale products, an additional ex ante replicability test (ERT or other) 
should not be imposed. Ex ante replicability tests (ERT or other) should only be implemented if no price regulation 
for wholesale products is imposed. 




However, BEREC acknowledges that several NRAs currently apply MST on top of cost 
orientation, rather than as a substitute321.  
Table 14. Use of MST as a complement to cost orientation 







Dark fibre in 
the access 
segment 














CZ, DE DE, EL DE, EL AT, DE, 
EL, IT, 
LT, PL 
AT, IE, IT, 
LT, PL 
Ex post MST DK, EE, LT LT LT LT, EE, 
DK 
LT LT, EE EE EE 
Source: BEREC RA report 2020 (BoR (20) 210)  
h. Guidance on the copper anchor 
Provisions concerned 
• Recital 193 EECC refers to “a demonstrable retail price constraint resulting from 
infrastructure competition or a price anchor stemming from other regulated access 
products, or both”. 
• Pursuant to Point 6.c of the NDCM Recommendation, the copper anchor is a cost-
oriented copper wholesale access product, which constrains NGA prices in such a way 
that NGA services will be priced in accordance with the consumers’ willingness to pay 
for the additional capacity and functionalities an NGA based retail product can provide 
in comparison with a copper-based retail product. 
• Recital 56 of the NDCM Recommendation indicates that: “If the product offered by the 
SMP operator on the legacy access network is no longer able to exercise a 
demonstrable retail price constraint on the NGA product (e. g. in the event of a copper 
switch-off), it could in principle be replaced by an NGA-based product that is tailored to 
have the same product features. However, it is not envisaged that such an NGA-based 
anchor will be required in the immediate future or before 2020.” 
Follow up by NRAs 
The copper anchor is relevant for some but not all NRAs. Under the NDCM Recommendation, 
a demonstrable retail price constraint on NGA-products stemming from cost-oriented access 
to the legacy copper access network (copper anchor) is only one of the alternative conditions 
under which no cost-orientation for NGA wholesale access products should be imposed322. 
Such a retail price constraint may also stem from other infrastructures (such as cable, mobile 
or alternative FTTH). Indeed, some of the responses to the online survey indicate that 
constraints from other infrastructures may be more relevant. The other conditions which all 
need to be fulfilled are that the following non-discrimination obligations should be in place: (i) 
 
321 See BoR (20) 210, Figure 6, p. 8. 
322 In Italy, e. g., price flexibility was based on the presence of infrastructure competition in specific areas (presence 
of (at least) two alternative access networks (FTTC or FTTH) ready to service, each of which covers 60% of 
customers’ premises. The total coverage (of both alternative networks) must not be less than 75%, while the SMPs 
retail NGA market share (by connections) must be less or equal to 40% and wholesale NGA active services (VULA 
and bitstream) share must be less than 80%). See Commission Decision of 11.07.2019 concerning case 
IT/2019/2181-2182, p.6 and Delibera N. 348/19/CONS, Documento V, point 102. 
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Equivalence of inputs (EoI) or obligations relating to technical replicability when EoI is not yet 
fully implemented and (ii) obligations relating to the economic replicability (economic 
replicability test – see above). Therefore, for NRAs which do not apply the ERT approach 
recommended by the NDCM Recommendation, the concept of the copper anchor is not directly 
relevant323. As a consequence, guidance on the copper anchor currently concerns only a 
limited number of NRAs324. Among them, two NRAs which consider the regulated local loop 
unbundling as the ‘copper anchor’ in their market, even if, in those countries the share of 
unbundled lines compared to the total number of fixed active connections on the network of 
the SMP operator is rather limited325. These figures hide marked geographical variations in 
one Member State, where the usage of ULL was much lower in competitive areas326. However, 
the decisive factor is not necessarily the relative market share of the anchor product, but rather 
the degree to which the anchor product constrains the retail prices of the SMP operator.  
To constrain the pricing of fibre-based wholesale products, copper- and fibre-based products 
must be substitutes and therefore be parts of the same market. Although this is likely to change 
in the future, this is still the case in most countries in which the NRA deems pure copper-based 
products (ADSL products), FTTC products, and pure fibre-based products as substitutes 
because end users consider them to be interchangeable. The fact that products are 
substitutable means that respective end user prices influence each other. In some countries, 
as the wholesale prices for ADSL products are subject to cost-based regulation, there is a 
copper anchor in place limiting the possibilities for setting excessive prices for relevant NGA 
products. Although copper has limitations in terms of speed and quality, end-users were overall 
satisfied with services provided over copper loops and would not consent paying a substantial 
premium for fibre-based services.  
NGA-based product that is tailored to have the same product features as the copper 
anchor 
Responses to the Commission’s targeted consultation revealed that “most stakeholders agree 
that the copper anchor continues to be relevant in many Member States”327. However, the 
competitive pressure stemming from this regulated anchor can be expected to diminish in the 
years to come.  
According to BEREC, whether a copper anchor exercises a demonstrable price constraint on 
an NGA- or a VHCN-based retail product “depends on factors such as the level of investment 
 
323 Even where still considered relevant, there may be other retail market competitive constraints. E. g. in the Czech 
republic where the NRA found that strong presence of alternative infrastructure operators (CATV, fixed LTE and to 
some degree also WiFi operators) exerted a constraint on the retail prices (ČTÚ market analysis ČTÚ-79 197/2015-
611). 
324 In total, 8 NRAs indicated that they use copper unbundling when deciding to subject other wholesale access 
products to pricing flexibility, 4 NRAs indicated that they use virtual or active products provided over the copper 
network (upgraded or not), while 7 NRAs indicated other. NRAs could indicate more than one type of product. 
325 However, to constrain the pricing of access to VHCN products, copper LLU must belong to the same market as 
fibre. For example, in Sweden no such constraint exists despite the large reported share of ULL because there is, 
according to the Swedish NRA, a break in the chain of substitution between copper and fibre-based products. 
However this finding was questioned by the Commission, which stated that: “it is not obvious that Telia, despite its 
monopoly position, is able to continue to behave independently of its competitors and ultimately consumers. The 
consumers show a strong preference for higher performing products and have to a large extent the ability to switch. 
Moreover, where no fixed alternative is available, consumers may in the future be able to substitute a copper 
broadband subscription with mobile broadband” (Commission Comments of 6.12.2019 concerning Case 
SE/2019/2216, p.15). 
326 An NRA response to the online survey. 
327 Access Recommendations: Factual summary report of the targeted consultation on the proposed revision, 8 





in new networks which act as a network competitor to the existing copper network and the 
price and demand patterns observed in the market (…) and possibly additional considerations. 
For example, in cases where a chain of substitution leads to a market definition encompassing 
legacy copper, a copper anchor might still be sufficient. This may be because, for example, 
with non-VHCN NGA-networks (e.g. FTTC-Vectoring) and FTTB/H-products similar retail 
offers are provided based on all of these networks”328.  
However, an NRA already found that copper networks no longer provide competitive pressure 
on coaxial and fibre networks329 as well as the Swedish NRA in its market review that was 
withdrawn in 2020330. According to another NRA, copper unbundling is becoming less 
important following migration to VULA and the main pricing constraints stem from cable 
networks and mobile broadband331. Yet another NRA also found that local copper access and 
non-NGA bitstream are not able to constrain NGA prices (FTTC, FTTH, HFC) due to volumes 
being too low, while a different NRA says that rather than from copper technology, the 
competitive constraint is arising from alternative infrastructures332. An NRA reports that the 
copper anchor has declined in importance for an access seeker given that fibre unbundling is 
available almost everywhere. Fibre unbundling is easier to implement than VDSL from a street 
cabinet. So, having these considerations in mind, the NRA doubts that the copper anchor will 
remain a serious constraint for the NGA price333. 
Ireland is another Member State where the pricing of access to the copper local loop (mainly 
for the provision of ADSL broadband at a retail level) no longer constrains that of FTTC or 
FTTH wholesale access. Consequently, the Irish NRA decided to subject FTTC access (FTTC 
VUA) to cost orientation where it was previously only subject to an MST334. The NRA justified 
the move on among other grounds as follows335:  
• The constraint posed by copper-based broadband is likely to have diminished as 
evidenced by the reduction in LLU volumes and the switch from copper to fibre-based 
services in the NGA footprint. 
• The SMP operator increased its NGA wholesale prices twice since the launch of NGA 
services in 2013. In July 2015, Eircom increased the VUA monthly rental price by €2, 
from €17.50 to €19.50. From 1 September 2016, Eircom increased the rental price for 
FTTC based VUA by €3.50, from €19.50 to €23 and the monthly rental price for FTTH 
based VUA by €3. 
• Similarly, at a retail level, Eircom increased its retail broadband prices for standalone 
NGA products by about €5 (incl. VAT). These pricing developments demonstrate that 
Eircom’s prices do not appear to be effectively constrained at a retail or wholesale level 
in the presence of the existing form of price regulation.  
 
328 BEREC (2020), BEREC Response to the Targeted consultation on the revision of the Commission’s access 
recommendations, BoR (20) 169, Q12. 
329 An NRA response to the online survey. 
330 Commission Decision of 7.02.2020 concerning case SE/2019/2216, p.2. 
331 An NRA response to the online survey. 
332 An NRA response to the online survey. 
333 An NRA response to the online survey. 
334 Referred to by Vodafone as a best practice in its response to the Targeted Consultation, Q9: “ComReg’s 
assessment of the FTTC market in 2018 noted that ‘the absence of direct and indirect pricing constraints indicates 
that economic replicability on its own has not been sufficient to address competition problems in the WLA market, 
and that is why ComReg has now decided to impose cost orientation on FTTC-based VUA in the WLA Market”. 
335 ComReg 18/95, Decision D11/18. 
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The Irish case illustrates that when an NRA finds that copper no longer constrains fibre, it can 
‘move up’ the anchor from legacy to FTTC NGA access. However, contrary to what was 
advocated by an expert336, the Irish NRA did not in parallel remove legacy product access 
pricing obligations337. At the same time, the Irish NRA maintained price flexibility for VUA based 
on FTTH, but mainly because of the difficulty in modelling the access in order to set cost-
oriented prices. 
The UK NRA came to similar conclusions and changed its previous approach regarding the 
SMP operator’s lower bandwidth VULA services (VULA 40/10) by introducing a charge control. 
The NRA justified this change (among other grounds) by the apparent fact that the pricing 
constraint previously exercised by LLU access ('the copper anchor') was no longer sufficiently 
strong to constrain the VULA 40/10 pricing in a way that would avoid a negative knock-on 
effect for retail superfast broadband prices338. As in Ireland, the UK NRA maintained cost 
orientation for LLU (except shared use) on grounds that access seekers need MPF access in 
addition to a VULA product to provide end-users with a retail high-speed broadband package. 
In cases where copper-based products are already being phased out and largely replaced by 
FTTC-Vectoring based products, the latter might thus become the focal product for exercising 
retail price constraints on VHCN-based products. However, where “copper is being phased out 
and replaced by new and enhanced networks, especially FTTH/B, a chain of substitution might 
be absent. This might lead to situations, where no retail price constraint is observed at all”339.  
Finding 12. The copper anchor continues to be relevant in many Member States. However, 
given the diverging market evolution in the various Member States, different ‘anchor 
products’ may be appropriate across the EU in the future. 
Given varying levels of take up of virtual local access products and of fibre deployment from 
Member State to Member State, different ‘anchor products’ are likely to be used across the EU 
in the future. For example, an NRA considers that in its market, coax could possibly be an 
anchor for fibre (replace copper) under the right circumstances340, while another NRA reports 
that FTTC bitstream could theoretically be used as an anchor product, although it is already 
an NGA product341. Two NRAs could envisage differentiating remedies geographically and 
maintaining the copper anchor in some areas, while using another anchor in other areas. Other 
respondents did not consider such differentiation appropriate. 
 
336 Brian Williamson (2017), Supporting fibre rollout and infrastructure competition in Ireland via continued pricing 
flexibility, June 2017 Communications Chambers, p.34,  
337 The prices for LLU continue to be set by a combination of BU-LRAIC+ costing methodology and a Top-down 
HCA costing methodology (the revised copper access model - CAM). See Commission Decision of 10.10.2018 
concerning Case IE/2018/2115, p.3.   
338 Commission No-Comments Letter of 22.03.2018 concerning Case UK/2018/2062, p.8. 
339 BEREC (2020), BEREC Response to the Targeted consultation on the revision of the Commission’s access 
recommendations, BoR (20) 169, Q12. 
340 An NRA response to the online survey. 




i. Guidance on other circumstances in which pricing remedies are not 
appropriate 
Provisions concerned 
• Point 58 NDCM Recommendation says that the demonstrable retail price constraint, 
ERT and strict non-discrimination scenario “should not be seen as the only 
circumstances under which NRAs can decide not to impose regulated access prices 
for NGA wholesale inputs. Depending on the demonstration of effective equivalence of 
access and on competitive conditions, in particular effective infrastructure-based 
competition, there may be additional scenarios where the imposition of regulated 
wholesale access prices is not warranted under the Regulatory Framework” 
• Recital 193 EECC states that beyond the case of demonstrable retail price constraint, 
ERT and strict non-discrimination, NRAs may identify “circumstances under which it 
would be appropriate not to impose regulated access prices for certain wholesale 
inputs, such as where high price elasticity of end-user demand makes it unprofitable 
for the undertaking designated as having significant market power to charge prices 
appreciably above the competitive level or where lower population density reduces 
incentives for the development of very high capacity networks and the national 
regulatory authority establishes that effective and non-discriminatory access is ensured 
through obligations imposed in accordance with this Directive”. 
• Art.68.2 EECC provides that where an undertaking is designated as having significant 
market power (SMP) on a specific market, NRAs shall, as appropriate, impose ex ante 
regulatory obligations. In accordance with the principle of proportionality, NRAs must 
choose the least intrusive way of addressing problems identified in the market analysis. 
• Art.74.1 EECC states that “(…) In determining whether price control obligations would 
be appropriate, NRAs shall take into account the need to promote competition and 
long-term end-user interests related to the deployment and take-up of next-generation 
networks and in particular of very high-capacity networks. In particular, to encourage 
investments by the undertaking, including in next-generation networks, NRAs shall take 
into account the investment made by the undertaking (…)”. 
Some examples 
Neither of the Access Recommendations provides guidance as to specific circumstances in 
which pricing obligations are not required beyond the specific scenario of ERT, effective non-
discrimination and pricing constraints from the retail market. To date only a very limited number 
of NRAs that have found SMP on the wholesale local access market decided not to impose 
any pricing obligation on the SMP operator. 
The Portuguese NRA goes the furthest. The SMP operator is under no obligations as regards 
the provision of physical or virtual fibre unbundling at a certain price. It is not even mandated 
to provide such access in areas where no alternative infrastructure has yet been deployed.  
The NRA only imposes access to LLU and to ducts and poles, waiving regulated access to 
fibre in areas without infrastructure competition on proportionality grounds given that the SMP's 
fibre coverage in these non-competitive areas was also limited and that the NGA access 
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regulation could constitute a disincentive to further NGA deployment. NRA also referred to a 
wholesale commercial access offer to fibre published by the SMP operator342. 
Similarly, but with a much more limited geographic scope, the Belgian NRA decided to refrain 
from regulation for five years after an infrastructure becomes operational. All pricing obligations 
on wholesale access to any new NGA infrastructure (including upgrades of non-NGA 
infrastructures) rolled out in ‘white’ areas have been lifted. Only the following obligations are 
then imposed:  
• An obligation to negotiate access in good faith  
• Access to civil engineering or failing this, dark fibre  
• Access intended to serve non-residential multi-site customers  
• Transparency measures related to the evolution of the network 
The ‘white areas’ cover 299,000 households or 6.2% of Belgian households. The areas are 
defined as areas currently served only by a single NGA infrastructure. The Belgian NRA so 
aims to improve the service quality and/or a user’s choice in these areas by stimulating 
investments. An operator would not consider the regime foreseen for ‘white areas’ as a 
‘regulatory holiday’, as you would get a softer regulatory regime, but as still some level of a 
regulatory access regime (obligation to negotiate on fair and reasonable terms), rather than 
full deregulation. The regulatory tool covers a minor territory, as there are not too many formal 
white areas in Belgium343. 
In addition, the Belgian NRA decided to phase out, after a transition period, all pricing remedies 
in certain geographical areas - defined on the basis of a statistical unit at a level below the 
boundaries of municipalities – (See chapter on geographic segmentation) as soon as they are 
served by three independent NGA operators. Being independent covers:  
• Completely independent passive infrastructure, or 
• regulated duct access or wavelength unbundling from SMP operator, or 
• a passive commercial agreement with the SMP operator compliant with some 
requirements defined in a market analysis.  
The market analysis encourages lighter regulation in the presence of a third independent 
operator. A co-investment agreement of a structural nature is one of the requirements to 
achieve that. This is a lighter regime, but not full deregulation. An operator states that one 
could argue whether there is still a case for ex ante regulation altogether in an environment 
with three independent NGA operators (or three independent passive infrastructures). They 
state that as the sunk costs of deploying fibre in fact are high, all networks are conceived as 
open networks, trying to capture as much market demand as possible. A different operator 
also considers the requirement of three competing infrastructure operators to be excessive, 
and that two competing infrastructures where at least one of those provide (active) access on 
 
342 The Commission challenged the measure and recommended that the NRA to impose a wholesale obligation to 
provide access to the unbundled fibre line as well as to bitstream over fibre. In doing so, ANACOM should consider 
whether to grant MEO a degree of pricing flexibility for the fibre access product in line with the Commission 
Recommendation on Non-discrimination and Costing. The Portuguese NRA nevertheless disregarded the 
recommendation of 29.11.2016 C(2016) 7674 final in Cases PT/2016/1888 and PT/2016/1889: Wholesale local 
access provided at a fixed location and wholesale central access provided at a fixed location for mass-market 
products. 




a commercial basis (‘2.5 infrastructures’) should already be sufficient to create a competitive 
environment to lift SMP remedies in the geographic areas concerned344. 
As in the case of the white zones, the only remedies that will continue to apply are: 
• The obligation to negotiate access in good faith  
• Access to civil engineering or failing this, dark fibre  
• Access intended to serve non-residential multi-site customers  
• Transparency measures related to the evolution of the network 
The Belgian NRA considers that in these areas, investment in VDSL networks is barely 
profitable and consequently seeks to avoid imposing any measure that would carry a 
substantial risk of stifling investment incentives. 
Also worthwhile mentioning that in another Member State, the NRA is currently in the process 
of negotiating commitments with several operators who do not wish to be regulated by classical 
price regulation (LRAIC)345.  
ETNO346 advocates that in the presence of retail competitive constraints resulting from 
increasing infrastructure-based competition, ex ante remedies that affect retail pricing of the 
regulated operator, such as the ex ante economic replicability test (ERT), should not be 
imposed where price controls remain on one or more wholesale products in the market (which 
may provide some anchor product constraints), a fortiori if EoI/EoO is imposed and already 
ensures effective non-discrimination. 
Telefonica347 also argues that if certain conditions are met, price control in VHCN would be 
disproportionate particularly in markets where in a forward-looking perspective, effective 
access to civil engineering infrastructure is leading to effective infrastructure-based 
competition (as it is the case in Spain) and where effective non-discrimination obligations are 
in place ensuring the technical replicability of the retail products or EoO and an appropriate 
definition and monitoring of KPIs.  
Access seekers do not show much support for such approaches. According to Iliad, “Any tariff 
control flexibility on wholesale offers should be strictly limited to resale products only and in a 
context of effective competition by at least 3 or 4 operators representing a significant market 
share (e.g. > to 60%)”348. 
A study (meta-analysis of previous empirical research) conducted by PTS349 highlights the 
empirical evidence from prominent academic research showing that incumbent investments 
are increasing in response to alternative operators’ investments, but the reasoning is not valid 
for the reverse ratio, i.e. incumbent investments do not trigger investments in the same way 
from alternative operators. PTS then highlights that in Sweden, ANOs were the first to invest 
in their fibre infrastructure, which, if the above reasoning is true, would explain Sweden’s 
 
344 Case study interviews. 
345 An NRA response to the online survey. 
346 ETNO response to the Targeted Consultation, Q10. 
347 Written feedback to the Stakeholders‘ workshop of 9 June 2021.  
348 Iliad response to the Targeted Consultation, Q19. 
349  PTS (2019). Så påverkas investeringar i ny infrastruktur av tillträdesregleringens utformning [How investments 
in new infrastructure are affected by the design of access regulation]. Report number PTS-ER-2019:6. 
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success in achieving high fibre coverage despite the relatively large area and sparse 
population density. PTS also mentions the NGA Recommendation directly, questioning 
whether access regulation is the key measure to bringing about infrastructure competition: 
“The [NGA] recommendation [Points 39 and 40] can be interpreted as that future regulation of 
new infrastructures is still expected to start from an access perspective, i.e. to create conditions 
for service-based competition in the incumbent network in order to ultimately encourage 
service providers to invest in their own infrastructure. This goes partly against what research 
has shown regarding the causal relationship between infrastructure investments from 
incumbent and alternative operators. A new framework directive with accompanying 
recommendations is under development (2018) and it remains to be seen how this issue is 
dealt with there.”350 
Finding 13. Only a few NRAs that have designated an operator as having SMP on the 
market for wholesale local access have decided to waive pricing obligations, other than in 
the scenario of ERT, effective non-discrimination remedies, and retail price constraints as 
envisioned in the NDCM.   
j. Guidance on pricing remedies other than cost orientation 
Provisions concerned 
• Recital 192 EECC provides: “Price control may be necessary when market analysis in 
a particular market reveals inefficient competition (…) The method of cost recovery 
should be appropriate to the circumstances taking account of the need to promote 
efficiency, sustainable competition and deployment of very high capacity networks and 
thereby maximise end-user benefits (…)” 
• A national regulatory authority may, in accordance with Article 68, impose obligations 
relating to cost recovery and price control, including obligations for a cost-orientation 
of prices and obligations concerning cost-accounting systems, for the provision of 
specific types of interconnection or access, in situations where a market analysis 
indicates that a lack of effective competition means that the undertaking concerned 
may sustain prices at an excessively high level, or may apply a price squeeze to the 
detriment of end-users. 
• Art.74.1 EECC: “A national regulatory authority may, in accordance with Article 68, 
impose obligations relating to cost recovery and price control, including 
obligations for cost orientation of prices and obligations concerning cost-accounting 
systems, for the provision of specific types of interconnection or access, in situations 
where a market analysis indicates that a lack of effective competition means that the 
undertaking concerned may sustain prices at an excessively high level, or may apply a 
price squeeze, to the detriment of end-users” (emphasis added). 
• In addition, the EECC foresees several circumstances in which access should be 
provided on “fair and reasonable” terms:  
 
350 Ibid. Original quote in Swedish: “[NGA r]ekommendationen kan tolkas som att framtida reglering på ny 
infrastruktur fortfarande förväntas utgå ifrån ett tillträdesperspektiv, dvs. skapa förutsättningar för tjänstebaserad 
konkurrens i inkumbentens nät för att i förlängningen uppmuntra tjänsteleverantörerna att investera i egen 
infrastruktur. Detta går delvis emot vad forskningen visat gällande det kausala förhållandet mellan 
infrastrukturinvesteringar från inkumbent respektive alternativa operatörer. Ett nytt ramdirektiv med tillhörande 




a) In the context of symmetrical obligations beyond the first concentration or 
distribution point (Article 61.3 second subparagraph of the Code).  
b) Where the SMP operator enters into a co-investment agreement (Art.76.1 (b)(i)) 
or  
c) when the SMP operator is a wholesale only operator (Article 80 of the Code).  
• In its guidance on the implementation of Art.76.1 (b)(i), BEREC states that for the 
assessment of financial terms of co-investment agreements, “NRAs could make use in 
particular of information that forms the basis for the network deployment’s business 
case. For example, information about anticipated costs, expected evolution of demand 
and revenues, as well as the resulting economic risk associated with the deployment 
might be of interest to the NRAs and could be evaluated. If possible, NRAs could also 
use information gathered from benchmarks of comparable co-investment agreements 
that are already in place or other agreements between market participants. However, 
the amount of agreements already in place as well as the comparability between 
different existing agreements and thus different deployment projects might be very 
limited. This especially seems relevant for the comparison of projects across different 
countries. Furthermore, NRAs should look at undertakings actually operating in the 
market and their ability to compete effectively and sustainably in the long term based 
on the given terms and conditions. This assessment should take into particular 
consideration the results of the market test conducted in accordance with Article 79 (2). 
In case the NRA concludes that an efficient undertaking cannot compete effectively 
and sustainably when accepting the proposed terms of the co-investment offer, these 
terms usually cannot be considered being fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory and 
thus do not comply with the conditions of Article 76 (1) (b) (i). Alternatively, NRAs could 
potentially evaluate the terms of the co-investment offer by assuming a hypothetical 
efficient provider of electronic communications networks and/or services. If there are 
different business models present in the market, NRAs could also make use of several 
different hypothetical providers of electronic communications networks and/or services 
for this type of assessment.”351  
• The Broadband Cost Reduction Directive (hereafter BCRD) refers to “fair and 
reasonable terms and conditions, including prices” in Recital 18 and Article 3(2). Such 
pricing must take into account the impact of the requested access on the business plan 
of the access provider (Article 3(5) subparagraph 2 BCRD). In this respect, the dispute 
settlement body (DSB) should also take “into account national conditions and any tariff 
structures put in place to provide a fair opportunity for cost recovery taking into account 
any previous imposition of remedies by a national regulatory authority” (Recital 19 
BCRD). 
Cases of application of ‘fair pricing’ instead of ‘cost orientation’  
Neither the NGA nor the NDCM Recommendation refers to the notion of “fair and reasonable” 
pricing, but this silence does not prevent NRAs from applying such a pricing remedy. In May 
2020, the Belgian NRA published352 its decisions regarding wholesale tariffs for access to cable 
networks. The Belgian NRA decided that a strict cost-orientation would not be proportionate 
 
351 BoR (20) 113, p.20. 
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and defined a ‘fair’ access price, creating possibilities for competition on the retail market to 
the benefit of the end-users, whilst remunerating the network operators fairly for access. A 
similar pricing obligation applies for VULA FTTH353.  
Fair prices mean ensuring that prices maintain a link to costs, while including a potentially 
reasonable margin between costs and prices so as to encourage FTTH deployments. These 
margins were set as follows for bitstream on cable networks: 
Table 15. Additional margins by speed category for bitstream over cable 
Category 2019-2021 From 2022 onwards 
Standard = no margin Up to 200 Mbps included Up to 400 Mbps included 
High = 2.5 % margin More than 200 Mbps up to 600 
Mbps included 
More than 400 Mbps up to 900 
Mbps included 
Top = 5 % margin More than 600 Mbps More than 900 Mbps 
Source: Draft BIPT decision [Projet de décision du Conseil de l’IBPT concernant les tarifs mensuels pour l’accès 
de gros au réseau FTTH de Proximus. Version publique destinée à la Commission européenne]. 
The reason why the Belgian NRA did not allow a mark-up for speeds up to 200 Mbps is that 
such speeds were available even before the latest modernisation investments undertaken by 
the operators. Moreover, the 200 Mbps speed product is taken up by a significant proportion 
of customers, which also points towards a product that does not entail exceptional risks. The 
100 Mbps threshold for FTTH354 is based on similar findings. 
To determine its mark-up, the Belgian NRA drew on the experience of Dutch and German 
NRAs: 
• the Dutch NRA granted a risk premium of 3.5 % for ODF access 
• The German NRA uses a mark-up of 15 % above LRIC+ costs already including WACC 
to compute its non-abuse test. The value is based on German case law, but the 
Commission commented that a mark-up in the range of 5-10 % would be more 
appropriate355.  
Regarding FTTH356, the Belgian NRA allowed additional margins, on top of the WACC as 
follows357: 
 
353 Décision du Conseil de l’IBPT du 9 mars 2021 concernant les tarifs mensuels pour l’accès de gros au réseau 
FTTH de Proximus. See in particular p.10 : “Par ‘équitable’, la CRC entend un prix qui peut être supérieur aux coûts 
mais qui conserve un lien avec les coûts. En d’autres termes, une marge raisonnable peut exister entre les coûts 
et le prix. Cette obligation sera vérifiée à l’aide d’un modèle de coûts LRIC bottom-up qui reflète les coûts d’un 
opérateur efficace. L’IBPT tiendra compte autant que possible de la méthode de comptabilisation des coûts 
recommandée par la Commission européenne”. The document is available at : 
https://www.bipt.be/file/cc73d96153bbd5448a56f19d925d05b1379c7f21/24f86c5f77046d35dece4aaf4cf2a249966
6135b/Decision_tarifs_mensuels_acces_gros_reseau_FTTH_Proximus_2021-03-09.pdf  
354 Draft BIPT decision [Projet de décision du Conseil de l’IBPT concernant les tarifs mensuels pour l’accès de gros 
au réseau FTTH de Proximus. Version publique destinée à la Commission européenne]. 
355 Commission Decision of 16.12.2016 concerning Case DE/2016/1954 
356 Commission Comments of 25.022021 concerning Case BE/2021/2301.Final decision adopted on 9 March 2021. 




Table 16. Additional margins by speed category for VULA FTTH and bitstream over 
FTTH 
Category 2019-2021 From 2022 onwards 
Standard = no margin Up to 100 Mbps included Up to 400 Mbps included 
High = 2.5 % margin More than 100 Mbps up to 600 
Mbps included 
More than 400 Mbps up to 900 
Mbps included 
Top = 5 % margin More than 600 Mbps More than 900 Mbps 
Source: NRA decision of 26 May 2020 [Décision de la CRC du 26 mai 2020 concernant les tarifs mensuels pour 
l’accès de gros aux réseaux des câblo-opérateurs pour la radiodiffusion télévisuelle sur le territoire de la région 
bilingue de Bruxelles-Capitale et la large bande]. 
Operators agree that Proximus faces competitive pressure from cable operators (especially 
since cable operators have the possibility to offer 1Gbps products over their HFC networks), 
as well as potentially being overbuilt by newly-constructed FTTH networks (e.g. Fluvius in 
Flanders)358. A stakeholder also sees uncertainties related to the demand as being particularly 
relevant, noting that in the past few years, Proximus FTTC market shares were subject to the 
constraints of upgraded HFC networks. In their view, this may increase the uncertainty related 
to the take-up that can be reached on the FTTH network that Proximus had started to build359, 
i.e. making it difficult for FTTH network operators to compete with the cable incumbent offering 
very high speed products.  
A stakeholder indicates that the effect of new pricing on FTTH deployment is not fully clear 
(although some extension of FTTH deployment ambitions can be observed, but the number of 
lines captured by alternative operators up to now may be considered as limited)360. For cable 
access, the new pricing is also too recent to draw conclusions. A stakeholder is of the opinion 
that at this stage, it is too early to say whether the ‘inventive’ regulation in the form of extra 
margins of 2.5 or 5% above the cost-oriented tariffs for higher speed tiers is effective, given 
that some of the speed tiers concerned are not taken up in the market361. Data in Figure 17 
shows that in 2019 some 37% of subscriptions were still below 100 Mbps. Unfortunately, data 
breakdowns by speeds above 100 Mbps are not available in BIPT’s data. 
 
358 Case study interviews. 
359 Case study interviews. 
360 Case study interviews. 
361 Case study interviews. 
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Figure 17. Distribution of (active) fixed broadband lines by transmission speed (2015-
2019) 
 
Source: BIPT Economic situation of the telecoms sector 2019: data of 30 June 2020 
Note: since 2019, there are 261 lines capable of speeds of 1Gbps or more; this number is not represented in the 
graph before since it comprises a negligible percentage (0.006%) of the total lines. 
Proximus is of the opinion that ‘fair pricing’ appears to be working out, as it endorses, at this 
point in time, Proximus’ proposed wholesale prices. Proximus views ‘fair pricing’ methodology 
as ‘escaping’ the ‘binary’ system of the Recommendations (which advocate either strict cost-
orientation or pricing flexibility with ERT). However, there are still points for discussion: VDSL 
is not regulated under fair pricing, although it is also an NGA network. Tiering in particular is 
helpful for investment. However, they are of the view that investments in general deserve to 
be allowed to have a better margin. ERT allows for that in a context where competition is 
safeguarded, but at the same time allows operators to maximize revenues on a network, which 
is especially important in the context of huge sunk costs (where they need to get any margin 
they can). Customers are also safeguarded by the fact that in VHCN economies, there is no 
other way to make the network profitable other than by getting many customers onto the 
network. There is no economic incentive to increase prices beyond a competitive level362. 
Prior to the decisions by the Belgian NRA, OFCOM in the UK was imposing fair and reasonable 
access prices (e.g. for the LLU Shared Metallic Path Facility (SMPF) and the wholesale copper 
input for basic broadband services363). The UK NRA interprets the fair and reasonable 
obligation to mean that the SMP operator should not set prices that would equate to a margin 
squeeze-under ex post competition law for existing and new forms of network access364.  
The French NRA is also using fair and reasonable prices365 for the pricing of access to their in-
house segment and to connections enabling the provision of electronic communications 
services to end-users366 in the context of the symmetric framework. 
 
362 Case study interviews 
363 Commission No-Comments Letter of 22.03.2018 concerning Case UK/2018/2062, p.8. 
364 OFCOM, consultation document ‘Promoting competition and investment in fibre networks: Wholesale Fixed 
Telecoms Market Review 2021-26’, Volume 4: Pricing remedies, 8 January 2020, p.1, footnote 1. 
365 See Decision no. 2009-1106 which states that “ la tarification mise en œuvre par l’opérateur d’immeuble doit 
répondre à plusieurs objectifs : « […] - encourager l’investissement des opérateurs, notamment à travers les 
schémas de cofinancement prévoyant un partage équitable des coûts entre opérateurs. Afin de répondre à ces 
objectifs, il convient, pour établir la tarification des offres d’accès, de prendre en compte les principes suivants (…)- 
le principe de non-discrimination […], le principe d’objectivité […], le principe de pertinence [… et] le principe 
d’efficacité des investissements […], conformes aux objectifs fixés dans le II de l’article L. 32-1 ». The pricing 
obligation thus links ‘fair’ pricing with the deployment cost of the in-house cabling. 
366 Art. L. 34-8-3 of the Post and Electronic Communications Law. NRA decisions taken under this article, i.e. 
Decisions 2009-1106 and 2010-1312 specify the tariff conditions for access to the point of mutualisation. Article 3 


























Under the BCRD, ten Member States have not defined the term “fair and reasonable” pricing, 
while in 14 Member States the law includes further guidance on pricing367 or foresees 
publication of rules regarding pricing methodologies368. “Reference to recovery of cost leads 
some DSBs to explicitly interpret “fair and reasonable” as “cost orientation”, both in general (5 
Member States) and within the framework of a case-specific approach (2 Member States). 
However, other NRAs have specified a more general approach, where reference is made to 
the impact of pricing on the business model and investments and/or to the opportunity cost of 
providing access (5 Member States). For example, the German NRA, based on principles 
under BCRD and the DigiNetz Law, calculate fair and reasonable prices on a case-by-case 
basis taking into account the state of the network infrastructure used and the effect of network 
sharing on the owner’s profitability”369. Some NRAs also place the focus on existing market 
prices, (mainly regulated prices), as a relevant element to be considered (4 Member 
States)”370. 
Finding 14. Only a few NRAs have imposed ‘fair and reasonable’ pricing obligations on 
SMP operators for wholesale broadband access products. The meaning attached to the 
term by each of them is different. BCRD uses a similar terminology for access to civil 
engineering and in-house cabling. However, national implementation reveals substantial 
differences of interpretation. 
Impact 
According to the French operator Iliad in France, “the notion of fair and reasonable conditions 
has been applied in the context of fibre deployment as described above (i.e. based on costs + 
rate of return on capital employed taking into account the specific risk attached to fibre 
deployment). We consider that this has indeed contributed to encouraging deployments and 
promoting competition on fibre, as shown by the figures (deployment of 20 million sockets; 
almost 10 million subscribers)”371. 
In the case of Belgium, Proximus views ‘fair pricing’ based on tiering particularly helpful as an 
investment incentive. However, they are of the general view that investments deserve to be 
allowed to have a better margin.372. However, both the NRA and the company Telenet warn 
that the new pricing approach is too recent to draw conclusions373. 
Other feedback from the stakeholders 
BEREC argues that the concept of fair and reasonable can rather be seen as context 
dependent. “(…) “Fair and reasonable” has to be seen in the context of the regulatory 
objectives which need to be balanced out, e.g. with respect to the objective to “promote 
competition” (Art. 3(2)(b) and (d) EECC) or to “promote connectivity” (Article 3(2)(a) and (d) 
EECC) and to “promote efficient investment and innovation” (Article 3(4)(d) EECC). Therefore, 
 
access must be reasonable and comply with the principles of non-discrimination, objectivity, relevance and 
efficiency. 
367 E. g., in Portugal where the law transposing BCRD foresees that access prices should be cost-oriented. 
368 BoR (19) 23. 
369 Vodafone response to the Targeted Consultation, Q12. 
370 BoR (19) 23. 
371 Iliad response to the Targeted Consultation, Q12. 
372 Case study interviews. 
373 Case study interviews. 
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in re the need for further guidance on the concept of “fair and reasonable” terms and conditions 
in the revised access recommendation(s), the conclusions are as follows. BEREC deems it of 
the utmost importance to regard the notion of “fair and reasonable terms and conditions” as a 
broad concept, which needs to be applied context-dependent and thus cannot be directly 
linked to a specific pricing methodology. Because of this, BEREC is of the opinion that there is 
no need for further specific guidance that would limit the required flexibility for the application 
of the concept of “fair and reasonable”374. 
According to Telecom Italia, “the right of access to existing infrastructures according to the 
principles established by the BCRD - and in particular the obligation to apply “fair and 
reasonable” terms and conditions - can effectively contribute to the development of [very high 
capacity] networks and promote competition”375. Deutsche Telekom adds that “guidance 
concerning the notion of fair and reasonable would be appreciated if such guidance clarifies 
the relationship between prices which are subject to cost-based ex ante price control and 
negotiated prices. As a general rule, a regulatory pricing decision concerning a dispute on “fair 
and reasonable” prices between providers of electronic communication networks should lead 
to higher prices than a regulatory pricing decision because of a cost-based price control and 
should have a strong reference to market prices”376. On the other hand, ECTA warns that “the 
concept of “fair and reasonable terms and conditions” contained in BCRD was intended to be 
more favourable to the access provider than a standard of cost-orientation because the target 
of the BCRD was not SMP operators in the electronic communications sector, which were 
understood to be subject to separate specific SMP-based ex ante regulation”377. 
Cases of application of price controls in the form of price caps based on a 
predetermined policy premium instead of cost-orientation 
In the Netherlands, access to the Optical Distribution Frame (ODF-access) of a joint-venture378 
between the SMP operator and Reggefiber has been subject to price caps based on a 
discounted cashflow (DCF) model which takes into account the business case of 
KPN/Reggefiber379. The price caps on monthly maximum fees (initially a monthly rental €14.5-
€17.5 per FTTH fibre pair depending on the underlying construction costs in the respective 
areas) were defined using as a basis the business model of the investors (not an NRA cost 
model) and the investors’ internal rate of return (IRR) of 7% to 10%. The cap was indexed 
every year based on the consumer price index (CPI) during the review period. In order to 
provide a predictable framework for the investors, NRA determined how caps would be 
reviewed at the next market review. If IRR was above the ‘all-risk WACC’ (i.e. ‘excessive 
return’), NRA would adjust the price cap downwards (a situation of ‘over performance’). 
Conversely, if IRR was close to the ‘all-risk WACC’, the investors would be allowed to choose 
to be price-regulated (capped) on wholesale fibre unbundling going forward, to offer greater 
volume discounts for wholesale fibre unbundling, or to extend the network to areas that are 
less profitable to avoid being regulated (the goal being to stimulate deployment). In cases 
where the further deployment option would not be chosen, the cap would be reduced for the 
next 3-year period, but again allow for annual CPI-related increases. The ‘all-risk WACC’ 
 
374 BEREC (2020), BEREC Response to the Targeted consultation on the revision of the Commission’s access 
recommendations, BoR (20) 169, Q18. 
375 Telecom Italia response to the Targeted Consultation, Q12. 
376 Deutsche Telekom response to the Targeted Consultation, Q12. 
377 ECTA response to the Targeted Consultation, Q12. 
378 Although KPN had at the time only a 41% stake in JV, NRA included it in the KPN designation as the operator 
with Significant Market Power (SMP) on Market 4 (wholesale (physical) network access at a fixed location). 






included a risk premium of 3.5% on top of the WACC applicable to the legacy copper network 
(i.e. 7.6%-10.5% after taxes) addressing: (i) fibre-project specific risk on demand/take-up of 
fibre access, and (ii) asymmetric risks380 (e.g. risk of future regulation of the fibre investor)381. 
Volume discounts per city concentration point (hierarchical level above the actual ODF-access 
locations) were allowed (“penetration sharing”) under certain conditions, in particular based on 
the common volume achieved i.e. not on a taker-by-taker basis.  
The price cap was continued in the subsequent market review. In response to RFI from the 
Commission, NRA assumed that Reggefiber was not over-performing and did not make any 
excessive returns. Considering the inflation level of 2.2%, the NRA accepted an increase of 
the maximum tariff per line for ODF FTTH access in the different areas from €14.86-€17.94 
per month in 2011 to EUR €15.19-€18.33 per month in 2012382. However, in 2018, the 
Commission asked the Dutch NRA to reconsider its pricing remedy and to impose instead an 
economic replicability test (ERT). The ERT could apply either from the start or as a fall-back in 
case commercial negotiations failed383. 
Since 2015, the French NRA uses a DCF model to settle disputes related to the pricing of 
access to the terminating segment of FTTH in the less dense areas384, mandated in the 
framework of symmetric access obligations imposed according to the predecessor of Art.61 
EECC.  
In the UK, the NRA recently mandated the SMP operator to apply fair and reasonable charges 
for higher-speed products385 (in ‘area 2’386) . Fair and reasonable pricing implies for OFCOM 
that “BT should not set prices that would equate to a margin squeeze under ex post competition 
law for existing and new forms of network access.”  At the same time, the fair and reasonable 
pricing remedy means in practice that no ex ante price control is imposed for the review period 
nor anticipated for the subsequent review period (2026-31). It would appear that even if no 
competition emerges beyond 2031, remedies that could be imposed by the NRA will still have 
to comply with the principles set forth in the 2021 market review, and in particular with the Fair 
Bet principle. The NRA understands Fair Bet387 as Oxera, i.e. reflecting the notion “that 
investments will be undertaken only if investors believe that they will make a reasonable return. 
On this basis, a ‘fair bet’ is one where the firm making an investment should, in expectation, 
 
380 “The logic is that Reggefiber should to some extent be compensated for the risk of a negative scenario, which it 
would not be able to off-set by raising its ODF-access rates as a result of the price cap”. Jaap Doeleman (2009), 
“Digging for gold? Incentivising NGAs in the Netherlands”. IBA Legal Practice Division Communications Law 
Committee Newsletter May 2009, p.12. 
381 Commission Comments letter of 18.02.2009 did not criticise the remedy. 
382 Commission Decision of 21.12.2011 concerning Case NL/2011/1278: market for wholesale (physical) network 
infrastructure access (including shared or fully unbundled access) at a fixed location in the Netherlands, p.5. 
383 Commission Decision of 30.08.2018 concerning Cases NL/2018/2099 and NL/2018/2100: Wholesale fixed 
access market, 30.8.2018, p.14. 
384 Model available at: https://www.arcep.fr/uploads/tx_gspublication/doc-model-tarif-acces-ftth-oct2015.pdf 
385 Bandwidths higher than 40/10 Mbps. 
386 Where there is already some material commercial deployment by rival networks to the SMP operator or where 
this could be economic. 
387 OFCOM, Promoting competition and investment in fibre networks: Wholesale Fixed Telecoms Market Review 
2021-26, Volume 4: Pricing remedies, 18 March 2021, p.22: “An investment is a ‘fair bet if, at the time of investment, 
the expected return is equal to the cost of capital (…)However, we accept that some risk remains, and that BT 
should be allowed the opportunity to earn and keep a higher return than normal if it is successful (…) should we 
need to regulate in future, we would check to ensure that BT had a fair bet. Our guiding principle in assessing this 
would be to consider whether, at the time BT took the decision to invest, it would have gone ahead with the 
investment if it had understood the regulation we were proposing to adopt. (…) In setting any future charge control, 
our policy would be to ensure that BT could keep the upside it had earned up to that point and ensure that it has 
the ability to earn its cost of capital going forward (…) ”. 
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be allowed to earn a return equal to the investment’s cost of capital. That is, for an investment 
to be a fair bet, the firm should be allowed to enjoy some of the upside benefit when demand 
turns out to be high or costs low (i.e. be allowed returns higher than the cost of capital) in order 
to balance the probability that it will earn returns below the cost of capital if demand turns out 
to be low or costs high.”388 In its consultation document, the UK NRA already anticipated that 
“ensuring that the fair bet is satisfied may entail BT earning returns above the cost of capital 
to compensate for the additional downside risks that were faced when the investment was 
made”.389 
The underlying rationale is to maintain regulatory credibility and to keep commitments even at 
times when the regulated SMP operator is making large profits. Ratcheting the regulated 
profitability down too quickly or too frequently in response to the success of a network operator, 
for instance, can undermine incentives to invest in the first place.390 
Feedback from the stakeholders 
The Irish operator EIR says that “price caps rolling incentive schemes between regulatory 
review periods can be an effective way to ensure that incentives for the undertaking to develop 
efficiencies remain constant over the life of the price control period”391. There are trade-offs 
involved in determining the optimal duration of a price cap. If the price-cap period is too short 
it undermines the cap’s intended incentive properties, too long and consumers realise a much 
smaller share of potential savings. A firm will have the strongest incentive to achieve greater 
efficiency towards the beginning of the regulatory period as it can retain the value of efficiency 
for the longest period. A system of rolling incentives (i.e. where caps are not lowered at the 
end of the initial market review when the SMP operator can perform better than expected, but 
where profitability is considered over the lifetime of the investment) may remedy this distortion 
to efficiency incentives. 
ETNO asks for the “fair bet and risk premium approach to be taken into account on all the 
pricing obligations imposed by regulation, with a potential variation over the lifetime of the 
project. However, this should be transparent and clear from the beginning of the project and 
price control obligations should not vary over time in such a manner that they de facto put at 
risk the expected return on investment already realised. Thus, potential variation in such a 
parameter should only apply to new investments”392. BEREC disagrees393, stating that, 
“Starting from the efficiency of capital markets as the objective, a risk assessing method leaves 
no room for the application of an alternative approach such as the “fair bet” principle as all risks 
are priced-in already”. Vodafone likewise does not support a rate of return based pricing 
remedy, but advocates ERT instead: “If economic replicability is applied instead of cost-
oriented prices, there is no need for such predictability nor for a risk premium nor the 
application of the “fair bet” principle. The SMP operator will adjust retail and wholesale prices 
in order to cope with market dynamics”394. 
 
388 Oxera (2017), Does Ofcom’s approach in the WLA market review honour the fair bet principle? 
389 Ofcom (2017), ‘Wholesale Local Access Market Review – Volume 1 Consultation on the proposed market, 
market power determinations and remedies’, at https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0033/99636/Vol1-
Market-review.pdf.  
390 Jean-Jacques Laffont and Jean Tirole (2000), Competition in Telecommunications, MIT Press, page 5. 
391 EIR response to the Targeted Consultation, Q19 
392 ETNO response to the Targeted Consultation, Q19. 
393 BEREC (2020), BEREC Response to the Targeted consultation on the revision of the Commission’s access 
recommendations, BoR (20) 169, Q19. However, BEREC does not discard discounted cash-flows approaches, 
involving a comparison of expenditures and revenues not year by year but over a longer period (as it is for instance 
the case in France for FTTH networks). 




Finding 15. The Dutch NRA’s experiment with a rate of return regulation was not emulated 
by other EU NRAs. However, the UK NRA’s ‘fair and reasonable’ concept relies on the 
same regulatory philosophy. 
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6. The recommended non-discrimination obligations  
a. Summary of findings 
There is substantial variation between the non-discrimination obligations (EoI and EoO) 
imposed by NRAs. When deciding on whether to impose EoI or EoO for specific access 
products, NRAs seldom proceed to a quantitative cost/benefit analysis, but rather rely on a 
qualitative estimation of the need to ensure ‘stricter’ non-discrimination for the wholesale 
access products at stake. 
Several comments received from stakeholders acknowledge that any requirement to set up 
EoI will have a cost. Calls from operators to move from EoO to EoI are sometimes motivated 
by (potential) information sharing between wholesale and retail arms of the SMP operator. 
Beyond that specific issue, these calls seem to reflect problems related to the enforcement or 
the functioning of EoO rather than to the current guidance. Similar monitoring and enforcement 
problems are in some cases raised even when EoI is imposed. 
According to the findings, very few NRAs perceive causal links between strict non-
discrimination and incentives to invest in VHCN deployment. In fact, no NRA acknowledged 
that such obligations may decrease access providers’ incentives to invest in VHCN 
deployment.  
The analysis shows that all NRAs foresee a TRT or at least mandate KPIs ensuring non-
discriminatory replicability of the retail services of the SMP operator by alternative operators. 
However, comments received suggest there is some room for improvement. The manner in 
which KPIs are monitored varies substantially across the EU. Several comments by access 
seekers relate to alleged weaknesses in the monitoring and enforcement. In some Member 
States, there appears to be a lack of transparency as to how the NRA monitors KPIs, and what 
happens if they are not adhered to. In fact, comments received sometimes go beyond the non-
discrimination issue. Operators seem concerned with QoS issues, stressing that KPIs set by 
NRAs are sometimes not ambitious enough. 
Finally, the study found that SLAs and in many cases also SLGs on the provision of wholesale 
broadband access products are provided by SMP operators across the EU. However, access 
seekers’ comments suggest that in some cases the billing procedure and the level of the SLG 
payments foreseen would not be sufficiently dissuasive to ensure that the SMP operator 
complies with its delivery obligations. 
b. Introduction 
Context 
The EECC mentions different gradations of non-discrimination safeguards: 
• Wholesale only operators in the sense of Art.80 EECC. 
• Other operators characterised by a degree of vertical separation, i.e. legal separation, 
but cross-shareholding, in the sense of Art. 78. 
• Functional separation in the sense of Art. 78, i.e. “establishment of a separate business 
entity in order to provide all retail providers, including its own retail divisions, with fully 




• ‘Equivalence of Input (EoI)’: the provision of services and information to internal and 
third-party access seekers on the same terms and conditions, including price and 
quality of service levels, within the same time scales using the same systems and 
processes, and with the same degree of reliability and performance. Some products – 
e.g. collocation – are access seeker specific and not ‘equivalent’. 
• ‘Equivalence of Output (EoO)’: provision to access seekers of wholesale inputs 
comparable, in terms of functionality and price, to those that the SMP operator provides 
internally to its own downstream businesses albeit using potentially different systems 
and processes. 
Provisions of the EECC relating to EoI and EoO 
• Recital 185 EECC: “In order to address and prevent non-price related discriminatory 
behaviour, equivalence of inputs (EoI) is in principle the surest way of achieving 
effective protection from discrimination. On the other hand, providing regulated 
wholesale inputs on an EoI basis is likely to trigger higher compliance costs than other 
forms of non-discrimination obligations. Those higher compliance costs should be 
measured against the benefits of a more vigorous competition downstream, and of the 
relevance of non-discrimination guarantees in circumstances where the undertaking 
designated as having SMP is not subject to direct price controls. In particular, national 
regulatory authorities might consider that the provision of wholesale inputs over new 
systems on an EoI basis is more likely to create sufficient net benefits and thus be 
proportionate, given the comparatively lower incremental compliance costs to ensure 
that newly built systems are EoI-compliant. On the other hand, NRAs should also 
consider whether obligations are proportionate for affected undertakings, for example, 
by taking into account implementation costs and weighing possible disincentives to the 
deployment of new systems, relative to more incremental upgrades, if the former would 
be subject to more restrictive regulatory obligations. In MS with a high number of small-
scale undertakings designated as having significant market power, the imposition of 
EoI on each of those undertakings can be disproportionate.” 
• Art.60.2 EECC “Without prejudice to Article 21, Member States shall require that 
undertakings which acquire information from another undertaking before, during or 
after the process of negotiating access or interconnection arrangements use that 
information solely for the purpose for which it was supplied and respect at all times the 
confidentiality of information transmitted or stored. Such undertakings shall not pass 
on the received information to any other party, in particular other departments, 
subsidiaries or partners, for whom such information could provide a competitive 
advantage”. 
• Art.69.4 EECC “(…) where an undertaking has obligations [to meet reasonable 
requests for] wholesale access to network infrastructure, NRAs shall ensure the 
publication of a reference offer taking utmost account of the BEREC guidelines on the 
minimum criteria for a reference offer, shall ensure that key performance indicators are 
specified, where relevant, as well as corresponding service levels, and closely monitor 
and ensure compliance with them.” 
• Art.70(2) EECC “NRAs shall consider not imposing or maintaining [price control 
obligations], where they establish that a demonstrable retail price constraint is present 
and that any obligations imposed (…), including, in particular, any economic 
replicability test imposed in accordance with Article 70, ensures effective and non-
discriminatory access.” 
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• Art.74.1, third paragraph EECC “National regulatory authorities shall consider not 
imposing or maintaining obligations pursuant to this Article, where they establish that a 
demonstrable retail price constraint is present and that any obligations imposed in 
accordance with Articles 69 to 73, including, in particular, any economic replicability 
test imposed in accordance with Article 70, ensures effective and non-discriminatory 
access.” 
Elements reviewed 
The implementation of the guidance to strengthen non-discriminatory access is reviewed in 
this chapter. This review examines successively the implementation of the following four 
recommended practices: 
1. Guidance relating to imposing EoI or EoO  
2. Guidance relating to the technical replicability test 
3. Guidance on the monitoring of non-discrimination obligations 
4. Guidance relating to SLAs 
c. Guidance relating to EoI and EoO obligations  
Provisions concerned (NDCM Recommendation) 
• Recital 23: “(…) KPIs are the most appropriate tools to detect potential discriminatory 
behaviour and enhance transparency with respect to the delivery and quality of the 
SMP operator’s regulated wholesale access products in the relevant markets. In order 
to enhance transparency and foster market confidence, NRAs may facilitate through 
appropriate industry forums the agreement between the SMP operator and third-party 
access seekers on the detailed KPIs and ensure that such KPIs are audited and 
published in a manner that allows for the early detection of potential discriminatory 
behaviour. The KPIs should be related to the key activities in the provisioning cycle, 
covering all its stages, i.e. the ordering process, the delivery or provision of the service, 
the quality of service including faults and fault repair times, and migration by access 
seekers between different regulated wholesale inputs.” 
• Point 6(j): “Key Performance Indicators (KPIs)’ are indicators that measure the level of 
performance in the provision of the relevant wholesale services.” 
• Point 7: “The surest way to achieve effective non-discrimination is by the application of 
‘equivalence of input’ (EoI), which ensures a level playing field between the SMP 
operator’s downstream businesses, for example, its retail arm, and third-party access 
seekers, and promotes competition. Where NRAs consider that the imposition of a non- 
discrimination obligation on SMP operators (…) is appropriate, proportionate and 
justified (…), they should examine whether it would be proportionate to require SMP 
operators to provide relevant wholesale inputs on an EoI basis. In doing so, NRAs 
should consider, among other things, whether the compliance costs, for example due 
to the redesign of existing systems, are outweighed by the envisaged competition 
benefits. In doing so, the NRA should take into account in the proportionality 
assessment, inter alia, the following considerations: 
(i) incremental costs of compliance with EoI are likely to be low when new systems 




(ii) the potentially linked non-imposition of regulated wholesale access prices on 
NGA networks as recommended in points 48 and 49; 
(iii) the potentially positive effect the application of EoI might have on innovation 
and competition; 
(iv) any voluntary commitment by the SMP operator to provide wholesale inputs to 
access seekers on an EoI basis, as long as such a voluntary offer meets the 
conditions set out in this Recommendation; and 
(v) the number and size of the SMP operator(s).” 
• Point 8: “Where proportionate, EoI should be applied at the most appropriate level(s) 
in the value chain to those wholesale inputs which the SMP operator provides to its 
own downstream businesses, for example its retail arm, unless it can be demonstrated 
to the NRA, having sought the views of third-party access seekers, that there is no 
reasonable demand for the wholesale input in question.” 
• Point 9: “Where EoI is disproportionate, NRAs should ensure that the SMP operator 
provides the wholesale inputs to access seekers on an ‘equivalence of output’ (EoO) 
basis.” 
• Point 10: “NRAs should ensure that when a non-discrimination obligation is imposed, 
access seekers can use the relevant systems and processes with the same degree of 
reliability and performance as the SMP operators’ own downstream retail arm.” 
Provisions concerned (NGA Recommendation) 
Annex II: Application of the principle of equivalence for access to the civil engineering 
infrastructure of the SMP operator for the purpose of rolling out NGA networks. 
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Annex II (NGA Recommendation) 
 1. PRINCIPLE OF EQUIVALENCE 
(…) it is important that [access to civil engineering infrastructure] is provided on a strictly 
equivalent basis. NRAs should require the SMP operator to provide access to its civil 
engineering infrastructure under the same conditions to internal and to third-party access 
seekers. In particular the SMP operator should share all necessary information pertaining 
to infrastructure characteristics and apply the same procedures for access ordering and 
provisioning. Reference offers and service level agreements are instrumental to ensuring 
a proper application of the principle of equivalence. Conversely, it is important that any 
asymmetric knowledge the SMP operator possesses of the rollout plans of third-party 
access seekers is not used by the SMP operator to gain undue commercial advantage. 
2. INFORMATION ON THE CIVIL ENGINEERING INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE 
DISTRIBUTION POINTS 
The SMP operator should provide third-party access seekers with the same level of 
information on its civil engineering infrastructure and distribution points as is available 
internally. This information should cover the organisation of the civil engineering 
infrastructure as well as the technical characteristics of the different elements of which the 
infrastructure consists. Where available, the geographical location of these elements, 
including ducts, poles and other physical assets (e.g. maintenance chambers) should be 
provided, as well as the available space in ducts. The geographical location of distribution 
points and a list of connected buildings should also be provided. 
The SMP operator should specify all intervention rules and technical conditions relating to 
access and use of its civil engineering infrastructure and distribution points, and of the 
different elements the infrastructure consists of. The same rules and conditions should 
apply to third-party access seekers as to internal access seekers. (…) 
3. ORDERING AND PROVISIONING OF ACCESS 
The SMP operator should implement the procedures and tools necessary for ensuring 
efficient access and use of its civil engineering infrastructure and distribution points, and 
the different elements the infrastructure consists of. In particular, the SMP operator should 
provide third-party access seekers with end-to-end ordering, provisioning and fault 
management systems equivalent to those provided to internal access seekers. This should 
include measures aimed at de-congestioning currently used ducts. 
Requests for information, access and use of the civil engineering infrastructure, the 
distribution points and the different elements the infrastructure consists of by third-party 
access seekers should be processed within the same delays as equivalent requests by 
internal access seekers. The same level of visibility on the progress of the requests should 
also be provided, and negative answers should be objectively justified. (…) 
7. ASYMMETRY OF INFORMATION 
The incumbent has prior knowledge of third-party access seekers’ deployment plans. To 
prevent such information from being used to gain undue competitive advantage, the SMP 
operator in charge of operating the civil engineering infrastructure should not share such 
information with its downstream retail arm. 
NRAs at a minimum should ensure that those persons involved in the retail arm activities 
of the SMP operator may not participate in company structures of the SMP operator 





Did the guidance bring about consistent execution of non-discrimination remedies 
across the EU? 
In 2016, BEREC carried out a monitoring exercise on how NRAs have been implementing 
broadband common positions (CPs) relating to, among other, wholesale local and central 
access395. BEREC found that, at the time, all NRAs except one396 had imposed equivalence 
obligations to some degree in the wholesale local access market. However, only a minority are 
imposing EoI. Some approaches are also difficult to classify. For example, the Latvian NRA 
imposes KPIs, SLAs and SLGs on wholesale access products and requires the provision of 
access services and information to other undertakings under the same conditions and with the 
same quality as the SMP operator provides to itself. This includes access to online information, 
online service ordering and maintenance and fault repair systems, but it was considered that 
full EoI would be disproportionate397. Instead, access seekers use an online tool (a web page 
called SPRINTT)398. 
At the time of BEREC’s research (2016) in the WCA market, although all NRAs had imposed 
some form of equivalence obligation, only the Spanish and the Czech NRAs had imposed EoI 
(for next generation products), while some NRAs relied on EoI at the upstream/WLA level399. 
Conversely, in the Netherlands, non-discriminatory access is no longer provided under a 
regulated wholesale access offer but in a commercial offer published in February 2018, 
commercial offer that was extended after the annulment on 17 March 2020 of the market 
analysis decision on a wholesale fixed access market that combined Markets 3a and 3b400. 
The equivalence regime in place for different products in the WLA and WCA markets, as 
reported by NRAs in the online survey and BEREC Regulatory Accounting 2020 report, are 
presented in Table 17. 





ES EoI EoI for NEBA local and NEBA fibra 
LU EoI EoI for all regulated products in markets 3a and 3b 
PT EoI EoI for duct access (no other NGA access products) 
SI EoI EoI for all access products 
SK EoI401 EoI for VULA and bitstream products, however, for processes where costs 
are high, EoO can be justified  
 
395 BEREC (2016), Monitoring implementation of the BEREC Common Positions on Wholesale Local Access (WLA), 
Wholesale Central Access (WCA) and Wholesale High Quality Access at a Fixed Location (WHQAFL) Phase 3, 
BoR (16) 219 
396 Bulgaria. In Romania no operator was found to have SMP and in the Netherlands, the market review was 
annulled in Court. 
397 Commission Decision of 19.07.2018 concerning Case LV/2018/2097-2098; Notification of a Draft Measure 
pursuant to Article 7, para.3, of the Framework Directive 2002/21/EC, Summary of SPRK Draft Decision concerning 
Markets 3a and 3b. 
398 See: https://sprintt.tet.lv/  
399 BEREC (2020), BEREC Response to the Targeted consultation on the revision of the Commission’s access 
recommendations, BoR (20) 169, Q1. 
400 KPN response to the Targeted Consultation, Q1. KPN is “committed to provide non-discriminatory access to 
services and information products at non-discriminatory rates. KPN has an economic incentive to provide wholesale 
access , without which a certain part of end customers would switch to another (cable or fibre) provider with its own 
access network, and KPN would no longer generate any income. In other words, we encourage effective 
competition through the provisioning of non-discriminatory wholesale access to our network for actual or potential 
alternative providers”. 
401 RU Reg. číslo: 63/OER/2018-434, Case SK/2016/1906-1908 
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CY EoI and 
EoO402 
EoI imposed for "products via GPON optical fibre topology network and 
Vectoring technique in the copper network". Other products subject to EoO 
FR EoI and 
EoO403 
EoI is imposed on wholesale access to ducts and civil engineering, EoO 
is imposed for access to FTTH 
IE EoI and EoO Market 3a: VULA FTTC & FTTH - EoI; Civil Engineering Infrastructure 
(Duct & Pole Access) - EoI; Other legacy products - EoO. 
Market 3b:  Next Generation Bitstream FTTC & FTTH - EoI; Current 
Generation Bitstream - EoI.  
IT EoI and EoO EoI for LLU, SLU and VULA FTTH/B, Enhanced EoO for other access 
services (VULA FTTC and bitstream services). 
SE EoI and EoO EoI is used on local access to fibre-based infrastructure. EoO is used on 
backhaul and co-location (and before the deregulation on civil 
engineering). 
AT EoO EoO for all access products 
BE EoO EoO for all forms of NGA access 
DE EoO EoO for all access products 
EE EoO EoO for all products 
EL EoO EoO for all wholesale products. 
FI EoO EoO for LLU and bitstream 
HU EoO EoO for all access products 
MT EoO EoO on VULA FTTH (the only regulated access product) 
PL EoO EoO for all access products 
HR EoO404 EoO for all access products 
NL None Decision currently annulled 
RO None Deregulated 
BG None Deregulated 
CZ Other Obligation was not imposed in last market review (due to the voluntary 
structural separation of the SMP operator). 
DK Other EoO imposed on all access products (legacy and fibre), but voluntary legal 
separation of the incumbent will effectively comply with EoI 
LT Other Effectively EoO for all access products, although there are no references 
to either EoO or EoI in the decisions.  
LV Other405 KPIs, SLAs and SLGs have been imposed on wholesale access products, 
and NRA requires the provision of access services and information to 
other undertakings under the same conditions and with the same quality 
as the SMP operator provides to itself. This includes access to online 
information, online service ordering and maintenance and fault repair 
systems, but it was considered that full EoI would be disproportionate, 
access seekers use an online tool (a web page called SPRINTT). 
Source: NRA responses to the online survey and BEREC Regulatory Accounting 2020 Report, unless stated 
otherwise in footnotes. 
Equivalence of Input (EoI) is imposed by several NRAs on SMP operators but the number of 
regulated access products subject to EoI varies among Member States. NRAs that decided 
 
402 Market 3a Decision 91/2017 stipulates that "[CYTA must provide] in the context of access equivalence, products 
via GPON optical fibre topology network and Vectoring technique in the copper network, based on the input 
equivalence principle (EOI)." 
403 Commission Comments of 25.11.2020 concerning Cases FR/2020/2277-2278-2279-2280. 
404 Case HR/2019/2164-2165; HAKOM market analyses Tržište veleprodajnog lokalnog pristupa koji se pruža na 
fiksnoj lokaciji lipanj 2019; Tržište veleprodajnog središnjeg pristupa koji se pruža na fiksnoj lokaciji za proizvode 
za masovno tržište 
lipanj 2019 
405 Commission Decision of 19.07.2018 concerning Case LV/2018/20197-2098; Notification of a Draft Measure 
pursuant to Article 7, para.3, of the Framework Directive 2002/21/EC, Summary of SPRK Draft Decision concerning 




not to impose EoI but instead to implement strict non-discrimination in the form of Equivalence 
of Output (EoO) generally did so after a proportionality assessment. However, this assessment 
was in most cases not based on precise estimates of the costs that EoI and/or EoO imposes 
(or would prospectively impose) on the SMP operators and on access seekers. Six NRAs406 
have proceeded to such cost estimation for one or more access products. The justifications 
given for imposing EoO instead of EoI are therefore in most cases based primarily on 
qualitative justifications (see Box 7 for some examples where quantitative estimations were 
performed). 
Box 7. Sample of quantitative estimations of implementing EoI 
Ireland 
In the 2018 Decision, following the results of the so-called “Cartesian Report”407, the CEI 
access standard was changed from EoO to EoI. NRA mentions408 that the costs of 
development and implementation of EoI were estimated at being between €465,000 and 
€543,000, including enhancement of the current EoO service delivery model (€365,000 to 
€425,000 plus license costs) and the transition to an EoI delivery model (€100,000 to 
€118,000 including an estimate for training). 
Lithuania 
According to the operator Cgates, the SMP operator estimated that EoI for access to CEI 
would cost them approx. €100,000-€150,000 to develop and wanted access seekers to 
contribute to the costs of developing this system. Eventually, no EoI common interface was 
developed. 
Source: Case studies of Ireland and Lithuania. 
Based on the cost estimates, two NRAs – Polish and Danish – abstained from imposing 
obligations of EoI so far. However, in these two countries, different degrees of separation were 
voluntarily implemented by the SMP operator. In Poland, the SMP operator established a 
wholesale department that provides regulated wholesale services both to its own retail arm 
and to access seekers409. In Denmark, the SMP operator completed in June 2019 its legal 
separation into two independent companies encompassing services and infrastructure. On the 
one hand, Nuuday that provides retail services and comprises the SMP operator’s retail brands 
such as YouSee, TDC Business, Fullrate, Telmore, Hiper, Blockbuster and Firmafon. On the 
other hand, TDC Net that develops and manages the SMP operator’s fixed and mobile network 
infrastructures410. 
Lack of demand for duct access is sometimes invoked as a reason not to impose access to 
EoI411.  
 
406 Online survey data and desk research. 
407 Cartesian (2016). CEI Service Delivery Process Equivalence Options: Analysis of alternative service delivery 
approaches. 
408 ComReg Consultation and Draft Decision 16/96 of 11 November 2016, p.341. 
409 Cullen International (2019), Models of separation, equivalence of treatment and the role of the supervisory 
committee, December 2019, p.22. 
410 Idem, p.10. 
411 Case study interviews indicate this is the case in Ireland and Cyprus. 
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While no NRA has imposed functional separation under the market review process, a few have 
accepted undertakings proposed by SMP operators consisting in different degrees of 
separation412. Beyond the Polish and Danish NRAs, this is also the case in Ireland, Italy, and 
the Czech Republic: 
• In Ireland, the SMP operator implemented a form of functional separation in 
accordance with a settlement with the NRA concerning alleged discriminatory 
behaviour. The SMP operator established a wholesale unit providing access services 
both to its retail arm and to access seekers. Wholesale staff are separated from staff 
working in the retail arm. There is also a separation, for the most part, between 
wholesale and retail systems and processes, although there is shared but controlled 
access to certain “low risk” IT systems from both parts of the SMP operator’s 
business413.  
• In Italy, the SMP operator has set up a wholesale division department to provide access 
services both to its own retail arm and to access seekers. The wholesale division 
function has its own staff, information systems, investment budget, and a separate 
incentive scheme for wholesale staff and management. In addition, the Italian approach 
to separation includes a supervisory committee, Organo di Vigilanza (OdV), which is 
responsible for monitoring the SMP operator’s compliance with the principles of non-
discrimination414. 
• In the Czech Republic415, beginning in 2015, the SMP operator (O2) undertook a 
voluntary division (without being forced to do so by a regulator) of its business into two 
legally distinct companies, by means of a split-off, with the establishment of a new 
company called Česká telekomunikační infrastruktura a.s. (CETIN). CETIN is legally 
independent of O2416 and offers wholesale services to all market players, while 
investing in next-generation networks. In parallel, O2 as an operator has freed itself 
from regulation by NRA, “which gives the operator an opportunity for rapid development 
in many respects, such as O2 TV and other services with attractive content”417. As 
regards CETIN, NRA withdrew the obligation to ensure economic replicability between 
wholesale NGA inputs provided on market 3a and retail offers and removed the 
obligation to publish KPIs418. 
 
412 BEREC (2020), BEREC Response to the Targeted consultation on the revision of the Commission’s access 
recommendations, BoR (20) 169, Q1. 
413 Cullen International (2019), Models of separation, equivalence of treatment and the role of the supervisory 
committee, December 2019, p.16. 
414 Idem, p.19. 
415 More information available at : https://www.ppf.eu/en/case-studies/telefonica-o2-czech-republic-and-its-
uniquevoluntary-division 
416 This is the case even though both companies are controlled by the same shareholder : the PPF-group. The PPF 
Telecom Group is a leading telecom player in Central and Eastern Europe. Through acquisition and consolidation, 
the Group portfolio comprises of five mobile operators, a convergent telco operator and 4 infrastructure operators. 
CETIN Bulgaria, CETIN in the Czech Republic, CETIN Hungary, CETIN Serbia, O2 Czech Republic, O2 Slovakia, 
Telenor Bulgaria, Telenor Hungary, Telenor Montenegro, and Telenor Serbia all fall within the PPF Telecom Group 
portfolio. The group structure is available on https://www.ppftelecom.eu/group-structure  
417 More information available at : https://www.ppf.eu/en/case-studies/telefonica-o2-czech-republic-and-its-
uniquevoluntary-division 




Finding 16. Historically, EoI was perceived by some as a way to ensure strict non-
discrimination without losing the benefit of vertical integration. It can in any case be 
considered a more proportionate approach than the imposition of functional separation, 
which is a last resort remedy. At the same time, where functional or structural separation 
is in place, certain non-discrimination requirements may no longer be warranted as 
suggested by the Czech NRA’s approach. 
In Hungary, EoI is not imposed because: 
• The application of the EoI obligation on copper networks would require a major 
restructuring of the existing systems of SMP operators because of declining 
technology. Accordingly, the imposition of an EoI obligation for access services 
provided over traditional copper networks cannot be considered a proportionate 
obligation. 
a) Competition in the Hungarian market is basically infrastructure-based. The 
proportion of services provided using regulated wholesale services is smaller. 
In the case of lower take-up, positive market effects resulting from the 
introduction of the obligation are also smaller and disproportionate to the 
significant regulatory burdens that would have been associated with the 
application of the obligation. 
• In Hungary, three separate markets are defined and there are three different SMPs 
with significant size differences. As the EoI requirement for small providers is 
disproportionate, in practice this would mean imposing different obligations on each 
SMP, which is not justified by differences in market power, as the market analysis did 
not identify differences that would support differentiated obligations. 
a) For each of the three SMP operators, ex ante obligations are imposed only on 
part of their respective service areas. Accordingly, in the case of EoI, the 
obligation would only affect part of their service area or access network. This 
would mean that SMP operators would have to operate either two systems or, 
if SMP operators decide to have a single system, procedures, etc., they should 
implement the service of their own retail arm even in the non-regulated area 
with the systems and processes established on the basis of the obligations 
imposed in the regulated area. In the first case, there is the significant additional 
burden of maintaining two types of systems and in the second case, there is the 
restrictive effect of an imposed obligation on services in a non-regulated area, 
which may cause market problems due to regulation. (…) Although it can be 
stated that the information asymmetry is very high regarding the SMP operator’s 
civil engineering infrastructure between the SMP and the access seekers, thus 
imposition EoI for access civil engineering infrastructure is worth considering419. 
An NRA observes that the imposition of EoI would have led to significant adaptations to IT 
systems of the SMP operators, which would in turn have led to significant adaptations to IT 
systems of the alternative operators420. However, the SMP operator claims the only difference 
 
419 Hungarian NRA response to the Targeted Consultation, Q5. 
420 An NRA’s response to the online survey. 
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between the EoO system in place and EoI, would be “the different interface through which 
retail and wholesale is being accessed”421. 
A different NRA invokes the importance of regulatory stability in addition to the implementation 
cost of EoI to justify maintaining its EoO approach422.  
In Germany, all wholesale products are subject to the EoO standard423. 
Finding 17. When deciding on whether to impose EoI or EoO for specific access products, 
NRAs seldom proceed to a quantitative cost/benefit analysis, but rather rely on a qualitative 
estimation of the need to ensure ‘stricter’ non-discrimination for the wholesale access 
products at stake. 
EoO does not cover the same set of obligations in all countries where NRAs have imposed it. 
For example, in France the NRA imposed a so-called "reinforced EoO", detailed in several 
subsequent decisions relating to both SMP remedies as well as under symmetrical regulation 
(in particular Decision no. 2015-0776 of 2 July 2015 on the technical and operational processes 
for the mutualisation of very high-speed fibre optic electronic communications networks)424. 
The French Competition Authority has also been involved in the implementation of this principle 
(see the ADLC’s opinion 15-A-04 of 6 February 2015425). In Italy, NRA also developed an 
enhanced EoO regime426. 
Examples of countries in which NRA imposed EoI include: 
• France, where EoI is imposed on wholesale access to ducts and civil engineering (the 
"GC BLO" access offer in France). EoI was discussed and imposed before the 
beginning of fibre deployment427. EoI is even applied in a symmetric way. The NRA 
requires operators who have deployed FTTH networks to put in place "common tools" 
 
421 Operator’s response to the online survey. The operator says that according to the NRA, access provided cannot 
qualify as EoI as long as the same interface is not used for internal as for external ordering even though the ordering 
system and associated Operational Support Systems (OSS) underlying the applicable retail and wholesale 
interfaces are the same already. In a similar vein, Deutsche Telekom in response to the Targeted Consultation, Q4 
advocates that “the definition of EoI should be relaxed so that wholesale and retail do not necessarily have to obtain 
their wholesale products via identical interfaces. The decisive factor for EoI should be that the processes following 
an interface are identical”. 
422 An NRA’s response to the online survey. 
423 Deutsche Telekom in response to the Targeted Consultation Q4 argues that a complete conversion of the 
underlying IT systems which were predominantly built at a time when the telecommunications markets had not yet 
been liberalized, “to a level that would meet EoI would involve disproportionate costs”. 
424 Iliad response to the Targeted Consultation, Q1. However, the operator stresses the shortcomings of EoO for 
FTTH because the operational processes implemented in FTTH deployment are very much interlinked together 
(with the commercial operator responsible for the connection of the end-user), “which makes it very difficult to 
compare operational processes from end-to-end”. 
425 The opinion is available at: https://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/sites/default/files/commitments//15a04.pdf  
426 Telecom Italia response to the Targeted Consultation, Q1. However, the operator stresses that “Italy is the only 
country among the EU Big 5 where both the cost orientation obligation on the main wholesale access services (LLU, 
SLU e VULA) and the economic replicability obligation on all retail access offers are applied throughout the whole 
national territory, despite the EoI, the processes’ disaggregation obligation (very exceptional in the EU) and the high 
degree of competition reached in several geographical areas of Italy”. 
427 An operator’s response to the online survey. Likewise, Orange in the Targeted Consultation, Q8 adds that when 
“not imposed from the beginning (both for SMP's own provision and wholesale provision), EoI is generally 
burdensome, costly and long to implement. This can lead to be a remedy less efficient than other less intrusive 





to offer access to any operator, including their possible downstream branch at the 
mutualization point428. According to the same operator, EoO is imposed for access to 
the FTTH from the SMP operator and works relatively well, mainly because the 
regulator is attentive to its implementation and the context on the FTTH retail market is 
characterized by strong competition429. 
• In Spain430, EoI is imposed for fibre-based access in regulated areas. EoO in the form 
of the KPI’s obligation is applicable both to copper and to fibre in the rest of the territory. 
• In Portugal, EoI has been imposed in the 2017 Market 3a review regarding ducts and 
poles431. 
• In Ireland, EoI was imposed on WLA/WCA requiring the SMP operator to provide 
access to pre-ordering, ordering, provisioning fault reporting and repair for VUA based 
WLA and CEI. EOI also applies in the regional WCA market. The EoI standard was 
introduced for the initial rollout of NGA services in 2013. This enabled the development 
of an effective industry agreed-upon process for the launch of NGA432. The EoI 
obligations carried over in WLA VUA, CEI and WCA regional bitstreams in 2018. It was 
also extended to WCA CGA in 2018 within prescribed timelines up to 12 months from 
the date of the 2018 decision. 
• In the Czech Republic, EoI was brought about by the voluntary legal separation of the 
SMP operator in the wholesale only company CETIN and a service operator O2433.  
• In Italy, the SMP operator implemented an equivalence model on a voluntarily basis. It 
is based on EoI for copper unbundling and FTTH VULA services434. 
The NRAs concerned report having followed elements of the guidance of the NDCM 
Recommendation for designing the EoI regime they have implemented and in particular the 
guidance on the following aspects (see Table 18). 
 
428 An operator’s response to the online survey. NRA Decision Nr 2020-1432 of 8 December 2020 nonetheless 
foresees a possible exemption where the implementation of common tools would be disproportionate. 
429 Iliad response to the Targeted Consultation, Q6. 
430 An operator’s response to the online survey. 
431 In this latter case of duct and pole access offers EoO proved insufficient to address severe differences in 
(1) access to mapping and occupation information, 
(2) network availability criteria (that is, the alternative providers have had much more restrictions with being 
granted availability to specific sections of the network than the SMP provider) and 
(3) procedures to access the civil infrastructure and deploying network and solving access bottlenecks (e.g. duct 
blockage). 
With the implementation of additional EoI obligations in late 2019, an operator reports having witnessed an 
important reduction of these asymmetries, but effective impact cannot yet be assessed (response to the online 
survey). Another operator mentions in its response to the online survey that access seekers still experience 
significant costs associated with some of the measures and process in place (e.g. large annual fee to the duct and 
pole database). 
432 An operator’s response to the online survey. 
433 However, CETIN not qualifying as a ‘wholesale only operator’ within the meaning of Article 80 EECC because 
of common shareholdership. This raises the question on how to deal with ‘wholesale only’ SMP operators. For 
example, recitals 13, 26, 33, 37, 39 as well as in Annex I and Annex II of the NGA recommendation mention “the 
downstream retail arm of the SMP operator”. The same holds true for points 10 through 13 of the 2013 
Recommendation on non-discrimination and costing methodologies, which all assume that the SMP operator has 
its own retail arm. See TDC response to the Targeted Consultation, Q1. 
434 ETNO response to the Targeted Consultation, Q1. ETNO alleges a proportionality issue in this regard: “as the 
NRA imposed on top of this multiple additional layers of equivalence and non-discrimination guarantees (in addition 
to the EoI/EoO and to the economic replicability test obligation, also subject an obligation of disaggregating delivery 
& assurance activities for copper activities)”. 
Study on Regulatory Incentives for the Deployment of Very High Capacity Networks in the 
Context of the Revision of the Commission’s Access Recommendations 
148 
 
Table 18. Elements of guidance in the current Recommendations deemed useful by 
NRAs when designing their EoI regime  
Elements of guidance No. 
Process of monitoring the conditions to ensure compliance by reference to systems and 
processes 
7 
The ordering procedures themselves for both SMP operators’ downstream operations and 
alternative operators 
6 
Appropriate controls that should be performed regularly over time 2 
Penalties 3 
Other 1 
None of the above 1 
 Source: Online survey of NRAs. N = 8. 
Practices among NRAs are diverse. Observing the substantial variation between the non-
discrimination obligations imposed by NRAs435, BEREC concluded that the best practices 
listed in the Broadband Common Position (BoR (18) 24) could be updated to “further highlight 
the availability of a range of remedies (including different degrees of functional separation, EoI, 
EoO and non-discrimination)”. 
Finding 18. Notwithstanding the best practices listed in the Broadband Common Position 
(BoR (18) 24), substantial variation between the non-discrimination obligations imposed by 
NRAs remains. 
Reported impact 
Two NRAs strongly disagree with the statement that EoO obligation decreases access 
providers’ incentives to invest in VHCN deployment while one NRA is of the opinion that EoO 
may increase access seekers’ incentives to invest in VHCN deployment. 
Finding 19. Very few NRAs perceive causal links between strict non-discrimination and 
incentives to invest in VHCN deployment. No NRA acknowledges that such obligations 
may decrease access providers’ incentives to invest in VHCN deployment. 
The impact of the introduction of EoI on the frequency and importance of alleged discrimination 
cases compared to the period before it was implemented is also not clear. Only one NRA 
observed an impact, while six say that they have found no impact. 
An NRA reports436 that the benefit of the EoI model being applied to the above-mentioned basic 
services (LLU, SLU, VULA FTTH/B) was the fact that the SMP operator’s retail division and 
infrastructure competitors were placed in identical positions enjoying an identical chain of 
delivery for such services. Thus, a true level playing field was assured. Where EoO is applied, 
it is ensured that the SMP operator will provide its regulated access services with methods 
comparable to the ones used towards the SMP operator’s retail division in terms of functionality 
and price. Furthermore, the EoO enhanced model approved by the NRA benefits from the 
 
435 Including the different definitions used by EoI, such as highlighted by Proximus response to the online survey, 
which says that contrary to the Belgian NRA, the Spanish NRA qualified as EoI an operational access obligation by 
which the access interface used by alternative operators was different from the one used by the SMP operator to 
provide wholesale inputs to its retail services.  Proximus asks for a more consistent interpretation of EoI. The issue 
is also flagged by ETNO in its response to the Targeted Consultation, Q1. 




unification of the supply processes of basic service components processed according to the 
Full Equivalence regime. Regarding access to civil infrastructure and in-building infrastructure, 
which is not subject to EoI, an operator reports to have experienced a significant number of 
cases in which internal branches or subsidiaries of the incumbent receive access to these 
infrastructures on economic, technical and process conditions that are different from those 
applied to other market players437. 
A Swedish operator claims that EoI for wholesale local fibre access had a very positive impact 
on the build-out of fibre networks and on competition because it resulted in lifting the previously 
imposed pricing obligations on fibre unbundling by the SMP operator. The price regulation on 
the incumbent/SMP operator had a negative and withholding effect on investments in fibre 
networks in general and on investment in wholesale-only fibre networks. As the roll out of fibre 
networks increased in Sweden (many operated by municipal networks as "open" networks), 
competition in the market increased both at the infrastructure level and at the service level. In 
conclusion, it was consequently not the imposition of EoI on the incumbent/SMP operator as 
such that led to an increased fibre roll out and competition, but the fact that the imposition 
meant that the previously imposed price regulation had been lifted438. 
An NRA firmly believes that the entry of an additional wholesale operator in the market shows 
that EoO has been effective.439  
In Germany, an operator440 flags a need for the German NRA to impose EoI in the context of 
access to the incumbent’s fibre network since current regulatory discussions show that future 
regulation concerning reference offers and prices may be less intrusive when compared to 
copper based products. In the past, access seekers in Germany have experienced problems 
with the incumbent’s activation procedures441. This operator therefore advocates that activation 
and fault clearance of Deutsche Telekom’s wholesale customers and retail customers should 
be processed via identical IT systems and interfaces (in particular in view of the upcoming 
access regime for fibre). 
Another NRA considers442 EoI to have been was one of the main contributing elements to the 
current success of fibre unbundling in the country. Given that fibre unbundling requires a large 
upfront investment from the operators, as colocation needs to be implemented at many local 
POPs, EoI allowed these operators to have a higher level of confidence in the regulated 
products. Especially the increased transparency (KPI, annual EoI implementation report) and 
clearly defined procedures provided operators with the necessary assurance that they could 
compete with the retail branch of the SMP operator. The SMP operator also benefitted from 
the implementation of EoI as it was able to restructure and implement new processes within 
the company. The EoI obligation helped the internal decision-making processes and 
"convinced" the staff that EoI is necessary and beneficial to the company. The EoI process 
was also very helpful for the NRA, allowing it to gain a better view of entire supply chain. During 
the first regulatory period with EoI, the NRA received a lot of information and insights from the 
SMP operator. However, the incumbent was not forced to share this information with the 
alternative operators. Therefore, the NRA implemented a stronger transparency measure 
 
437 An operator’s response to the Targeted Consultation, Q4. 
438 Stokab response to the online survey. 
439 An NRA’s response to the online survey 
440 An operator’s response to the online survey. 
441 An operator’s response to the Targeted Consultation, Q1 refers to the procedure BK2-19/032 concerning 
„zahlreichen Wettbewerbern umfänglich diskriminierende Praktiken u.a. der Telekom wie verzögerte Bereitstellung 
oder unterschiedliche Vertragsbedingungen geschildert.“ 
442 An NRA’s response to the online survey. 
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during the course of the 2nd regulatory period with EoI in the form of an annual report which 
has to be shared by the incumbent with alternative operators. 
According to a different NRA443, the advantages of imposing EoI in access to ducts and poles 
of the SMP operator are associated with the creation of incentives to investment in alternative 
networks and the increase of competition in infrastructures. 
Implementation difficulties444 
a) EoI can more easily be applied to specific inputs than to products: the boundary 
between EoI and EoO at a product level will not be clear-cut because wholesale products are 
built up from various inputs, such as assets, IT processes, etc. Consequently, the 
proportionality testing on a product-by-product basis is likely to conclude that some inputs to a 
specific product can reasonably be delivered on an EoI basis, but that other inputs to the 
product are not so easily susceptible to EoI445. However, access seekers claim that applying 
EoI only on a subset of access may be ineffective in ensuring the effective replicability of all 
flagship products446. 
b) Monitoring costs should be taken into account: According to the Polish NRA, the 
implementation of EoI requires some form of functional separation and significant 
implementation costs447. However, EoI implemented through structural measures is easier to 
audit than EoO448. In the absence of EoI, constant and transparent monitoring of measurable 
KPI is required, which is difficult in practice449. While EoI may have high implementation costs, 
the monitoring costs of EoO will generally be higher than those of EoI. The NRAs should take 
into account both types of costs when proceeding to their proportionality assessment. 
Moreover, comparing KPIs of the SMP operator to those of alternative operators is not possible 
if the number of connections used by the latter is large enough. If not, deviations are statistically 
not relevant450.  
c) Implementation of EoI can lead to wholesale price increases: an operator would like the 
Greek NRA to impose EoI on local loop unbundling in NGA networks but is concerned that this 
may lead to an increase in pricing due to the higher costs of redesigning existing provisioning 
and operational support systems to make them EoI compliant451. 
 
443 An NRA’s response to the online survey. 
444 The section summarizes data reported by the NRAs and operators via the Targeted Consultation, online survey 
and case study interviews, unless otherwise indicated. 
445 BEREC (2020), BEREC Response to the Targeted consultation on the revision of the Commission’s access 
recommendations, BoR (20) 169, Q1. 
446 For example, an operator in response to the online survey reports that “The absence of EoI for VULA - the main 
wholesale services adopted by the alternative operators - makes the current EoI implementation in the Italian market 
completely ineffective (…)”. AllP response to the Targeted Consultation Q4 notes that “AIIP believes that when the 
EoI model is adopted, it must necessarily be extended to all regulated wholesale products on the SMP network. 
Any limitation is prelaminar to discriminatory practices in the supply of the remaining inputs on the SMP network”. 
447 UKE response to the Targeted Consultation, Q4. 
448 An operator’s response to the online survey. 
449 During the Stakeholders’ workshop of 9 June 2021, Bouygues Telecom stressed that the implementation of EoO 
is often ineffective because it requires continued NRA monitoring that is often insufficient in practice. However, also 
in the case of EoI monitoring it is of utmost importance (an operator’s response to the online survey: “an audit to 
the incumbent processes could be beneficial and shed light on the need for additional measures to ensure effective 
non-discriminatory access/EoI [to civil engineering in Portugal]”). 
450 CETIN, Stakeholders’ workshop 9 June 2021. 




In Italy, the implementation of EoI has been extremely long, difficult and costly for alternative 
operators even “for the few basic services” as they had to bear most of the costs. Compared 
to the benefits of the system, one operator claims that the costs were even higher452. 
In Lithuania, when estimating the potential costs of implementing EoI (in particular, a system 
that would ensure equivalent processes for providing and processing access requests), an 
alternative operator recalls that the SMP operator claimed that the costs would amount to 
approx. €100.000-€150.000, and wanted access seekers to contribute to the development of 
this system. No such common interface was developed since access seekers were not willing 
to contribute453. 
Finding 20. Several comments acknowledge that any requirement to set up EoI will have 
a cost. However, access seekers did not express an inclination to pay for or share the costs 
of the implementation of EoI either in the online survey or during interviews. 
d) Need to deal with allocation of workforce by the SMP operator: an operator highlights 
that it would be important to ensure EoI in Spain regarding the use of the same human work 
force for wholesale and retail services. The operator had noticed that the SMP operator keeps 
its own retail services better resourced than its wholesale services454. EoI will not necessarily 
be more effective than EoO, if such underlying issues which are common to both are not 
addressed first. 
e) Need to differentiate between KPIs for business and residential users: an operator455 
flags that in Spain this is of particular importance in the case of KPIs applicable both to 
residential and business segments. It hopes that this will be changed in the on-going market 
review, because in business markets discriminatory behaviours have a much higher impact on 
each customer (e.g. in terms of breakdowns, repair times, etc.). 
f) EoI is more easily implemented if an SMP operator is modernising its business. Some 
operators reported that in some circumstances implementation of EoI would not create 
excessive additional costs. For example, in Ireland, EIR says it did not face any excessive 
burden to implement EoI for NGA networks, as it was a new service and it was easier to 
implement (compared to the costs of implementing EoI on legacy products).456 In Sweden, 
Telia reports having already planned a deep internal transformation and therefore could 
accommodate the (otherwise significant) EoI compliance costs within the budget earmarked 
for their transformation (but indicates that implementation of EoI as a self-standing operation 
would have been tremendously costly)457. 
e) Other issues reported: In France, an operator458 points to various problems: 
 
452 Italian operator’s response to the Targeted Consultation, Q1. However, a different operator’s response to the 
online survey notes that “In Ireland, while wholesale prices remain high, there has not been substantial incremental 
implementation costs arising as a result of the imposition of EoI obligations”. For this reason, G. Sorensen of GOS 
Consulting advocated a transition to EoI over time (Stakeholders’ workshop of 9 June 2021). 
453 Case study interviews. 
454 An operator’s response to the online survey. 
455 An operator’s response to the online survey. 
456 Case study interviews. 
457 Case study interviews. 
458 An operator’s response to the online survey. 
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• Absence of an effective 'Chinese Wall' between SMP operators' wholesale divisions 
and their retail divisions 
• Non-availability of prior information on deployment (or not with the same conditions) 
• Pre-offering of services prior to deployment by an infrastructure operator (confusion of 
roles between a commercial operator and an infrastructure operator) 
• Based on the French experience, they consider EoI to be more effective than EoO, 
especially in the context of fibre deployment, for the following reasons: 
a) The EoO principle implies regular and detailed monitoring by NRA, which may 
not feasible on a long term basis (in case ex ante regulation ceases to exist in 
a given market  
b) In France the operational processes implemented in FTTH deployment are very 
much interlinked (the commercial operator is responsible for the connection of 
the end-user), which makes it very difficult to compare operational process from 
end-to-end. 
Finding 21. Calls from operators to move from EoO to EoI often concern (potential) 
information sharing between wholesale and retail arms of the SMP operator. Beyond that 
specific issue, these calls seem to reflect problems related to the enforcement or the 
functioning of EoO rather than to the current guidance. Similar monitoring and enforcement 
problems are in some cases raised even when EoI is imposed. 
Sustainability  
Telefónica459 considers the preference for EoI to be increasingly out of pace with the current 
evolution towards a more granular geographic definition of markets. When, as a result of the 
market analysis, the operator is found as an SMP only in certain geographical areas, the costs 
of implementing different ordering and provisioning systems according to geographic regions 
will become increasingly high as there will be less and less potential for economies of scale. 
d. Guidance relating to the technical replicability test (TRT) 
Provisions concerned (NDCM Recommendation)  
• "(11) NRAs should require SMP operators subject to a non-discrimination obligation to 
provide access seekers with regulated wholesale inputs that allow the access seeker 
to effectively replicate technically new retail offers of the downstream retail arm of the 
SMP operator, in particular where EoI is not fully implemented. 
• (12) To that end, and in order to guarantee a level playing field between the SMP 
operator’s downstream retail arm and third-party access seekers, NRAs should ensure 
that internal and third-party access seekers have access to the same technical and 
commercial information regarding the relevant regulated wholesale input, without 
prejudice to applicable rules regarding business confidentiality. The relevant 
information includes information on newly regulated wholesale inputs or on changes to 
already existing regulated wholesale inputs to be provided in accordance with lead-
times defined on a case-by-case basis. 
 




• (13) When assessing the technical replicability of the SMP operator’s new retail offer, 
the NRA should take into account: (i) whether the corresponding wholesale input(s) for 
ordering, delivery and repair necessary for an efficient operator to develop or adapt its 
own systems and processes in order to offer competitive new retail services are made 
available at a reasonable period before the SMP operator or its downstream retail arm 
launches its own corresponding retail service taking into account the factors set out in 
Annex I and (ii) the availability of corresponding SLAs and KPIs. 
• (14) The required technical replicability test can be carried out by either the SMP 
operator or the NRA.” 
• Annex I: Specification of Lead time and provisions of information 
• “When assessing the reasonable length of the required lead time, NRAs should take 
into account the following factors: 
1. if the product is a new product or is an update of an existing product; 
2. the time necessary to consult and agree on the wholesale processes for the 
provision of the relevant services; 
3. the time necessary to produce a reference offer and sign contracts; 
4. the time necessary to modify or update relevant IT systems; 
5. the time necessary to market the new retail offer.” 
Did the guidance bring about consistent technical replicability tests (TRTs) across the 
EU? 
α) The technical replicability test (TRT) 
Technical replicability is not only applicable in EoO situations, but generally to a non-
discrimination obligation. A sample of NRA approaches is provided hereunder. When a strict 
EoI obligation has been imposed and fully implemented by the SMP operator, the relevance 
of a separate technical replicability obligation will normally be smaller, which explains some of 
the differences in the TRTs imposed across the EU.  
• The Hungarian NRA says460 that it required the SMP operator to apply technical 
replicability tests461 as follows: 
a) Before launching any new retail product based on a new technology or type of 
network, the SMP operator must test whether the new retail product can be 
replicated using the wholesale services offered in the reference offer. 
i. If the outcome of the TRT is that the new retail product can be replicated 
using existing wholesale services, the SMP operator has to provide NRA 
with the results, including the details of the new retail product and all of 
the information needed to demonstrate that technical replicability is 
ensured at least 90 days before the planned retail market introduction. 
 
460 Hungarian NRA response to the Targeted Consultation, Q7. 
461 See also an operator’s response to the online survey: “In Hungary, a technical replicability obligation is imposed 
on the SMP operator, which is working well.” 
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ii. If the outcome of the TRT is that the new retail product cannot be 
replicated using existing wholesale services, the SMP operator has to 
complement its reference offer with a new wholesale service which 
ensures replicability. New retail products can be introduced 45 days 
after the new reference offer approved by the NRA enters into force.  
b) If the SMP operator introduces a new retail service with a new bandwidth and 
that bandwidth is not available in case of L2 WAP or bitstream access (BSA) 
services, the SMP operator must provide the new bandwidth in case of L2 WAP 
and BSA as well, not later than the retail launch of the retail service with the 
new bandwidth. The SMP operator does not have to notify the new bandwidth 
to NRA or modify the reference offer but must publish the information about the 
new bandwidth 60 days before its retail market introduction. (The process of 
termination of retail and wholesale offers with a certain bandwidth is also 
regulated.) 
c) If the SMP operator modifies the quality (KPI level) of its retail products in such 
a way that they cannot be replicated by the actual KPI level of wholesale 
products, the SMP operator has to provide the new KPI level in wholesale as 
well, not later than by the retail launch of the new KPI level. The SMP operator 
does not have to notify the new KPI to NRA or modify the reference offer but 
does have to publish the new KPI level 60 days before its retail market 
introduction. Evaluation of obligations: So far there have been no examples of 
application of the TRT due to a new technology or network type462. 
• In Italy, the SMP operator must also ensure replicability of the retail products from a 
technical point of view. However, according to some operators463, the replicability test 
discipline does not appear to consider all relevant aspects, and in particular does not 
include coverage of the specific retail SMP service, technical parameters of the retail 
SMP offer (e.g. download and upload minimum rates) and time to market information, 
etc. 
• In Germany464, the SMP operator is not obliged to demonstrate technical replicability 
before the launch of new retail products, but must be able to do so on request465. 
The online survey confirmed that NRAs have different approaches on the timing of the TRT. 
(See Table 19). 
 
462 Hungarian NRA response to the Targeted Consultation, Q7. 
463 AIIP response to the Targeted Consultation, Q6. 
464 Deutsche Telekom response to the Targeted Consultation, Q6. 
465 Online survey responses, as well as anonymous operator’s response to the Targeted Consultation, Q6: Eine 
technische Replizierbarkeit ist im deutschen TKG nicht ausdrücklich vorgeschrieben. Sie ist aber Bestandteil des 
Missbrauchsmaßstabs des § 42 TKG, d.h. wenn es an einer technischen Replizierbarkeit fehlt, kann dies ein 




Table 19. Approaches to implementing the TRT 
Approaches No. 
The SMP operator must submit a report before the launch of any new resale offers 9 
The SMP operator must be able to demonstrate technical replicability upon request 9 
Other466 8 
Not applicable (because not regulated, or no obligation) 6 
Source: Online survey of NRAs. N = 23 
• In Greece467, within the context of non-discrimination obligations, NRA have imposed 
specific rules on the SMP operator to ensure the technical replicability of all of its retail 
offers. More precisely, prior to the launch of a new retail product, the SMP operator 
must perform a technical replicability test. The NRA should be notified of the results of 
the test and all relevant information as regards the wholesale inputs that ensure 
technical replicability. If the NRA considers the new retail offer to be technically non-
replicable, it may prohibit its provision of the product. Moreover, it is required that the 
SMP operator make wholesale broadband access products available six months before 
launching its corresponding NGA retail services. The six-month period starts from the 
approval of wholesale prices by EETT. In cases of technical upgrades of existing retail 
products (e.g. upgrades from VDSL to VDSL Vectoring) a two-month period is 
considered sufficient. 
• In Slovakia, the SMP operator has an SMP obligation of non-discrimination on Markets 
3a and 3b, including the obligation to ensure technical replicability468. 
• In Croatia, the SMP operator is subject to an obligation of technical replicability: it is 
prohibited from launching new retail services unless an adequate wholesale solution is 
offered well in advance to enable other operators to replicate its retail offer thus 
preventing the first mover advantage of the SMP operator469.  
• In Poland470, the SMP operator is obliged to ensure the technical availability of its 
wholesale product 5 months in advance of the commercial launch of a retail product (at 
least 2 months in advance for vectoring related products as these are considered to be 
upgrades to existing VDSL services). 
• In Greece471, a period of 6 months is foreseen. 
• In Italy, a period of 3 months is foreseen472. 
 
466 The category ‘other’ also encompasses variations of the previous two categories. For example, in one country, 
the SMP operator must send a test documenting the technical replicability of the retail product to the NRA before 
the launch of a new or significantly changed retail product. However, the test requirement is triggered only if the 
replication of the retail product in question necessitates adjustments in the underlying wholesale process - e.g. as 
a result of new or changed network access products or as a result of changes in the way of ordering and assembling 
the relevant network access products. 
467 Deutsche Telekom response to the Targeted Consultation, Q6 
468 Ibid. 
469 Ibid. 
470 Orange response to the Targeted Consultation, Q6. 
471 Deutsche Telekom response to the Targeted Consultation, Q6. 
472 Article 9(8) Decision 348/19/CONS provides that: 
• Any change in the technical conditions of the services included in the reference offer is published on the 
website (after AGCom’s approval) at least 3 months prior to the date of entry into force 
• The offer should be technically available at least 1 month prior to the date of entry into force 
• TIM can use any new access profiles or services for the provision of its services in the downstream markets 
only after 3 months have passed since their publication on its website. 
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• In Spain, the wholesale product for local access over fibre (VULA) must be at the 
alternative operator’s disposal one month before is launched at the retail level473. For 
instance, the introduction of a 600 Mbps speed in Telefónica’s retail broadband 
products474 in 2018 was launched only after NGA wholesale Reference Offers (NEBA 
local and NEBA fibra) were effectively available for alternative operators.  
• In Sweden, the SMP operator on the WLA market is to apply a technical replicability 
test to prove that all retail services provided by Telia can be replicated using the fibre 
wholesale products offered to alternative operators475.  
• In the Czech Republic, technical replicability is not imposed on any services because 
the SMP operator is a structurally separated wholesale only operator and does not 
have a retail product476. 
b) KPIs 
In 2016, BEREC carried out a monitoring exercise on how NRAs have been implementing 
broadband common positions (CPs) covering among other wholesale local and central access. 
Under the Common Positions, NRA must require SMP operators to adhere to reasonable 
service levels and must set of KPIs which allow monitoring compliance with non-discrimination 
obligations. BEREC found that, at the time, all but a few NRAs imposed: 
• A generic KPI requirement (best practice 34); 
• KPIs to cover specific areas (best practice 34a); 
• KPIs available to all operators (best practice 34b); 
• NRA should take oversight of the process of setting KPIs (best practice 34c).477 
Table 20. Best practices related to KPIs 
MS BP33d: SLGs 














oversight for the 
process of 
setting KPIs 
AT √ √ √ √ √ 
BG  √ √ √ √ 
HR √ √ √ √ √ 
CY √ √ √ √ √ 
CZ √ √ √  √ 
DK √ √ √ √ (√) 
EE     (√) 
FR √ √ √ √ √ 
DE √ √ √ √ √ 
IE √ √ √ √ √ 
IT √ √ √ √ √ 
 
In Spain, Telefonica has to guarantee the technical replicability of the whole set of wholesale products (Telefonica 
response to the Targeted Consultation, Q6). 
473 Orange response to the Targeted Consultation, Q6. Telefonica response to the Targeted Consultation, Q6 
considers this obligation disproportionate and not hospitable to a favourable climate for incentivising investments in 
VHCN networks. 
474 BEREC (2020), BEREC Response to the Targeted consultation on the revision of the Commission’s access 
recommendations, BoR (20) 169, Q6. 
475 Ibid. 
476 An operator’s response to the online survey. 
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oversight for the 
process of 
setting KPIs 
LV √ √ √ √ √ 
LT √ √ √   
LU √ √ √ √ √ 
MT  (√)    
NL √ √ √ √ √ 
RO N/a N/a N/a N/a N/a 
ES √ √ √ √ √ 
SE √ √ √ √ √ 
Source: BEREC, BoR (16) 219. 
In Germany and Spain, KPIs are included in the Reference Offer (RO) and consequently are 
subject to approval from their NRAs. In Germany, there is a two-step procedure that begins 
with the publication of a draft Reference Offer by the SMP operator, and a request that access 
seekers provide comments. The NRA’s ruling chamber (Beschlusskammer 3) examines the 
draft Reference Offer, holds a public hearing and may make comments. In the second round, 
a revised Reference Offer is published, further comments are solicited, and the second hearing 
is held. The process culminates with the publication of an approved Reference Offer that 
includes service specifications, price lists, the ordering process, and procedures for fault repair 
and monitoring.  
In Italy, KPIs and KPOs (key performance objectives) are set by the incumbent together with 
the NRA478 in a multi-stakeholder process. The NRA is of the view that the process avoids 
placing needless restrictions on the SMP operator, fully engages alternative operators, and 
generates a degree of market consensus. The Polish NRA confirms that it provided the tools 
for testing the technical replicability with respect to LLU and BSA services in its decisions479. 
In Greece, as regards wholesale regulated products, the NRA has imposed an obligation on 
the SMP operator to publish KPIs on a quarterly basis and at the NRAs’ request in order to 
ensure that the SMP operator does not discriminate between its retail arm and wholesale 
operators or between wholesale operators. These KPIs are defined in the Reference Offers 
concerned and are publicly available through the Wholesale Customer Relationship 
Management system (W-CRM). Moreover, they are being constantly monitored by the NRA480. 
In Slovakia, the SMP operator has the obligation to monitor and publish KPIs altogether as 
part of its obligations on Markets 3a and 3b. They are published online on a quarterly basis481. 
In Croatia, KPIs are used in relation to wholesale regulated products and are defined by the 
market analysis. Detailed calculation rules are approved and audited by the NRA; KPI results 
are available to all operators and the NRA482. 
In Hungary, the KPIs are:  
(i) Supply time for access service  
 
478 BoR (16) 219, p.40. 
479 UKE response to the Targeted Consultation, Q6. 
480 Deutsche Telekom response to the Targeted Consultation, Q7. 
481 Ibid. 
482 Ibid. 
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(ii) Ratio of fault repair time within 24 and 72 hours 
(iii) Supply time for change of service provider 
(iv) Supply time for change of wholesale service 
(v) Supply time for relocation of access service 
 
The Hungarian NRA imposes these KPIs and they are applied for the following access 
products: ULL, VULA and central access to broadband services483. 
In practice484, whether NRAs impose a TRT or not, the KPIs imposed by NRAs generally cover 
the key elements in the provision of regulated wholesale services that are listed in Point 20 of 
the NDCM Recommendation that are aimed at monitoring a non-discrimination obligation (see 
Table 21). 
Table 21. Elements of the regulated wholesale services that are covered by KPIs aiming 
at monitoring a non-discrimination obligation 
Elements covered by KPIs No. 
Ordering process 21 
Provision of service 22 
Quality of service, including faults 22 
Fault repair times 22 
Migration between different regulated wholesale inputs (excluding one-off bulk migrations) 12 
Other key elements 8 
Source: Online survey of NRAs. N = 23.  
Impact of TRT and KPIs 
In Greece, the TRT obligation imposed under the “vectoring regulation” entails prior 
notifications on technical/design information of the wholesale product and provides access to 
information about the development of wholesale products. There was limited transparency 
regarding the flow of the activation process before the vectoring regulation485. According to 
one operator in Hungary, the measurement of KPIs does not have a sufficient deterrent 
effect486. 
Finding 22. TRTs, or at least KPIs, that ensure non-discriminatory replicability are available 
throughout the EU. However, comments received suggest that there is some room for 
improvement. 
Implementation difficulties487  
How to avoid disproportionate TRT requirements? For example, in Croatia the TRT obliges 
the SMP operator to include in its wholesale offer numerous wholesale services and solutions 
(wide set of available speeds, technologies, private virtual circuits, levels of access etc.), many 
 
483 An operator’s response to the online survey. 
484 According to NRA responses to the online survey 
485 Vodafone response to the Targeted Consultation, Q6. 
486 An operator’s response to the online survey. 
487 The section summarizes data reported by the NRAs and operators via the Targeted Consultation, online survey 




of which have never been used by access seekers, leading the SMP operator to claim that the 
TRT applied in that Member State would lead to an inefficient use of resources. An example 
of such overly inefficient use of resources is, according to the operator488, the obligation to offer 
a wholesale hybrid modem service (a technological solution which simultaneously uses fixed 
and mobile broadband access to improve available bandwidth at the customer’s location), 
disregarding the fact that the SMP operator’s competitors would be able to replicate this retail 
solution by using their own mobile networks. As the SMP operator expected, it has not received 
a single request for it489. The question is raised by the SMP operator as to whether NRA should 
not limit the constraints on the technical availability of wholesale products to the most critical 
level of access490. Using KPIs generates costs to update, upgrade, and maintain them in 
parallel to the information system and operating system’s costs. Using KPIs also puts under 
constraints the access seeker which must properly manage the mirroring processes: a fluid 
ordering system, a good and reliable diagnosis of the defaults incurred, and order 
qualification491. Another operator is of the opinion that there should only be a few/key EoI and 
quality KPIs and SLAs rather than a long list, but that these should be monitored carefully and 
that any minimum deviation from such should be subject to significant sanctions. Dissuasive 
sanctions are required to make sure that the provision and assurance of the quality level target 
are met. Otherwise, the SMP operator may opt for paying the penalties instead of reviewing 
its internal processes492. 
How to ensure non-discrimination between infrastructure based and access-based 
retail competitors? Vodafone illustrates the problem with an example of next generation 
leased line products (“CFV 2.0”) in Germany which were not designed as a wholesale product 
and therefore does not allow the SMP operator’s competitors that have their own infrastructure, 
such as Vodafone, to take advantage of using their own (backbone) infrastructure compared 
to pure resellers. Vodafone and other competitors have therefore advocated an alternative 
product design to avoid the SMP operator’s discrimination against competitors that have their 
own infrastructure when compared to resellers493. 
How to deal with ‘small’ access seekers? KPIs work for ‘large’ (i.e. statistically significant) 
numbers. Divergences arise when comparing KPIs for small access seekers who may only 
have 10-20 monthly instances of service installations, single digit repair orders, etc. Such 
divergences may have nothing to do with any discriminatory practice but instead are a 
reflection that some orders are more difficult to fill than others and a statistical approach does 
 
488 Deutsche Telekom response to the Targeted Consultation, Q6. 
489 The German NRA did not impose a similar wholesale service, which a German alternative operator considers to 
be problematic: “Da die Telekom Deutschland GmbH Wettbewerbern ein Hybrid- Vorleistungsprodukt vorenthält 
und die zur Nachbildung der Hybrid-Produkte erforderlichen (depriorisierten) LTE-Kapazitäten am Markt nicht 
verfügbar sind, können Wettbewerber, die über kein eigenes Mobilfunknetz verfügen, ihren Endkunden (bis heute) 
keine Hybrid- Anschlüsse anbieten. In diesem Zusammenhang hat die Bundesnetzagentur eine teilweise 
Nachbildbarkeit aufgrund anderer bandbreitensteigernder Produkte (Kabelnetze oder LTENetze) für städtische 
Gebiete angenommen (Beschluss BK 2b-15/006, S. 29). Aber auch für den ländlichen Raum, in dem die mangelnde 
Nachbildbarkeit des Hybrid-Produkts nicht durch andere Anschlüsse mit einer vergleichbaren Bandbreite 
substituiert werden kann, hat die Bundesnetzagentur einen Missbrauch von Marktmacht durch die Telekom 
Deutschland GmbH abgelehnt“. 
490 Orange response to the Targeted Consultation, Q6. 
491 ETNO response to the Targeted Consultation, Q7. 
492 Iliad response to the Targeted Consultation, Q1. ECTA in response to the Targeted Consultation, Q1 also 
stresses that “There is a real question on effectiveness and dissuasiveness of sanctions for non-compliance with 
non-discrimination obligations. This is underscored by the fact that cases keep occurring, involving the same SMP 
operators over and over again. This indicates that the SMP operators’ breaches of non-discrimination obligations 
are not sufficiently sanctioned so as to root out non-compliance because the benefits of breaching the obligation 
appear to outweigh the occasional and relatively limited sanctions.” 
493 Vodafone response to the Targeted Consultation, Q6. 
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not work well for small numbers. Moreover, small access seekers can specialize in a niche 
market segment (for instance small business customers only), which sometimes means 
specific problems with installation, repair etc. This blends in when comparing KPIs for large 
access seekers but stands out for niche market operators494. 
For example, NRAs could require the introduction of specific KPIs for B2B provisioning. When 
NRAs allow SMP operators to calculate KPIs as an average across operators, this practice 
allows hiding discriminatory treatment of alternative operators among their customers495. 
How to ensure that KPIs are up to date? An operator stresses that performance results must 
be regularly updated and KPIs must be assessed from time to time in order to take into account 
the evolution of access products and the reality of the market. It is definitely important to focus 
KPIs on processes that are effectively used by managers in the field. Regular meetings with 
all of the stakeholders, under the supervision of NRA, could be used in order to fine tune each 
item and adapt it, if necessary, to the environment and the technical or marketing evolution, as 
well as to explaining the perimeter, the differences and evolution of the KPIs under comparison. 
This method has often proven to bring progress and the right level of transparency. It is 
important that, when appropriate, real and comparable KPIs are established, including 
provision effectiveness and failure ratios, as well as overall and partial provision and repair 
times. KPIs depend on SMP operator criteria regarding their responsibility as to the cause of 
failure or of delay. In this regard, a comparison with data provided by the operators could be 
used by NRA to better understand the differences between the wholesale process and self-
provision by a SMP496. In Denmark, the SMP operator has an obligation to take an active part 
in meetings with alternative operators so that alternative operators can affect on-going issues 
including SLAs, SLGs and KPIs which must be included in the SMP operator’s reference offer. 
These meetings are supervised by the NRA497.  
e. Guidance on monitoring of non-discrimination obligations 
Provisions concerned (NDCM Recommendation) 
• Point 19: “(…) NRAs should impose on the SMP operator the use of KPIs in order to 
monitor effectively compliance with the non-discrimination obligation.” 
• Point 20: “The KPIs should measure performance at least in relation to the following 
key elements in the provision of regulated wholesale services: 
o Ordering process 
o Provision of service 
o Quality of service, including faults 
o Fault repair times and 
o migration between different regulated wholesale inputs (excluding one-off bulk 
migrations).” 
• Point 21: “NRAs should impose KPIs for each of the abovementioned key elements in 
the provision of regulated wholesale services. KPIs should allow for comparison 
 
494 An operator’s response to the online survey. 
495 ECTA response to the Targeted Consultation, Q8. ECTA adds that this is currently the case in, e. g., Spain. 
496 An operator’s response to the online survey. Another operator similarly argues that updating performance results 
and KPIs is needed; also to account for the actual data instead of commitments. 




between services provided internally to the downstream retail arm of the SMP operator 
and those provided externally to third- party access seekers.” 
• Point 22: “The specific details of KPIs imposed by the NRA pursuant to point 21 could 
be agreed between the SMP operator and third-party access seekers and should be 
updated on a regular basis as necessary.” 
• Point 23: “In imposing the KPIs, the NRA should take account of already existing 
performance measurements, even when only used for internal purposes of the SMP 
operator.” 
• Point 24: “In order to ensure early discovery of potential discriminatory behaviour and 
transparency with regard to the provision of regulated wholesale services, the NRAs 
should ensure that KPIs are published at least on a quarterly basis, in an appropriate 
form either on the NRAs website or on the website of an independent third party 
designated by the NRA.” 
• Point 25: “NRAs should ensure that the KPIs are regularly audited by the NRA or, 
alternatively, by an independent auditor.” 
• Point 26: “Where the results of the KPIs indicate that the SMP operator may not comply 
with its non-discrimination obligation, the NRA should intervene by investigating the 
matter in more detail, and where necessary enforce compliance. NRAs should make 
public, for example on their website, their decision to remedy non-compliance.” 
Provisions concerned (NGA Recommendation) 
• Annex II: Application of the principle of equivalence for access to the civil engineering 
infrastructure of the SMP operator for the purpose of rolling out NGA networks 
“(…) NRAs should ensure that the principle of equivalence is effectively applied. For 
this purpose they should make sure that upon request, a reference offer for access to 
civil engineering infrastructure is provided to third party access seekers in due time. 
Also in addition to service level reports, NRAs should ensure that SMP operators keep 
track of all elements necessary to monitor compliance with the equivalence of access 
requirement. This information should allow NRAs to run regular controls, verifying that 
the required level of information is provided to third-party access seekers by the SMP 
operator and that the procedures for access ordering and provisioning are correctly 
applied. 
In addition, NRAs should ensure that a fast-track ex post procedure is available to settle 
disputes.” 
Did the guidance bring about consistent enforcement across the EU? 
The monitoring of KPIs varies across the EU. For example, as regards who monitors ex post 
compliance of the SMP operator with technical replicability tests and/or key performance 
indicators, the situation is the following: 
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Table 22. Who monitors, ex-post, the compliance of the SMP operator with technical 
replicability tests and/or key performance indicators? 
Monitoring of compliance with TRT No. 
NRA in case of complaint 14 
NRA monitors reports published by the SMP operator 10 
Regular audits are undertaken by the NRA or independent auditor 1 
Other 6 
Source: Online survey of NRAs. N = 22.  
• In Germany, the regulator constantly monitors compliance of the KPIs. The existing 
mechanism has been effectively applied and was used by the NRA in a recent decision 
regarding the abusive behaviour of the SMP operator in the leased line segment498.  
• In France, there is a monthly publication and presentation in multilateral meetings with 
wholesale access seekers and the NRA, which is considered efficient. The NRA must 
be given sufficient information on the way the KPIs are elaborated on for EoO 
supervision499. 
• In Italy, KPIs are reported monthly by the SMP operator. The NRA monitor KPIs with 
the support of the Organo di Vigilanza500, which acts as an independent auditor within 
the SMP operator.  
• In Spain, the SMP operator must publish and report KPIs to the NRA for all wholesale 
services and comparable retail services on a monthly basis501. 
• In Poland, KPIs (which cover service activation, functioning and repair time) were 
audited by an independent audit company during their adoption and about a year after 
their adoption. All of the auditor's comments were introduced by the SMP operator. 
Currently, the system is audited by an internal auditor. The list of indicators in the New 
KPI System (NSKPI) was implemented by the SMP operator in close cooperation with 
the NRA. NSKPI covers all Regulated Offers. The system distinguishes 36 tactical 
indicators and 30 additional indicators, grouped by services to which they relate: WLR, 
BSA, LLU, LL, ROI, etc. Additional indicators were introduced for selected tactical 
indicators to be more specific in the area of events, measurements and more precise 
monitoring502. The quarterly publication is assessed by the regulator and each of the 
wholesale customers receives the results of the KPI and the average value for the sake 
of comparison503. 
• In Belgium, there is a bi-monthly KPI publication and no audit but there is an obligation 
to provide - upon BIPT's request - the raw data linked to the KPI calculation504. 
• In Slovakia, the SMP operator reports not having seen any in-depth check of its KPI 
reporting to the NRA, except for a few questions in the initial stages shortly after their 
implementation. There is no requirement for an external audit505. 
• In the Czech Republic, the NRA sets the basic principles for SLAs/SLGs and KPIs and 
verify compliance with these basic principles. In relation to BP34b (KPIs available to all 
operators) other than in the Czech Republic, all NRAs mandate KPIs to be available to 
 
498 Vodafone response to the Targeted Consultation, Q7 
499 An operator’s response to online survey. 
500 See more at: https://organodivigilanza.gruppotim.it  
501 An operator’s response to online survey. 
502 UKE response to the Targeted Consultation, Q7. 
503 An operator’s response to the online survey. 
504 Proximus response to the online survey. 




all authorised operators (systematically or on request). In the Czech Republic, only 
aggregated values are made available and operators can compare KPIs to the industry 
average506 
• In Hungary, the values of KPIs were set by the SMP operators, but the values were 
examined (and in some cases) modified by the NRA in the process of approval of the 
Reference Offers. The KPIs are not audited (neither by the NRA nor by an independent 
auditor)507. 
• In Ireland, the SMP operator is required to generate a quarterly equivalence KPI report, 
which is provided to the NRA and is published on their wholesale website. The KPI 
metrics for each market are split between Supply and Repair of Service.  
(i) Supply of service: % connections in x working days, average connection time 
and quality of supply. 
(ii) Repair of service: % repairs in x working days, average repair time and quality 
of repair. 
The SMP operator is obliged to publish the final KPI report within two months of quarter 
end. While the KPIs are not audited per se, the report is issued to the NRA prior to 
publication to facilitate review508. 
Moreover, following a dispute, ComReg and Eir came to a settlement agreement at the 
end of 2018 and established an independent oversight board (IOB)509. 
Impact and best practices 
An operator510 says that regular multi-operators’ meetings under the supervision of the NRA to 
deal with operational questions are a very useful means of ensuring the transparent monitoring 
and review of KPIs, as proven in France and Poland. The operator stresses that KPIs must be 
based on accurately designed processes in order to make any EoO system credible, such as:  
• Definitions and metrics of KPIs  
• Reference levels, which need to take into consideration accidents and seasonal events 
• The minimum number of events 
Publishing the results of the KPIs for EoO ensures transparency and credibility that are further 
complemented by commentaries in order to clarify the comparisons and the analysis, as well 
as to make them understandable and easy to interpret by access seekers. 
In Poland, the SMP operator proposed to publish KPIs on a voluntary basis to allow for the 
detection of non-financial forms of discrimination in 2009. A definition of the criteria for different 
indicators was the subject of a long discussion with the NRA and other market players, and it 
was finally audited by an external consultant. Since then, each of the SMP operator’s 
wholesale customers receives a detailed report and comparison of the provisioning of services 
 
506 Vodafone response to the Targeted Consultation, Q6. 
507 Hungarian NRA response to the Targeted Consultation, Q7. 
508 EIR response to the Targeted Consultation, Q7. 
509 ComReg Information Notice ComReg 18/110.  
510 An operator’s response to the online survey. 
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in comparison to the retail part of the SMP operator. The report is also submitted to the NRA 
on a regular basis511. 
Implementation difficulties512  
The Czech NRA lifted the obligation of the wholesale company of the SMP operator to publish 
its KPIs after its voluntary legal separation from the retail provider. Vodafone has criticized the 
decision because in the absence of KPI indicators, non-discriminatory behaviour by the party 
cannot be monitored513. Vodafone notes the common ownership of the wholesale and retail 
arms (PPF Group) 514, hinting that there may still be an economic incentive to discriminate. 
Vodafone515 has stressed that in some markets KPIs alone are not enough to ensure the non-
discriminatory behaviour by SMP operators (e.g. Greece and Spain). Hence, NRAs should 
further strengthen their audits proactively and not only after a complaint by access seekers. 
Conversely, in Germany the regulator is constantly monitoring the compliance of the KPIs. In 
Portugal, the NRA has mandated KPIs for duct and pole access, yet neither NRA nor an 
independent auditor audit such KPIs. The incumbent must put together a monthly report on 
KPI performance, which the operators may challenge. ECTA asks516 for a more systematic use 
of KPIs and advocates to establish and measure KPIs in terms of:  
(i) Each step of the provisioning process individually (to reveal possible bottlenecks and 
differential treatment, including extra steps that apply for supply to alternative 
operators). 
(ii) End-to-end performance, systematically comparing the effective outcome for end-
users. Where differences are identified that are detrimental to competition, NRA need 
to take measures to ensure that discrimination is remedied and to monitor and report 
on process improvement.  
An operator claims that in Lithuania, a quantitative audit of KPIs does not suffice if it is not 
complemented with a qualitative assessment of non-discrimination or other parameters of 
effective access517. 
According to an operator518 in Portugal, the NRA has traditionally adopted a reactive stance by 
waiting for alternative providers' complaints or intervention requests, while a more proactive 
monitoring and auditing of SMP obligations would be desirable in a context where the SMP 
provider has no incentives to be fully compliant519. 
In Cyprus, the NRA does not specify KPIs in order to follow-up on the implementation of 
decisions – this is left up to the negotiating parties to decide upon (e.g. defining SLAs and 
SLGs.) An operator, however, remarks that while they can define the desired level of service 
where they have experience with the access product, this is not the case with access to poles 
 
511 Orange response to the Targeted Consultation, Q11. 
512 The section summarizes data reported by NRA and operators via the Targeted Consultation, online survey and 
case study interviews, unless otherwise indicated. 
513 ČTÚ Decision REM/3a/05.2018-03 of 15 May 2018 
514 Vodafone response to the Targeted Consultation, Q2 
515 Idem, Q8 
516 ECTA response to the Targeted Consultation. 
517 Case study interviews. 
518 An operator’s response to the online survey. 
519 Vodafone response to the Targeted Consultation, Q1 highlights (regarding Spain) that “the efficiency of the non-





in the absence of prior experience. This may render effective enforcement of the non-
discrimination obligation in case of dispute resolution procedures difficult520.  
Finally, according to an operator active in several EU markets, “there are, in our footprint, often 
problems of enforcement either due to the fact that the data is not available or due to difficulties 
in making proof of the impact and economic consequences of the discrimination”521.  
Finding 23. The manner in which KPIs are monitored varies substantially across the EU. 
Several comments by access seekers relate to alleged weaknesses in monitoring and 
enforcement. In some Member States, there appears to be a lack of transparency as to 
how NRA monitor KPIs, and what happens if they do not adhere to the rules.   
f. Guidance relating to SLAs  
Provisions concerned (NDCM Recommendation) 
• Recital 24: “(…) KPIs should be complemented by SLAs and SLGs. Imposing SLAs 
ensures that access seekers are provided with an agreed quality of service, whereas 
the use of corresponding SLGs acts as a deterrent against discriminatory behaviour. 
NRAs should be closely involved in the development of SLAs, for instance, by 
approving the SLAs developed by the SMP operator as part of a regulatory reference 
offer.” 
• Point 6: ”(s) ‘Service Level Agreements (SLAs)’ means commercial agreements under 
which the SMP operator is obliged to provide access to wholesale services with a 
specified level of quality. 
• (t) ‘Service Level Guarantees (SLGs)’ form an integral part of SLAs and specify the 
level of compensation payable by the SMP operator if it provides wholesale services 
with a quality inferior to that specified in the SLA.” 
• Point 27: “NRAs should require the SMP operator to implement corresponding SLAs 
alongside KPIs. “ 
• Point 28: “NRAs should require the SMP operator to provide corresponding SLGs in 
case of a breach of the SLAs. “ 
• Point 29: “NRAs should ensure that SLG payments are, in principle, made among the 
operators without undue delay and through a pre-established process for payment and 
billing. The level of such penalties should be sufficiently dissuasive to ensure that the 
SMP operator complies with its delivery obligations.” 
Provisions concerned (NGA Recommendation) 
• Annex II: Application of the principle of equivalence for access to the civil engineering 
infrastructure of the SMP operator for the purpose of rolling out NGA networks: 
“4. SERVICE LEVEL INDICATORS 
 
520 Case study interviews. 
521 Vodafone response to the Targeted Consultation, Q1. 
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In order to ensure that access and use of the civil engineering infrastructure of the SMP 
operator is provided on an equivalent basis, service level indicators should be defined 
and calculated for both internal and third-party access seekers. Service level indicators 
should measure the responsiveness of the SMP operator to perform those actions 
necessary to provide access to its civil engineering infrastructure. Target service levels 
should be agreed with access seekers. 
Service level indicators should include delays for replying to requests for information 
on availability of elements of infrastructure, including ducts, poles, other physical assets 
(e.g. manholes), or distribution points; delays for replying to a request for feasibility to 
use elements of infrastructure; a measure of responsiveness to handle requests for 
access and use of elements of infrastructure; a measure of responsiveness for fault 
resolution processes. The calculation of the service level indicators should be 
performed at regular, fixed intervals and submitted to third-party access seekers. The 
NRA should control that service levels delivered to third-party access seekers are 
equivalent to those delivered internally by the SMP operator. The SMP operator should 
commit to adequate compensation in case of failure to comply with target service levels 
agreed with third-party access seekers.” 
Relevant provisions of the BEREC Guidelines522 on the minimum criteria for a reference 
offer 
“Section 3. Minimum criteria for a reference offer:  
A reference offer shall contain a description of the relevant offerings for access, broken down 
into components according to market needs (…)  
3.3. Service supply and quality conditions: 
• service level agreements (SLAs) for ordering, delivery, service (availability) and 
maintenance (repair), including specific time scales for the acceptance or refusal of a 
request for supply and for completion, testing and hand-over or delivery of services and 
facilities, for provision of support services (such as fault handling and repair); 
• the quality standards that each party must meet when performing its contractual 
obligations including the specification of key performance indicators (KPIs) with respect 
to SLAs, where relevant; 
• service level guarantees (SLGs) for ordering, delivery, service (availability) and 
maintenance (repair), including the amount of compensation payable by one party to 
another for failure to perform contractual commitments as well as the conditions for 
eligibility for compensation” 
 




Did the guidance bring about consistent SLAs across the EU? 










































































































































































































































































































AT √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
BG   √         
HR √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
CY √ √ √ √ √  √ √ √ √ √ 
CZ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
DK √ √ √ √ (√)  √ √ √ √ √ 
EE √ √ √ √ √       
FR √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √  √ √ 
DE √ √ √ √ √  (√) √ √ √ √ 
IE √ √ √ √  √ √ √ √ √ √ 
IT √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
LV √  √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
LT √ √ √  √ √ √ √  √ √ 
LU √ √ √ √ √  √ √ √  √ 
MT √ √ √ √ √       
NL √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √  √ 
Ro N/a N/a N/a N/a N/a N/a N/a N/a N/a N/a N/a 
ES √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
SE √ √ √ √  √  N/a N/a N/a √ 
Source BEREC BoR (16) 219, Annex 3, p.81. 
Notes: √ - Impose obligations pertaining to best practice, empty cell – Does not impose obligations pertaining to 
best practice, (√) – Does not impose obligations, but conforms to best practice, n/a – Best practice is not applicable. 
For example, in cases where specific technology relevant to BP is not deployed and therefore BP is not required; 
or where the market is deregulated. 
SLAs/SLG are used notably in France, Poland, Slovakia, Belgium, Italy523: 
• In Poland, SLAs are understood as time limits for the removal of failures, provision of 
services, service availability levels, etc. They are a part of a reference offer and any 
breach of them is subject to contractual penalty in the amount specified in the offer. For 
exceeding time limits indicated in the reference offer, the SMP operator pays 
contractual penalties in the amount specified in the reference offer, which makes for an 
effective preventive measure. UKE has no knowledge as to additional contracts 
specifying SLAs, including e.g. minimum data transmission value524. 
• In Ireland, the SMP operator is required to “conclude, publish, maintain, and update 
SLAs for regulated products as well as publish a quarterly SLA performance report. 
SLAs are required to include a provision for service credits, specify circumstances 
under which credits would be paid, include the methodology for calculating service 
credits and worked example(s) and include T&Cs for suspension”525. 
 
523 ETNO response to the Targeted Consultation, Q8. The association advocates in this regard that that SLAs/SLGs 
would be left to commercial agreements between parties. NRA should only intervene in case such commercial 
agreements are not effective. 
524 Polish NRA response to the Targeted Consultation, Q8. 
525 EIR response to the Targeted Consultation, Q8. 
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• In Denmark and Germany, there is no demand for differentiated SLAs to reflect 
customer differences (BEREC Best Practice 32d). In Germany, there are high quality 
offers and the SLAs reflect the types of offers but all quality levels are available for 
residential and business customers. 
Implementation difficulties526  
Several comments advocate that EoI should be accompanied by appropriate SLAs on the 
quality of provisioning and assurance. Low quality provided to all access seekers (both the 
SMP operator’s own retail arm and the competitors) on a non-discrimination basis may 
otherwise be the outcome527.  
Finding 24. Comments received sometimes go beyond the non-discrimination issue. 
Operators seemed concerned about QoS issues, stressing that KPIs set by the NRAs are 
sometimes not ambitious enough. 
Eleven (out of 14 responding) NRAs report that they ensure EoO by requiring SMP operators 
to enter into SLAs and to provide SLGs. This is in line with Point 27 of the NDCM 
Recommendation which advocates NRAs to require SMP operators to implement 
corresponding SLAs alongside KPIs. However, several SMP operators argue that the 
supervision of non-discrimination should not be confused with the definition and supervision of 
the efficiency (including SLA, SLG) of process at the wholesale level, and thus, NRA should 
clearly distinguish the two issues528. Orange529 argues that KPIs may not be based on the 
same perimeter of the wholesale products for which SLAs/SLGs exist, nor be linked to the 
commercial conditions attached. Thus, SLAs should not be further covered by the future 
access recommendation, even though the topic of appropriate SLAs/SLGs is a key element of 
the access provided by the SMP operator, especially for addressing the business segment of 
the market. Generally, in retail markets, SMP operators do only offer SLAs in the business 
segment and not to residential users. They therefore view the imposition of SLAs on their 
wholesale offers, where they are intended for residential end-users, as discriminatory since 
they do not themselves provide such SLAs. However, mandating reinforced SLAs in the 
residential segment may nevertheless be justified where VHCN are available and some 
smaller and medium size businesses are sufficiently served based on mass-market 
connections.530 
According to one operator531, SLAs in several markets have not been effective. The main 
reasons are lack of empowerment by NRAs to impose penalties, penalties that do not have a 
sufficient deterrent effect, many subjective justifications to deviate from the agreed SLAs. In 
Spain, NRA have already confirmed SLA breaches but are not empowered to impose fines for 
these types of breaches. Only courts are empowered to impose fines for SLA breaches. In 
 
526 The section summarizes data reported by NRA and operators via the Targeted Consultation, online survey and 
case study interviews, unless otherwise indicated. 
527 In that sense: Iliad response to the Targeted Consultation, Q1. 
528 An operator’s response to the online survey. Liberty Global in response to the Targeted Consultation, Q8 
stresses that that any SLAs/SLGs should “recognise commercial realities and do not impose highly onerous 
obligations on operators that go beyond enabling the access seeker to compete in the market. Similar to KPIs, 
Liberty Global believes that the type of services should be taken into account – e.g. ‘best effort’ services require 
different SLAs”. 
529 Stakeholders‘ workshop 9 June 2021. 
530 Explanatory Note Accompanying The Document Commission Recommendation on relevant product and service 
markets SWD(2020) 337 final p.47. 




Germany, the SLAs imposed in the reference offer concerning activation and fault clearance 
procedures should be stricter in order to provide better customer experience. More problematic 
has been the fact that the penalties imposed by NRAs in cases of breach of SLAs are far too 
low532. In Portugal also, the penalties foreseen in the incumbent’s reference offers are still low 
and therefore not an effective deterrent. In Ireland, the SMP operator is unilaterally able to 
invoke suspensions in the obligation to make SLA penalty payments with limited scrutiny or 
objective criteria. These suspensions apply to both provisioning and repair processes. The 
operator concludes that, to be fully respected, any SLA system must be accompanied by an 
adequate and effective system of penalties, i.e. by appropriate deterrence measures aimed at 
guaranteeing the service levels established to protect not only the operators but also, and 
above all, the final customers533. One access seeker alleges that the SMP operator has a broad 
margin of discretion to play on the "reasons/metrics" of the delay in the provision of the input 
concerned, as the SMP operator is the one who attributes the responsibility in the event of 
delays. The operator therefore advocates that future guidelines should ensure predictability 
and consistency in the calculation and application of SLAs534. 
Vodafone regrets that the Czech NRA removed the obligation for the SMP operator CETIN to 
monitor and submit KPIs. The reasoning was that CETIN is legally separated from the retail 
provider O2, even though they are owned by the same owner. However, considering the 
common ownership of the wholesale and retail arms, there may still be an economic incentive 
to discriminate535.  
In the same vein, ECTA536 alleges that the levels of quality offered by SMP operators at a 
wholesale level in their reference offers are generally very low in terms of provisioning times 
and especially in terms of repair times. The situation prevailing around the time of the adoption 
of the NDCM Recommendation would not have, since then, substantially improved: some SMP 
operators’ wholesale access conditions do not guarantee that a line used to serve a B2B 
(business or public administration) customer’s connection will never be down for an entire 
working day. Similarly, they only guarantee that a limited percentage of B2C connections (often 
below 80-90%) would be repaired within that timeframe. However, the average tolerance level 
means that a significant share of customers whose service is based on wholesale access from 
the SMP operator may be left without service for several days. ECTA moreover complains that:  
(i) Breaches of SLAs by SMP operators are frequent and even very low targets are 
regularly unmet. 
(ii) NRAs sanctioning SMP operators for breaches of SLAs/SLGs is not something that 
occurs regularly; it is rather quasi non-existent. In addition, it has been very rare for an 
NRA to actively seek meaningfully improvement in the quality on the wholesale 
products of SMP operators (with exceptions, notably in the UK, after many years of 
very poor performance).  
(iii) It is very rare for SMP operators to effectively pay-out penalties in real monetary terms 
to alternative operators for breaches of SLGs. The prevalent situation is that penalties 
 
532 This claim is supported by an anonymous operator in response to the Targeted Consultation, Q8: “Die 
Vertragsstrafen werden auch regelmäßig fällig. Unseres Erachtens ist wichtig, dass eine Vertragsstrafe eine 
hinreichende Höhe vorsehen muss, damit auch eine Verhaltensänderung bewirkt werden kann. Dieses sollte von 
den NRBs eingefordert werden“. 
533 Vodafone response to the Targeted Consultation, Q8. 
534 An operator’s response to the online survey. 
535 Vodafone response to the Targeted Consultation, Q8. 
536 ECTA response to the Targeted Consultation, Q8. 
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due by SMP operators are set off or otherwise settled, including by converting them 
into a credit for future wholesale services purchased by the alternative operator 
concerned (meaning that in fine revenues still accrue to the SMP operators). In sum, 
whist SLAs/SLGs exist for SMP operators’ wholesale access products, the current set 
of circumstances means that the quality of service (notably including repair time 
performance) remains basically in the hands of the SMP operators, and that this is a 
‘manageable problem’ for the SMP operators to administer with non-dissuasive 
penalties being part of SMP operators’ day-to-day management. Penalties imposed by 
NRAs for discrimination in terms of quality on SMP operators are exceedingly rare, and 
have not dissuaded SMP operators from continuing to provide below SLA/SLG quality 
at a wholesale level to alternative operators. A recommendation should include a 
recommendation for the prompt imposition of effectively (rather than ‘sufficiently’) 
dissuasive penalties and an explicit referral to the aggravating nature of cases of 
recidivism on overall penalty levels. 
A Hungarian NRA imposed a sanction for a breach of SLA. As a result of a market surveillance 
procedure, the NRA found that one of the SMP operators did not send in time and with the 
required content the regular SLA report to the access seekers. Altogether, a 10,000,000 HUF 
(c.a. €28,500) penalty was imposed on the SMP operator537. 
In France538, according to an access seeker, contractual SLAs have not proved to be efficient 
enough and the level of associated penalties is “ridiculous”. In addition, operators must claim 
penalties from Orange, as they are not paid automatically when QoS are not met. The NRA 
sent a formal notice to the SMP operator after finding deterioration in the quality of service of 
the wholesale offers two years ago. However, since then the NRA has not yet sanctioned the 
SMP operator. Another operator doubts that SLAs are the most effective mechanism to enforce 
the principle of non-discrimination, considering in particular that the level of penalties which 
are usually set on a contractual basis remain at a relatively low level539. 
As a matter of fact, higher penalties may be difficult to justify because they must be proportional 
to the rental fee. For example, penalties higher than a one year rental payment might be 
squashed by a Court for reasons of non-proportionality. 
Moreover, even if SLAs are mandated in reference offers, the penalties are part of a 
commercial contract, reasons for which the customer must claim payment of the penalties in 
the same way as other contractual obligations. When invoiced, the SMP operator may always 
invoke an ‘act of god’ or other circumstances independent from its will (e.g. absence of end-
user in cases of a problem in the house) and refuse to pay. The issue of a limited 
dissuasiveness of penalties may nonetheless be solved by an alternative means. For example, 
in Belgium, to avoid discussions on possible unjustified delays in case the intervention of a 
technician is necessary, access seekers can ask a technician directly in the field to intervene, 
as long as the latter is a ‘certified technician’. It is also possible for alternative operators to 
send their own technicians to be certified. For installation, the system works quite well but SMP 
operators often refuse such solutions for repairs. Their arguments are relevant because most 
of the failures in the field concern not only one customer from one alternative operator but a 
set of customers from retail and several alternative operators. 
 
537 Hungarian NRA response to the Targeted Consultation, Q8. 
538 An operator’s response to the online survey. 




Finding 25. SLAs and SLGs on the provision of wholesale broadband access products are 
provided by SMP operators across the EU. However, access seekers’ comments suggest 
that in some cases the billing procedure and the level of the SLG’s payments foreseen 
would not be sufficiently dissuasive to ensure that the SMP operator complies with its 
delivery obligations, despite Point 29 NDCM Recommendation. 
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7. Regulation of civil engineering infrastructure and relations 
between asymmetric SMP regulation and symmetric access 
a. Summary of findings 
The study findings show that the scope of the physical infrastructure access obligations 
imposed on SMP operators varies across the EU. For example, several NRAs do not require 
an SMP operator, when deploying newly-built civil engineering, to design it so as to allow 
several operators to deploy their fibre lines as advocated by Point 16 of the Recommendation. 
However, these NRAs often have reasons not to do so based on their specific national 
situation. On the other hand, the guidance on transparency (availability of a reference offer) 
and pricing (cost orientation) seems to be followed by nearly all NRAs. Still, there is more 
variation in the guidance on the equivalence of inputs (EoI) set out in Annex II of the NGA 
Recommendation which is advocated to ensure effective access. Finally, two NRAs regulate 
duct access in Market 4/2014, reminding us that access to CEIs can also be indispensable for 
the establishment of dedicated connections.  
The analysis has shown several potential obstacles to the use of civil engineering: 
• Pricing. However, it is not clear whether the alleged problem is confined to countries in 
which access to civil engineering is mandated under national laws transposing the 
BCRD or whether the guidance of the NDCM Recommendation on cost orientation of 
access was not duly followed. 
• Lack of enforceable QoS and costly ancillary obligations. 
At the same time, proper design and enforcement of access obligations seem to be crucial for 
an effective access remedy. 
Generally, NRAs do not differentiate between the pricing of newly built and legacy civil 
engineering infrastructures. However, NRAs have differing views on whether SMP operators 
retain sufficient incentives to invest in new civil engineering infrastructures with a sufficient 
capacity to host alternative operators where necessary when SMP access obligations are 
imposed. 
Looking at the information provision and given that in several Member States the NRA was not 
entrusted with the SIP task, Point 17 of the current NGA Recommendation retains its 
relevance. The usefulness of the information made available by SMP operators is an issue in 
some Member States. Availability of online systems containing up-to-date information on duct 
location and availability with measures to ensure accuracy of such data is a key requisite. 
The analysis also shows that most NRAs consider that in a large majority of cases, the BCRD 
alone is not sufficient to ensure effective access to relevant civil engineering infrastructures for 
access seekers. Access seekers share that view. According to some stakeholders, negotiated 
symmetric access, as under the BCRD, may provider stronger investment incentives than SMP 





Provisions of the EECC   
• Recital 172 EECC: (…) before the NRA determines whether any additional (…) remedy 
should be imposed (…), it should seek to determine whether the retail market 
concerned would be effectively competitive, also taking into account (…) other types of 
regulation already in force, such as for example general access obligations to non-
replicable assets or obligations imposed pursuant to Directive 2014/61/EU (…).  
• Recital 187: Civil engineering assets that can host an electronic communications 
network are crucial for the successful roll-out of new networks because of the high cost 
of duplicating them and the significant savings that can be made when they can be 
reused. Therefore, in addition to the rules on physical infrastructure laid down in 
Directive 2014/61/EU, a specific remedy is necessary in those circumstances where 
civil engineering assets are owned by an undertaking designated as having SMP. 
Where civil engineering assets exist and are reusable, the positive effect of achieving 
effective access to them on the roll-out of competing infrastructure is very high, and it 
is therefore necessary to ensure that access to such assets can be used as a self-
standing remedy for the improvement of competitive and deployment dynamics in any 
downstream market, to be considered before assessing the need to impose any other 
potential remedies, and not just as an ancillary remedy to other wholesale products or 
services or as a remedy limited to undertakings availing themselves of such other 
wholesale products or services. 
• Recital 189: Mandating access to network infrastructure can be justified as a means of 
increasing competition, but national regulatory authorities need to balance the rights of 
an infrastructure owner to exploit its infrastructure for its own benefit, and the rights of 
other service providers to access facilities that are essential for the provision of 
competing services. 
• Art.72: 1. An NRA may (…) impose obligations on undertakings to meet reasonable 
requests for access to, and use of, civil engineering including, but not limited to, 
buildings or entries to buildings, building cables, including wiring, antennae, towers and 
other supporting constructions, poles, masts, ducts, conduits, inspection chambers, 
manholes, and cabinets, in situations where, having considered the market analysis, 
the national regulatory authority concludes that denial of access or access given under 
unreasonable terms and conditions having a similar effect would hinder the emergence 
of a sustainable competitive market and would not be in the end-user’s interest. 
2. NRAs may impose obligations on an undertaking to provide access (…) irrespective 
of whether the assets that are affected by the obligation are part of the relevant market 
in accordance with the market analysis, provided that the obligation is necessary and 
proportionate (…). 
• Art. 73 EECC: 1. NRAs may (….) impose obligations on undertakings to meet 
reasonable requests for access to, and use of, specific network elements and 
associated facilities, in situations where the NRAs consider that denial of access or 
unreasonable terms and conditions having a similar effect would hinder the emergence 
of a sustainable competitive market at the retail level, and would not be in the end-
user’s interest. 
NRAs may require undertakings inter alia: (a) to give third parties access to, and use 
of, specific physical network elements and associated facilities, as appropriate, 
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including unbundled access to the local loop and sub-loop (…) (g) to provide co-location 
or other forms of associated facilities sharing (…) NRAs may subject those obligations 
to conditions covering fairness, reasonableness and timeliness. 
Where NRAs consider the appropriateness of imposing any of the possible specific 
obligations referred to (…), and in particular where they assess, in accordance with the 
principle of proportionality, whether and how such obligations are to be imposed, they 
shall analyse whether other forms of access to wholesale inputs, either on the same or 
on a related wholesale market, would be sufficient to address the identified problem in 
the end-user’s interest. That assessment shall include commercial access offers, 




The EECC does not define the concept of CEI. However, Art.2(10) EECC defines ‘associated 
facilities’ as “associated services, physical infrastructures and other facilities or elements 
associated with an electronic communications network or an electronic communications 
service which enables or supports the provision of services via that network or service, or has 
the potential to do so, and includes buildings or entries to buildings, building wiring, antennae, 
towers and other supporting constructions, ducts, conduits, masts, manholes, and cabinets”. 
The concept of CEI is defined in Point 11 NGA Recommendation as “physical local loop 
facilities deployed by an electronic communications operator to host local loop cables such as 
copper wires, optical fibre and co-axial cables. It typically refers, but is not limited to, 
subterranean or above-ground assets such as sub-ducts, ducts, manholes and poles”. While 
‘building wiring’ is an associated facility, it is, however, not CEI in the sense of the NGA 
Recommendation. Point 18 of that Recommendation advocates that “Where an SMP operator 
deploys FTTH, NRAs should, in addition to mandating access to the civil engineering 
infrastructure, mandate access to the terminating segment of the access network of the SMP 
operator, including wiring inside buildings”. However, Art.72 EECC seems to interpret the 
concept of civil engineering more broadly since it specifies that mandated access to CEI can 
include access to “buildings or entries to buildings, building cables, including wiring, antennae, 
towers and other supporting constructions, poles, masts, ducts, conduits, inspection 
chambers, manholes, and cabinets”. It would appear that the term CEI is used in Art.72 EECC 
with the same meaning as ‘associated facilities’.  
Conversely, the definition of ‘physical infrastructure’ in Art.2(2) BCRD is similar to that of CEI 
in the NGA Recommendation. The BCRD definition is: “any element of a network which is 
intended to host other elements of a network without becoming itself an active element of the 
network, such as pipes, masts, ducts, inspection chambers, manholes, cabinets, buildings or 
entries to buildings, antenna installations, towers and poles”, however “cables, including dark 
fibre (…) are not physical infrastructure within the meaning of [the BCRD]”. 
A key issue to address in this review of the Recommendations is whether the current definition 
of CEI is carried over or whether the definition should be aligned with the scope of the access 
that can be mandated under Art.72 EECC. 
Elements reviewed 
The NGA Recommendation invites NRAs to impose access to civil engineering infrastructures 
“where duct capacity is available” (Point 13) and, in Point 18, to the terminating segment as an 
ancillary remedy to access obligations (in particular in those cases of wiring inside buildings) 




whether and where ducts and other local loop facilities are available for the purpose of 
deploying NGA networks and ensure that the SMP operator provides access under the same 
conditions to third-party access seekers as to its own downstream arm. Annex II of the 
Recommendation sets out in detail what comprises the principle of equivalence. The 
Recommendation concerns only the design by NRAs of SMP remedies. Mandatory access to 
civil engineering from utilities other than electronic communications network operators is not 
covered.  
The implementation of the guidance to ensure effective access to civil engineering of the SMP 
operator is reviewed in this chapter. This review examines successively the implementation of 
the following three recommended practices: 
1. Guidance on the design of the SMP remedy. 
2. Guidance on the centralisation of information on available civil engineering. 
3. Usage of symmetric access obligations or negotiated access under the BCRD as an 
alternative.  
c. Guidance on the design of the SMP remedy 
Provisions concerned (NGA Recommendation) 
Reference offer 
• Point 13. (…) Mandating the publication by the SMP operator of an adequate reference 
offer as soon as possible after it has been requested by an access seeker is 
proportionate to the objective of encouraging efficient investment and infrastructure 
competition. Such reference offer should specify the conditions and procedures of 
access to the civil engineering infrastructure, including access prices. 
• Annex II, Point 3. ORDERING AND PROVISIONING OF ACCESS:  
The SMP operator should implement the procedures and tools necessary for ensuring 
efficient access and use of its civil engineering infrastructure and distribution points, 
and the different elements the infrastructure consists of. In particular, the SMP operator 
should provide third-party access seekers with end-to-end ordering, provisioning and 
fault management systems equivalent to those provided to internal access seekers. 
This should include measures aimed at de-congestioning currently used ducts.  
Requests for information, access and use of the civil engineering infrastructure, the 
distribution points and the different elements the infrastructure consists of by third-party 
access seekers should be processed within the same delays as equivalent requests by 
internal access seekers. The same level of visibility on the progress of the requests 
should also be provided, and negative answers should be objectively justified. 
The information systems of the SMP operator should keep track records of the handling 
of requests which should be available to the NRA. 
• Point 5. REFERENCE OFFER  
The different items required to provide equivalent access to the civil engineering 
infrastructure of the SMP operator should be published in a reference offer, if a request 
for such an offer has been made by an access seeker. At a minimum, the reference 
offer should contain the relevant procedures and tools for retrieving civil engineering 
asset information; describe the access and usage conditions to the different elements 
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which make up the civil engineering infrastructure; describe the procedures and tools 
for access ordering, provisioning and fault management; and fix target service levels 
and the penalties for breach of those service levels. The internal access provision 
should be based on the same terms and conditions as contained in the reference offer 
provided to third-party access seekers. 
Access to the terminating segment 
• Point 17. Transparency and non-discrimination obligations are required to ensure the 
effectiveness of access to the terminating segment. Where so requested, the 
publication by the SMP operator of an adequate reference offer within a short timeframe 
is necessary in order to allow access seekers to make investment choices. 
• Point 18. In a Fibre to the Home (FTTH) context duplication of the terminating segment 
of the fibre loop will normally be costly and inefficient. To allow for sustainable 
infrastructure competition, it is therefore necessary that access be provided to the 
terminating segment of the fibre infrastructure deployed by the SMP operator. To 
ensure efficient entry, it is important that access is granted at a level in the network of 
the SMP operator which enables entrants to achieve minimum efficient scale to support 
effective and sustainable competition. Where necessary specific interfaces could be 
required to ensure efficient access. 
• Point 21. NRAs should, in accordance with market demand, encourage, or, where 
legally possible under national law, oblige the SMP operator to deploy multiple fibre 
lines in the terminating segment. 
Did the guidance bring about consistent design of SMP access to civil engineering 
across the EU? 
Access to civil engineering infrastructures is not imposed on the SMP operator in every 
Member State, as illustrated by the following: 
• NRAs that do not impose SMP access to civil engineering: HR, SE, DK, MT, RO, LU, 
CZ, AU, FI 
• NRAs that impose SMP access to civil engineering: EE, IE, IT, LT, CY, EL, PT, BE, 
HU, ES, SK, SI, PL, DE. 
Moreover, the scope of the segments of physical infrastructure assets that are regulated in the 
context of market analyses varies widely. The 2019 BEREC Report on access to physical 




Table 24. Type of physical infrastructure to which access was540 imposed in the market 
analysis in the EU Member States 
Physical infrastructure Number of countries Countries 
Ducts, pipes 19 BE, BG, CY, DE, EL, EE, ES, FR, HR, HU, IE, 
IT, LT, LU, LV, PL, PT, SE, SI, SK 
Chambers, manholes 12 BG, CY, ES, FR, GR, HU, IE, IT, LV, SI, PL, PT 
Poles 10 ES, FR, GR, HU, IE, IT, LV, PL, PT, SI 
Source: BEREC BoR (19) 94. 
Until the 2020 market review, notification by the French NRA and only the UK NRA (when the 
UK was still a Member State) had defined a product market exclusively for physical 
infrastructure, such as ducts and chambers541.  
The BEREC report542 indicates that remedies imposed on SMP operators relating to access to 
their physical infrastructures applies in most countries to the local access and backhaul 
segments, while only the Hungarian, Italian, Polish and Slovenian NRAs include in-building 
wiring543 within the scope of SMP remedies. In many cases, in-building infrastructure is not 
controlled by the SMP operator.  
The terminating segment may represent a structural barrier for all competitors, incumbent 
included, insofar as there would be a risk that the (incumbent and/or the) first operator who 
reaches a building pre-empts this facility, thus preventing its competitors from having access 
to the end-users in that building. Moreover, multiple in-house wiring deployments could lead 
to significant annoyance to the building’s inhabitants544. Therefore, prior to the adoption of the 
NGA Recommendation, some Member States adopted national legislation to deal with this 
matter outside of the framework of the national electronic communications law. 
Box 8. Member States that impose access to in-house wiring using a different legal basis 
Croatia. In December 2009, Croatia adopted the Ordinance on technical conditions of an 
electronic communications network for business and residential buildings. This ordinance 
allows the owners of buildings to freely choose between operators and for the operators to 
access these buildings under equal and non-discriminatory conditions. A building must 
allow the installation of cables and wires for the provision of broadband access services. 
Network operators can access and use the installation for the purposes of service provision 
free of charge, however, access is done under equal conditions. An operator can build new 
 
540 The situation may have changed in some Member States since the data was collected by BEREC in 2019. For 
example, in the meantime, the Bulgarian NRA fully deregulated its broadband wholesale access markets. 
541 The UK proceeded with a similar approach in parallel and defined such market on 18 March 2021 : Statement: 
Promoting investment and competition in fibre networks – Wholesale Fixed Telecoms Market Review 2021-26, 
available at : https://www.ofcom.org.uk/consultations-and-statements/category-1/2021-26-wholesale-fixed-
telecoms-market-review The first NRAs applying such a market definition were the Swiss and Liechtenstein NRAs. 
The Swiss NRA defined a separate market in 2009 for ducts and found a SMP on that market. Under Swiss law, 
access to ducts is an explicit obligation (if capacity is available) for operators having SMP in the access market. 
Similarly, the Liechtenstein NRA defined a specific market for physical access to the infrastructure in the core 
network (See BoR (19) 94, p.8). 
542 BoR (19) 94. 
543 Within a building, in-house wiring is deployed between e.g. the basement and each flat, normally inside of 
dedicated cable trays. 
544 BoR (11) 43, p.31. 
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fibre optic installations but it needs to make sure that other operators will be able to access 
the installations. 
Portugal. A Decree-Law was published in May 2009 that defined the framework for 
investment and the development of NGA. This law provides a measure to prevent the first 
operator from monopolizing access to buildings by imposing a sharing of any new (or 
upgraded) infra-structures within the building. The first operator who deploys in a building 
must install at least two fibres per apartment. A second operator seeking to connect end-
users in that building will then owe the first 50% of the costs incurred in the installation of 
the shared infrastructure, while the third operator would owe 33% and so on. 
Spain.  In 2008, Spain imposed symmetrical obligations on electronic communications 
operators with regard to in-house wiring for the deployment of NGA access pursuant to 
Article 12 of Directive 2002/21/EC (Case ES/2008/0820). An obligation to meet reasonable 
requests for access to, and use of, network elements and equipment within buildings is 
imposed on the first operator to deploy a fibre access solution in a building. The first 
operator must sign bilateral agreements within four months of the request and must ensure 
that sharing of the network elements and equipment is available. Moreover, the first 
operator is obliged to set reasonable prices and provide sufficient information to third 
parties in order to facilitate the planning and implementation of their requests for access. 
With regard to access points, the measure foresees access at points which are located 
further away from the building in certain circumstances. These situations mainly arise in 
areas with levels of population density which, owing to the criteria of efficiency and 
economic viability, lead to network designs based on terminal boxes of suitable dimensions 
to serve several homes located on public property. In these cases, the point of sharing will 
be transferred to the locations accommodating those elements, whether they be boxes, 
cabinets, or other infrastructural elements. 
Source: Visionary Analytics based on BEREC (2010) Annex to the BEREC Report Next Generation Access – 
Implementation Issues and Wholesale Products, Document number BoR (10) 08b, European Commission (2015). 
Implementation of the EU regulatory framework for electronic communication - 2015. Commission staff working 
document. Brussels, 19.6.2015 SWD(2015) 126 final 
The SMP framework is on that point complemented by the BCRD, which requires all newly 
constructed and substantially renovated buildings to be equipped with a physical infrastructure, 
such as mini-ducts capable of hosting high-speed networks and an easily accessible access 
point in the case of multi-dwelling buildings. Providers of public communications networks must 
have access to the access point and the in-building physical infrastructure under fair and non-
discriminatory terms and conditions if duplication is technically impossible or economically 
inefficient545.  
 
545 The BCRD 2018 implementation report nevertheless mentions that “stakeholders have not noticed a significant 
change since the implementation of the Directive because provisions were already in place or had only recently 
been transposed. Some improvements were reported in Spain and Italy, in terms of a reduction of cases where the 
building owner refused access. Nevertheless, operators in some Member States had problems getting permission 
to access apartment buildings (from building owners) to install and upgrade in-building infrastructures for high-
speed broadband”. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the implementation 
of Directive 2014/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on measures to reduce the 





Finding 26. The scope of the physical infrastructure access obligations imposed on SMP  
operators varies across the EU. 
In the subsequent sections we will distinguish between effective access, transparency and cost 
oriented pricing, which are respectively pursued by the equivalence requirement (Point 13 
NGA Recommendation), price control obligation (Point 14 NGA Recommendation) and 
mandated reference offer (Point 15 NGA Recommendation). While the NRAs of some Member 
States imposed detailed duct access obligations, the remedies adopted by a few NRAs appear 
less strict than those advocated in the NGA Recommendation, as reflected in the overview of 
countries in Table 25.  
Table 25. Overview of adherence to key guidance NGA Recommendation in a sample of 
Member States relating to the topics of effective access, pricing and transparency 
Member 
State 
Case number Art.7 
notification 
Point 13 NGA 
Rec. 
(Equivalence) 
Point 14 NGA 
Rec. (pricing 
remedy) 
15 NGA Rec. (reference 
offer)  




Proximus Reference Offer 
for Duct Access in GPON 
Underground 
Deployments546 
Cyprus CY/2016/1882 EoO Cost orientation Separate SMP RO not 
published 
Estonia EE/2017/1980 EoO Cost orientation 




EoI Cost orientation, 
RAB (HC + 
indexation)548 
Offre d’accès aux 
installations  
de génie civil et d’appuis 
aériens d’Orange549 
Ireland IE/2018/2089 EoI Cost orientation 
(Top-down 
HCA)550 
Master licence and SLAs 
online551 
Italy IT/ 2019/2181-2182 EoO Cost orientation 
(BU-LR(A)IC+) 
RO Servizi di Accesso 
NGAN552 
 
546 The draft offer – still pending approval by the NRA - does not (i) include a tool for an alternative operator to 
quickly assess where ducts may be available (although a procedure is foreseen in the reference offer to check 
actual availability); (ii) access to ducts in the feeder network (i.e. between the LEXs and the OFPs) neither (iii) 
provide access to the drop fibre. According to the SMP operator, this kind of access would not be possible because 
there are no free inputs/outputs available on the DTP to make this drop fibre available to a beneficiary operator. 
The Belgian NRA consulted the other NRAs on the draft via BEREC. The consultation is available at: 
https://isportal.berec.europa.eu/view-doc/prior-consultation-proximus-reference-offer-proda-duct-access-in-gpon-
underground-deployments  
547 Available at: https://www.telia.ee/partnerile/sideettevotjale/vorguressursi-rent  
548 As specified by décision n° 05-0834 of  15 Decembre 2005 modified by Décision n° 2012-0007 of 17 January 
2012, available at: https://www.arcep.fr/uploads/tx_gsavis/05-0834.pdf  
549 Available at: https://www.orange.com/sites/orangecom/files/documents/2021-
02/Offre_unique_iBLO_4fev2021.pdf  
550 For RAB and BU-LRAIC+ costs) of replacement of ducts for the provision of NGA services. Pricing of Eir’s 
Wholesale Fixed Access Servicesp, final decision, Decision DO3/16, 159. 
551 Available at: https://www.openeir.ie/products/data/pole-and-duct-access/  
552 Available at: https://www.wholesale.telecomitalia.com/it/c/document_library/get_file?uuid=98cb69d6-d1bb-
4b59-89ba-0af8576dd9af&groupId=10165. 
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Case number Art.7 
notification 
Point 13 NGA 
Rec. 
(Equivalence) 
Point 14 NGA 
Rec. (pricing 
remedy) 
15 NGA Rec. (reference 
offer)  
Lithuania LT/2019/2183 KPIs553 Cost orientation 
(TD HC FDC) 
Yes554 
Portugal PT/2019/2193 EoI Cost orientation 
(FDHC) 
ORAC555 
Poland PL 2019/2160556 EoO 
(functional 
separation) 








Slovenia SI/2017/2004 EoI Cost orientation 
(BU-LRIC+) 
In the WLA RUO560 
Spain  ES/2015/1818 KPI but no 
EoO 
BU-LRIC+ Oferta de Acceso a 
Registros y Conductos 
(MARCo)561 
Source: CIRCA database (Article 7 procedure files). 
Finding 27. The guidance on transparency (availability of a reference offer562 ) and pricing 
(cost orientation) seems to be followed by nearly all NRAs. However, there is more 
variation as regards the guidance on the principle of equivalence as set out in Annex II 
NGA of the Recommendation. 
 
NRAs regulate access to the ducts and poles of the SMP operator as a remedy in different 
markets: Market 3a and 3b or – in the case of Cyprus and Poland - Market 4 of the 2014 
Markets Recommendation563. In France, the NRA defined a separate physical infrastructure 
 
553 De facto principle of EoO: e.g. the NRA carries out periodic checks on the conditions under which the SMP 
operator provides analogous services to its own customers and compares it with the conditions applied to access 
seekers. Moreover, the SMP must offer SLAs. A complaint from operators about the application of the SMP’s SLA 
on grounds of breach of the non-discriminatory obligation is currently being assessed (Case study interviews). 
554 Available at: https://www.telia.lt/verslui/reguliuojamos-paslaugos/isankstiniai-pasiulymai/infrastrukturos-prieiga  
555 Available at: https://ptwholesale.pt/pt/Documents/ORAC.zip See also : ANACOM simplifies access to MEO 
ducts and poles by other operators, available at: https://www.anacom.pt/render.jsp?contentId=1479181  
556 No SMP duct access obligation is imposed. In September 2018, UKE issued 7 decisions (one of them addressed 
to the SMP operator) by which access to ducts is regulated symmetrically for the 7 largest network operators in 
Poland, regardless of SMP. The general obligation to provide duct access follows directly from national statutory 
legislation. In cases of disputes regarding access, the NRA is empowered to resolve these disputes. The 
symmetrical and statutory obligation to provide duct access for the SMP operator applies nationwide. 
557 Within SMP remedies, UKE does not impose price control on access to ducts. Price of access to ducts is 
regulated on the basis of a separate decision, and that regulated price is derived from competitive prices. Source: 
UKE Decision DR.SMP.6040.1.2019.74 of 22 October 2019. 
558 For access to ducts, available at: https://www.hurt-orange.pl/operatorzy-krajowi/uslugi/uslugi-
infrastrukturalne/kanalizacja-kablowa/ For access to poles, the terms and conditions are contained in Part VII of the 
SOR (the Orange Polska Reference Offer), which is available at: https://www.hurt-orange.pl/wp-
content/uploads/2021/02/oferta-sor-1.pdf?x32548  
559 Available at: https://www.telekom.sk/dokumenty/referencna-ponuka-na-pristup-ku-kablovodom-a-infrastrukture/  
560 Available at:  https://www.telekom.si/operaterji/vzorcne-ponudbe/wla-lokalni-dostop-na-fiksni-lokaciji  
561 Resolución por la cual se aprueba la revisión de los precios  de la oferta mayorista marco de telefónica y se 
acuerda su  notificación a la comisión europea y al organismo de  reguladores de comunicaciones electrónicas, 
OFE/DTSA/009/20/PRECIOS MARCO, available at: https://www.cnmc.es/sites/default/files/3559121_5.pdf  
562 More specific guidance on elements to  be included in a duct reference offer were provided by BEREC in BoR 
(10) 08, section D1 and BoR (11) 43, section B5. 




market. There are other countries where a similar approach might be considered by the NRA 
in the next market review (e.g. Lithuania, where duct access is the main access product used 
by ANOs, while there is zero take up of fibre unbundling and the use of copper unbundling is 
in steady decline)564. 
Finding 28. Two NRAs regulate duct access in market 4/2014. This raises the question of 
the scope of the access that can be imposed in market 1/2020: only in the local loop and 
for network deployment, or also for dedicated end-to-end connections, i.e. whether NRAs 
should impose two parallel, distinct access to CEI obligations. 
Space for competitors in new ducts 
According to Point 16 of the NGA Recommendation, NRAs should, where possible, work 
towards ensuring that newly-built facilities of the SMP operator are designed to allow several 
operators to make use of these facilities. However, the NGA Recommendation does not deal 
with scarcity in legacy ducts i.e., how to optimise the usage of existing ducts and also does not 
advocate any obligation to capacity available if ducts are fully used, or impose another type of 
obligation (like access to dark fibre) in those cases565. 
The French NRA distinguishes between areas where infrastructure-based competition is 
expected to emerge (i.e. where the SMP operator is normally required to leave at least as 
much space as it used itself in the civil engineering infrastructure) and the areas where the 
network is expected to be ‘mutualised’ (shared on the basis of co-financing offers), where it is 
not required to leave space566. Several other NRAs567 explicitly confirm that in cases where a 
civil engineering infrastructure is deployed by the SMP operator for the purpose of VHC 
network deployment, they require the SMP operator to deploy with sufficient space to host 
alternative networks, while several NRAs568 report that this is not the case in their countries, 
and three NRAs also say that there is no such obligation under the SMP regulation569 in their 
respective countries. However, some NRAs provide the following explanations for not requiring 
the SMP operator to deploy with sufficient space to host alternative networks570: 
• Operators do not plan to have an overlapping VHCN.  
• Demand for duct access is extremely limited.  
 
564 Case study interviews and desk research. 
565 BEREC provides some guidance in these situations in BoR (11) 43, p.19-20. 
566 WIK (2017), Best practice for passive infrastructure access, 19 April 2017,p.39. 
567 7 NRAs as per responses to the online survey. For example, in Lithuania, the Rules for Installation, Marking, 
Supervision and Use of Electronic Communications Infrastructure, approved by Order No. 1V-978 of the Director 
of the Communications Regulatory Authority of the Republic of Lithuania of 14 October 2011, foresaw that the pipe 
of a communications cable duct system should be of an outer diameter of 110 mm or more. Space for alternative 
operators is available if there are technical possibilities to do so. ANOs note that there are very few issues as 
regards availability of space for competitors in the SMP operator’s ducts despite the fact that there is a high demand 
for access to ducts and there is a high degree of parallel infrastructures in urban areas (case study inteviews). 
568 In Sweden, there is no longer an SMP duct access obligation, but Stokab reports that it has designed its network 
in such a way - FTTH, multifibre point-to-point – to be able to carry any type of services now and in the future (e.g. 
5g) and to also have enough dark fibre to be able to meet all demands. Consequently, Stokab puts down 1,000-
fibre cables in its ducts where needed (Stokab response to the online survey). Minimum diameters for ducts are 
also set in Lithuania and Ireland. 
569 Online survey data. 
570 NRA online survey data. 
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• FTTH is deployed by the SMP operator as much as possible on the facades of 
buildings, without ducts.  
• There are few FTTH deployments by the SMP operator and access seekers focus on 
VULA.  
• Fibre is mostly deployed in new High Density Polyethylene (HDPE) ducts and any extra 
HDPE duct is usually deployed as an operational reserve (used in case of repairs or 
breakdown of the original duct).  
• Space for future access by competitors is not always foreseen.  
• In Poland, there is also no such requirement, but the structure of the access fees 
(structure which is specified in the market review concerned) encourages the SMP 
operator to deploy ducts with extra space for hosting alternative operators. In particular, 
before the regulation was updated in 2018, fees for access to ducts were set by the 
percentage use of the ducts (a fixed price for the whole capacity of the duct was set 
irrespective of the duct’s diameter). Therefore, if a duct is 110 mm in diameter and an 
operator wants to place a cable 11 mm in diameter, they take up 10% of the duct, 
meaning that they need to pay for 10% of the capacity. However, the NRA noticed that 
many ducts were in fact smaller than 110 mm and staying with the same methodology 
meant higher price-per-cable in smaller ducts. In response, they changed the 
methodology to calculate a stable price-per-cable571. 
• Finnish operators report that they “build and dig trenches for new fibre every day 
(except during some freezing winter months)”572 and that additional capacity is always 
foreseen for their own future needs and for the needs of competitors. 
• In France, the existing infrastructure is mainly reused since the civil engineering of the 
SMP operator covers the quasi-totality of the territory. Instances where new ducts are 
built or poles erected are marginal573.   
Finding 29. Several NRAs do not require the SMP operator, when deploying newly-built 
civil engineering, to design it so as to allow several operators to deploy their fibre lines as 
advocated by Point 15 of the Recommendation. However, these NRAs often have reasons 
not to do so based on their specific national situations. 
 
Effective access: why is CEI access not used more widely across the EU? 
Regulated access to SMP ducts is used by access seekers (e.g. in France, Spain or 
Portugal574). The online survey of NRAs and operators identified a couple of interesting cases: 
• In Portugal, the SMP operator's ducts and poles have been widely used by alternative 
operators and it was one of the main drivers for the deployment of the VHCN by 
alternative operators. In the specific case of duct infrastructure, the ducts of the SMP 
operator have been the main choice for alternative operators. 
 
571 Case study interviews and desk resarch. 
572 Operator’s response to the online survey. 
573 Operator’s response to the online survey.  




• Conversely, in Greece (since only a single operator is deploying NGA networks in each 
geographic area) demand for access to civil engineering for NGA deployment is not 
expected - at least in the short to medium term. 
• In Malta, operators use a combination of civil engineering infrastructures including 
those of non-telecoms (other utility) operators. In general, the SMP operator cannot 
cover an area with FTTH without a prior upgrading of the civil infrastructure.  
Operators provided positive feedback on access to ducts in a number of countries: 
• In France, access to civil engineering is widely used because ducts are largely 
deployed.  
• In Spain, “access to civil infrastructure has fostered competition on infrastructure over 
the last decade, thus favouring the competition of wholesale and retail fixed broadband 
markets”575.  
• In Italy, an operator notes that “cable ducts and dark fibre are essential elements to 
ensure infrastructural competition”576. 
BEREC states that it is “difficult to assess the efficiency of [the NGA Recommendation] on an 
aggregate level given the variety of cases (starting with operational differences, like the 
ubiquity of duct and pole networks entailing different regulatory approaches)”. As most of the 
VHCN deployments are relatively recent, it would be premature to seek assessing the impact 
of the measures adopted by NRAs in some countries. Indeed physical deployment takes more 
time than the provision of other wholesale products like activated accesses, which are likely to 
show a market impact much faster)577. Moreover, BEREC highlights that differences in national 
circumstances more than in the manner in which the guidance was followed by NRA may 
explain the contrasting take ups by alternative operators of regulated access to civil 
engineering in the different Member States, but without naming the countries concerned: “For 
those operators not using this possibility to deploy VHCN, there are several explanations: 
• The characteristics of the SMP operator’s ducts do not enable alternative deployments 
(e.g. ducts that are too small for other users, or already saturated)578; 
• Dark fibre is widely available as a wholesale product and can be seen as a substitute 
to civil engineering in many cases; 
• The SMP operator (if there is one) is not the only provider of an adapted civil 
engineering infrastructure. 
 
575 Telefonica response to the Targeted Consultation, Q23. 
576 Italian operator’s response to the Targeted Consultation, Q23. 
577 BEREC (2020), BEREC Response to the Targeted consultation on the revision of the Commission’s access 
recommendations, BoR (20) 169, Q23. 
578 BEREC (2020), BEREC Response to the Targeted consultation on the revision of the Commission’s access 
recommendations, BoR (20) 169, Q23 explains that “aging, damaged or no longer used infrastructures, as well as 
infrastructures with no longer available space or capacity can impede the deployment of new and enhanced 
networks, in particular VHCN. The construction of new civil engineering infrastructure elements is usually very costly 
(often estimated to account for about 80 percent of total deployment costs), both financially and in terms of time 
(…)When a duct or a sub-duct is damaged or is currently not in use, it can be rehabilitated in order to be useable 
for the deployment of new and enhanced networks, in particular VHCN. When a duct or sub-duct is saturated, a 
solution can be the removal of unused cables (e.g. inactive copper cables) or the bundling of active cables. This 
solution should permit the liberation of more space, and can be coupled with efficient engineering rules to occupy 
the available space in ducts”. 
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[Moreover] the lack of complementary obligations ensuring access to a physical infrastructure 
in [effective, efficient and non-discriminatory] conditions can be the first impediment for their 
use”579. 
The main obstacles to wider usage of civil engineering infrastructures can be grouped into the 
following categories: 
• Limited availability of ducts 
• Mismatch with the required specifications of access seekers 
• Pricing and other access conditions 
• Other mentioned obstacles (not falling into any of the above categories) 
a) Limited availability of ducts 
As mentioned by BEREC, the availability of legacy ducts differs strongly between Member 
States, varying between 0 and 100 percentage of households that can be connected using a 
SMP’s civil engineering infrastructure580. 
In Belgium, there was no demand, which, according to the SMP operator, predominantly finds 
its origin in the absence of a capillary, widely-available legacy civil engineering duct 
infrastructure. The copper cable distribution network infrastructure was generally buried 
directly in the ground, without using a sturdy re-usable concrete infrastructure to host such 
copper cables. As a result, contrary to countries such as Spain, Portugal, and to a certain 
extent France, no widespread civil-engineering type of passive physical infrastructures (e.g. 
concrete ducts) exists to be reused as a helpful pre-existing civil engineering asset in view of 
wide-scale FTTH deployment. Following recent regulatory decisions on broadband (2018) and 
high quality (2019), a sub-ducts reference offer has been elaborated and submitted to the 
regulator both for the GPON-type of sub-ducts and P2P fibre type of sub-ducts, but there was 
no demand581.  
Moreover, some NRAs mention that in their countries the civil engineering infrastructures of 
the SMP operator are not equally available for deployment of VHCN in rural and urban areas. 
In addition, the segment between the street cabinet and the end-user is not ducted in some 
countries582. 
b) Available CEI not meeting the required specifications by access seekers 
In Greece, the obligation of access to civil engineering infrastructures is in place but it is not a 
common practice as operators prefer to deploy their own networks. In most cases, existing 
infrastructures do not meet the required specifications in order to be used583. In the Czech 
Republic also, the SMP operator reports that they processed several requests, but there was 
no follow-up from the applicants, who apparently lost interest following their physical inspection 
of the requested infrastructure. The SMP operator acknowledges that its infrastructure may 
not always be of an acceptable quality584. 
 
579 BEREC (2020), BEREC Response to the Targeted consultation on the revision of the Commission’s access 
recommendations, BoR (20) 169, Q23. 
580 NRA responses to online survey, N=10. 
581 Proximus response to the online survey. 
582 An NRA response to the online survey. 
583 Deutsche Telekom response to the Targeted Consultation, Q23, 




An access seeker from Italy alleges that the “Reference Offers concerning access to passive 
infrastructures nowadays can satisfy only connections of single premises. (…) In particular, 
the standard acquisition processes are particularly slow, expensive, not optimized and are 
unsuitable for massive acquisitions due to the supply capacity offered by [the SMP operator], 
the timing for an availability of infrastructures and the costs”585. 
In Germany, the need for end-to-end provisioning rather than segment-by-segment was raised 
during some interviews586.  
An NRA reports that it is also important that access is provided to ducts in the curb section 
(from just outside of the private property to the inside of the private property)587. 
In addition, the findings also show that operators can also prefer to deploy their own ducts for 
security reasons588.  
c) Pricing and other access conditions 
According to the Polish NRA, the main circumstances which can hinder the usage of third party 
civil engineering are the duration of procedures, pricing and the lack of space to deploy VHC 
networks589. “Situations such as (…) extreme and exaggerated labour security requirements, 
reluctance to share posts due to security reasons and not enough human resources allocated 
by the SMP operator to ensure efficient physical infrastructure access are some examples on 
how an efficient remedy in theory can be practically undermined”590. An operator active in 
several Member States agrees that, in certain countries, pricing could be an explanation i.e. 
where the proposed price is too high, negotiations will not lead to the take-up of CEI591. The 
size of the access seeker could, according to one operator, also be an issue for the model 
being sustainable. When the size of the access seeker is too small, the pricing model cannot 
be suitable due to the lack of scale economies592. In the case of Lithuania, some stakeholders 
indicated that a stable, cost-oriented price is the main variable driving the take-up of the SMP 
operator’s ducts (although ANOs criticise the lack of transparency regarding the actual costing 
model, see Chapter 5)593. 
Finding 30. Pricing is mentioned as a (potential) obstacle to the usage of existing civil 
engineering. However, it is not clear whether the alleged problem is confined to the 
countries in which access to civil engineering is mandated under the national law 
transposing the BCRD or whether the guidance of the NDCM Recommendation on the cost 
orientation of the access was not duly followed 
 
 
585 An operator’s response to the online survey. 
586 Case study interviews. 
587 An NRA response to the online survey. 
588 E.g. Stokab’s response to the online survey: in order to be able to operate the network securely and efficiently, 
including to quickly repair any damages on the cables or ducts, it is necessary for Stokab to deploy its own ducts. 
589 Polish NRA response to the Targeted Consultation Q23. 
590 Vodafone response to the Targeted Consultation Q23. 
591 Case study interviews. 
592 An operator’s response to the online survey. 
593 Case study interviews. 
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In the Czech Republic, there is very little interest in the commercial offer from the SMP 
operator594. Civil engineering from other utilities are used. However, one operator states that 
access to CETIN’s civil engineering “is not used in practice as it is set rather ineffectively. 
Mostly, the lack of information about existing and or built infrastructures make its use difficult 
along with wide options for gaining exemption from this obligation based on non-transparent 
criteria.”595 Even when an SMP access obligation was in force596 the obligation did not 
encompass quality of service obligations coupled with an obligation to pay compensations in 
case of non fulfilment of these QoS requirements. On the contrary, the Portuguese NRA 
mandated financial compensations inter alia for failure to provide operators with timely 
responses to requests for information such as regarding the (viability of the) installation of 
cables, and to requests of unblocking of ducts. If the SMP operator should fail to be present in 
a given location when a specific intervention/installation of cables is to be carried out by an 
operator, this could also give rise to a compensation obligation. In addition, the SMP operator 
is under specific transparency obligations including providing information on its duct 
occupation (dimensions, occupied volume and available space) via an electronic database.  
Another issue raised is the allegedly excessive and costly obligations imposed by some SMP 
operators, such as requiring the presence of the staff of the SMP operator in cases of 
intervention in ducts and manholes597, which does not correspond to common practice in other 
Member States598.   
Finding 31. The lack of enforceable QoS and costly ancillary obligations are mentioned as 
obstacles to the usage of existing civil engineering. 
 
In Italy, in its latest market review, the NRA differentiated599 on the pricing of access to ‘mini-
ducts’ depending on the volumes ordered:  the higher the number of mini-ducts, the lower the 
access price per mini-duct. The lack of similar ‘volume discounts’ in Lithuania or other means 
to achieve economies of scale was regretted by ANOs where access to ducts is the main 
access product used by alternative operators to deploy VHCN networks (there is no take-up 
of fibre unbundling provided by the SMP operator)600. 
d) Other obstacles  
An operator reports that, in Hungary, the demand for regulated physical infrastructure access 
(PIA) is close to zero, while the demand is significant in Portugal and Spain. The operator 
concludes “that in Member States where it was properly implemented (…) this type of access 
has been the key factor for NGA deployment”601. 
 
594 An operator’s response to the online survey. 
595 Deutsche Telekom response to the Targeted Consultation, Q23. 
596 Repealed by the subsequent market review (Case CZ/2018/2067) in the wake of the transposition of the BCRD. 
The Commission, in its decision of 27 April 2018, asked the NRA to impose a cost orientation obligation if it appeared 
that access “cannot be ensured in an appropriate, timely and effective manner”. 
597 Case study of Cyprus. This is also the case in Portugal. 
598 “In Spain, France and the UK, access seekers may install cables on poles themselves subject to accreditation 
(in Spain and the UK) or following engineering rules (France) and after giving notice to the incumbent (e.g. 24 hours 
in the case of Spain)”, WIK (2017), Best practice for passive infrastructure access, 19 April 2017, p.48. Similar 
practices are in place in Lithuania.  Note that the Polish NRA also expressed this concern (discussed in this chapter). 
599 Commission Decision of 11.072019 concerning Case IT/2019/2181-2182. 
600 Case study interviews. 




In Italy, an operator alleges being discriminated against by the SMP operator “that provides 
exclusive access to its civil infrastructure to its retail division and to a selected number of 
operators on conditions that are better than those published in the Reference Offer (lower 
prices, simpler process and more products)”602. In Lithuania, operators allege that the SMP 
operator concludes contracts with end-customers in areas where access seekers request 
access to SMP operator’s ducts, implying a breach of Chinese walls, however, regretting that 
this type of behaviour is impossible for the ANOs to prove. An operator also alleges that the 
time to carry out technical feasibility tests (of whether access can be granted) systematically 
differs between regions, wondering whether the SMP operator is deliberately delaying the reply 
in some areas603.  
Finding 32. Proper design and enforcement of the access obligations seem to be crucial 
for the effectiveness of the access remedy. 
 
Do SMP operators have sufficient investment incentives to deploy civil engineering for 
third parties? 
In 2011, the Italian NRA considered applying a risk premium in case of newly built 
infrastructure604, but eventually did not allow it. Other NRAs also do not differentiate pricing 
access to civil engineering depending on whether it is already existing or newly built605.  
In the UK, the NRA uses its estimates of the SMP operator’s Copper WACC, since it considers 
that this most closely reflects the systematic risk associated with physical infrastructure606. 
Telefónica607 considers that, in a market with a high degree of infrastructure competition, BU-
LRIC cost orientation is neither future-proof nor proportionate and hinders investment 
incentives. 
• A SMP operator will not recover its investment on CEI assets if the modelled network 
is not based on the SMP operator’s network and the wholesale demand on real data. 
Moreover, if the cost model design is based on a ‘fibre-only model’ (i.e., a theoretical 
design for FTTH deployment), then the assets which are fully depreciated according to 
the net value of the accumulated depreciation at the time of calculation should not be 
directly excluded because the depreciation period should not start before the beginning 
of the deployment of the FTTH network. 
• The SMP CEI access model will be artificially perpetuated if it continues with cost 
oriented prices at a lower level than the “fair and reasonable” prices under the 
transposition of the Broadband Cost Reduction Directive because the difference 
constitutes a disincentive for other players to adapt or make available their CEIs for 
fibre deployment. The only solution would be to align pricing rules. 
 
602 An operator’s response to the online survey.  
603 Case study interviews. 
604 BEREC (2011), BEREC Report on the Implementation of the NGA-Recommendation, BoR(11) 43, October 
2011, p.89. 
605 Case study interviews. 
606 OFCOM, Promoting competition and investment in fibre networks: Wholesale Fixed Telecoms Market Review 
2021-26 Volume 4: Pricing remedies, 18 March 2021, footnote 132, p.78. 
607 Written feedback to Stakeholders’ workshop of 9 June 2021. 
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Finding 33. Generally, NRAs do not differentiate between the pricing of newly-built civil 
engineering and legacy civil engineering 
 
NRAs have different608 views on whether and when SMP access obligations should be 
imposed and on whether SMP operators retain sufficient incentives to invest in new civil 
engineering infrastructures with sufficient capacity to host alternative operators where 
necessary. One NRA says that while there is currently no evidence that current SMP access 
obligations would impede new investments, the question needs nevertheless to be re-
evaluated in the future in light of the continual reassessment of access and rate obligations. 
Another NRA says that while, under the current SMP fair pricing rate regulation, even though 
the SMP operator is sufficiently remunerated and incentivized for investments in the 
deployment of new civil engineering infrastructures, there is no real incentive for the SMP 
operator to provide sufficient capacity to host alternative operators. 
In order to reduce the risk of deploying new ducts by the SMP operator, the Italian NRA has 
approved609 volume discounts in its tariff scheme for access to ducts. This Decision provides 
for volume discounts in the tariff scheme for access to ducts. The more mini-ducts inside ducts 
are ordered, the lower the unit price paid, enticing alternative operators to book more space 
for the deployment of fibre and ensuring that idle capacity in ducts is taken up more speedily.  
Finding 34. NRAs have different views on whether SMP operators retain sufficient 
incentives to invest in new civil engineering infrastructures when SMP access obligations 
are imposed. 
Telefónica610 advocates that in order to reflect the new self-standing remedy of access to CEI 
under the EECC, the successor recommendation should acknowledge that in those markets 
with effective access to CEIs, pricing remedies as well as the ERT should be removed if an 
effectively monitored TRT or KPIs are in place. Such an approach would provide an incentive 
to SMP operators to improve access to their CEIs. 
Scope of the access obligation 
The definition of civil engineering infrastructure in Point 11 of the NGA Recommendation 
explicitly refers to the local loop. One may thus imply that the mandated access to civil 
engineering infrastructure is limited to those facilities (like ducts611) that are deployed to host 
local loop cables, which generally run from the ODF/cabinet/manhole to the subscriber (or its 
proximity)612. Specific access obligations should be imposed for infrastructures between the 
MDF (or ODF) and the primary network segment (generally starting from the chamber outside 
the central office) and for infrastructures from the last distribution point at the end of secondary 
 
608 Based on the NRA online survey data. 
609 Art.46  of DELIBERA Nr 348/19/CONS. More specifically, Art.46 set the price for a 15 year IRU at €7,11 for up 
to 2 miniducts; €5,81 for up to 3; €4,91 for up to 4 miniducts; and €4,26 for up to 5. 
610 Written feedback to stakeholders’ workshop of 9 June 2021. 
611 Access to full duct, access to segments of ducts or to micro-ducts. 





network segments and the in-building wiring (generally the infrastructure composed of the last 
chamber on public land until the infrastructure inside the building)613. 
However, BEREC stresses that under some circumstances, it may be inappropriate to 
duplicate some network parts or elements (e.g. for backhaul networks or shelters hosting 
operators’ passive and active equipment). However, if such related facilities have enough 
capacity to address the needs of future deployments, it may be appropriate to impose access 
obligations regarding those network elements. For example, existing dark fibre based backhaul 
networks, which are essential to connect deployed optical local loops, can offer connection 
capacities for new and enhanced networks and thus their duplication614 can be avoided. 
“BEREC therefore considers that in order to grant an effective and non-discriminatory access 
to the civil engineering infrastructure, NRAs may impose an access obligation to related 
facilities”615.  
In line with BEREC’s position and based on its experience, an NRA confirms that an access 
obligation to a backhaul section may be relevant for the access seekers616. In France also the 
NRA “ARCEP [imposes] the obligation on Orange to maintain and improve the provisioning of 
its current commercial backhaul offer (LFO) for providing access to ducts hosting a fibre link 
between two MDFs/ODFs and between an MDF/ODF and an alternative operator's Point of 
Presence (PoP)”617.   
As regards manholes, a Cyprus operator reports that the SMP operator was not offering access 
to manholes. However, the Cyprus operator was aware of many unused extra manholes and 
requested that an access product be provided, but there was a refusal to supply. The Cyprus 
operator filed a dispute which was ongoing at the time of this research. The Cyprus operator 
estimated that if its dispute were to be unsuccessful, they would have to create approx. 10k 
manholes (costs estimated at 3m EUR), even though there are many CYTA’s unused 
manholes. The same operator also indicated that access to poles was granted only after a 
dispute and that regulated access product to in-house wiring for buildings housing less than 5 
households was in discussion with the SMP operator618. 
Another issue is whether access should only be granted for the deployment of fibre networks. 
While acknowledging that scarce available space must be utilized in the most efficient and 
future proof way, the Commission nonetheless invited an NRA “to ensure that the scope of the 
access obligation is technologically neutral by extending it to deployments of networks other 
than fibre, unless such access request would objectively lead to an exhaustion of available 
space for future fibre deployments on that specific route”.619 
 
613 Idem, footnote 22. 
614 According to the BEREC (2020), BEREC Response to the Targeted consultation on the revision of the 
Commission’s access recommendations, BoR (20) 169, Q23, an artificial distortion of the competition between the 
SMP operator and access seekers would result from the former being able to use such resources with an important 
level of capillarity that falls into their property, while the latter would need disproportionate financial inputs to 
effectively deploy new and enhanced networks, precluding so the latter to deploy its fibre network at the same pace. 
615 BEREC (2020), BEREC Response to the Targeted consultation on the revision of the Commission’s access 
recommendations, BoR (20) 169, Q23. 
616 An NRA response to the online survey. 
617 Commission Comments of 26.11.2020 concerning Cases FR/2020/2277-2278-2279-2280, p.11. In the 
meantime, the measure was adopted. 
618 Case study interviews. 
619 Commission Comments of 26.11.2020 concerning Cases cases FR/2020/2277-2278-2279-2280, p.20.  
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Increasing demand for poles 
There seems to be a high demand for access to poles for deployment of VHCN: 
• In Lithuania, ANOs are exploring a possible strategic cooperation with the electricity 
provider to use their electricity poles to improve fibre coverage in more remote areas 
(e.g. small towns/villages). Even though the SMP operator owns one of the most 
extensive duct networks covering nearly the entire territory of the country, access to 
poles is still a very relevant issue620. 
• In Ireland, Vodafone cooperated with the electricity provider to create the joint venture 
SIRO to use their electricity poles to roll out their FTTH network instead of using the 
SMP operator’s CEI.621 
• In Cyprus, two main ANOs have an agreement with the electricity provider and have 
rolled out their networks using electricity poles.622 
• In Poland, the need for access to poles is very high – there are approx. 7m poles in 
Poland, and only 10% are used by telecommunications companies. UKE estimates that 
the need is 4-5 times larger. In February 2021 the NRA issued a decision regulating 
access to energy operators’ poles in Poland. An operator claims that this decision was 
welcomed by the whole telecommunications market.623 
However, it appears to be even more difficult to ensure access to information on available civil 
engineering, especially when it comes to available space. For example, even in the cases of 
Spain and Portugal, which have some of the most elaborate and well-developed information 
systems on the available civil engineering of the SMP operator, information on the available 
space of poles is not stored in the system624. 
d. Guidance on the centralisation of information on available civil 
engineering 
Provisions concerned (NGA Recommendation) 
• Point 17. NRAs should work with other authorities with a view to establishing a data-
base containing information on geographical location, available capacity and other 
physical characteristics of all civil engineering infrastructure which could be used for 
the deployment of optical fibre networks in a given market or market segment. Such 
database should be accessible to all operators.  
Annex II, Point 2. INFORMATION ON THE CIVIL ENGINEERING INFRASTRUCTURE 
AND THE DISTRIBUTION POINTS 
The SMP operator should provide third-party access seekers with the same level of 
information on its civil engineering infrastructure and distribution points as is available 
internally. This information should cover the organisation of the civil engineering 
infrastructure as well as the technical characteristics of the different elements of which 
the infrastructure consists. Where available, the geographical location of these 
elements, including ducts, poles and other physical assets (e.g. maintenance 
 
620 Case study interviews. 
621 Case study interviews and desk research. 
622 Case study interviews and desk research. 
623 Case study interviews and desk research. 




chambers) should be provided, as well as the available space in ducts. The 
geographical location of distribution points and a list of connected buildings should also 
be provided. 
The SMP operator should specify all intervention rules and technical conditions relating 
to access and use of its civil engineering infrastructure and distribution points, and of 
the different elements the infrastructure consists of. The same rules and conditions 
should apply to third-party access seekers as to internal access seekers. 
The SMP operator should provide the tools for ensuring proper information access, 
such as easily accessible directories, data bases or web portals. Information should be 
regularly updated, so as to take account of the infrastructure’s evolution and 
development and of further information collected, in particular on the occasion of fibre 
deployment projects by the SMP operator or other access seekers. 
Did the guidance of the NGA Recommendation bring about centralisation of information 
on available civil engineering?  
The NGA Recommendation is not specific as to which infrastructures (e.g. those belonging to 
the SMP or alternative operators, and/or those outside the ECN framework) should be included 
in the database referred to in its Point 17. One can assume that the database should cover 
both. In that case, the guidance of Point 17 needs to be articulated625 with the national 
measures implementing Art.4.2 BCRD relating to the centralisation of information on  the 
physical infrastructures held by public sector bodies and the obligation upon these bodies to 
make it available, upon request, to undertakings providing or authorised to provide public 
communications networks. If the relevant BCRD provision has been transposed and a single 
information point (SIP) has been established for that purpose and provides sufficient 
information626, it makes little sense for an NRA to build/maintain a separate database. 
The obligation for public bodies to make available the relevant information via a single 
information point is one of the several optional provisions left to the Member States’ discretion 
to transpose, which means that Point 17 retains its relevance for certain Member States. 
According to the Commission’s 2018 report on the implementation of the BCRD,627 obligations 
“to require public sector bodies to make the minimum information concerning existing physical 
infrastructure available via the single information point, if it has such information from network 
operators in electronic format and by reason of its tasks, exist for instance in Austria, Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Greece, Finland, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal and Slovakia (Article 
4(2)).” 
As regards the data-base containing information on geographical location, available capacity 
and other physical characteristics of all civil engineering infrastructures also referred to in Point 
17 NGA Rec, the Commission’s 2018 report says that the single information point’s (SIP) tasks 
have been entrusted to organisations different from the NRAs (e.g. energy agency, e-utility, 
and road, planning/mapping or local authorities) in 10 Member States and in four cases to no 
organisation (see Figure 18). However, the SIP, more broadly, must under the BCRD also 
 
625 The BCRD is currently being reviewed in light of technological, market and regulatory developments. Draft 
amendments by the Commission are due in the first quarter of 2022. See: High-speed broadband in the EU – review 
of rules, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/12463-High-speed-broadband-in-
the-EU-review-of-rules_en  
626 Even in cases where MS have transposed Art. 4(2), public sector bodies might not have up-to-date information 
on all physical infrastructures. 
627 COM(2018) 492 final of 27.6.2018 
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cover other types of information, i.e. related to planned civil works and procedures for permit 
granting. 
Figure 18. Single information point tasks, set out under BCRD, assigned to NRAs in the 
EU 
 
Source: COM(2018) 492 final of 27.6.2018. 
The electronic communications NRA is the competent body assigned in 12 Member States, 
while in 2 Member States the NRA shares the SIP function with other bodies. Bodies tasked 
with the SIP function have to gather, from many different sectors, information on physical 
infrastructures, which requires strong coordination in collecting and integrating that data628, 
which might be further described in Point 17, building on the experience acquired since the 
transposition of the BCRD. 
Moreover, the current experience with the development of databases is susceptible to support 
the drafting of guidance on such databases. 
Table 26. Overview of availability of a single database on PI. 
Availability of single database 
Countries with SMP regulated access to civil engineering 
1 Belgium KLIP/GIPOD is a digital platform which georeferences location and properties of 
underground cables. 
2 Croatia Not implemented 
3 Cyprus In the case of existing available infrastructures in electronic format, a mapping 
portal tool collects and provides available information to potential access seekers 
and/or access providers. Maps are provided via web services by the department 
of Lands and Surveys. For all other network providers that have not made 
available their infrastructure in electronic form, there are relevant contact points 
available on OCECPR’s website 
4 Estonia Not yet implemented 
5 France ‘Guichet unique’ which refers the access seekers to the network operators 
6 Germany Infrastruktur-Atlas managed by the NRA629 
7 Greece the Telecommunication Infrastructure Registry operated by  the Ministry of Digital 
Governance provides access to information  submitted by the owners of the 
infrastructures. 
8 Hungary An E-Utility System gives access to data from the own registers of public utility 
providers:(information from approximately 900 electricity, hydrocarbon, water 
supply, drainage, telecommunication and district heating network providers. Due 
to the applied Web Map Service (WMS) and Web Feature Service (WFS) 
technologies, these data are not stored in a central database but through web-
based geospatial information services formed by public service providers. This 
can serve data requests of the e-utility system real time through online data links. 
Using these services, public utility networks are shown on a map interface of the 
 
628 Summary Report of Best Practices Outcome of phase 1 of the work of the Special Group for developing a 
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Availability of single database 
e-utility which is based on Open Street Map, but also incorporates basemap 
layers from the land registry and the National Orthophoto Database as well 
9 Ireland No630 
10 Italy Single information point (SINFI)631. NRA manages a parallel database632 
11 Latvia Database provided by the SMP operator 
12 Lithuania Maps from topographical data with the location of the infrastructure (mainly ducts) 
are available on the RRT website www.e-infrastruktura.lt (provides links to 
municipalities databases which are used for the generation of maps). Other 
availability of georeferenced location of the infrastructure and other information 
will be implemented in the Topography and Engineering Infrastructure 
Information System. 
13 Poland Managed by the NRA633  
14 Portugal Managed by the NRA634  
15 Slovakia Managed by the NRA635  
16 Slovenia Managed by the Surveying and Mapping Authority636  
17 Spain Managed by the SMP operator, but the current SIP in Spain is ready to store 
information on planned physical infrastructures for the coordination of civil works. 
Countries without SMP regulated access to civil engineering 
18 Austria The ZIS-Portal637 managed by the NRA that collects data on physical 
infrastructure that is or can be used for telecommunication and civil engineering 
projects in many different sectors while also cooperating with public sector bodies 
of different levels including municipalities and ministries collecting and integrating 
data on e.g. funded infrastructure projects.  
19 Bulgaria No 
20 Czech 
Republic 
Managed by the NRA. However, it doesn't have complete information. Access 
seekers must apply for additional data to the network operator. 
21 Denmark Agency for Data Supply and Efficiency638  
22 Finland  Managed by the NRA639  
23 Luxembourg National register for infrastructures managed by the NRA 
 
630 An inter-departmental Government working group has been established with the remit to map digital hubs across 
the country, and it is anticipated that a composite picture in respect of same will be available in 2021 (Summary 
Report of Best Practices Outcome of phase 1 of the work of the Special Group for developing a common Union 
Toolbox for connectivity, 16/10/2020-20/12/2020, p.149). 
631 https://www.sinfi.it/portal/. The data covers both underground and aboveground elements. The data follow a tree 
logic: each layer defines its themes, which identify its own classes, which are composed of several attributions. 
Layer 07 - "Subservice Networks" includes the following themes: Management of housing infrastructure networks; 
Water supply network; Water disposal network; Electricity network; Gas network; District heating network; Pipelines; 
Telecommunication networks. Specifically, the class network housing infrastructure (070001) covers "buildings with 
a prevalent longitudinal development of  adequate size to accommodate one or more networks, i.e. pipelines, 
cables, main and ancillary works suitable for the provision of a public service". This type of infrastructure includes: 
conduits, technological tunnels, multi-purpose tunnels, manholes, pylons, poles, etc. See Summary Report of Best 
Practices Outcome of phase 1 of the work of the Special Group for developing a common Union Toolbox for 
connectivity, 16/10/2020-20/12/2020, p.150. 
632 https://maps.agcom.it/  
633 https://mapbook.uke.gov.pl/  
634 http://www.anacom.pt/render.jsp?categoryId=384370#.Vu-F9MfPy8U  
635 https://www.teleoff.gov.sk/data/files/48968_vestnik9.pdf  
636 http://e-prostor.gov.si/index.php?id=240  
637 https://www.rtr.at/TKP/was_wir_tun/telekommunikation/zentrale_informationsstellen/zis/ZIS.de.html  
638 https://ler.dk/Portal/P.10.English.aspx LER has since the beginning of 2020 offered a feature in support of the 
joint use of physical infrastructure for multiple cables. This feature is optional for cable owners and is still in the very 
early stages of deployment. Therefore, this feature cannot give a full overview of passive physical infrastructure or 
excess capacity in passive physical infrastructure. See Summary Report of Best Practices Outcome of phase 1 of 
the work of the Special Group for developing a common  Union Toolbox for connectivity, 16/10/2020-20/12/2020, 
p.148. 
639 https://www.traficom.fi/fi/asioi-kanssamme/verkkotietopiste  
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Availability of single database 
24 Malta No 
25 Netherlands The Netherlands’ Cadastre, Land Registry and Mapping Agency – in short  
Kadaster operates an online information exchange portal for underground utilities 
called KLIC 
26 Romania The NRA created a software application available to the providers of public 
electronic communications networks as a single information point for 
transparency concerning physical infrastructure. 
27 Sweden “Ledningskollen (LK) managed by the NRA640https://www.ledningskollen.se/ It 
was established in 2010 for sharing information on cables, pipelines and other 
underground infrastructure. 
Source: Summary Report of Best Practices Outcome of phase 1 of the work of the Special Group for developing a 
common Union Toolbox for connectivity 16/10/2020-20/12/2020. 
The need for qualitative improvements in the directories of CEIs was mentioned by network 
operators. The latter is particularly important, because “situations such as the lack of proper 
information on the location and availability of the infrastructure (…) are some examples on how 
an efficient remedy in theory can be practically undermined”641. This is echoed by operators in 
several Member States: 
• In Lithuania, ANOs regret the lack of access to relevant information. Operators indicate 
that the possibility to access (part of) SMP operator’s database on available CEI 
occurred 3-4 years ago despite it being a requirement in the NRA decision for much 
longer. Access seekers have two opportunities: 1) order a physical inspection of the 
availability of access or 2) perform a technical feasibility test on the basis of data 
available in the database. In practice, information in the database is not sufficient for 
option 2). The database contains only a limited set of data, e.g. only the routes of duct 
network, but no information on the available space within the network; also there is no 
information on the diameters of ducts or manholes. The information is useful for the 
access seeker only for planning of the network route, and it does not replace a technical 
feasibility test with a physical inspection. The price differences between options 1) and 
2) are significant, with option 1) being much more expensive)642.  
• In Cyprus, an operator alleges that information on where the ducts are placed is limited. 
The GIS tool (managed by the NRA) provides information on the rooting of ducts, but 
does not provide any information on the availability of space or how the building is 
connected to the duct; they have needed to go to CYTA each time and request this 
information. They won their dispute and CYTA was instructed to upload this information 
to the GIS tool within 6 months for urban areas and within 12 months for all of Cyprus 
(including information on manholes and poles), but at the time of the interview, the SMP 
operator had not yet complied643. 
Moreover, the justifications to restrict access to information on CEI availability should be 
assessed. An operator assumes that the databases on structural infrastructure do not have 
any personal data and thus, do not require additional conversion before the information is 
provided to competitors644. However, public security may justify restrictions. Electronic 
 
640 https://www.ledningskollen.se  
641 Vodafone response to the Targeted Consultation, Q23. 
642 Case study interviews. 
643 Case study interviews. 
644 German operator response to the Targeted Consultation, Q5. In Estonia, the SMP operator indicates that the 
database contains business secrets and other confidential information. In Lithuania, ANOs report that the SMP 




communications infrastructures are critical infrastructures for a nation645 and constitute 
potential targets of terrorist or criminal attacks.  
Finding 35. The usefulness of the information made available by SMP operators is an issue 
in some Member States. The availability of online systems containing up-to-date 
information on duct location and availability with measures to ensure the accuracy of such 
data is a key requisite. 
 
e. Usage of symmetric access obligations or negotiated access under 
the BCRD as alternative  
Provision concerned (NGA Recommendation) 
• Point 7. When applying symmetric measures under Article 12 [Framework Directive] 
granting access to an undertaking’s civil engineering infrastructure and terminating 
segment, NRAs should take implementing measures under Article 5 [Access Directive]. 
Implementation of the guidance 
Prior to the NGA Recommendation, several NRAs had already imposed transparency and 
access obligations under national law rather than transposition measures based on the 
Framework and Access Directives).  
According to BEREC646, in Croatia, France, Greece, Italy, Poland and Spain, decisions of 
NRAs on symmetric obligations in relation to the deployment of NGA networks fell within the 
scope of powers set out in Article 5 AD, Article 12 FD or Article 9 BCRD.  
As a consequence of the transposition of the different EU legal bases, the civil engineering of 
SMP operators is subject to overlapping access regimes with different obligations. 
For example, Orange reports that in Poland the same infrastructure can be subject to 
overlapping regulations: their infrastructure is currently subject to symmetric access obligations 
(together with cable operators) as well as, where the infrastructure was built using state aid, 
under the specific regime also mandating open-access. Consequently, they have to publish a 
different reference offer per regulation. They are concerned that a third regulatory layer might 
be added in case of regulation of the PIA market under the transposition of the EECC (and 
another reference offer, with potentially another price for access to CEI). They claim that it is 
problematic to have different regulations applying to the same infrastructure647. 
When could access mandated on the basis of the measures implementing the BCRD be 
sufficient? 
Where an NRA imposes remedies on operators found to have a SMP, they must take into 
account other types of regulation or already imposed measures which affect the market power 
 
645 Directive (EU) 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council concerning measures for a high 
common level of security of network and information systems across the Union (NIS Directive) 
646 BoR (18) 214. 
647 Case study interviews. 
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of the SMP operator. This includes, in the case of a physical infrastructure, limitations of this 
market power deriving from rights granted to access seekers by the national laws transposing 
the Broadband Cost Reduction directive. The rights and obligations set by these national laws 
vary across the EU. For example, in Bulgaria, national law transposing the BCRD directive 
significantly reinforced its provisions by including obligations for access, non-discrimination, 
transparency (including the publication of a reference offer) and price control equivalent to a 
significant extent to the set of obligations imposed on BTC due to its SMP status. Thus, CRC 
considered that the opportunities for BTC's anti-competitive behaviour were constrained648. 
An NRA reports having observed no drawbacks from the implementation of the access regime 
under the BCRD: no disputes were submitted relating to electronic communications network 
operators649 (even though symmetric access is occasionally used by operators650). 
In Hungary, access seekers prefer to use civil engineering infrastructures of power suppliers 
to those of the SMP operators. There are informal complaints relating to access to civil 
engineering infrastructures of power suppliers but there have been hardly any formal requests 
to initiate dispute resolution also in cases of access to civil engineering infrastructures of power 
suppliers651. Access seekers are reluctant to initiate individual proceedings against civil 
infrastructure owners because they are afraid of ruining their good relationships with these 
giant (mainly electricity) companies in the future652. At the same time, the BCRD regime has 
an advantage over SMP regulation in that it does not depend on the outcome of periodic market 
decisions, so it is probably more predictable and reliable for access seekers. Under the SMP 
regulation, a partial (geographical) or total deregulation would result in the withdrawal of civil 
infrastructure access after a transitory period, which may potentially cause uncertainty in the 
return of investments and the local market presence of access seekers. Access seekers might 
possibly be able to use the infrastructure of other sectors’ utilities, but their usability might be 
limited in practice. There may be different reasons for it, such as longer timing than for the 
SMP regulation653, knowledge, experience, regulatory and standard compliance, information 
availability, architecture of infrastructure. 
In Poland, while access to the ducts and poles of the SMP operator are regulated as an SMP 
obligation on Markets 3a and 3b, access to the ducts of the SMP operator can also be 
requested on the basis of Art. 3 of BCRD (decision from September 2018)654. However, 
according to the Polish NRA655, costs of access and lack of space to deploy VHC networks 
 
648 BG/2019/2155 , quoted in the Explanatory Note accompanying the Commission Recommendation on relevant 
product and service markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in 
accordance with Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 
establishing the European Electronic Communications Code, SWD(2020) 337 final, 18 December 2020, footnote 
194. 
649 An NRA response to the online survey. 
650 Case study interviews. 
651 Hungarian NRA response to the Targeted Consultation, Q23. 
652 Hungarian NRA response to the Targeted Consultation Q26. The Hungarian NRA assumes that  the revision of 
BCRD could deal with the problem. E.g. with the consideration of a broader entitlement for NRAs in choosing the 
way to handle issues arising from the application of implemented rules under the Directive, including, but not limited 
to the possible extension of the NRA’s power for conducting sectoral investigations on its own initiative, on an ex-
officio basis. 
653 The duration is also quoted by the Polish NRA in its response to the Targeted Consultation, Q23. At the same 
time, SMP access may also require some time. For example, in Lithuania, access seekers complained about the 
lengthy (around 20 days) technical feasibility study deadline before the provision of access services (Case study 
interviews). 





can hinder the usefulness of the BCRD regime. The latter obstacle does, however, not appear 
to be specific to access under the BCRD regime. 
In Croatia, the SMP operator complains that it is the only infrastructure operator that is price 
regulated656 in the country. No procedure to regulate prices of access to other facilities’ 
infrastructure exists in practice as the NRA is not responsible for the regulation of municipal 
infrastructure657. The asymmetry between the access obligations imposed on the civil 
engineering of respectively the SMP operator and other utilities, however, did not prevent 
access seekers from using the latter’s infrastructure in France, Italy and Portugal, in addition 
to the mandated access to the SMP operator’s civil engineering. 
Conversely, in Cyprus658 and Lithuania659, alternative operators also make use of the national 
law transposing the BCRD to access the civil engineering from the SMP operator. 
In Romania, the NRA initially imposed access to civil infrastructure on the SMP operator. 
However, competing operators did not take advantage of this remedy, choosing instead to 
deploy aerial fibre loops (which are much less expensive). Despite a prohibition in Romania in 
2011 on deploying aerial cables in the main cities660, the NRA noted that 85 new operators 
entered the market both in rural and urban areas while existing operators invested further in 
urban areas661. As a consequence of the network build-out by competitive operators, the 
Romanian NRA decided in 2015 to phase out regulation in Market 3a. The NRA kept the 
regulatory remedies in place for one year and pointed out that, if access to civil engineering 
would be required in the future, it would be available under the symmetric legislation 
transposing Directive 2014/61/EU (BCRD). In Sweden, since dark fibre is readily and widely 
available, “there is no demand from access seekers for access to ducts and poles. This is also 
the reason why the national regulator PTS has revoked the previous obligation on the national 
SMP (the incumbent) to offer access to ducts and poles”662. 
An NRA reports that in its country, access to the physical infrastructure using the BCRD regime 
is seldom used. The Dispute Settlement Body has not dealt with any cases663. Yet another 
 
656 The lowest by the benchmark in EU 28 (up to 4 times the average) and in the lowest in the Croatian market (up 
to 3 times the average). See Deutsche Telekom response to the Targeted Consultation, Q23. 
657 Deutsche Telekom response to the Targeted Consultation, Q23. 
658 The (symmetric) Collocation Decree. 
659 Case study interviews. In addition, ANOs make (limited) use of infrastructure owned by water or electricity 
companies, wherever necessary. 
660 Which would not be strictly enforced: “Most cities require underground infrastructure, which is expensive to 
approve, build, and maintain. But the Bucharest neighborhood networks never went through regulatory approval 
processes. Due to salutary neglect, aerial connections proliferated in Romania, giving rise to the poles with wire 
nests. As even the International Telecommunications Union noted, “Often, aerial fibre is deployed in areas where 
[underground] duct-based network roll-out is mandatory.” Even though the law often required underground 
deployment, neighborhood networks would use poles to wire their community”, Will Rinehart, The curious case of 
Romanian broadband, 15 October 2020, available at: https://medium.com/cgo-benchmark/the-curious-case-of-
romanian-broadband-c58291b2fcda.  
661 Including using utilities’ infrastructures. For example, RDS reports to have save 50% fibre deployment cost and 
increased 12% market share in 3 years by cooperating with utilities (Su Peng, Industry collaboration enables Smart 
City, slide presentation at the 3d Asia Pacific Regional Forum, slide 11). 
662 Stokab response to the online survey. As dark fibre is readily and widely available by neutral players such as 
the municipal networks, operators and other access seekers prefer access to dark fibre based on voluntary 
commercial agreements instead of having to request access under the BCRD and then invest in and roll out their 
own networks. 
663 An NRA response to the online survey. The NRA assumes that the drawbacks of the BCRD regime are: lack of 
information on ducts availability (process on request basis is not transparent enough, capacity information is not 
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NRA sees the BCRD rather as a soft law that requires good cooperation between the parties. 
On the other hand, access to the civil engineering infrastructure in the context of a SMP can 
be more direct and effective. Nevertheless, neither regime has been used in the country664. 
Several NRAs see drawbacks of using the BCRD regime instead of SMP regulation. The 
following were mentioned in the online survey: 
• In contrast to relying on SMP remedies, commercial agreements and other means 
imposed by the BCRD are more complex and therefore more costly to negotiate and 
are therefore better suited to specific individual cases665. 
• Decisions based on the non-standardised BCRD criteria for the assessment of “fair and 
reasonable” terms might be less appropriate for generalisation compared to 
determining the cost of efficient service provision as applied under the SMP regulation. 
• Access under BCRD does not include specified SLAs, SLGs and KPIs (contrary to SMP 
remedies). 
• Under the BCRD regime access seekers do not have access to mandatory indicative 
information on the availability of physical infrastructures (while that obligation exists 
regarding the SMP operator's ducts)666. 
• Additional technical requirements by the host network (e.g. safety in power grids) and 
network topology variation. 
For BEREC667, the case-by-case approach to dispute resolution envisioned by the BCRD may 
not be sufficient to remedy important competition problems identified under SMP regulation, 
which rather requires a frequent and more general regulatory intervention. BEREC refers 
further to the additional potential drawbacks stemming from the exclusive application of the 
BCRD mentioned in the Report on access to physical infrastructure in the context of market 
analyses668. On the other hand, the BCRD may, according to BEREC, be sufficient in instances 
where physical infrastructure (in particular ducts and poles) is not widely available or is not 
widely used, as well as in instances where other economic agents besides the SMP operator 
have the means and incentives to grant access to their physical infrastructure, on the basis of 
economic and technical terms and conditions which are similar to those that may be available 
from the SMP operator.  
 
required), low incentive for utility companies to share ducts due to complexity (operational processes to be put in 
place, need to provide SLA to telecom...), uncertainties about the pricing in the absence of price control, risk of long 
negotiations. EIR response to the Targeted Consultation Q26 also advocates the strengthening and significantly 
reinforcing the provisions of the Directive, including the obligation to publish a reference offer, operators. 
664 An NRA response to the online survey. 
665 Another NRA mentions that while being able to take account of the particular circumstances of each individual 
case by considering them on a case-by-case basis is an advantage, the disadvantage lies in greater uncertainty for 
market players, which could potentially discourage investment. Here, there is the possibility of achieving an 
increasing clustering and standardisation of case categories via as many individual cases as possible, which are 
made transparent. This would offer the possibility of achieving greater predictability for possible investment 
decisions. 
666 However, this is not necessarily the case in all Member States, given that it will depend on the manner that 
national legislators transposed Art. 4(1) BCRD which provides that “every undertaking providing or authorised to 
provide public communications networks has the right to access, upon request, the following minimum information 
concerning the existing physical infrastructure of any network operator (…)” 
667 BEREC (2020), BEREC Response to the Targeted consultation on the revision of the Commission’s access 
recommendations, BoR (20) 169, Q26. 






Operators also report drawbacks. The process is long, the reference offer (if any) is less 
stringent than the SMP-regulated reference offer, and implementation is complicated at best 
and can be even more complicated when technical or security constraints669 have to be 
managed670. An operator present in multiple Member States says that the BCRD regime might 
be a useful tool, but it could not in any case be a substitute to the SMP framework. This network 
operator maintains that SMP access to CEI is the only effective means of obtaining access to 
the incumbent operator's civil engineering, and it continues to be essential because of the 
ubiquity of the SMP operator’s network671.  
Vodafone would not consider it appropriate to rely only on obligations under the BCRD. It 
argues (among other considerations) that in Germany Deutsche Telekom has not shown any 
willingness to come to a fair agreement based on bilateral negotiations under the BCRD 
regime, and that therefore ex ante SMP regulation is indispensable672. At the same time, the 
SMP access regime relates only to the access network, while the BCRD regime relates to the 
entire network673. Both are therefore complementary. Similarly, exclusive reliance on BCRD 
could be insufficient674. A Portuguese operator675 also stresses the following limits of the BCRD 
regime:  
• Prices: there is a cost orientation principle in the BCRD, but infrastructures owned by 
municipalities are not directly subject to NRA scrutiny. This leads to a high risk of 
access prices of infrastructures owned by municipalities being too high without an 
expeditious mechanism for operators to dispute them (the only instruments are national 
courts with timings that can go up to years). 
• Operational issues: the absence of mandated EoI676 such as potential operational 
overheads introduced by access providers aiming to a ‘zero risk’ situation and therefore 
establish cumbersome processes and inflate access costs. 
 
669 A French operator’s response to the online survey refers specifically to the requirements of the electricity grid 
operator Enedis for aerial deployment on its poles in less dense areas (the so-called public initiative area - Réseaux 
d’Initiative Publique (RIP)). 
670 An operator’s response to the online survey. 
671 Iliad’s response to the Targeted Consultation, Q26. 
672 Vodafone response to the Targeted Consultation, Q24. In Germany, the SMP operator rejected any access to 
their ducts and generally referred to their portfolio of active access products in the past. Due to the German 
implementation of BCRD (DigiNetz Law), Deutsche Telekom was forced to provide access to ducts on demand. In 
various dispute settlement procedures, Deutsche Telekom requested excessive access prices. In bilateral 
negotiations, Deutsche Telekom seems unwilling to reach an agreement on an acceptable pricing structure and 
level. 
673 Orange response to the Targeted Consultation Q26, therefore, advocates that BCRD access should be 
considered only for non-local loop civil engineering. Otherwise, SMP or symmetric obligation assessment is more 
appropriate regarding bottleneck considerations. However, Telecom Italia response to the Targeted Consultation 
Q26 considers that, in the areas where other operators have deployed their own infrastructures (privately in black 
areas and with public funds in white areas), there is no longer the need to rely on SMP remedies for the access to 
physical infrastructures and only symmetric regulation is justified . 
674 A view supported by the Italian association AIIP in response to the Targeted Consultation Q26, for which for the 
foreseeable future (i.e. 3 to 5 years), obligations on SMP operators for access to civil engineering infrastructure 
should not be replaced by obligations under the BCRD. 
675 An operator’s response to the online survey. 
676 An operator in response to the Targeted Consultation Q26 also argues that the BCRD regime cannot replace 
the SMP access regime, first because „die Vorschriften aufgrund der Kostensenkungsrichtlinie auf eine Anwendung 
zwischen Wettbewerber – auf Augenhohe – angelegt sind. Zum anderen, da die schnelle Gewährung von 
Mitnutzungen für die Planung erforderlich ist, insbesondere bei Ausschreibungen – ob im Forderkontext oder ohne. 
Hier ist meist die Netz nähe, welche die Wettbewerber erst durch einen Zugriff auf die physische Infrastruktur des 
marktmachtigen Unternehmens erreichen konnten, entscheidend, um den bestehenden Wettbewerbsnachteil 
auszugleichen”. 
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ECTA677 stresses that, contrary to the BCRD regime, access pricing under the SMP regime 
relies on a cost-orientation methodology for reusable civil engineering assets values. The price 
control standard of fair and reasonable terms and conditions under the BCRD regime can lead 
to access charges (far) higher than those under an SMP obligation. There is thus no guarantee 
of access on predictable or feasible conditions. 
Finding 36. Most NRAs consider that in the large majority of cases, the BCRD alone, as it 
stands today, is not sufficient to ensure effective access to relevant civil engineering 
infrastructures for access seekers. Access seekers share that view. 
Effect on investment incentives of incumbent operators 
According to the NRAs concerned678 : 
• In certain countries, the BCRD may be adequate to promote the deployment of new 
ducts. 
• The possibility to enter into commercially negotiated joint ventures was instrumental for 
the SMP operator to deploy FTTH in several cities jointly with an access seeker. 
• Contractual negotiations under the BCRD concerning the coordination of civil works 
also seem to be investment supportive. 
According to BEREC679, the BCRD regime will be sufficient in instances where a physical 
infrastructure (in particular ducts and poles) is not widely available or is not widely used, as 
well as in instances where other economic agents besides the SMP operator have the means 
and incentives to grant access to their physical infrastructure, on the basis of economic and 
technical terms and conditions which are similar to those that may be available from the SMP 
operator. 
An access seeker680 also sees advantages in the BCRD regime, in particular that there is no 
direct conflict between the interests of the access seeker and those of the access provider. 
This may help to overcome some disputes but, at the same time, it also leads to potential 
operational overheads since the access provider aims for a ‘zero risk’ situation, which may 
lead to cumbersome processes and inflated access costs.  
Finding 37. According to some stakeholders, negotiated symmetric access, as under the 




677 ECTA response to the Targeted Consultation, Q26. 
678 Based on the online survey data. 
679 BoR (19) 94, available at: 
https://berec.europa.eu/eng/document_register/subject_matter/berec/download/0/8597-berec-report-on-access-
to-physical-infra_0.pdf  




8. Cooperative or sharing arrangements between operators 
aiming to foster the deployment of new fixed networks 
a. Summary of findings 
For the deployment of FTTH, operators use a mix of cooperative arrangements and 
commercial agreements for wholesale broadband access (entailing in some cases the grant 
of IRUs). The latter affect the competitive dynamic more rapidly. Most of the agreements have 
been taken into account during the market reviews. However, the threshold applied by some 
NRAs to determine whether to reduce regulatory obligations in the geographical coverage of 
the arrangements seems to be the same as for the definition of distinct geographical markets.  
The study also looked at conditions that could trigger changes in the obligations. It found that 
at this stage NRAs are very reluctant to determine ex ante conditions that would trigger a relief 
in regulatory obligations in areas affected by cooperation arrangements. Instead, they stress 
the need for review of remedies on a case-by-case basis. Generally, NRAs want to set the bar 
for the initiation of non-routine market reviews relatively high. However, there seems to be 
some consensus on the criteria that cooperative arrangements should fulfil to justify such non-
routine reviews. Looking from a different perspective, there is evidence that the absence of 
regulatory obligations leads to cooperative arrangements. Conversely, according to some 
operators, NRAs could also foster such agreements where regulated access is imposed.  
The online survey and interviews revealed that operators had decided to enter into cooperative 
arrangements for the economic benefits that such agreements would yield, rather than for 
hypothetical regulatory relief681. In the same vein, economic literature provides very little 
empirical evidence of the impact of co-investment agreements on ultra-fast broadband 
deployment, as we explain in Section 8.c. 
b. Introduction 
The NGA Recommendation acknowledges that volume and long term commitments can be 
useful to share investment risks, but does not actively encourage cooperative agreements 
allowing parties to diversify the risk of investment. However, it provides some support by 
recommending that NRAs duly take into account any such agreements and whether they 
warrant a change in remedies (in particular, suspension or lifting of some SMP obligations). 
This is in line with general economic considerations, since co-investment and other forms of 
cooperative agreements lead to wider coverage, higher quality, lower costs and prices, and 
more intense competition682.  
Since the adoption of the NGA Recommendation, several NRAs have considered the 
existence of cooperative or sharing arrangements (made between competing operators aiming 
to deploy fibre infrastructure) in the framework of market reviews. This was the case in Spain 
where the deployment of such an infrastructure occurs in certain areas based on the 2012 
 
681 At the same time, SMP operators that entered or consider entering into such agreements plead for a predictable 
approach by NRAs as regards the possible reduction of remedies, and in particular pricing obligations. This 
expectation goes beyond the arrangements caught by Article 76 EECC and the BEREC guidelines on co-
investment.  
682 CERRE (2020). Implementing Co-investment and Network Sharing. CERRE. M. Bourreau, S. Hoernig and W. 
Maxwell. May 2020.  
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network infrastructure sharing agreements between Telefónica and Jazztel683 or the 2013 
agreement between Telefónica, Orange, and Vodafone684. The French NRA even mandates 
cooperative agreements under symmetric regulation regarding drop cables and the in-house 
segment685. 
Today, in pursuit of its policy objectives, the EECC requires NRAs, among other things, to 
promote efficient investment and innovation in new and enhanced infrastructures, including 
(…) by permitting various cooperative arrangements between investors and parties seeking 
access to diversify the risk of investment. When such arrangements influence competitive 
dynamics, NRAs must consider these arrangements not only in their (forward looking) market 
reviews, but also in-between the periodic review cycles.  
The EECC is encouraging participants to enter into co-investment agreements through offering 
regulatory incentives and recognises the positive attributes of co-investment: the EECC 
mandates NRAs to grant SMP operators regulatory relief where the latter offer commitments 
in the form of co-investment proposals for the deployment of VHCN open to other operators 
(Article 76 and Annex IV EECC). This chapter does not cover co-investments in new very high 
capacity network elements falling within the scope of that Article and for which extensive 
guidance was provided by BEREC686. 
Provisions concerned in the Recommendations 
• Recital 27: “(…) Co-investment into NGA networks can reduce both the costs and the 
risk incurred by an investing undertaking, and can thus lead to more extensive 
deployment of FTTH”. 
• Point 11 of the NGA Recommendation: “‘Co-investment in FTTH’ means an 
arrangement between independent providers of electronic communications services 
with a view to deploying FTTH networks in a joint manner, in particular in less densely 
populated areas. Co-investment covers different legal arrangements, but typically co-
investors will build network infrastructure and share physical access to that 
infrastructure”. 
• Point 28 of the NGA Recommendation: “Where the conditions of competition in the 
area covered by the joint deployment of FTTH networks based on multiple fibre lines 
by several co-investors are substantially different, i.e. such as to justify the definition of 
a separate geographic market, NRAs should examine, in the course of their market 
analysis, whether, in the light of the level of infrastructure competition resulting from 
the co-investment, a finding of SMP is warranted with regard to that market. In this 
context, NRAs should in particular examine whether each co-investor enjoys strictly 
equivalent and cost-oriented access to the joint infrastructure and whether the co-
investors are effectively competing on the downstream market. They should also 
 
683 For example see: https://www.convergedigest.com/2012/10/telefonica-and-jazztel-announce-ftth.html  
684 For example see: https://www.commsupdate.com/articles/2014/01/10/vodafone-orange-in-new-network-
sharing-agreement/  
685 Under the symmetrical regulatory framework any operator (SMP or not) which has deployed its own FTTH 
network must enable access to it for any other operator. The SMP operator, as an operator deploying its own FTTH 
network, offers access to it under two main modalities: either a line per line subscription (with a monthly fee) or via 
co-investment (20-years rights of usage). Alternative operators have access to the SMP operator’s FTTH network 
via these two modalities. Conversely, the SMP operator is seeking access to FTTH networks deployed by 
competitors under the same modalities. 
686 BEREC (2020) BEREC Guidelines to foster the consistent application of the conditions and criteria for assessing 





examine whether the co-investors install sufficient duct capacity for third parties to use 
and grant cost-oriented access to such capacity”. 
Relevant provisions from the EECC 
• Art. 3.4 EECC: NRAs should permit arrangements that allow parties to diversify the risk 
of investment while protecting competition. 
• Art. 68.6 EECC which requires NRAs to “consider the impact of new market 
developments, such as in relation to commercial agreements, including co-investment 
agreements, influencing competitive dynamics”, also in the case of arrangements that 
do not fulfil these strict conditions. 
• Art. 76 EECC lists strict conditions under which SMP regulation can be lifted in case of 
co-investment agreements. 
• Art. 79 EECC details the commitment procedure to be followed by SMP operators in 
order to benefit from regulatory relief among others in case of cooperative 
arrangements. 
• Recital 181 EECC (“Reviews of obligations (…) during the timeframe of a market 
analysis should allow NRAs to take into account the impact on competitive conditions 
of (…)for instance of newly concluded voluntary agreements between undertakings, 
such as access and co-investment agreements, thus providing the flexibility which is 
particularly necessary in the context of longer regulatory cycles.”) 
 
c. Overview of cooperative or sharing arrangements already 
concluded or planned to be concluded 
NRAs and operators have reported agreements that could be classified into the following 
categories687: 
• Co-investment or access agreements to which the SMP operator is party. There 
are cases of co-investment via establishing a joint venture (Germany, Belgium, Italy), 
co-investment with reciprocal access (Czech Republic, Portugal, Spain), and reciprocal 
access without co-investment in deployment (Slovakia)  
• Co-investment agreements between alternative operators and third parties. 
Examples include co-investment via establishing a joint venture (Ireland), and co-
investment with reciprocal access (Portugal and Spain). 
Table 27. A selection of notable co-investment or access agreements to which the SMP 
operator is party  
Germany Co-investment (joint venture): Telekom Deutschland GmbH (SMP operator) and 
EWE AG (utilities group) established the joint venture Glasfaser NordWest 
 
687 These agreements do not fully correspond to the categories used in the online survey, which were 1) Agreements 
under which the SMP operator is leading the deployment of VHC networks and shares part of the investment risk 
with alternative operators; 2) Reciprocal access: the SMP operator and the alternative operators are each 
responsible for deploying and operating their own respective VHCN in geographically separate areas; each party 
has access to all other VHCN; 3) Agreements between alternative operators or between alternative operators and 
third parties to which the SMP operator is not party. Respondents reported a variety of different agreements to 
which the above categorisation of agreements was not helpful in terms of capturing the variety of types of 
agreements. 
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GmbH&Co.KG (to operate as a wholesale-only business), which will roll out fibre 
capable of gigabit speeds. It is a 50:50688 co-investment to serve 1.5m premises in parts 
of north-west Germany. Glasfaser Nordwest began its operations in January 2020689. 
Belgium Co-investment (joint venture): 
• Proximus (SMP operator) entered into agreements with Eurofibre and Deltafibre to 
deploy FTTH networks. The joint venture with Eurofibre should cover 500.000 
households in Wallonia690, while the joint venture with Deltafibre should cover 1.5m 
households in Flanders691.  
• Telenet is negotiating with the utility operator Fluvius about possible cooperation to 
deploy FTTH in Flanders. Fluvius has installed 15,000 homes with FTTH as proof-
of-concept in five cities and municipalities (Antwerp, Diksmuide, Ghent, Genk and 
Poperinge) 692. 
Italy Co-investment (joint venture): In 2016, TIM and Fastweb created a joint venture 
(Flash Fiber) to turn their respective FTTC networks into FTTH networks. The joint-
venture is managed and coordinated by TIM and envisages the equity investment of 
80% by TIM and 20% by Fastweb. Flash Fiber is aimed at creating a FTTH network in 
29 of the main Italian cities by 2020. The new infrastructures will make available by 
Flash Fiber to TIM and Fastweb at an agreed price, through the provision of passive 
access services on the GPON network; network resources exceeding the needs of TIM 
and Fastweb will remain available to Flash Fiber, which will be able to sell them to third 
party operators693.  
Czech 
Republic 
Co-investment (reciprocal access): In December 2020, a co-investment agreement 
between CETIN and T-Mobile to roll out FTTH was signed. The first households 
targeted by this project should be connected in the second half of 2021. The project 
aims to cover “hundreds of thousands” of households within the “next years”. The 
stated reason for cooperation was that there are locations where deployment is 
expensive or otherwise complicated, and in many of them individual operators cannot 
invest effectively694.. 
Portugal Co-investment (reciprocal access): In 2014, MEO (SMP operator) and Vodafone 
signed a co-investment agreement to deploy FTTH-PON, targeting mainly areas that 
were not already covered (namely in the less dense areas). The agreement provides 
 
688 Reuters (2020). “Deutsche Telekom launches fibre-optic joint venture in northwest Germany’, available at: 
https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-telecoms-deutsche-telekom-idUKKBN1ZE1AE  
689 Telekom (2020). “Glasfaser Nordwest begins its work”, available at: https://www.telekom.com/en/media/media-
information/archive/glasfaser-nordwest-begins-its-work-591494  
690 Press release, “Eurofiber and Proximus sign agreement for joint venture fiber roll-out Wallonia”, 30 October 
2020, available at: https://www.eurofiber.be/en/press/eurofiber-and-proximus-sign-agreement-for-joint-venture-
fiber-roll-out-wallonia/  
691 The JV was approved by the EU Commission on 24 March 202 (M.10087 - PROXIMUS / NEXUS 
INFRASTRUCTURE / JV, available at: 
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result&policy_area_id=2). Press release, 
“Proximus signe un accord final de collaboration avec EQT Infrastructure, concrétisant son ambitieux plan de 
déploiement de la fibre en Belgique”, 27 Novembre 2020, available at : 
https://www.proximus.com/fr/news/2020/20201127-Proximus-reaches-collaboration-agreement-with-EQT-
Infrastructure.html;pxcfrontend=09oar7M_qTQOc3RGQXHb5WexetI2VbkObx1Bh8q0.pxcp_frontend_21  
692 Fluvius (2020) Half-yearly financial report of the Fluvius-group as per 30 June 2020. Available at: 
https://over.fluvius.be/sites/fluvius/files/2020-09/fluvius-system-operator-group-condensed-consolidated-interim-
ifrs-financial-statements-30-june-2020.pdf  
693 See more at: https://www.flashfiber.it/en/about-us/the-company/ and https://www.fibercop.it/en/offered-
services/access-services/full-gpon/  
694 T-mobile (2020) “T-MOBILE and Cetin Will Build Common State-Of-The-Art Fiber Infrastructure for Hundreds of 










IRUs for 25 years695. The agreement which previewed the sharing of PON networks in 
circa 900 thousand homes (450 by each operator) has already been executed. 
Slovakia Reciprocal access (no co-investment in deployment): Slovak Telekom (SMP 
operator) and Orange Slovensko signed a commercial agreement in December 2020 
of granting reciprocal access to the fibre networks. Orange started to use wholesale 
access to Slovak Telekom’s fibre networks in December 2020, while Slovak Telekom 
plans to begin using Orange’s fibre infrastructure in April 2021696. 
Spain Co-investment (reciprocal access):  
In October 2012, Telefónica (SMP operator) and Jazztel signed a co-investment 
agreement for joint deployment of FTTH networks (limited to coverage of 3m premises), 
as well a provision of pre-existing fibre infrastructure and a vertical infrastructure access 
agreement697. 
Source: Indicated in footnotes. 
Table 28. A selection of co-investment agreements between alternative operators and 
third parties  
Portugal Co-investment (reciprocal access): In 2017, the two main alternative operators 
(Vodafone and NOS) signed a reciprocal sharing agreement to develop a FTTH-PON 
network for around 2.6 million homes mainly in areas not previously covered by FTTH, 
with each operator sharing an equivalent value in terms of investment698. The two 
operators were previously involved in a 2010 reciprocal access agreement covering 
FTTH rolled out in the cities of Lisbon and Porto699. The agreement ended as Vodafone 
bought the NOS (then Optimus) network in 2016 (following approval by the NCA of the 
Optimus/ZON merger); Vodafone was granted the option to buy the FTTH network that 
it shared with Optimus.  
Spain Co-investment (reciprocal access):  
In May 2013, Vodafone and Orange signed an agreement covering joint deployment 
of and reciprocal access to FTTH networks to reach 6m premises across 50 major 
cities by September 2017.The agreement also included deployment of a vertical 
infrastructure, reciprocal access and an agreement to jointly request access to any 
third-party vertical infrastructure700. 
In October 2016, Orange and MasMovil signed an agreement that granted MasMovil 
IRUs over a relevant part of Orange’s FTTH network (co-investment agreement) as 
well as access to the entire FTTH network (provision of wholesale broadband access 
services). MasMovil promised to grant Orange IRUs over the infrastructure it planned 
to deploy in the coming years701. 
 
695 Telecomlead (2014). “Portugal Telecom, Vodafone in fiber network sharing deal”, available at: 
https://www.telecomlead.com/broadband/portugal-telecom-vodafone-fiber-network-sharing-deal-51934  
696 Comms Update (2021). “Slovak Telekom will use Orange fibre networks from April”, available at: 
https://www.commsupdate.com/articles/2021/02/17/slovak-telekom-will-use-orange-fibre-networks-from-april/  
697 Comms Update (2012). “Jazztel inks FTTH deal with Telefonica for shared deployment”, available at: 
https://www.commsupdate.com/articles/2012/10/10/jazztel-inks-ftth-deal-with-telefonica-for-shared-deployment/  
698 Fibre Systems (2017). “Vodafone Portugal and NOS strike network sharing deal”, available at: https://www.fibre-
systems.com/news/vodafone-portugal-and-nos-strike-network-sharing-deal. 
699 Commsupdate (2012). “Optimus, Vodafone agree to share fibre network”, available at : 
https://www.commsupdate.com/articles/2010/12/20/optimus-vodafone-agree-to-share-fibre-network/  
700 Broadband Communities Magazine (2013). ”Vodafone and Orange to Co-Invest in FTTH in Spain”, available at: 
https://www.bbcmag.com/breaking-news/vodafone-and-orange-to-co-invest-in-ftth-in-spain  
701 CNMC (2020). Inicio y trámite de información pública del procedimiento para la definición y análisis de los 
mercados de acceso local al por mayor facilitado en una ubicación fija y acceso central al por mayor facilitado en 
una ubicación fija para productos del mercado de masas (mercados 3a-3b/2014), la designación de operadores 
con poder significativo de mercado y la imposición de obligaciones específicas [Initiation and processing of public 
information of the procedure for the definition and analysis of local wholesale access markets provided at a fixed 
location and central wholesale access provided at a fixed location for mass market products (markets 3a-3b/2014), 
the designation of operators with significant market power and the imposition of specific obligations], File no. 
ANME/DTSA/002/20/M3-2014. 
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Ireland Co-investment (joint venture). SIRO is a joint venture between Vodafone and the 
ESB (Ireland’s electricity incumbent) to roll out an FTTP network in certain parts of the 
country. It started in 2015 and based on publicly available information has passed 
some 338,000 premises in October 2020702. SIRO is a wholesale-only operator and 
provides an open access network.  
Germany Co-investment (joint venture). In October 2020, Telefónica announced a cooperation 
agreement with Allianz, through which Telefónica would invest up to 500m EUR, while 
Allianz would invest up to 1b EUR to deploy an FTTH network that would serve rural 
and “semi-rural” areas in Germany, in particular areas under-served by Deutsche 
Telekom (SMP operator), Vodafone, and other ANOs. Telefónica Group’s participation 
will be made through its infrastructure division Telefónica Infra, which will have a 40% 
stake while Telefónica Deutschland/O2 will have the remaining 10% stake. Allianz 
Capital Partners will invest 50% in the joint venture on behalf of Allianz insurance 
companies and the Allianz European Infrastructure Fund. The joint venture plans to 
pass more than 2m homes with FTTH connections703. 
Source: Indicated in footnotes. 
Francesco Castelli704 proposes an alternative typology to classify these agreements: 
• Co-Financing Only (CFO) where one party deploys and the other parties make a 
financial contribution. 
• Separate Deployment (SD) with reciprocal wholesale access where each co-investing 
party deploys a network but in separate areas, giving each other mutual wholesale 
access. 
• Joint Deployment (JD) where co-investing parties set up a joint venture that deploys 
the network. 
A further typology is used by Stephen Curram et al.705: 
• Sharing of network rollout costs. This type of co-investment retains infrastructure 
competition among two or more operators but has the potential to significantly reduce 
capital costs for network rollout. This may take different forms, as operators could agree 
to: 
a) share civil engineering works to lay multiple fibres and maintain completely 
separate infrastructures, or 
b) share costs for shared network infrastructure for the last drop (e.g. co-
investment approach in France with share of either building access or 
concentration point aggregating 100 units in very dense areas, or connection 
points for 1,000 households in less dense areas). 
• Network sharing with joint ownership. Two or more operators may co-invest in a 
single network and have shared access to it. In some cases, the operators will use a 
separate investment vehicle with a share of ownership. This reduces infrastructure 
competition between the operators but maintains retail competition and may lead to 
 
702 SIRO website, available at: https://siro.ie/news-and-insights/category/siro-for-home/  
703 Fierce Telekom (2020). “Telefonica hooks up with Allianz for FTTH rollout in Germany”, available at: 
https://www.fiercetelecom.com/telecom/telefonica-hooks-up-allianz-for-ftth-rollout-germany  
704 TIM Group (2019) “Co-investment or wholesale-only: Which model will spur more incentives to invest?”, 
Francesco Castelli FSR Conference – Florence, 13 December 2019 “The EECC and its impact on investment in 
very high capacity networks (VHCN)”, available at: https://fsr.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Francesco-
CASTELLI_Co-.investment_TIM.pdf  
705 Stephen Curram et al. (2019). Study on the determinants of investment in VHCN – a System Dynamics approach: 




VHCN deployment where two competing networks would otherwise be uneconomic 
(e.g. Telecom Italia and Fastweb). 
• Network sharing single ownership. Two operators may have an agreement not to 
overbuild and to choose to invest in infrastructures in different areas but to allow access 
to each other’s networks. This reduces infrastructure competition between the 
operators but maintains retail competition and may lead to quicker and more 
widespread VHCN deployment across a country (e.g. Telefónica and Jazztel). 
• Take or Pay contracts (not strictly a co-investment but rather a co-business case). 
The business case of a wholesale infrastructure operator is boosted by guaranteed 
revenue from a client retail operator, possibly with exclusive access for a period of time. 
While not strictly a co-investment (only one operator is investing, and the EECC 
specifically excludes this as a type of co-investment), this type of agreement 
significantly strengthens the business case of the infrastructure operator by 
guaranteeing a minimum revenue stream, while giving the retail operator VHCN access 
to the region. Potentially, the infrastructure operator can get cheaper “patient” finance 
than the retail operator could, so it can provide a significantly cheaper route to VHCN 
for the retail operator than building their own infrastructure (e.g. Open Fiber & 
Vodafone). 
Finding 38. To date, most co-investment initiatives in the EU have involved operators that 
are not designated as having SMP. As a result, while the number of co-investment 
schemes is growing, their overall impact on VHCN rollout in the EU remains somewhat 
limited706. 
NRAs also reported commercial access agreements that do not constitute co-investment 
agreements707 in the strict meaning of the term (corresponding to Curram et al.’s above 
mentioned ‘take or pay’ category of): 
• Access to wholesale active services: cases in Spain, Germany, Denmark, 
Luxembourg, Cyprus. 
• Access to passive services (physical infrastructure): cases in France, Italy, 
Germany, Cyprus.  
• Access to both wholesale active and passive services: such agreements seem to 
have been concluded only in Spain. 
Table 29. A selection of commercial agreements on access to wholesale active services  
Wholesale active access 
Spain Wholesale access agreement (active wholesale services only): 
In March 2017, Telefónica (SMP operator) and Vodafone signed an agreement that 
guarantees Vodafone access to the entire FTTH network of Telefónica including 
premises located in geographical areas where Telefónica was not subject to 
 
706 This finding from Felipe Flórez Duncan (EU broadband: co-investing in a faster future, Oxera, September 2019) 
seems to correspond to the collected data.  
707 These agreements correspond rather to risk-sharing models allowing the risks involved in network expansion 
activities to be spread across multiple undertakings. They serve to reduce uncertainties regarding the future 
development of demand and the amortisation of investments for the undertaking carrying out the work. 
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wholesale access obligations to its FTTH network. The agreement is based on 
purchase commitments over five years708. 
In February 2018, Telefónica (SMP operator) and Orange signed an agreement that 
guarantees Orange access to Telefónica’s FTTH network. Orange gained access 
both in the geographical areas where Telefónica was subject to wholesale access 
obligations and where it was not709. 
In July 2018, Telefónica (SMP operator) and Digi signed an agreement, which 
guarantees Digi access to Telefónica’s FTTH network710 
In February 2019, Telefónica (SMP operator) and MasMovil signed an agreement 
that guarantees MasMovil access to Telefónica’s FTTH network711. In July 2020, 
Telefónica (SMP operator) and Euskaltel signed an agreement that guarantees 
Euskaltel access to Telefónica’s FTTH network (NEBA FTTH) in areas exempt from 
regulation. The agreement is valid for five years and is renewable 712 
Germany Wholesale access agreements: Other commercial agreements for wholesale 
access to the SMP-network have been in place since 2013 and accompany the 
remedies imposed on Deutsche Telekom in markets where the latter is designated 
as having SMP. Conversely also some access agreements where an access seeker 
is granted wholesale-access to an alternative ECN are known713. 
Wholesale access offer to ANO coax network Vodafone offers wholesale access to 
its HFC-network in favour of Telefónica pursuant to a respective commitment in a 
merger case where Vodafone took over the HFC-network Unitymedia (Liberty 
Global)714. 
Wholesale access offer to ANO coax network. Wholesale access is intended to be 
offered (starting in 2021) by the second largest HFC-operator TeleColumbus in 
favour of Telefónica on a voluntary basis715. 
Denmark Wholesale access offer to SMP coax network (bitstream product): In 2016, TDC 
presented ANOs with a commercial offer regarding access to its coaxial network. The 
pricing is a combination of a payment for transmission capacity (that has to be booked 
in advance) and a fee paid per connection716. 
Cyprus Wholesale access agreement (commercial VULA offer): the SMP operator is 
offering a “Bitstream IP2+” product as a commercial alternative to the regulated WLA 
VULA product, allowing ANOs to interconnect to 3 points of handover of the SMP 
operator’s network. 717 
Access to passive services (physical infrastructure) 
 
708 Telefonica (2017). “Telefónica y Vodafone firman un acuerdo comercial de acceso mayorista a la fibra óptica”, 
available at: https://www.telefonica.com/es/web/sala-de-prensa/-/telefonica-y-vodafone-firman-un-acuerdo-
comercial-de-acceso-mayorista-a-la-fibra-optica  
709 Telefonica (2018). “Telefónica firma con Orange un acuerdo comercial de acceso mayorista para fibra óptica”, 
available at: https://www.telefonica.com/es/web/sala-de-prensa/-/telefonica-firma-con-orange-un-acuerdo-
comercial-de-acceso-mayorista-para-fibra-optica  
710 El Espanol (2018). “Digi cierra un acuerdo con Telefónica para llevar fibra óptica a sus clients”, available at: 
https://www.elespanol.com/invertia/empresas/20180312/digi-cierra-acuerdo-telefonica-llevar-optica-
clientes/291471754_0.html  
711 Expansion (2019). “Telefónica llega a un acuerdo con MásMóvil para darle fibra y móvil”, available at: 
https://www.expansion.com/empresas/tecnologia/2019/02/14/5c64908b468aeb5c0b8b45cb.html  
712 Xatakamovil (2020). “Euskaltel podrá usar la fibra de Movistar a nivel nacional durante cinco años y en plena 
expansión de Virgin Telco”, available at: https://www.xatakamovil.com/movistar/euskaltel-podra-usar-fibra-
movistar-a-nivel-nacional-durante-cinco-anos-plena-expansion-virgin-telco; Euskatel (2020). Relevant information 
note, available at: https://www.cnmv.es/portal/verDoc.axd?t={ae7b70a2-81a7-4ddc-9d4c-8ec7c5d4221a}  
713 Online survey data. 
714 Telecompaper (2019). “Vodafone offers Telefonica access to Geman cable network to seal Unitymedia deal”, 
available at: https://www.telecompaper.com/news/vodafone-offers-telefonica-access-to-german-cable-network-to-
seal-unitymedia-deal--1291630  
715 Digital TV (2021) “Telefonica begins marketing services on Tele Columbus network”, available at: 
https://www.digitaltveurope.com/2021/07/15/telefonica-begins-marketing-services-on-tele-columbus-network/  
716 Wik-Consult (2019), Competition and investment in the Danish broadband market (Non-confidential version) 




Cyprus Access to physical infrastructure: Primetel and Cablenet have agreements with 
the electricity company to use the electricity poles to deploy fibre networks718. 
Access to both wholesale active and passive services 
Spain Wholesale access agreement (active wholesale services together with access 
to infrastructure): 
In November 2017, Orange and Euskatel signed an agreement that facilitates 
Euskaltel’s access to Orange’s FTTH network in the broadband wholesale access 
modality. This agreement also provides for limited sharing of infrastructure719. 
In September 2018, MasMovil and Vodafone signed an agreement, which 
guarantees IRUs to respective fibre footprints, as well as wholesale access over 
respective FTTH networks720 
In April 2019, Vodafone and Orange signed an agreement that includes both access 
to infrastructure and the provision to Vodafone of wholesale broadband access 
services to the FTTH network in 1m lines covered by the Orange network721. 
In September 2020, Adamo and Euskatel signed an agreement that provides 
Euskatel access to Adamo’s FTTH network, which includes over 1m homes 
nationwide. The agreement is valid for five years, renewable by mutual agreement, 
and is expandable to the 500.000 additional homes that Adamo plans to reach with 
FTTH722. 
Source: Indicated in footnotes. 
The French NRA “opted for a complex regulatory framework mandating that first investors 
accept co-investing entrants. The exact types of obligations differ between urban, suburban 
and rural regions”723. The authors nonetheless add that the “uptake of [mandated 
coinvestment] schemes has been rather low”724. 
Have NRAs taken cooperative or sharing arrangements into account in their regular 
market reviews? Have they led to any changes in remedies? 
NRAs in countries where cooperative or sharing agreements have been made reportedly took 
three approaches: 
1. Analysed the agreements within regular market review and found a significant impact 
of these agreements (warranting re-consideration of SMP remedies) 
2. Analysed the agreements within the regular market review, but did not (yet) find a 
significant impact of these agreements 
3. Did not take the identified agreements into account within the market review. 
 
718 Case study interviews. 
719 Euskatel (2017). “El Grupo Euskaltel inicia su expansión en el Norte donde llegará a un mercado de 7,6 millones 
de personas”, available at: https://www.euskaltel.com/CanalOnline/nosotros/sala-prensa/notas-
prensa/20171113131204881  
720 Masmovil (2018). “Communication of relevant information”, available at: 
https://www.bmerv.es/docs/hechos/269/HS269374.PDF  
721 Orange (2019). “Orange y Vodafone amplían sus acuerdos de compartición de redes móviles y fijas en España”, 
available at: https://blog.orange.es/noticias/orange-y-vodafone-amplian-acuerdos-comparticion-de-redes-moviles-
y-fijas/  
722 Euskatel (2020). "Euskaltel firma un acuerdo que le permite obtener acceso a la red de fibra óptica de Adamo 
a nivel nacional”, available at: https://www.euskaltel.com/CanalOnline/nosotros/sala-prensa/notas-
prensa/20200908061313865 
723 Bourreau, S., Hoernig, S., & Maxwell W. (2020). Implementing co-investment and network sharing. Centre on 
Regulation in Europe, Report, p. 46. Available online at: 
https://www.cerre.eu/sites/cerre/files/cerre_implementing_co-investment_and_network_sharing-26.05.2020.pdf; 
724 Ibid. 
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Cases in all three circumstances/approaches are summarized below. 
The NRAs that reported to have analysed the agreements within the regular market review 
and found significant impacts to the market were DBA (Denmark) and CNMC (Spain).  
Denmark: The NRA reported that even though the SMP operator TDC is no longer obliged to 
offer bitstream access on its HFC network, the operator has committed to continue providing 
this wholesale access under the same overall conditions725.  
Spain: In the market review, the NRA identifies the key wholesale commercial access 
agreements and takes them into account when describing and assessing the competitive 
dynamics (both at the retail and wholesale levels) in the context of its on-going market review 
of wholesale markets for local and central access provided at a fixed location (and whose final 
decision has not yet been adopted at the time of writing). The NRA notes that these 
agreements are subject to frequent revisions, generally aimed at extending the scope of 
wholesale services or infrastructures, reviewing the economic conditions applied and 
extending the duration of the agreements. The scope of trade agreements can be 
approximated by the number of premises to which they give access or plan to provide 
reciprocal access. Taking this reference, CNMC notes that commercial agreements for 
wholesale broadband access have a markedly greater scope than co-investment agreements, 
which are usually below two million premises.726. 
The large display of various cooperative agreements did not trigger non-routine market reviews 
in Spain, despite market anticipation. On the other hand, co-investment agreements were 
taken into account when designing remedies. 
Other NRAs reported to have analysed the agreements within the regular market review727 
did not (yet) find significant impacts that would justify changes to SMP remedies  
(FICORA (Finland), BNetzA (Germany), ANACOM (Portugal), AGCOM (Italy), and ComReg 
(Ireland)). 
Finland: FICORA reports that there are many cooperatives and municipal companies that roll 
out fibre networks and follow open access models. However, this did not change the SMP 
remedies. As noted in Case FI/2018/2052-2053, FICORA states that regional network 
operators do not have an SMP position in the wholesale local and central access markets. The 
NRA argues that their competitive behaviour differs significantly from the traditional, vertically 
integrated telecommunications operators, which aim normally to maximise returns. Most of 
these open access network operators also must comply with state aid obligations (having 
received public funding) and thus are obliged to provide access on fair and non-discriminatory 
terms.  
 
725 Case DK/2017/1993-1994. The Commission Comments Letter notes in addition that the new offer even presents 
better conditions in relation to certain of its features (e.g. ordering capacity, billing or VOIP). 
726 CNMC (2020). Inicio y trámite de información pública del procedimiento para la definición y análisis de los 
mercados de acceso local al por mayor facilitado en una ubicación fija y acceso central al por mayor facilitado en 
una ubicación fija para productos del mercado de masas (mercados 3a-3b/2014), la designación de operadores 
con poder significativo de mercado y la imposición de obligaciones específicas [Initiation and processing of public 
information of the procedure for the definition and analysis of local wholesale access markets provided at a fixed 
location and central wholesale access provided at a fixed location for mass market products (Markets 3a-3b/2014), 
the designation of operators with significant market power and the imposition of specific obligations], File no. 
ANME/DTSA/002/20/M3-2014. 
727 In the 2002/2009 framework, the possibility to adapt remedies (without adapting the market analysis) in reaction 




Germany: as regards the co-investment agreement between the SMP operator and EWE AG 
(utilities group) establishing a joint venture, BNetzA took this agreement into account728 when 
1) carrying out market analysis, as well as when 2) carrying out the SMP assessment of Market 
3a and 3b.  
Portugal: the NRA considered the agreements when identifying the operator with the SMP 
within the defined geographic markets. In particular, ANACOM analysed the 2016 co-
investment agreement between Vodafone and NOS in detail729.  
Italy: Regarding Flash Fiber (controlled by TIM), in the context of the last market analysis 
(decision 348/19/CONS), was taken into account only in relation to the impact of the 
Undertaking n. 3 (made binding by the Italian competition Authority - case I799) according to 
which Fastweb (as well as TIM) committed to launch independent wholesale offers for VULA 
and NGA bitstream services (using Flash Fiber semi-GPON network) at non-discriminatory 
conditions. In Telecom Italia’s view, however, criteria for the geographical segmentation of 
remedies in the scope of the last market analysis of markets 3a and 3b pursuant to Decision 
348/19/CONS were “unjustifiably too strict”, leading many of the 29 cities where Flash Fiber 
deploys a FTTH network to not be recognised as competitive and thus not having remedies 
revised730. 
Ireland: ComReg included considerations on the impact of the joint venture SIRO in its market 
review D10/18 of 19 November 2018, however, concluded that “while SIRO offers VULA based 
WLA based services, the expected coverage of the SIRO network during the lifetime of this 
market review was likely to be limited, in particular, relative to that of Eircom.”731 
Two NRAs reported that they have not yet analysed the agreements within the regular 
market review. In both cases, the agreements have not yet been implemented and both NRAs 
expect to take these agreements into account in the next market review. 
Some SMP operators share the view that certain commercial wholesale access agreements 
have a more immediate impact on competitive dynamics. They advocate therefore that such 
commercial agreements should lead also to relief of regulatory obligations imposed732: 
• Deutsche Telecom: “Such agreements should also result in NRAs having to withdraw 
regulatory obligations and make them binding for at least seven years. It is not sufficient 
to take such agreements into account in the regulatory discretion. Such agreements 
have a similar positive effect on competition as co-investment agreements”. 
• ETNO and Telefonica (same answer presented): “Apart from the conformity with the 
conditions within the article 76.1, all long-term agreements signed outside of a SMP-
regime framework should be considered, and in particular, networks based on long-
term agreements should be covered, regardless of whether passive or active access is 
concerned. Those agreements should not only lead to review the remedies but should 
 
728 Commission Comments of 14.02.2020 conccerning Case DE/2020/2235, footnote 36, p.8. 
729 In its Recommendation from 29 November 2016 Cases PT/2016/1888 and PT/2016/1889, the Commission notes 
that “As to the possibility that a co-investment agreement in the NC areas could be reached between Vodafone and 
NOS, there is no evidence available to the Commission” (p.14). 
730 Telecom Italia response to the Targeted Consultation, Q28. 
731 ComReg Market Review D10/18 of 19 November 2018. 
732 The following citations are extracted from public replies to Q31 of the Targeted Consultation of the respective 
organizations (emphases added).  
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be taken into account in the market analysis itself (perimeter, three criteria test, SMP 
assessment, etc.) given its impact on competition.” 
 
Finding 39. For the deployment of FTTH, operators use a mix of cooperative arrangements 
and commercial agreements for wholesale broadband access (entailing in some cases the 
grant of IRUs). The latter affect the competitive dynamic more rapidly. Most of the 
agreements have been taken into account during the market reviews. However, the 
threshold applied by some NRAs to determine whether to reduce regulatory obligations in 
the geographical coverage of the arrangements seems to be the same as for the definition 
of distinct geographical markets. 
 
When could remedies be adapted to take into account the impact of arrangements? 
Which agreements should be taken into account?733 
NRAs were generally not comfortable with providing any specific criteria that could serve as a 
‘trigger’ for the need of a new non-routine market analysis. According to BEREC, “there is no 
general answer to the question as to whether and to what extent the SMP obligation should be 
modified in the case of a commitment that has been declared binding. This is because it will 
always be necessary to carefully assess each individual case, and it is always important to 
consider which obligations have already been imposed and what scope there is for 
adjustment.”734 BEREC notes “that the development towards multi SMP operator market 
environments in Member States results in an increased administrative burden that should be 
born in mind. The process needs to be manageable and should not end in “micro-
management”735. This reflects the approaches by NRAs of Spain, Ireland and Germany, which 
collected information on the networks deployed under such agreements for their market 
reviews, but did not specifically describe the effects taken into account resulting from each of 
the specific agreements concerned. In one case, the effects of cooperative agreements 
materialized after the market review (which was based on data predating the market review), 
but despite a request from the SMP operator, the NRA did not proceed to a review of the SMP 
obligations applicable in the areas concerned736. 
In its response to the targeted consultation, the Polish NRA advocates that: “[t]he conditions 
and criteria for VHCN and other co-investment commitments should be equal. Deregulation 
should be subject to the same transparent criteria related to open and non-discriminatory 
access and ensuring sufficient competition at the retail level.”737 
Vodafone stressed the need for regulatory predictability – since agreements are designed in 
accordance with the existing market situation, automatic revisions of market(s) after conclusion 
of an agreement, would be counterproductive738. Multiple operators reminded of the possibility 
to request their NRA to review the relevant market earlier, seemingly lending support to the 
view that a thorough case-by-case assessment on whether a new market review and/or 
adjustment of remedies are necessary is the most appropriate way.  
 
733 Sub-section summarizes patterns emerging from online survey responses and the responses to targeted 
consultation. 
734 BEREC (2020), BEREC Response to the Targeted consultation on the revision of the Commission’s access 
recommendations, BoR (20) 169, Q31. 
735 Idem, Q28. 
736 Case study interviews 
737 Polish NRA response to the Targeted Consultation, Q31. 





Finding 40. At this stage, NRAs are very reluctant to determine ex ante conditions that 
would trigger a relief in regulatory obligations in areas affected by cooperation 
arrangements. Instead, they stress (in an overwhelming majority) the need for a review of 
remedies on a case-by-case basis. 
 
However, in its 2018 market analysis, the Belgian NRA defined which cooperative agreements 
would trigger lighter regulation even before the next regular review (see Box 9 below) 
Box 9. BIPT’s approach to taking cooperative agreements into account when setting 
SMP remedies 
If a new network is built under a cooperative agreement, which could trigger partial lifting 
of regulation, it must comply with the following criteria to be considered as a 3rd 
independent network (taking into account areas where such an investment is economically 
justified and two networks are already present)739: 
1. Agreement between at least two independent parties providing electronic 
communication services and based on item 11 of the NGA Recommendation 
2. Open network and transparency 
3. Possibility for the party to act independently commercially and technically 
4. Reciprocal access if agreement covers complementary networks 
5. Possibility to resell all agreement or part of it with all rights and obligations 
6. No exclusivity 
7. Authorization of wholesale services to parties not a part of the agreement 
8. Duration of agreement must be significantly longer than 3 years 
9. Pricing and non-pricing clauses must be fair and non-discriminatory 
10. Information interchange limited to requested information for deployment and 
maintenance, and no possibility for a party to discover the strategy of its partner 
 
The areas used for segmentation are the statistical units from the National Institute of 
Statistics (around 20,000, while there are 581 municipalities), thus independent of network 
architectures. In order to be defined as competitive, 50% of area’s households must be 
able to access services from three different NGA operators. The regulator proposes to lift 
the obligations on the SMP operators on Market 3a, 3b1, 3b2 and radio broadcasting, 
except the following obligations: 
(i) the obligation to negotiate in good faith  
(ii) access to duct splice, splint or, failing this, dark fibre  
(iii) access intended to serve non-residential multi-site customers  
(iv) transparency measures related to the evolution of the network and  
(v) access to copper unbundling in the parts of the areas where fibre is not yet 
present 
 
739 Conférence des régulateurs du secteur des communications électroniques, Décision du 29 juin 2018 Analyse 
des marchés du haut débit et de la radiodiffusion télévisuelle, paragraph 1502. 
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Source: Visionary Analytics based on Conférence des régulateurs du secteur des communications électroniques, 
Décision du 29 juin 2018, Analyse des marchés du haut débit et de la radiodiffusion télévisuelle, section 19.8. 
The measure was followed by talks between operators to enter into cooperative arrangements 
that are susceptible to bring about the emergence of situations where three sufficiently 
independent operators would be present in certain areas in the future. However, to date, the 
trigger was not yet matched by any arrangements. How the trigger will be implemented in 
practice is therefore not yet clear.  
One operator suggests very similar criteria to apprehend the effects of commercial agreements 
and the transition from regulated offers to commercial offers740: 
• General level of competition in wholesale markets (e.g. sufficient number of 
independent and competitive wholesale networks) 
• Fair treatment of retailers  
• Enabling retail competition in downstream markets. 
Conversely, another operator advocated that NRA decisions to relieve SMP operators from 
regulatory obligations should be based on actual results that have already materialized rather 
than on only the commitments themselves, because a co-investment announcement does not 
lead to an effective competition by itself741. 
The Belgian NRA’s approach corresponds to the ‘bright-lines’ approach advocated by the 
Berkeley Research Group (BRG): “A bright-lines approach gives a clear statement of the 
conditions that need to be satisfied for a co-investment project to be deemed to be competitive. 
If a project meets these criteria, the bright-lines framework would require an NRA to presume 
that the services are being provided on an effectively competitive basis and therefore no 
regulation is required. This would allow market participants to understand in advance whether 
or not the project will qualify to be exempted from regulation. This could be confirmed through 
an approval process with the NRA. A bright-lines approach also avoids an open-ended 
commitment to no-regulation because, if the market structure evolved to the extent that it no 
longer met the criteria, the presumption of competition and therefore no-regulation would no 
longer hold. In addition, NRAs would continue to be able to undertake an investigation or 
market review if there was clear evidence that the market was not functioning correctly”742. 
The BRG proposed the following criteria743: 
• Within the relevant market, there are three or more independently controlled networks 
• The co-investment agreement does not unduly discriminate against one or more 
participants or prospective participants in the agreement 
• No undertaking deemed to have SMP in the relevant market has or is expected to have 
more than 50% of the retail market served by networks that rely on the VHC network 
elements built through the co-investment project 
• The co-investment agreement does not have the object or effect of restricting 
competition between participants to the agreement or between any party to the 
agreement and any other provider or potential provider of services in the same relevant 
 
740 An operator’s response to the online survey. 
741 An operator’s response to the online survey. 





market. Such terms or structures could include, for example, ones which had the effect 
of market-sharing, information-sharing, price-fixing or co-ordination of technological 
innovation. 
Co-investment agreements may not be exclusive. This means that other operators may join 
during the lifetime of the project. However, conditions may be different over time, because by 
the time the new co-investor wants to join, the risk of the project failing will have diminished744. 
Moreover, co-investors should be allowed to refuse access to non-co-investors for the higher 
speed access products. 
At the same time, the duration of the regulatory exemptions should be aligned to the duration 
of the project. If the exemption automatically expires after one (or two) review periods, this can 
have a significantly negative effect on the returns of the investment745. 
In general, alternative operators agree with the NRAs about the need for a market review 
before revising remedies since such agreements should be able to produce long-lasting 
positive effects before justifying any relief in regulatory obligations. According to ECTA, “only 
a full market analysis and market testing of any proposed commitments can ensure that a full 
assessment is made as to whether circumstances are sufficiently changed to review SMP 
obligations.”746  
NRAs mentioned two principles which could guide their decision-making on whether a 
cooperative agreement warrants a new market review to decide on a revision of remedies. 
The first principle concerns the impact of the agreement. A non-routine market review should 
only be seriously considered if the effect of the individual agreement on the relevant market is 
regarded to be of a structural nature, meaning a significant and long-term impact on the 
competitive environment. In practical terms, however, BEREC notes that the actual impact of 
a commercial agreement/cooperative agreement on the relevant market is typically hard to 
determine. It is not always possible to foresee clearly and in the short term that a particular 
agreement is of such significance that it will fundamentally change the market situation 
identified and examined in the market analysis. This view is echoed by an operator who 
stresses that wholesale competition needs to emerge before any drastic deregulatory 
interventions are made747. 
The second principle concerns the characteristics of the agreement. Elements to be taken 
into account: 
• Degree of reliability/binding force – only agreements with a high degree of reliability 
and binding force could be considered to trigger a non-routine revision of the market 
analysis. BEREC in particular points to binding commitments when referring to the 
degree of reliability. 
• Parties to the agreement – when the SMP undertaking enters into an agreement with 
a competitor, this should only lead to an extraordinary review of the market analysis in 
 
744 Felipe Flórez Duncan (2019), “EU broadband: co-investing in a faster future”, Oxera, September 2019, p.2. 
745 Idem, p.3. The author adds “It is therefore important for the regulator to give a clear indication of how the project 
might be regulated beyond the exemption date to allow investors to assess the expected returns of their investment 
with confidence. This is related to the principle that all investments should be regulated in a way that provides 
investors with a ‘fair bet’. 
746 ECTA response to the Targeted Consultation, Q31 
747 An operator’s response to the online survey. 
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specific individual cases. This is because in such cases NRAs do not exclude that the 
SMP undertaking entered into such an agreement at least partly due to regulatory 
pressure. Therefore, the SMP operator must not be given an incentive to prematurely 
trigger a new market analysis ultimately aimed at a reduction of regulatory control just 
by entering into any commercial agreement (which may be terminated at an early 
stage)”748.  
• Type of agreement – contracts on wholesale access conditions are deemed to be less 
likely to structurally affect the competitive environment than agreements concerning 
passive and neutral access (since ANOs in this case are able to act more 
independently).  
• Participation conditions – some NRAs point to the importance of structural rights of 
alternative operators to newly-built infrastructure, or access to this infrastructure under 
long-term conditions and pricing (for instance via IRU). The openness of such 
agreements to various market participants could also point to a condition with potential 
influence on ANOs’ ability to compete. 
BEREC also points to its ‘Guidelines to foster the consistent application of the conditions and 
criteria for assessing co-investments in new very high capacity network elements (Article 76 
(1) and Annex IV EECC)’, from which inspiration could be drawn on the criteria agreements 
should comply with, in particular, the requirement of a fair and reasonable character of the 
commitment. 
Finding 41. Generally, NRAs want to set the bar for the initiation of non-routine market 
reviews relatively high. However, there seems to be some consensus on the criteria that 
cooperative arrangements should fulfil to justify such non-routine reviews. 
Economic advantages of cooperative arrangements 
As noted in Curram et al., “[c]o-investment by rival operators may be used to reduce capital 
costs. A risk in the business case is that capital investment is made but that a response by a 
competitor to overbuild reduces revenues to the point that the investment is unprofitable and 
performs poorly against other options. Co-investment will usually confer advantages of 
lowering capital costs by sharing them, at the expense of reducing revenues through retail 
competition. Risk is reduced through the smaller capital investment required while revenue, 
though lower, will be more predictable”749. Their study provides an assessment on the recent 
relevant literature, discussed below. It shows that economic literature is divided on the chances 
of co-investment arrangements being broadly used by operators. 
Box 10. Review of relevant literature as provided in Cadman et al. (2019) 
Cadman (2019) is sceptical about co-investment, pointing out that whilst operators may 
share risks, they would also share rewards and therefore co-investment is likely to be most 
relevant for capital constrained operators. Abrardi and Cambini (2019) report on a number 
of papers that address this question (including Nitsche and Wiethaus 2011, and Inderst 
and Peitz 2012), but find that “apart from a series of theoretical papers and a single 
 
748 BEREC (2020), BEREC Response to the Targeted consultation on the revision of the Commission’s access 
recommendations, BoR (20) 169, Q28. 
749 Stephen Curram et al. (2019). Study on the determinants of investment in VHCN – a System Dynamics approach: 




laboratory experiment, very few empirical evidences exist on the impact of co-investment 
agreements on ultra-fast broadband deployment” (p. 196). 
Vogelsang (2019) says that there are two outcomes in the literature on co-investment: first 
that it leads to more infrastructure competition than under access regulation and secondly 
that it may lead to collusion and so needs policing by competition authorities. He points out 
that the Code provides for free entry by additional partners in a co-investment, but this will 
only occur if information accumulated after the original investment is positive. In addition, 
he suggests that the regulatory discretion allowed under Art. 74 of the Code increases 
regulatory risk. 
All his concerns notwithstanding, Vogelsang concludes: “If (…) collusion [amongst co-
investment partners] does not occur, co-investment projects should be particularly 
competitive because the forward-looking costs relevant for pricing decisions are close to 
zero. This contrasts with wholesale access-based pricing, where the access charges are 
the opportunity costs relevant for pricing” (Vogelsang 2019, p. 4). 
We can interpret Vogelsang as meaning that co-investment partners who have built their 
own networks face a predominantly fixed cost with minimal variable costs. The marginal 
cost of an additional unit of output is therefore close to zero. By contrast, a purchaser of 
wholesale access buys units of output from a provider and so faces a real cost, which 
would then be passed on to consumers. 
Aimene, Lebourges and Liang (2019) empirically explore the impact of co-investment in 
France on broadband adoption, coverage and competition. (…) Their econometric model 
first examines whether coverage is affected by co-investment. Once they correct for 
selection bias (i.e. selection of municipalities on exogenous economic factors), they find 
co-investment has no significant effect on FTTH coverage. In other words, their model 
suggests that there are no more municipalities that have FTTH as a result of co-investment 
than would have had them anyway, once selection bias is accounted for. 
However, they find that where co-investment takes place, there is a significantly higher rate 
of adoption by consumers. They find that adoption is 7.6% higher (significant at 99%) than 
where it has not taken place. They also find that competition is higher with Orange losing 
a 7.8% market share where there is co-investment, although it is not clear which operators 
are gaining from Orange’s loss. 
Aimene, Lebourges and Liang (2019) is so far the only empirical study on the effects of co-
investment. Until further such studies are conducted we cannot be certain that co-
investment either promotes or constrains investment in VHCNs. 
Source: Richard Cadman et al. (2019), Study on the determinants of investment in VHCN – a System Dynamics 
approach: Volume 2: Literature Review, p. 51-52. 
To determine the impact of co-investment on competition and investment, Bourreau et al. 
(2018)750 used a counterfactual or benchmark to “show that compared to a standard access 
regime, co-investment leads to: 
 
750 Bourreau, Marc, Cambini, Carlo and Steffen Hoernig (2018). Cooperative Investment, Access, and Uncertainty. 
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 56, 78-106, quoted in Bourreau, S., Hoernig, S., & Maxwell W. 
(2020). Implementing co-investment and network sharing. Centre on Regulation in Europe, Report, May 2020, p.21. 
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• Increased total coverage, and hence, expansion of the “grey areas” towards costlier 
areas: this is because, in the costlier areas, the entrant will not co-invest, increasing 
the return of covering these costly areas for the incumbent compared to the benchmark 
with access. 
• Expansion of the areas with service-based competition (“black areas”) if the access 
price is not set too high by the regulator in the counterfactual with access: this is 
because, while competition is slightly stronger with co-investment as it is with regulated 
access, due to a very low implicit access price, the deployment costs are shared in the 
former case, which makes it profitable to expand black areas. 
• Lower prices for consumers in “black areas”: this is because, with co-investment, the 
implicit access price is equal to the marginal cost of access, and typically lower than 
the regulated access price in the benchmark situation”. 
Francesco Castelli751, comparing data from Cullen-International on co-investment initiatives 
(October 2019) in the five most populated EU countries with the FTTH penetration finds a 
positive correlation and suggests that co-investment projects in Spain, Portugal and France 
are among the drivers of high FTTH coverage. 












Take-up (fixed, at 
least 100 Mbps, 
2019) 
ES 6 7%-16% 4 CFO, 2 SD 89% 52.9% 
PT 4 10%-52% 4 SD 83% 55.8% 
FR 4 10%-37% 1 SD; 3 CFO 43.8% 17.4% 
IT 1 12% 1 JD 30% 13.4% 
DE 4 4%-n.a. 2 CFO; 1 JD; 
1SD 
32.7% 20.6% 
Source: TIM Group (2019) Co-investment or wholesale-only: Which model will spur more incentives to invest? 
Francesco Castelli FSR Conference – Florence, 13 December 2019 “The EECC and its impact on investment in 
very high capacity networks (VHCN)”, available at: https://fsr.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Francesco-
CASTELLI_Co-.investment_TIM.pdf; data in the source is taken from Cullen International October 2019; DESI index 
data. 
Note: VHCN category covers FTTH, FTTB and Cable Docsis 3.1. 
 
Moreover, as the BGR notes “(…) co-investment also has the potential to increase the 
effectiveness of competition in the market for fixed-line services. This is because co-
investment lowers the barriers to entry for new infrastructure players which creates more end-
to-end network competition and could result in a more competitive wholesale market”752. 
Finding 42. Operators say that they entered into cooperative arrangement for economic 
benefits, rather than for hypothetical regulatory relief. However, economic literature 
provides very little empirical evidence of the impact of co-investment agreements on ultra-
fast broadband deployment. 
 
 
751 TIM Group (2019) “Co-investment or wholesale-only: Which model will spur more incentives to invest?”, 
Francesco Castelli FSR Conference – Florence, 13 December 2019 “The EECC and its impact on investment in 
very high capacity networks (VHCN)”, available at: https://fsr.eui.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Francesco-
CASTELLI_Co-.investment_TIM.pdf  




How can NRAs foster cooperative arrangements?  
According to Curram et al. “(…) regulation may (…) encourage or enforce co-investment. In 
Portugal, where the wholesale obligation to allow access to FTTP networks (above copper 
speeds) was not imposed, co-investment became the feasible route for some alternative 
operators that previously were retail only to gain access to the market and retain market share 
(more recently non-obligated wholesale access has become available to other operators). In 
less densely populated regions of France there is a regulatory requirement for an operator to 
announce the intention to roll-out an FTTP network and allow other operators to co-invest in 
5% allotments (it is also possible to invest after installation) in order to gain access to the 
infrastructure (see Aimene, Lebourges & Liang, 201837). In Spain’s non-competitive areas, 
co-investment agreements were struck immediately on regulatory imposition of access to 
FTTP in 2016”753. Ilsa Godlovitch and Sonia Strube Martins also consider754 that the 
experience in France, Spain and Portugal shows that “in the absence of regulation, reciprocal 
access arrangements or other forms of commercial co-investment or wholesaling can emerge 
to ensure choice in retail services”. Conversely, where regulated access is in place, room for 
negotiating commercial agreements may be limited, as Telekom Italia, observed: “to date the 
conclusion of commercial access agreements have been difficult to arise due to the strict ex 
ante regulation based on the cost orientation of wholesale access services”755. 
Thus, there is evidence that the lack of access to SMP-regulated products on a reasonable 
basis can lead operators to conclude commercial agreements. This was also the case 
particularly in Germany, where more than one alternative operator noted that wholesale prices 
to regulated products offered by the SMP were too high. Therefore, operators entered into 
commercial agreements as they were the only viable alternative756. A similar situation occurred 
in Cyprus, where the regulated VULA product proved to be too costly to use (there were too 
many points to interconnect to ANOs, creating very high backhauling costs), which led to the 
provision of a different VULA product on a commercial basis between the SMP operator and 
ANOs757.  
However, tools are available to NRAs in promoting the conclusion of agreements. First and 
foremost, they can do so by acknowledging the benefits of such initiatives. This is 
elaborated by Proximus (see Box 11 below). 
Box 11. Proximus insight into expectations for the regulators regarding assessment of 
cooperative agreements 
Proximus acknowledges the benefits of cooperative agreements to foster large-scale and 
efficient VHCN deployment, yet expects the following from a regulator in relation to 
cooperative agreements758: 
 
753 Stephen Curram et al. (2019). Study on the determinants of investment in VHCN – a System Dynamics approach: 
Volume 1: Technical Report, November 2019, p. 38 
754 WIK-Consult (2019), Prospective competition and deregulation, An analysis of European approaches to 
regulating full fibre, 28 February 2019, p.32. 
755 Telecom Italia response to the Targeted Consultation, Q28. 
756 Online survey results as well as case study interviews. 
757 Case study interviews. 
758 Proximus response to the online survey. 
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• That regulators in general acknowledge the beneficial impact of such initiatives on 
the competitive market dynamics, and allow for an open investment climate, which 
means acknowledging the need for positive perspectives on return on investment 
for such investors. A rigid, un-flexible and severe wholesale pricing regime, to the 
contrary, would dissuade such investors to take the investment risk, in Proximus’ 
view. 
• That regulators take due account of such initiatives when carrying out the three 
criteria test in their market reviews (which should lead to the withdrawal of ex ante 
regulation where the test is not passed in the footprint of the arrangement).  
• That regulators take due account of such initiatives in the context of the assessment 
of the presence of effective infrastructure-based competition; namely that creation 
of a network infrastructure with non-discriminatory access could bring about the 
same effects upon the market as infrastructure. In this case, Proximus also points 
towards the expectation of the lifting of ex ante price control regulation. 
Source: Online survey data. 
An SMP operator currently negotiating its first major co-investment agreement in the market 
has also noted that setting a precedent on how such co-investment deals are treated within 
market analyses is important, as it also sends signals for potential future deals759.  
Finding 43. There is evidence that the absence of regulatory obligations leads to 
cooperative arrangements. Conversely, according to some operators, NRAs could foster 








9. Geographic dimension of regulation, in particular regarding 
the geographic segmentation of remedies  
a. Summary of findings 
The number of NRAs that differentiate remedies geographically is limited so far. Moreover, the 
scope of the differentiation and approaches differs among them substantially. In the future, 
there might even be less scope for differentiated remedies if NRAs follow the more granular 
approach to the geographic market definitions advocated by the 2018 SMP guidelines and the 
2020 Recommendation on Relevant Markets.  
However, a geographic segmentation of remedies is likely to be used increasingly for ‘fine 
tuning’ remedies according to geographical differences in competitive constraints that the SMP 
operator is facing in the same geographical market. 
NRAs overwhelmingly support the usage of similar criteria for the geographic segmentation of 
remedies and the definition of distinct sub-national markets, though some advocate that more 
case-specific criteria should also be used for the segmentation of remedies to better reflect 
differences in competitive dynamics within a market in which an operator has been designated 
as having SMP.  
While the assessment must be prospective, or forward-looking, under the competition law 
methodology used for the definition of subnational markets760, NRAs currently segmenting 
remedies do not base segmentation on a prospective analysis, but on the current status of 
competition in the market. 
Stakeholders advocate an assessment of cost as well as of benefits before implementing a 
geographic segmentation of remedies because segmentation is likely to increase 
administrative costs and to reduce predictability for access seekers. 
b. Introduction 
Regulation of Markets 3a/2014 and 3b/2014 has a geographic dimension because the situation 
within national markets may vary greatly across different countries. While, overall, an operator 
may have a SMP in a Member State, it may not necessarily be justified to subject this operator 
to the same remedies nationwide, even when the scope of the SMP operator's network is 
national761. Indeed, competitive constraints increasingly vary due to the deployment of 
alternative infrastructures. In many instances, it will nevertheless not yet be possible to 
conclude that the relevant areas constitute distinct geographic markets because the SMP 
operator does not yet face appreciably different conditions of competition to a degree that its 
activities are constrained in some areas but not in others. An indication, which is not sufficient 
by itself to conclude that a market is national762, would be that despite these geographically 
 
760 As required in Point 25 of the 2018 SMP guidelines. 
761 In the case of Sweden, the Commission objected to a finding that the geographical market was national because 
the NRA had not established that ANO’s services in different areas constituted a real alternative source of supply 
because in Sweden, contrary to other Member States, the (fibre) network footprint of the incumbent operator is no 
longer national (Commission's serious doubts of 6 December 2019 in case SE/2019/2216, p.12). 
762 In Case SE/2019/2216, the Commission observed that „While PTS presents some evidence that Telia acts 
uniformly within the areas in which it is present with its fibre network, the analysis does not sufficiently take into 
account the actual boundaries of Telia’s network.“ 
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limited competing networks, the SMP operator continues to act uniformly across its network 
area, as reflected by national pricing by the SMP operator. However, such constraints may 
justify lighter access remedies in areas where an alternative infrastructure has been deployed, 
such as moving from cost orientation to ‘non excessive’ pricing obligations, leaving access 
seekers the choice between negotiating with the SMP operator or with the operator or 
operators that deployed the alternative infrastructures concerned. 
If NRAs follow the more granular approach to geographic market definitions advocated by the 
2018 SMP guidelines and the 2020 Recommendation on Relevant Markets, there might be 
less scope for differentiated remedies. Differentiated remedies will nonetheless remain 
relevant in particular for ‘fine tuning’ remedies according to geographical differences in 
competitive constraints that the SMP operator is facing in the same geographical market, for 
example where an alternative infrastructure is being deployed, but the NRA is reluctant in 
differentiating markets based on prospective infrastructure competition or where competitive 
constraints do not suffice in certain areas to conclude the absence of SMP (and the removal 
of all asymmetric access obligations) but where remedy differentiation is justified.  
Provisions concerned 
• Article 64(3) EECC (use of competition law methodology to define geographic markets) 
in combination with recital 172 regarding geographic segmentation of remedies. 
• Article 68.6 EECC requires NRAs to consider the impact of new market developments, 
such as in relation to commercial agreements, including co-investment agreements, 
influencing competitive dynamics. 
• Recital 172 reminds us that “[…] even if such differences do not result in the definition 
of distinct geographic markets, they should be able to justify differentiation in the 
appropriate remedies imposed in light of the differing intensity of competitive 
constraints”. 
• Recital 179 EECC: “When assessing the proportionality of the obligations and 
conditions to be imposed, NRAs should take into account the different competitive 
conditions existing in the different areas within their Member States” 
• The 2018 SMP guidelines763 provide guidance as to when opting for remedies 
segmentation instead of market segmentation. 
• The BEREC Common Position on geographical aspects of market analysis (definition 
and remedies) of 5 June 2014764 also provides guidance to the NRAs. 
• The Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the 2020 Recommendation on 
Relevant Markets765 that “differentiation at the level of remedies should be limited to 
 
763 “If regional differences are found, but not considered to be sufficient to warrant different geographic markets or 
SMP findings, NRAs may pursue geographically differentiated remedies (43). The stability of the differentiation — 
specifically the degree to which the boundary of the competitive area can be clearly identified and remains 
consistent over time — is the key to distinguishing between a geographical segmentation at market-definition level 
and remedy segmentation”, OJ C159 of 7.5.2018, p.8, Point 50.  
764 In particular in Point 165 “(…) where the available evidence suggests that the scope of the relevant market is 
national (any differences in the conditions of competition between geographical areas are not yet sufficiently stable 
or sustainable to justify the definition of regional or local markets), market power will have to be assessed within 
this national market. In case of geographical variations in competitive conditions within this national market, it may 
be appropriate to vary remedies within that national market, despite the fact that an operator is found to have SMP 
throughout the entire territory”. 
765 See in particular p.19. The guidance in the relevant section relates nevertheless mainly to the criteria to be used 




less significant or less stable variations of competitive conditions (…). It might, for 
instance, be used by NRAs for a periodical or punctual update of remedies in 
accordance with Article 68(6) of the Code. The market review may foresee such 
reviews and the criteria to be used for that purpose” 
• Point 9 NGA Recommendation states that NRAs should examine differences in 
conditions of competition in different geographical areas in order to determine whether 
the definition of sub-national geographic markets or the imposition of differentiated 
remedies are warranted. In case the conditions of competition are not stable and/or 
substantial, NRAs should monitor whether the deployment of NGA networks and the 
subsequent evolution of competitive conditions within a geographically defined market 
warrant the imposition of differentiated remedies. 
• Point 50 and Annex II766 NDCM Recommendation provide some examples of the ways 
in which differences in geographical areas can be addressed at the remedies stage. It 
says among other things that NRAs should differentiate the regulation within 
geographical markets, which includes removing price control, in cases where only in 
certain areas of the national market has retail competition emerged from the effective 
infrastructure-based competition and when EoI been implemented by the SMP operator 
offering wholesale access allowing technical replicability of its flagship offers (see 
chapter 5). An NRA can address this either by defining sub-national geographic 
markets or by imposing differentiated remedies, if a definition of a sub-national 
geographic market is not justified. 
Differentiation of remedies will typically be foreseen in market reviews in order to capture 
expected market evolutions that have not yet fully materialized. When NRAs consider including 
geographical segmentation of remedies in their market reviews, they will have to address the 
following questions: 
• On which grounds and with which objectives should remedies be differentiated 
geographically?  
• What will be the trigger? 
• On which parameters should remedies be differentiated geographically? 
• What are the drawbacks of the geographic segmentation of remedies (risk 
assessment)? 
To identify possible best practices, we will first examine the approaches of the NRAs that apply 
geographic segmentation of remedies or define sub-national geographic markets. 
c. Application of geographic segmentation of remedies as opposed to 
sub-national geographic markets 
BEREC notes that “geographic segmentation is an increasingly relevant aspect for the market 
analyses carried out by European NRAs for markets 3a, 3b and 4”767. The 2020 BEREC report 
 
766 More specifically, Annex II, which deals with the economic replicability test, states that NRAs may need to adapt 
the test according to the differences in the competition conditions detected at the geographical level, e.g. to take 
into account the fact that what is deemed to be the most relevant NGA access input needed to perform the test may 
be different in rural and densely populated areas. 
767 BEREC (2020), BEREC Response to the Targeted consultation on the revision of the Commission’s access 
recommendations, BoR (20) 169, Q39. 
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on Regulatory Accounting768 indicates that Belgium, France, Denmark, Italy and Spain apply 
geographic segmentation of remedies to at least some extent in Market 3a/2014. In Market 3b, 
only Belgium, France, Italy and Slovenia do this. Thus, there are a limited number of countries 
that are segmenting the remedies geographically. In addition to them, Cyprus, Hungary, 
Finland and Poland use market segmentation to account for the geographic variation in Market 
3a/2014, while Germany, Spain, Finland, Hungary, Ireland, Poland and Portugal do so in 
Market 3b/2014. 
The definition of geographic markets is dealt extensively in the Commission Staff Working 
Document accompanying the document Communication from the Commission Guidelines on 
market analysis and the assessment of significant market power under the EU regulatory 
framework for electronic communications networks and services769. In this report, we therefore 
only cover the geographic segmentation of remedies. Table 31 lists the geographic 
segmentation of remedies of NGA access products currently applied by NRAs. 























Remedies DK BE, IT BE, ES, 
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Source: BEREC (20) 210 and own research in italics.  
The differentiated remedies, the criteria for geographical differentiation and the approaches of 
the nine770 NRAs applying geographic differentiation of remedies vary, including in defining the 
geographic units771. Indeed, while some NRAs use administrative geographical units, others 
take into account the network topology. 
Finding 44. The number of NRAs that differentiate remedies geographically is limited so 
far. Scope of the differentiation and approaches differ among them substantially. 
 
The reasons and objectives for differentiating the remedies geographically 
It will often not be possible based on competition law methodology to conclude the absence of 
a SMP in any of the sub-national geographical markets that can be distinguished based on the 
level of competitive constraints. In this case, the geographical differentiation of remedies is a 
tool in the hands of NRAs allowing for a better targeting of remedies imposed in terms of the 
competitive environment in a particular area (“limited to less significant or less stable variations 
 
768 BoR (20), 210. 
769 Brussels, 27.4.2018, SWD(2018) 124 final 
770 AGCOM, BIPT, BNetzA, CNMC, ComReg, OCECPR, DBA (in market 3a/2014), AGCOM, ARCEP, BIPT, DBA 
in Market 3b/2014 and ARCEP and ANACOM in Market 2/2020. 
771 The explanatory note to the Recommendation on Relevant Markets refers to the following criteria that help 
identify the units: “NRAs should ensure that this unit: (a) is of an appropriate size, i.e. small enough to avoid 
significant variations of competitive conditions within each unit but big enough to avoid a resource-intensive and 
burdensome micro-analysis that could lead to market fragmentation, (b) is able to reflect the network structure of 




of competitive conditions”772), even if it is considered that an incumbent operator has a SMP 
nationally (or in a sub-national market, as is the case with the rest of Italy773). 
An example of a driver/grounds for differentiating remedies is the difference between densely 
populated urban areas and less dense rural locales where the deployment of competing VHCN 
networks is more challenging and less likely. Given that alternative operators will, for cost 
reasons, continue to be dependent on wholesale access to the SMP network, these areas will 
likely require stricter remedies, for example, a cost orientation instead of an ERT. Conversely, 
in urbanised areas where alternative operators have a business case for deploying competing 
infrastructures, a cost orientation may have an adverse effect on their investment incentives, 
given that if alternative operators invest in the infrastructure, they may face competition on the 
retail market of access-based service providers, depressing retail prices and profit margins. In 
those areas, a wholesale margin squeeze test may be more appropriate to guarantee investors 
that the SMP operator will not price bitstream access too low. 
The method for differentiating the remedies geographically 
The segmentation of remedies aims to reflect differences in the competitive conditions 
between areas altough these differences may in some case be insufficient to justify a market 
differentiation.  Such differentiation will in particular contribute to the regulatory objective of 
Article 3 EECC, including VHCN connectivity, when it incentivises investments that are not yet 
implemented (and may never materialize in the absence of the perspective of remedy 
differentiation). The criteria used for the segmentation need therefore to reflect prospectively 
likely market developments. Such prospective criteria can be:  
a) The (prospective) number of competing networks 
b) The (prospective) distribution of market shares 
c) A preliminary analysis of (prospective) pricing and price differences at the regional level  
d) Prospective behavioural patterns. 
NRAs generally use the criteria listed in the Explanatory Note to the Recommendation of 
Relevant Markets774 for the assessment of the geographical dimension of market definitions, 
but some also use other criteria. 
a) NRAs using criteria listed in the Explanatory note 
The Belgian NRA segments access obligations (see Box 10) on the basis of the presence of 
at least three sufficiently independent NGA operators (providing services over an infrastructure 
 
772 SWD, Explanatory note accompanying the document Commission Recommendation on relevant product and 
service markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with 
Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the 
European Electronic Communications Code. 
773 Two different geographic markets are defined in Markets 3a/2014 and 3b/2014: Municipality of Milan and Rest 
of Italy. 
774 SWD, Explanatory note accompanying the document Commission Recommendation on relevant product and 
service markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with 
Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the 
European Electronic Communications Code. 
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offering speeds of 30 Mbps and above, and where there is no or a maximum of one NGA 
infrastructure. 
The Italian NRA differentiated remedies in municipalities matching the following indicators: 
• Number of network alternative operators and their coverage: where at least two 
alternative access networks (FTTC or FTTH) are available, each of which covers 60% 
of customer premises. 
• The combined coverage of both alternative networks is not less than 75% 
• The SMP operator’s retail NGA market share (by connections) is ≤40% 
• The SMP operator’s wholesale NGA active services (VULA and bitstream) is < 80%. 
The Danish NRA withdrew an obligation to provide access to fibre in 56 postcodes (totalling 
274,619 households) based on criteria (a) and (b), i.e., where the following criteria are met 
cumulatively: 
(i) The SMP operator had a market share below 40 % in the previous year or a projected 
market share below 40 % in the subsequent775 year. 
(ii) At least 75 % of households in the postal code area must be covered by at least 2 
alternative infrastructures. 
(iii) The areas must include more than 25,000 addresses either individually or combined in 
a cluster of areas. 
The Spanish NRA did not require776 the SMP operator to offer VULA (layer 2 Ethernet 
wholesale broadband service over fibre) in the 66 so-called ultra-fast broadband (UFB) 
municipalities. These are municipalities matching both retail competition and NGA deployment 
criteria: 
• With regard to retail competition, in case the following two criteria are fulfilled:  
(i) Presence of at least 2 alternative operators operating either by means of their own 
infrastructure or of LLU access, having a market share of at least 10%. 
(ii) Telefonica's market share in the same area is below 50%.  
• Regarding prospective NGA deployment, when: 
(i) There are at least 3 NGA networks (FTTH or HFC) deployed 
(ii) Each of the NGA network has coverage of at least 20%. When a MDF fulfils all the 
above criteria (retail competition plus NGA deployment) it is considered to be an 
Ultra-Fast Broadband MDF and the municipalities containing at least one of those 
UFB MDF are considered UFB municipalities. 
 
775 In its Comments letter of 6 July 2017 in Case DK/2017/1993, the Commission says that the Danish NRA 
“considers it appropriate to use a projection that does not exceed the [subsequent year] because in its view fibre 
deployment is made stepwise. In other words, an area which has undergone a fibre upgrade in one period is likely 
to experience low activity in the next period. For this reason, it is only possible to project deployments for a short 
period of time, and in DBA's view not beyond [subsequent year]” (footnote 9). 




Nonetheless, the Spanish NRA does not operate geographical segmentation based on 
administrative borders but reviewed per local switch (MDF). 758 switches matched the above 
criteria. 
NRAs overwhelmingly support the usage of criteria for the geographic differentiation of 
remedies similar to those for the definition of distinct sub-national markets (19 responses out 
of 20)777. The main arguments for such a position can be summarised as follows778: 
• Differentiating geographic markets and differentiation remedies within a market pursue 
the same aim, i.e. to address the of variation in the competitive environment in different 
geographically defined units. Therefore, similar criteria should be used in both cases. 
• The main drivers of regional variation in the competitive environment are similar (e.g. 
infrastructure, market shares, etc.) and, therefore, the criteria should also be similar. 
• Using the same criteria would provide greater clarity to market players, in particular as 
regards the levels of competitive conditions that would trigger a differentiation of 
remedies and levels of competitive conditions that would trigger a differentiation of sub-
national markets. 
NRAs tend to see similar criteria as necessary because the coverage of network(s) deployed 
by alternative operator(s), market shares, and the number of providers active on the retail 
market are key indicators of competitive constraints. Some comments stressed that market 
share plays an especially important role, with several suggestions that it should be the main 
criterion.  
Conversely, alternative operators question some of the criteria arguing that779: 
• The number of retail service providers is not necessarily relevant, especially if these 
providers use the wholesale products of an SMP operator. 
• A deeper analysis of each criterion might be needed (rather than superficial evaluation) 
in order to fully grasp the competitive situation in a geographically defined area. 
• Assessment of the competitive environment can be highly individualised and vary from 
case to case. 
Finding 45. NRAs overwhelmingly support the use of similar criteria for the geographic 
differentiation of remedies and the definition of distinct sub-national markets. 
 
Some NRAs suggested that in specific cases additional criteria could complement the above-
mentioned criteria and that national conditions may justify prioritizing certain criteria above 
others.  
The following possible further criteria were suggested: 
• Assessment of vertical integration 
 
777 Based on the online survey data.  
778 Summarised based on the responses to the online survey and the Targeted Consultation. 
779 Based on the online survey data. 
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• Households without Internet access780  
• Number of service providers in the retail market 
Finding 46. Some NRAs consider that beyond the criteria used for geographic market 
delineation, more case-specific criteria should be used to better reflect differences in the 
competitive dynamics within the market in which an operator has been designated as 
having SMP. 
 
b) NRAs using criteria not listed in the Explanatory Note 
The Cypriot NRA differentiated obligations in urban and rural areas, where the mandated 
provision of LLU was waived, if the SMP operator offered instead a virtual access product with 
equivalent characteristics based on vectoring. Conversely, in urban areas, the SMP operator 
is only allowed to introduce vectoring in agreement with the alternative operators781. 
The Irish NRA differentiates pricing remedies for pole, duct and dark fibre access, depending 
on the geographic area. The maximum annual price per metre of sub duct and per metre of 
dark fibre is differentiated between duct access in Dublin exchanges and duct access in 
provincial exchanges782 while different price caps are set for pole access in the ‘modified LEA’ 
(i.e. in the footprint of urban exchanges) and outside of the modified LEA (i.e. in the footprint 
of the rural exchanges).  
In 2016, the German NRA only required the SMP operator to offer VULA in the ‘near areas’ 
and for those street cabinets outside near areas783 in cases Deutsche Telekom would withdraw 
previously granted copper access. In fact, the NRA only mandated VULA where it assumed 
that access seekers would be interested in such access. In addition, the NRA defined different 
rules on vectoring outside and inside the near areas. 
In Finland (where there are many SMP operators, each covering geographic areas of different 
sizes), the NRA uses the size of the SMP operator as criterion. It imposed price caps only on 
the three largest SMP operators as regards wholesale local access. The Finnish case is 
nonetheless not fully comparable to the others since none of the remedies imposed on any of 
the SMP operators is segmented for a single SMP operator, but the differentiation is instead 
between the SMP operators.  
How to design the trigger? 
a) Prospective or not? 
Different criteria are used by NRAs to trigger the geographic differentiation of remedies. 
 
780 Suggestion by an NRA, likely referring to adapting remedies in such areas so as to make investments by the 
SMP operator more attractive. 
781 Commission Comments of 27.07.2016 concerning Case CY/2016/1882-1883, footnote 25. 
782 Comreg, Pricing of Eir’s Wholesale Fixed Access Services: Response to Consultation Document 15/67 and Final 
Decision, Decision D03/16, 18 May 2016, p.22 and 24..  
783 Defined as areas outside of 550 meter wire length starting from the serving main distribution frame (MDF). See 
Fourberg, Niklas; Korff, Alex (2020), “Fiber vs. vectoring: Limiting technology choices in broadband expansion”, 





In Belgium784, the NRA has set the following criteria which, if fulfilled, will trigger the 
differentiation: 
• At least three sufficiently independent NGA operators (providing services over an 
infrastructure offering speeds of 30 Mbps and above) are present in an area 
corresponding to a statistical unit (administrative unit below that of municipalities). 
• At least 50% of households can access services from three different NGA operators. 
A second trigger has been defined by the Belgian NRA: the deployment of an NGA 
infrastructure by an SMP operator in areas which are currently covered by no more than one 
NGA infrastructure785. 
In Italy, the NRA identified municipalities (‘competitive municipalities’) within the geographic 
market that were deemed non-competitive and where an SMP operator was designated. The 
aim was to avoid over-regulating areas where competition was emerging, but where 
competition was not yet considered effective enough to conclude that the areas were part of a 
distinct geographic market. The triggering criteria could thus be described as a type of ‘below 
dominance’ criteria. These criteria are: 
1. Coverage of alternative networks: presence of (at least) two alternative access 
networks (FTTC or FTTH) each of which covers 60% of customers' premises. The total 
coverage (of both alternative networks) must not be less than 75%.  
2. TIM's retail NGA market share (by connections) must be less or equal to 40%. 
3. TIM's wholesale NGA active services (VULA and bitstream) share must be less than 
80%.  
These criteria led to the identification of 26 competitive municipalities where no cost orientation 
obligation was imposed. 
In neither the Belgian nor the Italian cases was geographic segmentation implemented based 
on future deployments. This contrasts with the competition law methodology used by NRAs to 
define sub-national markets, which must be forward-looking, as “ex ante regulation addresses 
the lack of effective competition that is expected to persist over a time horizon in accordance 
with the duration of the review period”786. Expected or foreseeable market developments must 
be considered. For example, an NRA reports already taking future infrastructure roll-out into 
account when carrying out a market analysis787.  
Most NRAs replying to the question788 (16 out of 21) say that prospective infrastructure 
competition should be considered in addition to existing infrastructure competition for the sake 
 
784 Assessed by the Commission under Cases BE/2018/2073 and BE/2018/2074. 
785 The situation in Belgium is somewhat distinct because both access to the incumbent’s network and the FTC 
operator’s networks are regulated on respectively Markets 3b1/2014 and 3b2/2014. The measure aims to promote 
consumer choice in areas where only one of both provides high speed broadband.  
786 Commission Staff working Document, Accompanying the document Commission Recommendation on relevant 
product and service markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in 
accordance with Directive (EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 
establishing the European Electronic Communications Code p. 9. 
787 An NRA response to the online survey. 
788 Online survey data. 
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of geographic differentiation789. This should not be misunderstood. In the case of segmentation 
of remedies, no ex ante definition of geographic boundaries is required. Indeed, geographic 
segmentation of remedies enables NRAs to address the main problem faced when defining a 
sub-national market, i.e. that network deployment “is hardly predictable and very inaccurate 
information as the situation, operator's plans can change quickly”790, a problem also flagged 
by an NRA, which acknowledges that “information about the future availability of alternative 
infrastructures, based on declarations of operators […] cannot be the main elements to 
motivate the identification of geographical markets and/or of a geographical segmentation of 
remedies”791. Or, as Open Fiber says: contestability is not sufficient to determine 
competitiveness in a geographic area and NRAs should go for a gradual deregulation, allowing 
the entrant to build a position, so as not to reduce the competition by dropping the regulation 
too suddenly792. In the same vein, other stakeholders recall that793: 
• Deployment of infrastructure needs significant time for the effects to materialise  
• Time needed for a new operator to establish itself is significant and the mere fact of 
establishment may not be sufficient 
Remedy segmentation enables NRAs to determine a priori ‘triggers’ in their market review, 
which if and once fulfilled will lead to a differentiation of remedies in areas where access over 
new infrastructures is effectively offered. As an NRA notes, segmentation or remedies allows 
“to consider prospective dynamic stemming from new network deployment or upgrades in the 
context of regulatory obligations, especially in situations when the period between regular 
market reviews were extended to 5 years, NRAs should [foresee mechanisms in their market 
analysis and remedies decisions] which will allow them to adjust remedies imposed under the 
pre-determined criteria set for the market or remedies segmentation by using up-to-date data 
about (alternative) infrastructure coverage”794, i.e. actual data, not prospective data. 
Finding 47. While a majority of NRAs advocate using similar criteria for the geographic 
segmentation of remedies to those used for the definition of subnational markets, the 
NRAs’ currently segmenting remedies do not do this based on a prospective analysis, but 
on the effectively materialized triggering criteria. 
 
b) ‘Self-executing’ or not? 
A second aspect is when the differentiation is triggered. While some respondents did not have 
specific comments or suggestions on how such a process could work, several others 
suggested that automatically updating areas susceptible to the geographic differentiation of 
remedies would not be a good solution. An NRA noted that the approach “is always an 
individual assessment based on a number of criteria”795, while another NRA said that the 
fulfilment of criteria “has to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis”796. Moreover, yet another 
NRA identified the legal difficulty of automatic adaptations of geographic segments: “such 
 
789 The question did however not ask the NRAs whether they saw a difference in the case of geographic 
segmentation of remedies as opposed to geographic market definition. 
790 An NRA response to the online survey. 
791 An NRA response to the online survey. 
792 Open Fiber response to the Targeted Consultation, Q38. 
793 Based on the online survey data. 
794 An NRA response to the online survey. 
795 An NRA response to online survey. 




conditions are usually not allowed as part of the remedies in [the country] (the obligations have 
to be defined precisely, so that no additional proceeding is necessary for their interpretation - 
according to a court ruling)”797. Therefore, updates should always require at least the explicit 
confirmation by the NRA that the criteria have been fulfilled, i.e. an administrative decision 
susceptible to appeal by stakeholders concerned. 
At the same time, the specific timing of an NRA assessment whether criteria are fulfilled is 
desirable.  For example, Telecom Italia, invoking regulatory certainty, suggests that “it would 
be better that the criteria are set in the market analysis and applied at least annually in order 
to review/withdraw remedies accordingly”798. 
On which parameters should remedies be differentiated geographically? 
Geographic segmentation of remedies allows NRAs to fine-tune their regulatory approach for 
areas where competition is adequate to allow “the market to work by itself under a lighter set 
of obligations, while ensuring competition at the retail level for non-competitive or less 
competitive areas via additional obligations aimed to ensure availability of wholesale inputs to 
alternative actors not in a position to self-supply their own wholesale services”799. This is 
echoed by several other stakeholders. For example, Liberty Global states that “in a single 
geographic market, there may be justification to differentiate inter and intra regions (for 
example, between urban and rural areas where the level of competition differs), all taking into 
account the principles of appropriateness and proportionality”800. 
A second difference between the definition of sub-national geographic markets and geographic 
segmentation of remedies is that in the latter case: (i) there will always be an operator 
designated as having SMP in the area – which is not necessarily the case in sub-national 
markets - and (ii) given that the ‘geographic segments’ will not be deemed competitive, all 
segments will continue to be regulated. 
For example, in the case of Belgium, while pricing obligations will no longer apply in geographic 
segments fulfilling the criteria set in the 2018 market review, the following SMP obligations will 
still apply to the SMP operator:  
i. The obligation to negotiate in good faith  
ii. Access to duct splice, splint or failing this, dark fibre 
iii. Access intended to serve non-residential multi-site customers 
iv. Transparency measures related to the evolution of the network. 
In parallel, access obligation on legacy copper access (LLU) will also remain. 
 
797 An NRA response to online survey. 
798 Telecom Italia response to the Targeted Consultation, Q41. 
799 BEREC (2020), BEREC Response to the Targeted consultation on the revision of the Commission’s access 
recommendations, BoR (20) 169, Q39. 
800 Liberty Global response to the Targeted Consultation, Q39. 
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What are possible drawbacks of the geographic segmentation of remedies (risk 
assessment)? 
Segmentation of remedies could potentially increase the complexity of the geographic 
structure of remedies. For example, the Hungarian NRA expressed concern that since the 
country has six markets (three regulated with one SMP operator present and three deregulated 
with no SMP operators present), “geographic differentiation of remedies would further segment 
the market that would lead to highly fragmented regulation which would be difficult to manage 
both for market players and for the NRA”801. 
More specifically, the following risks were identified802: 
• Variation of remedies in different geographic locales could create additional costs for 
the operators when complying. 
• Unpredictable regulatory changes if adjustments are made in between market reviews. 
As BEREC notes in its response to the targeted consultation, an SMP operator in Poland was 
subject to more than one set of remedies identified in 2011 in Market 3b. Due to the high 
compliance costs, a decision was made to a single reference offer that would adhere to the 
strictest set of requirements. Thus, only one set of remedies (the strictest) was implemented 
de facto by the SMP operator. Even if the lighter remedies in specific areas might have 
decreased the constraints of the SMP operators, the latter considered that overall, making use 
of the differentiation did not justify the costs associated with differentiating reference offers803. 
As regards the predictability of regulatory obligations, BEREC notes that “the possibility of 
changing remedies without a proper market analysis should be handled carefully to secure 
predictability and certainty of ex ante regulation”804. Market players need time to prepare for 
any possible changes. Vodafone notes that ”deviating from this new source of predictability 
[i.e. 5 years review cycles] would require a very thorough analysis. This type of remedies 
review could, in our view, introduce a non-systematic decision making without proper analytical 
evidence (in case the remedies could be changed without a new market analysis)“805. Other 
operators that are also active on the retail high quality market contend that the geographic 
segmentation of remedies should be avoided because a nationwide access under 
homogeneous access conditions is necessary to compete effectively on this market, given that 
large businesses tend to be present in multiple locations. However, NRAs tend to disagree 
with such a position, maintaining that this should not justify a different approach towards the 
geographic segmentation of remedies on a high-quality market (13 vs. 5 responding NRAs)806. 
The burden of implementation will also be felt by NRAs. As noted by one NRA in the online 
survey, the data collection processes would have to be frequent to allow for a rapid reaction to 
changes in the competitive environment807.  
Even where market data would suggest that a segmentation of remedies might be warranted, 
NRAs do not always consider such an approach. For example, about half of the NRAs (9 out 
of 18 responding to the question) acknowledge that there is a significant geographic 
 
801 Hungarian NRA response to the Targeted Consultation, Q40. 
802 Based on the online survey data. 
803 BEREC (2020), BEREC Response to the Targeted consultation on the revision of the Commission’s access 
recommendations, BoR (20) 169, Q39. 
804 Idem, Q41. 
805 Vodafone response to the Targeted Consultation, Q41. 
806 Online survey data. 




differentiation in the usage of ULL copper lines by alternative operators. However, most 
respondents to a related survey question (14 out of 16) also consider that there is no need to 
differentiate remedies geographically in order to maintain a copper anchor in some areas but 
not others, even where the difference in take-up of ULL reflects the pervasive deployment of 
alternative networks.  
Finding 48. Stakeholders advocate an assessment of cost and benefits before 
implementing a geographic segmentation of remedies because the latter is likely to 
increase administrative costs and might reduce predictability for access seekers. 
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10. Regulatory incentives to foster migration from copper to 
fibre 
a. Summary of findings 
The study found that the NGA Recommendation brought about uniformity in the overall 
approach, but not for the details of its implementation. Variations may result from differences 
in the state of evolution of the networks from the regulated SMP operators in their respective 
Member States. 
Many NRAs say that they are not aware of the SMP operators’ plans to decommission, partially 
or totally, the copper network over the next 5-10 years. This may suggest that in many Member 
States decommissioning is still not a topical issue. 
Field research suggests that the 5 years default notice period set in Point 39 NGA 
Recommendation no longer seem to correspond with the periods set by most NRAs. Several 
stakeholders consider that the notice period should be reconsidered. 
There also seems to be little support for NRAs to set mandatory deadlines for (partial) switch-
off from the legacy networks to foster migration to newly built fibre networks. 
The study also found that views are divided on whether departing from the principle of cost 
orientation to set access prices to legacy networks would be appropriate to hasten migration 
to fibre networks. In any case, pricing alone will not achieve efficient migration to fibre. 
Lastly, several comments suggest the need for a clear monitoring system to ensure that the 
migration process is non-discriminatory as there are concerns that SMP operators could use 
a copper switch-off to gain a competitive advantage. 
b. Introduction 
The EU’s key objective for 2030 of ‘top-notch trustworthy and secure Digital Infrastructures’ of 
the proposed 2030 Digital Compass808 and in particular the full coverage of homes with a 
gigabit network, suggests the need for migrating towards higher capacity networks in order to 
reach the required ultrafast broadband coverage.  
According to the NGA Recommendation, NRAs should put in place a transparent framework 
for migration from copper to fibre-based networks and should ensure that systems and 
procedures put in place by the SMP operator facilitate the switch from copper to fibre for 
alternative service providers. In parallel, NRAs were asked to ensure that SMP operators 
design support systems to facilitate the switching of competitors to NGA-based virtual 
products. 
At the time, the Framework Directive did not require Member States to grant specific powers 
to their NRAs to accompany the migration from copper generation networks to fibre networks. 
Art. 81 EECC now entrusts specific tasks to NRAs in this area and, in doing so, strengthens 
the legal basis for the guidance concerned in the NGA Recommendation. 
 




At the same time, while the NGA Recommendation aimed primarily - in order to foster 
consumer choice - at protecting investments by access seekers in unbundling of copper loops 
and subloops, the EECC takes a more balanced stance and underscores the need to avoid 
unjustified delays to the migration. The replacement of copper networks by more energy-
efficient fibre networks fits within the environmental objective of incentivising the deployment 
of electronic communications networks with a reduced environmental footprint.809 The Polish 
authorities, for example, estimate that replacing “the existing copper internet networks with 
fibre-optic networks results in a several-fold reduction in the energy consumption of 
telecommunications networks; in particular, it reduces the amount of energy needed to transmit 
the same data volume several times (a five-fold reduction according to estimates), the 
production of which in Poland is based on coal. 74% of the dismantled copper cable 
components can be reused for non-telecommunications products and services and the 
remaining components are recycled”810. 
Provisions concerned 
• Art. 81 EECC: “1. Undertakings which have been designated as having [SMP] shall 
notify the NRA in advance and in a timely manner when they plan to decommission or 
replace with a new infrastructure parts of the network, including legacy infrastructure 
necessary to operate a copper network (…). 
2. The NRA shall ensure that the decommissioning or replacement process includes a 
transparent timetable and conditions, including an appropriate notice period for 
transition, and establishes the availability of alternative products of at least comparable 
quality providing access to the upgraded network infrastructure substituting the 
replaced elements if necessary to safeguard competition and the rights of end-users. 
With regard to assets which are proposed for decommissioning or replacement, the 
national regulatory authority may withdraw the obligations after having ascertained that 
the access provider: 
a) has established the appropriate conditions for migration, including making 
available an alternative access product of at least comparable quality as was 
available using the legacy infrastructure enabling the access seekers to reach 
the same end-users; and 
b) has complied with the conditions and process notified to the NRA (…). 
3. This Article shall be without prejudice to the availability of regulated products 
imposed by the NRA on the upgraded network infrastructure (…)”. 
• Recital 209 EECC: “(…) in order to avoid unjustified delays to the migration, NRAs 
should be empowered to withdraw access obligations relating to the copper network 
once an adequate migration process has been established and compliance with 
conditions and process for migration from legacy infrastructure is ensured (…)”. 
NGA Recommendation: 
• Point 39: “Existing SMP obligations (…) should continue and should not be undone by 
changes to the existing network architecture and technology, unless agreement is 
reached on an appropriate migration path between the SMP operator and operators 
 
809 Summary Report of Best Practices Outcome of phase 1 of the work of the Special Group for developing a 
common Union Toolbox for connectivity pursuant to the Commission Recommendation (EU) 
2020/13071,16/10/2020-20/12/2020, p.10. 
810 Idem, p. 191. 
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currently enjoying access to the SMP operator’s network. In the absence of such 
agreement, NRAs should ensure that alternative operators are informed no less than 5 
years, where appropriate taking into account national circumstances, before any de-
commissioning of points of interconnection such as the local loop exchange. This 
period may be less than 5 years if fully equivalent access is provided at the point of 
interconnection”. 
• Point 40: “NRAs should put in place a transparent framework for the migration from 
copper to fibre-based networks. NRAs should ensure that the systems and procedures 
put in place by the SMP operator, including operating support systems, are designed 
so as to facilitate the switching of alternative providers to NGA-based access products”. 
• Point 41: “NRAs should use their powers under Article 5 of Directive 2002/21/EC to 
obtain information from the SMP operator concerning any network modification plans 
that are likely to affect the competitive conditions in a given market or sub-market. 
Where the SMP operator envisages to replace part of its existing copper access 
network with fibre and plans to de-commission currently used points of interconnection, 
NRAs should under Article 9(1) of Directive 2002/19/EC [now Art. 69 EECC] ensure 
that undertakings enjoying access to the SMP operator’s network receive all necessary 
information in timely fashion to adjust their own networks and network extension plans 
accordingly. NRAs should define the format and level of detail of such information, and 
ensure that strict confidentiality of the information disclosed is respected”. 
 
BEREC Best practice for NGA wholesale products as of December 2009811: “(…) wholesale 
customers should obtain relevant information on roll-out of new infrastructure or technologies 
per geographical area. A reasonable window of announcement is necessary to create a level 
playing field on the retail market; Information on phasing out of legacy wholesale services 
should also be announced a reasonable period in advance to avoid discriminatory situations.” 
This guidance was complemented on 8 December 2012 by the revised BEREC Common 
Position on best practice in remedies on the market for Wholesale Broadband Access 
(including bitstream access) imposed as a consequence of a position of significant market 
power in the relevant market812, of which the main guidance is summarized in Box 12. 
Box 12. Best practices as identified by BEREC 
• BP29 NRAs should require that switching procedures equally apply between legacy 
and NGA wholesale products. 
• BP30 Where an SMP operator intends to phase out its legacy network (e.g. ATM), 
NRAs should impose specific obligations on the SMP operator in relation to: a 
framework for migration; a notice period; an obligation for the SMP operator to 
provide all relevant information on network modification such as decommissioning 
of MDFs, technology, access points and active equipment. 
• BP31 NRAs should require that existing obligations remain in place until a certain 
migration path is agreed and finished. 
 
811 BEREC (2010). Next Generation Access – Implementation Issues and Wholesale Products. BoR (10) 08 p. 9. 
812 BEREC (2012). Revised BEREC Common Position on best practice in remedies on the market for wholesale 
broadband access (including bitstream access) imposed as a consequence of a position of significant market power 




• BP32 When imposing an obligation on SMP operators relating to a notice period 
for phasing legacy networks out, NRAs should take into account that the choice of 
the appropriate notice period may depend on the following factors: Notice period is 
likely to be longer for locations than for access products/technologies as a new 
access product may be available at the same location; Availability of a full-fledged 
alternative; Reasonable migration period for a switch of wholesale products. If a 
legacy access product will be phased out at an access location at which the NGA 
access product will also be available the reasonable notice period will be shorter 
than in a scenario where the NGA-access product will be available at a different 
access location, where competitors do not yet have a physical presence. 
• BP33 NRAs should require that in cases where an active product has been 
foreseen as an alternative for the legacy access products (either temporarily or as 
definitive measure) this active product is in operation in adequate advance to the 
MDF decommissioning as bitstream products are likely to gain in importance in a 
scenario of MDF decommissioning. 
Source: BoR (12) 128. 
c. Initial follow up by NRAs 
In 2011, a framework for migration from current to next generation access products referred to 
in Point 40 NGA Rec. was set by eleven NRAs813. Almost half of the NRAs obliged the SMP 
operator to provide information on network modifications, including the roll-out of new 
infrastructures.  Four of these NRAs did provide specific provisions for the de-commissioning 
of Main Distribution Frames (MDFs) in line with Point 39 NGA Recommendation. There was 
nonetheless a variety of notice periods ranging from 3 months814 to 5 years. Some of the 
NRAs815 concerned allowed for shorter periods if agreed upon by the operators involved. Some 
NRAs816 did explicitly link the decommissioning of MDFs to the availability of equivalent 
alternatives, whereas the Danish NRAs did not make the approval of decommissioning 
contingent on any conditions as long as the notice periods were adhered to817. 
As regards the modification plans referred to in Point 41, several NRAs818 had already (in 2011) 
obligated their SMP operators to provide information on any roll-outs of new infrastructures. 
Notification periods varied between 4 and 12 months. 
Two major issues are not covered by the NGA Recommendation: how to deal with stranded 
assets and how should the costs of migration be split between the SMP operator and the 
access seeker? In 2011, BEREC found that in Austria costs were borne by the operator rolling 
out the NGA network and a compensation scheme for frustrated investments applies if full 
unbundling is no longer possible or feasible. Belgium has specified certain actions (e.g. the 
 
813 The NRAs from Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, Hungary, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Romania, 
Slovenia, Spain. 
814 The Polish NRA did not allow any withdrawal of access to copper loops already granted but the SMP operator 
could decommission its MDFs with a notice period of 3 months in other cases. 
815 The NRAs from Belgium, Denmark, Hungary, Portugal, Spain 
816 From Belgium, Hungary and Portugal. 
817 BEREC (2011). Next Generation Access – Collection of factual information and new issues of NGA roll-out, BoR 
(11 (06) p. 14-15, quoted in BEREC (2011). Report on the Implementation of the NGA-Recommendation, BoR (11) 
43, October 2011, p.75. 
818 The NRAs from Belgium, Denmark, Hungary [about to be notified at the time], Italy, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Spain. 
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deconnecting of ATM access) that are not billed when migrating from ATM to Ethernet 
bitstream products. Other countries did not yet have provisions concerning the costs of 
migration819.  
The findings by BEREC in 2011 show that several NRAs had not included specific obligations 
relating to migration in the remedies imposed on the SMP operator. The main reason was that, 
at the time, no decommissioning of copper networks was expected in the short term. 
d. Commission’s comments letters 
The comments letters from the Commission in reply to Article 7 notifications relating to Market 
3a/2014 (Market 4/2007) seldom refer to the provisions of the NGA related to migration. This 
may show that NRAs were generally complying with the guidance when notifying of draft 
remedies.  
Among the few letters explicitly reviewing migration obligations imposed on SMP operators in 
the market, we can highlight the following cases: 
• The comments letter of 3 May 2010 to the Czech NRA recalling “that migration from 
copper to fibre loops and the dismantling of exchanges substantially affects the 
business case for alternative operators” and inviting the NRA “either in its final measure 
or in a subsequent amendment, to develop further remedies specifying in detail the 
migration process (including detailed information to be provided by the SMP operator 
in advance concerning its network rollout plans, the conditions for closing down the 
exchanges, and the methods of collocation for LLU operators at the newly-built access 
points and/or the provision of appropriate backhaul facilities if necessary), in addition 
to the obligation of transparency”820. 
• In another letter of the same year issued to Slovenia, the Commission notes that the 
NRA had clarified “that the non-discrimination obligation would entail a duty to provide 
operators and [the NRA] with information on planned upgrades of its network. This 
includes the obligation to provide services of the same quality and to provide the same 
information to all the operators and to make publicly available a set of quality indicators. 
(…) In addition, the SMP operator should ensure upon reasonable request the 
transition from bitstream access to the unbundled local loop and the transition from 
copper to the optical loop and ensure that any de-commissioning of points of 
interconnection or of an individual copper loop will not take place before 5 years have 
elapsed since access was granted, unless an agreement between the operators is 
reached” 821. 
• More recently, the Commission noted that the French NRA foresaw “the possibility to 
increase the price cap of the unbundling monthly fee, before the end of the period of 
validity of this decision, if Orange comes up with a detailed plan for the switch-off of its 
copper network. ARCEP explains that such a price increase would be used as an 
incentive for Orange to promote economic efficiency by avoiding the need to operate 
two parallel networks”. The Commission recalled that “prices shall reflect costs and 
WACC shall reflect the costs of capital” and that “any potential price-change (before 
the end of the period for which the prices are set, i.e. for 2021-2023 and in general) 
shall be subject to a notification to the Commission and shall be justified by a fully-
 
819 BoR (11) 06, p.15. 
820 Commission Decision of 3.05.2010 concerning Case CZ/2010/1070. 




fledged analysis of underlying costs and of the impact of such change on competitive 
conditions”822. 
e. The current situation 
The December 2019 BEREC internal workshop on ‘Migration from legacy infrastructures to 
fibre-based networks’ shows substantial differences between the remedies imposed across 
the EU, which may partly reflect the differences in the decommissioning plans of the various 
national SMP operators as well as the variation in the number of unbundled lines.  
Table 32 below summarises the migration practices in the selected Member States as 
identified in the BEREC summary report.  
Table 32. Migration practices by selected Member States 
MS Migration period Replacement products Information available for 
alternative network operators 
and end-users 
EE Unbundled loops to remain in 
place at least 6 months after 
notice 
No special wholesale 
access product 
No special information defined 
IT Switch-off prohibited before: 
100% NGA coverage (incl. FWA 
if necessary) and 
60% of NGA retail take-up 
Then LEX can be switched-off 
12 to 24 months 
VULA, bitstream and 
SLU 
SMP operator covers 
one-off wholesale costs 
of migration as well as 
additional costs for 
decommissioning co-
location 
SMP operators must inform 
access takers once a month 
PT 5-year notice period for total 
switch-off  
3-year notice period if fully 
equivalent WBA is provided 
Nothing defined by the 
NRA yet. No wholesale 
access was provided at 
the 6 MDF that were 
switched-off. 
Rules foreseen under 2017 
market analysis 
ES 5 years if ULL, 1 year if 
bitstream, 6 months if no 
wholesale. The incumbent may 
negotiate shorter periods with 
ULL operators. [The 2020 draft 
market review published for 
consultation indicates that the 
NRA proposes to decrease to 2 
years if ULL]823  
 
VULA or enhanced 
bitstream, there are no 
conditions or obligations 
regarding the migration 
costs. 
The NRA publishes the list of 
exchanges in closing process on 
its website. The SMP operator 
provides information when 
notifying an exchange closure: 
date of closure and details about 
FTTH deployment in exchange 
(such as OLT locations, 
percentage of FTTH, homes 
passed) 
SE The SMP operator is obliged to 
inform co-localized operator 5 
years before shutting down an 
MDF. The NRA proposes to 
shorten this period of time to 18 
months. 
Wholesale fibre access. 
If there is no fibre in an 
area the SMP operator 
normally offers end-
users an FWA-solution 
which connects via the 
The timing of the 
decommissioning of MDFs is 
made available on the SMP 
operator’s homepage. 
 
822 Commission Comments of 4.12.2020 concerning Case FR/2020/2284. 
823 CNMC (2020) La CNMC lanza la consulta pública sobre la regulación de los mercados mayoristas de banda 
ancha. Available at: https://www.cnmc.es/novedades/2020-11-17-la-cnmc-lanza-la-consulta-publica-sobre-la-
regulacion-de-los-mercados  
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Source: BEREC (2019). BEREC summary report on the outcome of an internal workshop on “Migration from legacy 
infrastructures to fibre-based networks”. BoR (19) 236. 
Note: information in italic is own research, based on sources in the footnote(s). 
 
Most of the NRAs responding to the survey question on following NGA Recommendation’s 
guidance on migration indicated that they did not deviate from the recommended approach (15 
out of 18 respondents to the relevant question). The measures advocated were generally not 
challenged, as confirmed by an NRA, which “used the NGA recommendation as a justification 
for imposing this. There was no negative feedback from the market players on this”824.  
Of the NRAs responding to the survey, 10 (out of 22) indicated that they monitor the migration 
from a main distribution frame (MDF) towards an Optical Distribution Frame (ODF) or towards 
active access at a higher level in the network (e.g. layer 2), while 12 NRAs responded that they 
do not. Likewise, 10 NRAs impose a requirement on the SMP operator to publish transparent 
transition timetables (some with penalties foreseen in case of delays), while 12 do not825.  
An overview of the data from the BEREC summary report (BoR (19) 236), online surveys, and 
the targeted consultation allowed for identifying the fact that variations mostly concerned the 
advance notice time, both generally and for specific circumstances, as well as the specific 
details of the obligations imposed. 
Finding 49. The NGA Recommendation brought about uniformity in the overall approach 
to migration, but not in the details of its implementation. Variations may result from 
differences in the state of evolution of the networks from the regulated SMP operators in 
their respective Member States. 
 
Ilsa Godlovitch et al. (2019) confirm that regulatory approaches “in France, Spain and Portugal 
mainly reflect the guidelines set out in the 2010 NGA Recommendation and 2013 
Recommendation on cost methodologies and non-discrimination, and pursue a cautious and 
gradual approach, which may limit disruption for consumers and alternative operators (…)”826.  
However, migration from copper to fibre is not yet a live issue in all Member States because 
the extent of achieved FTTH deployment varies across the EU. The number of MDFs closed 
is, in some countries (EE, SE), already significantly high (e.g. EE 70%) and in other countries 
(IT and PT) is still low827. In Portugal and Hungary (by 2025), SMP operators plan to close all 
of their MDFs and in Italy most of the MDFs828. The SMP operator in Sweden plans to complete 
 
824 An NRA response to the online survey. 
825 Online survey data. 
826 WIK-Consult (2019). Prospective competition and deregulation: An analysis of European approaches to 
regulating full fibre, p. 27-28. 
827 BEREC (2020), BEREC Response to the Targeted consultation on the revision of the Commission’s access 





its copper shut down by 2026.829 By September 2020, 54% of copper exchanges had been 
switched off, the majority of which were rural.830 
This different progress rate of FTTH deployment across the EU likely explains the divide in 
awareness regarding SMP operators’ plans to decommission the copper network over the next 
5-10 years. In the online survey, 11 NRAs indicated that they were not aware of such plans 
and 12 indicated that they were aware of them831. Only one NRA indicated setting a tentative 
deadline for a switch-off of the legacy network. 
As a matter of fact, the pace of migration was much slower than anticipated at the time of the 
drafting of the 2010 NGA Recommendation. However, migration is now starting to pick up in 
those Member States and areas that are the most advanced in terms of VHCN deployment 
and we observe increasing attention to the issue of migration and a copper switch off832. 
Finding 50. Many NRAs say that they are not aware of the SMP operators’ plans to 
decommission, partially or totally, the copper network over the next 5-10 years. This may 
suggest that in many Member States decommissioning is still not a topical issue. However, 
we observe increasing attention to the issue of migration and the copper switch off. 
 
f. Different evolution stages of network development across the EU 
explain most of the divergence found 
The lack of plans to decommission, partially or totally, the copper network over the next 5-10 
years may reflect that many SMP operators do not see a need for a migration in the short term. 
Indeed, the operator survey has shown that some SMP operators express concerns regarding 
the demand for higher speed Internet connections as products providing an alternative to fibre 
(such as VDSL) can provide speeds that satisfy end-users’ needs over the coming years833. 
The argument is that if the needs are satisfied there is no willingness to switch, especially if 
the customer has to bear the costs associated with it (e.g. a faster Internet plan costs more). 
The difference between the coverage of ultrafast broadband and the share of households that 
actually use it supports the views expressed regarding limited demand (see Box 13). 
Box 13. Coverage of VHCN and ultrafast broadband take-up 
According to the most recent DESI report (2020), there is a significant gap between VHCN 
coverage across the EU and the take-up of very high-speed broadband (100 Mbps and 
higher). While the average rate of VHCN coverage across the EU constitutes 44%; the 
take-up of high-speed broadband lies at merely 25.9%. Certainly, the terms VHCN and 
ultrafast broadband are not interchangeable (see Chapter 2 of the report), but the higher 
 
829 Telia (2021) Telia Strategy Update. Available at: https://www.teliacompany.com/globalassets/telia-
company/documents/reports/2020/q4/210129-strategy-update.pdf, p. 48  
830 WIK-Consult (2020). Copper switch-off, European experience and practical considerations; and BoR (19) 236. 
831 Online survey data. 
832 See e.g. BEREC calls for fast fibre networks roll-out available at: https://advanced-
television.com/2021/05/12/berec-calls-for-fast-fibre-networks-roll-out/ and FTTH Council Europe’s position 
available at: https://www.ftthcouncil.eu/home/latest-news/new-study-on-copper-switch-off-shows-accelerated-
migration-to-fibre-benefits-the-entire-economy-and-society?news_id=3865&back=/home/latest-news  
833 Online survey data 
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share of VHCN coverage than its uptake indicates that demand may be limited or has not 
yet caught up with the supply. The differences across countries further bolster this 
evidence. For example, while the VHCN coverage rate in Malta is 100% according to the 
DESI 2020 indicators, only 33.7% of Maltese households use access to the ultrafast 
broadband. Other similar examples include Denmark, Croatia, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Estonia, 
Slovenia, Finland, France, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Spain, 
and Portugal. At the same time, there are also the three cases of Austria, Hungary and 
Sweden where the take-up rate of an ultrafast broadband is slightly higher than the VHCN 
coverage rate. However, the overall picture suggests that the higher rate of VHCN 
coverage does not necessarily mean a higher access rate ultrafast broadband, possibly 
indicating a lower demand than supply (or the demand may not yet have caught up with 
the supply). 
Source: DESI (2020). 
Ilsa Godlovitch and Peter Kroon834 report that one of the factors supporting the migration 
process from copper to fibre in Spain identified by the NRA was that “customers have shown 
a demand and willingness to pay a premium for high value ultrafast broadband products that 
are often bundled with pay-TV alongside voice and mobile connections. Indeed, benchmarks 
suggest that prices for triple play bundles including ultrafast broadband in Spain are above the 
EU average. This has improved the business case for the deployment of FTTH”. 
Do the migration rules set by NRAs delay the replacement of copper networks by fibre 
networks? 
When guiding the migration process in their countries, NRAs need to address numerous 
regulatory issues. BEREC identifies the following835: 
• Deciding on the parts of the legacy access network to be decommissioned  
• Migration framework 
• Notice period and factors that affect it 
• Information provision obligations on the SMP operator 
• Duration of existing obligations 
• NRA’s procedure to establish migration rules 
• Stakeholder involvement 
• Regulatory treatment of migration costs 
• Trial/test run with the operators 
• Ensuring/monitoring the availability of alternative access products of a suitable quality 
 
However, the Swedish NRA says that in their country migration has not been much of a 
problem. They only have two remedies in the SMP decision (obligation to give notice and to 
 
834 WIK-Consult (2020). Copper switch-off, European experience and practical considerations, p. 15. 
835 BEREC (2020), BEREC Response to the Targeted consultation on the revision of the Commission’s access 




offer co-location in fibre networks replacing previous copper networks). Rather than monitoring 
a copper shut-down, the Swedish NRA monitors a fibre roll-out836. 
g. The prior notice period in the absence of a commercial agreement 
Under Point 39 NGA Recommendation SMP obligations – such as LLU and subloop 
unbundling – should continue unless agreement is reached on an appropriate migration path 
between the SMP operator and all access seekers using such products. Failing to reach such 
an agreement, NRAs should ensure that alternative operators are informed no less than 5 
years (where appropriate considering national circumstances) before the de-commissioning of 
any points of interconnection. 5 years is advocated because it would correspond with the 
standard investment period for unbundling a local loop or local sub-loop. However, in cases 
where the SMP operator provided equivalent access at the MDF, the NRA could decide to set 
a shorter period of time837.  
Ilsa Godlovitch and Peter Kroon (2020)838 provide an overview of the notice periods and 
associated wholesale obligations in the 10 countries covered by their analysis (see Table 33). 
Table 33. Overview of the notice periods and associated wholesale obligations in 10 EU 
Member States. 
MS Notice period for exchange 
closure  
Wholesaling obligations linked to exchange 
closure 
Estonia  6 months  None, but fibre wholesale access is available 
under similar conditions to copper wholesale 
access  
France  5 years – a shorter period may be 
requested for copper in "fibred" 
zones, but 5 years applies to the 
PSTN switch-off. [In 2020, the NRA 
reduced the notice periods and 
introduced more differentiated 
notification periods for technical 
and commercial closure, see 
Chapter 10.9] 
Wholesale offers must allow altnets to replicate 
“in an equivalent manner” offers available on the 
copper network  
Germany  1 year notice to withdraw LLU  Alternative wholesale offers must be made - in 
practice cabinet VULA, local bitstream  
Italy  3 years if no LLU, 5 years if LLU - 
can be reduced to 3 if suitable 
wholesale  
Technically and economically equivalent VULA 
guaranteed for 2 years after switch-off  
Netherlands  Before: 3 years notice before end of 
life and 1 if suitable wholesale 
replacement. IN March 2020 
nullification of NRA regulation due 
to incomplete evidence of joint 
market power KPN and 
VodafoneZiggo  
Unbundled FTTH, VULA FTTH or WBA FTTH - 
KPN must offer different price model if scale is 
obstacle for access seekers  
 
 
Poland  12 months  No specific wholesale requirements  
Portugal  5 years or 3 if equivalent wholesale  Products "equivalent" to copper wholesale  
Spain  5 years (LLU), 1 year (no LLU) [The 
2020 draft market review published 
Exchange can only be closed when > 25% of 
customers are connected by alternative means 
 
836 Case study interviews. 
837 Recital 40 NGA Reccomendation. 
838 WIK-Consult (2020). Copper switch-off, European experience and practical considerations, p. 41. 
Study on Regulatory Incentives for the Deployment of Very High Capacity Networks in the 
Context of the Revision of the Commission’s Access Recommendations 
244 
 
MS Notice period for exchange 
closure  
Wholesaling obligations linked to exchange 
closure 
for consultation envisages to 
reduce the notice period to 2 years 
for MDFs where ULL is used]839  
 
 
(e.g. fibre). If there are alternative operators 
unbundling the loop, Telefónica must continue 
to provide this wholesale service for 5 years, 
with 6 months’ notice. If there are no alternative 
operators in the plant, the guarantee period is 
reduced to 1 year with 6 months’ notice.  
Sweden  5 years for exchanges with co-
located operators, but commercial 
agreements made with 18-month 
notice. [In 2020 the 5-year period 
was shortened to 18 months]840  
 
No specific wholesale requirements  
United 
Kingdom 
No established rules  No established rules, but WLR obligation in 
place until 2020  
Source: WIK-Consult (2020). Copper switch-off, European experience and practical considerations, p. 41. 
Note: the update in italic is own research, based on sources in the footnote(s). 
 
Ilsa Godlovitch and Peter Kroon note that “whereas the conditions in Estonia and Poland are 
relatively light (6 and 12 months respectively) with no specific associated wholesale 
requirements, much longer periods have been applied in many other countries”. 
The notice time set by NRAs has been pointed out by some NRAs and operators (mainly 
having a SMP in specific markets) as a factor in delaying the replacement of copper networks 
by more energy-efficient fibre networks, as it increases the cost of replacement. For example, 
the obligation to operate copper and fibre networks in parallel because access seekers use 
unbundled copper lines in the former, increases costs for the SMP operator concerned. As 
ETNO puts it in its response to the targeted consultation, “the cost of parallel exploitation of 
the new networks should be taken into account in order to allow cost recovery. This 
assessment will be very relevant in the last phases of the copper decommission, where the 
huge technical and economic effort needs to be encompassed by a softer approach and 
increased flexibility in the terms agreed with NRAs”841. This sentiment is further supported by 
FTTH Council Europe, adding a point on environmental externality: “Obliging the sector to 
maintain two networks, particularly when that legacy network has a much larger carbon 
footprint makes no sense. The priority must be to ensure a rapid shut down of the copper 
infrastructure”842. 
Several operators argued for a shorter notification period. For example, in the targeted 
consultation, Deutsche Telekom argued for a more accelerated notification of three years in 
Greece, less than the current five years in Croatia (unless all involved operators agree), and 
less than 1 year in Slovakia if agreement with wholesale partners is reached843. According to 
Telefonica, “shorter notice periods ease overall framework certainties while increasing 
economic viability for VHCN for those remote and sparse regions”, which also suggests that 
notice periods could be modified based on switches’ size (smaller switches meaning shorter 
periods)844. Moreover, implementation of long-term plans (e.g. five-years notification period) 
 
839 CNMC (2020) La CNMC lanza la consulta pública sobre la regulación de los mercados mayoristas de banda 
ancha. Available at: https://www.cnmc.es/novedades/2020-11-17-la-cnmc-lanza-la-consulta-publica-sobre-la-
regulacion-de-los-mercados 
840 PTS Decision 15-7200 of 08 June 2020. 
841 ETNO response to the Targeted Consultation, Q34. 
842 FTTH Council response to the Targeted Consultation, Q37. 
843 Deutsche Telekom response to the Targeted Consultation, Q34. 




can also be affected by such shocks as Covid-19, for example, due to its effects on the 
workforce845. 
On the other hand, a French operator warns that the notice periods decided by the French 
NRA (e.g. two months for residential access and six months for companies’ access) may be 
incompatible with the duration of commitments made by alternative operators in the framework 
of offer in response to calls for tenders. The EECC does not provide alternative operators the 
right to terminate end-users contracts (the ones that could not be migrated at the end of the 
notice period for the technical shutdown). This brings insecurity with regard to operators’ 
access obligations, contractual obligations with their end-users, European and national 
consumer rules they have to observe846. 
Moreover, an operator pleads for consistency between a copper switch-off and a PSTN switch 
off. Alternative operators need to avoid double-migrations of customers a first time on the 
PSTN (PSTN migration to Total Unbundling if fiber is absent) and then with the end of copper 
a second migration towards FTTH847. 
Box 14. Country-specific issues related to the notice period 
A number of issues reported relate to how the notification period requirement is organised 
in specific Member States: 
• An SMP operator pe identified a challenge where the civil engineering of an 
electricity distributor is used, the operator itself receives a shorter notice and cannot 
comply with the requirement set by the regulator848. 
• Deutsche Telekom noted that in Slovakia the minimum period of 12 months is too 
long, when an agreement is made with the alternative operator on a shorter 
period849. 
Source: Online survey and Targeted Consultation data. 
More NRAs agreed (13) than disagreed (8) with the position that a five-year period, set as the 
notification period by default in the NGA, should be shortened850. Among the latter, an NRA 
argued that since all alternative operators use ULL to reach most of their retail customers, in 
cases of a simultaneous switch-off from multiple LEXs, the 5-year period may even be short 
enough to enable alternative operators to migrate their entire subscriber base to other 
wholesale products or to deploy networks, while another NRA recalls that the 5 year period 
corresponds to the time needed to depreciate the access seeker’s equipment. Yet another 
NRA considers the default period of 5 years reasonable since the NGA Recommendation 
allows them to set shorter periods when justified by the circumstances851. 
 
845 Ibid. 
846 Case study interviews. 
847 Case study interviews. 
848 An operator’s response to the online survey. The operator also notes that “migration to fibre in these areas is 
forced, cannot comply with the notification period, and in many cases, is unsuccessful - there is no business case 
to redeploy fibre and we are forced to abandon the services entirely”. 
849 Deutsche Telekom response to the Targeted Consultation, Q34. 
850 Online survey data. 
851 Online survey data. 
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At the same time, the views of the respective NRAs are conditioned by the specific national 
market structure in their jurisdiction. Protecting a competitive market in some Member States 
does not require such a long switch-off period (e.g. in the online survey response, an NRA 
noted that there is no need to use a five year period, because “operators use their own 
infrastructure or bitstream central access. Migration from copper to fibre and the potential 
decommission of copper network or exchanges would affect a small part of the market”852). 
ETNO also notices the need for flexibility in the approach, as “inflexible deadlines for prior 
notice for decommissioning included in Recital 39 of the NGA Recommendation are no longer 
appropriate in view of the principles established Art. 81 of the EECC”853. Moreover, where not 
ULL but bitstream products are used, the sunk costs of the access seekers (equipment, 
connection costs to points of handover etc) may be lower and mostly already depreciated. 
BEREC justifies the different notice periods set by NRAs across the EU therefore because of 
differences between the various Member State as to whether and which (i) type of wholesale 
access product (e.g. ULL, bitstream) based on the legacy copper infrastructure is used by 
access seekers and therefore needs to be replaced at the respective MDF location, (ii) the 
wholesale access products to which the access seekers can migrate are e.g. ducts, unbundled 
fibre, shared fibre, VULA and bitstream854.  
But sunk costs are only a part of the migration cost. Migration requires investment in new 
equipment – including in some cases a customer’s equipment – as well as ensuring access to 
new points of hand-over.  Not surprisingly, alternative operators plead for a cautious approach 
to the transition. In ECTA’s view, the French855, Italian, UK and Greek approaches managed 
to balance new network deployment, access and take-up, while also ensuring that a copper 
local loop remains where it is relevant856. 
Finding 51. The 5 year default notice period set in Point 39 NGA Recommendation no 
longer seem to correspond with the periods set by most NRAs. Several stakeholders 
consider that the notice period should be reconsidered.   
 
h. Alternative products of at least comparable quality providing 
access to the upgraded network infrastructure  
The NGA Recommendation does not provide specific guidance on the characteristics of the 
new NGA access products that could replace the copper generation access products. How 
should NRAs ensure that the new products provide the same quality of services as the legacy 
products do, so that the migration itself does not lead to a deterioration of services?  
 
852 An NRA response to the online survey. 
853 ETNO response to the Targeted Consultation, Q34. 
854 BEREC (2020), BEREC Response to the Targeted consultation on the revision of the Commission’s access 
recommendations, BoR (20) 169, Q34. 
855 Before the latest market review. Since the 2014 market review, the SMP operator was required to use a 5-year 
prior notice approach for its plan to switch off the PSTN network. However, in 2020 this notice period was reduced 
to an 18 or 36-month notification period for residential products and a 36-month notification period for business 
products, except in areas where the 4 main commercial operators are yet present on the FTTH network. In those 
areas, the SMP operator may proceed to the commercial closure of the corresponding copper lines with a 2-month 
notification period for residential products and a 6-month notification period for business products (see Commission 
Comments in Case FR/2020/2284, p.6). 




Access seekers consider that the same quality goes beyond downloading and uploading 
speeds and that QoS guarantees must also encompass other parameters (e.g. “delay 
parameters on Ethernet compared to SDH on data transport”)857. From the perspective of 
alternative operators, it is important that the new SLAs/SLGs are not inferior to those that were 
used for the legacy network, as ECTA notes in its response to the targeted consultation858. 
Moreover, “specific attention is needed to SMP operators’ planned and effective performance 
in terms of quality and related KPIs and penalties for non-compliance, which need to be 
genuinely dissuasive of discrimination and poor general performance.”859  
ETNO acknowledges the need to update the SLAs and KPIs to reflect the phasing out860.   
BEREC861 recommends that before the migration process starts, a wholesale service 
substitution matrix identifying each wholesale legacy service (such as LLU, Shared Access, 
analogue leased lines and DSL copper bitstream, etc.) and corresponding wholesale fibre-
based NGA service be drawn to provide transparency and predictability to the market players. 
This matrix should enable access seekers to evaluate those access products deemed to be 
similar, consider the structure of different access levels and the corresponding additional costs 
related to the handover of traffic in order to be in a position to choose the most adequate mix 
of new access products so that their business would not be adversely affected. Indeed, several 
products will not be replicable on the new network and should be substituted following the 
wholesale matrix or by means of different services that cannot be directly compared with the 
original services in terms of specific parameters. To define the wholesale substitution matrix, 
not only the wholesale services and related parameters should be considered but also its 
impact at the retail level of the migration.  
BEREC lists862 the following parameters as possibly relevant: 
• Down and upstream bandwidth speeds 
• SLG/SLA parameters and KPIs such as provisioning time, service availability and 
repair time863 
• The details of operational processes in the reference offers concerned, e. g. elements 
referred to migration from legacy products and infrastructure 
• Locations of Points of Handover (PoHs) of the new services 
The French NRA added to the requirement that the replacement product must offer functional 
and proven technical and economic conditions of access conditions that would allow third party 
 
857 Deutsche Telekom response to the Targeted Consultation, Q35. 
858 ECTA response to the Targeted Consultation, Q34: “It is also decisive to ensure that SLAs/SLGs for FttH-based 
networks are not inferior to those for copper local loop unbundling, in terms of the general activation and repair 
processes and times, as well as regarding improved SLAs/SLGs that are relevant to serve business customer sites 
(e.g. smaller sites of larger organisations) and smaller sites of socio-economic drivers such as schools and 
hospitals, where dedicated connectivity would be too pricey”. 
859 ECTA response to the Targeted Consultation, Q35. 
860 ETNO response to the Targeted Consultation, Q34. 
861 BEREC (2020), BEREC Response to the Targeted consultation on the revision of the Commission’s access 
recommendations, BoR (20) 169, Q35.  
862 Idem, Q35. 
863 BEREC provides the example of Layer 2 wholesale access products on market 4/2014 (now 2/2020 that are 
used for retail business services. In that case, relevant QoS parameters apart from the bandwidth are Frame Loss 
Ratio, Frame Delay and Frame Delay Variation and regarding SLAs provisioning time, service availability and repair 
time. BoR (20) 169, p.54. 
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operators to replicate sufficiently closely the main offers that they provided over the copper 
local loop and circumstances that suggest that this is the case in practice over the whole area 
for which the offer is proposed. These criteria are that: 
• At least two commercial operators distinct from the infrastructure operator making use 
of the product 
• The number of active accesses based on the product (excluding the infrastructure 
operator) amounts to at least 10,000 lines or 10% of the lines concerned 
• At least one retail fibre-to-the-home offer is available to all connectable premises in the 
area864. 
The French NRA’s approach seems to correspond to the one advocated by Deutsche 
Telekom865, i.e. that when “the regulated company retires its legacy retail products and 
introduces succession products, it should be ensured that the assessment of the comparability 
of the products is based on the new retail offers of the SMP operator” and not on parameters 
that the new infrastructure and technology cannot replicate. 
The French NRA’s approach would also match the approach advocated by the FTTH Council 
Europe, in that it notes that “the absence of electric power and the need to switch to batteries 
should not be considered”866 when assessing the comparability of the replacement product 
with the previous access product. Indeed, “the fact that the copper telecom network is powered 
has allowed a variety of services and applications to ‘piggyback’ on that power source” (e.g. 
house alarms and security cameras). However, fibre networks are not powered and thus 
cannot provide access products capable of enabling the continuation of such derived 
applications that should switch to batteries.  
Successor products are nevertheless susceptible to having a negative impact on investment 
incentives. For example, in Sweden, where the SMP operator offers fixed wireless access 
(FWA) as an alternative access product to copper, other stakeholders express concerns 
because these alternative products are also made available to users connected to fibre 
networks. In their view, such approach facilitating fixed-mobile substitution limits the incentives 
for further fibre roll-out, notably in areas where state aid is available for fibre deployment.867  
Moreover, an adequate monitoring framework is needed (also to ensure that the new products 
provide at least a comparable quality of service). In the case of comparable quality, NRAs see 
the following possible stakeholders engaged in this process868: 
• 17 NRAs agreed that NRAs should be involved 
• 14 NRAs agreed that SMP operators under NRA’s control should be involved 
• 14 NRAs agreed that access seekers should be involved 
• 8 NRAs agreed that operators of the new network should be involved. 
As regards the implementation of the migration itself, the French NRA plans to closely monitor 
the decommissioning, to monitor that the SMP operator does not favour commercial closures 
 
864 Decision no. 2020-1446 of 15 December 2020 portant sur la définition du marché pertinent de fourniture en gros 
d'accès local en position déterminée, sur la désignation d’un opérateur exerçant une influence significative sur ce 
marché et sur les obligations imposées à cet opérateur à ce titre, p.168. 
865 Targeted Consultation, Summary of answers, p.2, Point 5.  
866 FTTH Council response to the Targeted Consultation, Q35. 
867 Case study interviews. 




in areas where it has already completed its own fibre coverage (as opposed to a competitor’s). 
The NRA requested the SMP operator to provide comprehensive data showing the status of 
fibre access points and copper exchanges: closure status, fibre coverage of the area and the 
availability of retail services over fibre. 
In order to foster end-user interests, postponement to the date decided for decommissioning 
of the network may in some cases be appropriate to guarantee service to older end-users or 
people with disabilities until alternative products have been made available869. In Sweden, 
there are households and companies where the copper network has been closed down despite 
the fact that no alternative solutions had been offered. The Swedish NRA has no power to 
prevent the SMP operator from closing parts of its copper network in rural areas870. 
i. Regulatory incentives to facilitate migration from copper to VHCN 
In countries in which FTTH deployment has become more widespread, there is a clear 
economic case to move towards a copper switch-off to minimise duplicate network costs and 
to improve the business case for a VHCN. The following three regulatory tools were mentioned: 
a) Setting mandatory deadlines for the (partial) switch-off of the legacy network 
b) Changing legacy wholesale access prices 
c) Ending the obligation imposed on the SMP operator to provide wholesale access to its 
legacy network in the future 
However, besides the question of the effectiveness of these tools, another issue that NRAs 
need to consider is the likely impact of the treatment of alternative operators relying on LLU at 
copper exchanges which are due to be closed, as well as how to handle the switch-off of legacy 
analogue equipment that may be in use – especially for businesses. 
a) Setting mandatory deadlines for the (partial) switch-off 
There are also suggestions that once certain predefined fibre coverage is reached, NRAs 
should give a reasonable date for switching off the remaining legacy network871. Wholesale 
access over copper and over fibre are increasingly susceptible to constitute distinct product 
markets872. In the view of some stakeholders (e.g. Orange873), this could mean that the copper 
market may be deregulated. 
 
869 Case study interviews. 
870 Case study interviews. 
871 An operator’s response to the online survey. 
872 “(…) the entry of firms building their own FTTH networks and the emergence of HFC cable as a powerful network 
competitor to the existing copper network have invariably increased network competition in the relevant market (all 
else the same). If, however the existing copper network (even if upgraded) no longer constrains these alternative 
networks and has to be excluded from the analysis, competition in a new market for very high-capacity services 
would be confined to FTTH and HFC Cable networks” (Feasey & Cave (2017), Policy towards competition in high-
speed broadband in Europe, in an age of vertical and horizontal integration and oligopolies, CERRE, 20 February 
2017, p.45). In its comments of 6 December 2019 in Case SE/2019/2217, the Commission urged the NRA, should 
the [copper] market continue to shrink at the past rates (…) to revisit its finding of SMP, also taking into account, if 
relevant, mobile broadband, and to deregulate the market ahead of the end of the standard review period”. 
873 Orange response to the Targeted Consultation, Q37. 
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A delaying factor is that there is cost to provide low end services (e.g. basic universal service 
products) on fibre and the risk that customers would turn from the SMP operator because they 
do not want the intrusive work required to introduce fibre taking place inside of their homes, 
particularly in the presence of cable competition that requires less intrusive upgrading work874. 
Eventually, mobile networks can be used for replacing low-end services and to comply with 
universal service obligations. For this reason, BEREC considers that hard-set deadlines for 
migration could achieve the objective but says that a gradual migration will ensure more 
stability in the market875. 
Finding 52. There is little support for NRAs setting mandatory deadlines for a (partial) 
switch-off from legacy networks to foster migration to newly built fibre networks. 
 
b) Changing legacy wholesale access prices 
As an incentive for the SMP operator to swich off copper exchanges, the French NRA foresees 
the possibility876 to increase the price cap of the unbundling monthly fee where the SMP 
operator comes up with a detailed plan for the switch-off of its copper network877.  
In the UK, the NRA has decided to remove price controls878 on LLU from June 2023 onwards 
in areas where FTTH was completed and within a minimum of two years from the stop sell 
(see Point c) below)879, which will likely lead to price increases. 
While the positions differ, a changing legacy access price is seen as a potential means of 
affecting the migration process. However, while some stakeholders expressed their opinions 
that fibre deployment by alternative operators would incentivise the SMP operator to respond 
by migrating to fibre, others are not so sure. The NRA survey showed that more NRAs (12) 
consider this not to be true as opposed to those who agreed with such a statement (10)880. The 
Polish NRA suggests an alternative: that an SMP operator can be given incentives to migrate 
from increased WACC for services delivered through a fibre infrastructure881. 
Looking from the incentives’ perspective, variations of the copper unbundling price can bring 
about either positive or negative effects. In principle, both a price increase and a price decrease 
 
874 Cable operators can continue using in-house coaxial cabling, when deploying FTTfd (Fibre To The Front Door), 
which enable services of a quality similar to FTTH – and will also continue using Eurodocsis to avoid replacement 
of active equipment (named H-PON, Hybrid PON). 
875 BEREC (2020), BEREC Response to the Targeted consultation on the revision of the Commission’s access 
recommendations, BoR (20) 169, Q37. 
876 In the 2019 public consultation, the NRA suggested that either the SMP would be subject to a “non-excessive” 
pricing obligation or defining price caps which could be expressed in dependence of cost-based calculations in form 
of mark-ups. In addition, a maximum yearly increase percentage of LLU fees would be implemented. 
877 Decision n° 2020 1446 of 15 December 2020 states however that the NRA “ ne dispose toutefois pas à ce stade 
d’éléments permettant de démontrer l’efficacité d’une éventuelle modulation géographique du tarif pour inciter à 
une migration vers la fibre ou au vidage du réseau cuivre. La migration du cuivre vers la fibre optique accélère98 
alors même que le tarif du dégroupage n’a subi ces dernières années que des variations modérées. (…) 
Néanmoins, l’Autorité se réserve la possibilité de reconsidérer sa position, y compris au cours du cycle d’analyse 
de marché, si la situation venait à évoluer ou en cas d’obtention de nouveaux éléments à ce sujet." 
878 Except where FTTP is not available. 
879 OFCOM, Promoting competition and investment in fibre networks: Wholesale Fixed Telecoms Market Review 
2021-26, Volume 1: Overview, summary and structure, 18 March 2021, p.18. 
880 Online survey data (answers to question “In case VHCN network(s) are deployed by alternative operator(s) but 
not by the SMP operator in a given area, do you consider that the SMP operator would have the incentive to plan 
the switch off of its copper network in that area?”) 




could provide incentives to speed up migration, according to the French Competition 
Authority882: 
• A higher copper unbundling price would discourage access seekers from using legacy 
networks and promote switching to fibre to avoid higher retail prices when copper is 
used. 
• On the other hand, maintaining the current or lowering the copper unbundling price 
could decrease SMP operators’ incentives to maintain the copper line QoS affected by 
commercial closures, encouraging alternative operators to switch their customers to 
fibre in order to ensure that service for their customers does not deteriorate. 
However, the French Competition Authority, while maintaining the need for a careful analysis 
of reasons why the “supply and demand in retail markets are not switching to fibre in some 
cases”, expresses doubts about the first alternative because access seekers do not 
necessarily control the rate of switchover by their customers, some of whom have been 
reluctant to accept the fibre installation work. In the event of an increase in copper tariffs, a 
temporary rent will be granted to the SMP operator. 
Conversely, Open Fiber supports a price increase of the legacy products at a wholesale level. 
Such increase “should lead to an increase of retail legacy prices and make the migration 
economically interesting for all of the operators”883. Similarly, EIR points out that low prices of 
access to a legacy infrastructure do not encourage alternative operators to invest in a new 
infrastructure, thus reducing the need for the incumbent operator to invest in response884 and 
KPN notes the same incentive885. On the other hand, Iliad argues that the lower price of copper 
would provide incentives for the SMP operator to migrate886, and ECTA considers that higher 
copper prices would distort incentives as “SMP operators are unjustifiably rewarded with 
windfall profits on assets that are long sunk […], while alternative operators’ ability to serve 
and increase their customer base and either plan their migration or invest in their own fibre 
networks is severely diminished”887. 
According to Cadman (e.g. 2019)888, wholesale price setting for legacy networks can impact 
investment behaviours by incumbents and alternative operators offering legacy network retail 
services through unbundling, bitstream or re-sale. The relationship between legacy wholesale 
prices and incentives to invest in VHCN (or NGA) are the subject of several academic papers 
examining the impact and likelihood of different operator types investing in NGA or VHCN), of 
which two are quoted: 
First, Hellwig (2014), who concludes that “a low access price on the old network leading to a 
low retail price makes consumers less willing to switch to the new network, hampering 
investment. A high access price for the old network (relative to retail prices) aimed at 
incentivising entrants to invest in new infrastructure can disincentivise incumbents to invest 
 
882 Quoted by Iliad in its response to the Targeted Consultation, Q37. 
883 Open Fiber response to the Targeted Consultation, Q37. 
884 EIR response to the Targeted Consultation, Q37. 
885 KPN response to the Targeted Consultation, Q37. 
886 Iliad response to the Targeted Consultation, Q37. 
887 ECTA response to the Targeted Consultation, Q37. 
888 Study on the determinants of investment in VHCN – a System Dynamics approach: Volume 2: Literature Review, 
November 2019, p.24. 
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due to lost wholesale revenue for the old network and fear of triggering investment by entrants. 
Relative access pricing for the new network must also be carefully considered: 
“…a low access price [for the new infrastructure relative to the old infrastructure] could hamper 
investment as firms then find access-seeking more attractive and the potential first mover 
would accordingly invest less” (p.69) 
Second, Cave (2014), who summarises the effect of copper unbundling on fibre investment: 
“Clearly, unbundling which forces down the price of copper broadband is likely to have a 
restraining effect on fibre investment, by reducing the price of current generation broadband 
and thus the price which owners of fibre networks can charge. However (…) copper access 
decisions are mostly irreversible by now: policy makers and regulators must now lie upon 
whatever unbundled copper bed they have made.” (p. 679) 
Cadman (e.a. 2019)889 , summarizes key points from academic literature investigating the 
impact of the pricing of access to the copper local loop on incentives to deploy FTTH as follows: 
• “Low wholesale legacy prices incentivise incumbents to invest due to low opportunity 
cost – low legacy wholesale prices relative to costs create a low profit margin for the 
incumbent operator, so the opportunity cost from lost NPV value for the legacy network 
is lower, reducing the threshold that the VHCN NPV must exceed. 
• Low wholesale legacy prices disincentivise alternative operators from investing due to 
high opportunity cost – low legacy wholesale prices relative to retail prices creates a 
higher profit margin for alternative operators retailing legacy broadband using the 
incumbent’s legacy network, so the opportunity cost from lost NPV value for the legacy 
network is higher, creating a higher threshold that the VHCN NPV must exceed.  This 
is termed the “replacement effect” by Bourreau, Cambini & Doğan (2012).   In efficient 
markets it would be expected that high profit margins would attract more retail operators 
and so over time competition would cause retail prices and margins to be squeezed. 
• High wholesale legacy prices incentivise alternative operators to investing due to the 
low opportunity cost – high legacy wholesale prices relative to retail prices offer a lower 
profit margin for alternative operators retailing legacy broadband using the incumbent’s 
legacy network so that the opportunity cost from lost NPV value for the legacy network 
is lower, lowering the threshold that the VHCN NPV must exceed. 
• High wholesale legacy prices disincentivise incumbents to invest due to high 
opportunity cost – high legacy wholesale prices relative to costs create a high profit 
margin for the incumbent operator from the legacy network wholesale, so the 
opportunity cost from lost NPV value for the legacy network is higher, raising the 
threshold that the VHCN NPV must exceed. Bourreau, Cambini & Doğan (2012), term 
this the “wholesale revenue effect”. Further, they point out that the incumbent risks 
triggering alternative operators to build their own VHCN in retaliation, losing wholesale 
revenue for the incumbent for both its old and new networks. 
• Low legacy wholesale prices restrict VHCN prices – Bourreau, Cambini & Doğan 
(2012), argue that low legacy wholesale prices lead to low retail prices for legacy 
broadband, which in turn will restrict VHCN retail prices since operators must offer low 
VHCN prices to encourage consumers to switch. They term this the “migration effect”. 
 
889 Study on the determinants of investment in VHCN – a System Dynamics approach: Volume 1: Technical Report, 




As discussed in section 7.9.7.3, even without formal VHCN price regulation, there can 
be an informal anchor pricing impact from legacy network prices at least during the 
transition period where operators are looking to persuade consumers to switch to the 
VHCN.” 
Similarly, Ilsa Godlovitch et al (2019)890 report that “it has been acknowledged that pricing 
copper in a manner that purely reflects consumer welfare in copper-based retail services, could 
have a negative impact on FTTH investment and migration. More specifically, if the FTTH retail 
price is constrained by a low copper wholesale charge, this may limit the viable scope of 
deployment, while if FTTH wholesale and/or retail charges are set significantly above those 
charged for copper, this may impact alternative operators’ incentives to invest in FTTH (rather 
than relying on access to the cheaper legacy infrastructure) and retail customers’ incentives to 
migrate to the more modern technology”. 
However, these findings as such cannot be extrapolated to estimate the possible impact of the 
granting of pricing flexibility for ULL access and/or increases of its pricing once fibre is already 
rolled out. Indeed, while the mentioned literature relates to the impact of the relative prices of 
copper and fibre at the moment when the decision to invest or not is taken, the question today 
is whether the relative prices of copper and fibre will have an impact on the pace of the 
migration after the end of the deployment and on when running parallel networks can be ended 
and, in the relevant case, how substantial the impact could be. 
Examining the latter question, Karl-Heinz Neumann e.a. (2020)891, stressed nonetheless the 
„limits of provoking end customer and market participants’ reactions by pricing and therefore 
steer the desired outcome. As experience shows, user behaviour is far more complex than 
being able to be steered by one parameter. (…) Customers with high bandwidth preferences 
will rather - independently of the retail prices - switch to fibre as soon as it is available, given 
their higher willingness to pay for high bandwidth. Experience shows that about 1/3 will remain 
unaffected by pricing due to a reluctance for opening their in-house cabling to be replaced by 
fibre, which might also be reasoned by legal causes. Just like there is a group of high 
bandwidth affine users, there will remain a group of subscribers without the need to upgrade 
a telephony only- or a narrow band subscription. By 2018, the share of narrow band 
subscribers in France was still 25 %, with a good share within these number of customers that 
have technical access to higher bandwidths”. 
Ilsa Godlovitch and Peter Kroon (2020)892, acknowledge that reluctance from end-users to 
switch can be a “significant barrier to achieving migration from copper to fibre. Switching 
barriers for customers can be affected by: 
• Relative pricing of ADSL/FTTC products in comparison with FTTH/B 
• Satisfaction with ADSL-based offers (thereby seeing limited value in upgrading) 
• Practical difficulties associated with switching from one product to another or from one 
platform to another 
• Legacy equipment which is not supported by an IP-based communications 
infrastructure. 
 
890 WIK-Consult (2019). Prospective competition and deregulation: An analysis of European approaches to 
regulating full fibre, p. 27. 
891 WIK-Consult (2020). Copper switch-off, fibre take-up and ULL tariffs in France, p.96. 
892 WIK-Consult (2020). Copper switch-off, European experience and practical considerations, p. 37. 
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Interviews conducted in the context of their study suggest that “in France, customers are 
reluctant to migrate to fibre-based services due to the high quality of the DSL network and 
lower prices compared to fibre-based broadband. In other words, there was a perceived lack 
of imperative to switch. The intervention of a technician in the home was also not always 
welcome. In Spain, making contact with owners of second homes and holiday residences was 
considered a challenge by interviewees. (…) Interviewees in nearly all countries agreed that 
business customers could often be more challenging to migrate than residential customers due 
to the extensive use by some businesses of legacy equipment such as PABX and ISDN 
connections, which in many cases are also still the basis for their internal corporate network 
and call centres”. 
Moreover, access seekers will be reluctant to pass on possible price increases to their retail 
customers since under Art. 105.4 EECC, the latter would then have the right to terminate their 
contract without incurring any further costs. Such a right to cancel the contract is only not 
granted when the change of contractual conditions is directly imposed by national law, which 
would not be the case. 
Finding 53. Views are divided on whether departing from the principle of cost orientation 
to set access prices to legacy networks would be susceptible to hasten migration to fibre 
networks.  In any case, pricing alone is not the just means to achieve an efficient fibre 
migration. 
 
Ilsa Godlovitch and Peter Kroon (2020)893 therefore draw attention to the demand side and 
point to the likely contribution of the setting by the operators of retail prices considering the fact 
that the “similarity of pricing between ADSL 20Mbit/s offers and services offering 100Mbit/s or 
more in France should also support migration, while in Spain copper-based retail offers are no 
longer actively marketed at all in areas served with fibre”. 
c) Ending the obligation imposed on the SMP operator to provide wholesale access to 
its legacy network for the future 
In France, the NRA distinguishes technical closure of the copper local loop (which corresponds 
to the definitive interruption of services) from commercial closure of the copper local loop 
(which corresponds to the moment when Orange stops selling products based on the copper 
local loop)894. 
For the commercial closure, ARCEP distinguishes two cases: 
• If all national commercial operators are already connected to the fibre local loop, then 
Orange can proceed to a quick commercial closure at the level of the fibre mutualisation 
point with a 2-month notification period for mass-market products and 6-month 
notification period for business market products if certain conditions are met895. 
 
893 WIK-Consult (2020). Copper switch-off, European experience and practical considerations, p. 39. 
894 Commission Comments of 26.112020 concerning Cases FR/2020/2277-2278-2279-2280 
895 (i)All the main FTTH commercial operators must be present at the concerned mutualisation point at the time of 
the notification. 
(ii) At least one activated offer based on FTTH must be available to serve business needs.  
(iii) At least one high-quality passive access offer based on fibre must be available under technical and pricing 
conditions comparable to SDSL offers – for instance FTTH-based access with improved QoS. 




• If some of these commercial operators are not present at the mutualisation points of 
the local loop, then the SMP operator can only proceed to the commercial closure with 
an 18-month notification period for mass-market products in less dense areas of private 
initiative (ZMD-AMII), a 36-month notification period for mass-market products in the 
rest of the territory, and a 36-month notification period for products serving business 
customers896. These periods may be shortened once Orange presents a concrete 
switch-off plan. 
In the UK, the NRA has authorised897 an SMP operator, where the latter has covered 75% of 
premises connected to a copper exchange with fibre connections from June 2021 onwards, to 
stop selling copper services when a customer moves premises, changes service or switches 
provider (the “stop sell”). 
Some SMP operators support such a “stop sell” approach (see Box 15). 
Box 15. Approach advocated by the Belgian SMP operator Proximus 
Regarding costs, Proximus provides an elaborate assessment (in response to the online 
survey) that it uses a two-factor approach to help minimise costs (including of networks run 
in parallel): 
1. Initially, the operator identifies a broad set of operational processes for ensuring a 
gradual transition for all clients on the copper network. This includes sending 
notices explaining the advantages and a clear timeline of ceasing of services. 
2. During the transition period (when both copper and fibre networks are in place), it 
is necessary that the SMP operator is allowed to connect new retail and wholesale 
clients exclusively on the new network, stopping the orders of old copper products, 
which will be phased out soon due to migration. 
Source: Online survey data. 
d) Other factors delaying migration 
An Italian operator898 alleges that the NRA delays migration because it does not allow the SMP 
operator to notify the switch-off until the area is fully NGA covered and 60% of end customers 
has migrated to NGA accesses and that the SMP operator must notify the switch-off 12 (for 
non-LLU central offices), 18 (for LLU central offices) or 24 months (for central offices in the 
areas where a public NGA network will be deployed by a concessionaire different from TIM) 
 
896 At the end the notification period, the following criteria must be met: 
i. At least one FTTH local loop is deployed and able to fully serve the area concerned by the commercial closure. 
ii. The fibre local loop(s) in the area must offer access under technical and commercial conditions that allow access 
seekers to reproduce sufficiently closely their offer on copper, for instance with the presence of at least two 
commercial operators on top of the infrastructure operator and a number of active lines (on top of the infrastructure 
operator’s) of at least 10 thousand or 10% of the lines concerned by the access offer. 
iii. At least one FTTH-based retail offer is available for all locals in the area. 
iv. At least one activated offer based on FTTH must be available to serve business needs. 
897 OFCOM, Promoting competition and investment in fibre networks: Wholesale Fixed Telecoms Market Review 
2021-26, Volume 1: Overview, summary and structure, 18 March 2021, p.17. 
898 TIM response to the Targeted Consultation, Q34. 
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before the start of the technical migration process. Moreover, only the SMP operator bears the 
cost of migration.  
Ilsa Godlovitch and Peter Kroon (2020)899 acknowledge that such obligations could “be a 
hurdle for network operators to switch-off their copper networks”. Moreover, they advocate that 
migration could be implemented even if not all subscribers can be migrated to FTTH in the 
area concerned. They refer to the approach in Estonia, which is a frontrunner as regards 
migration, where “the copper subscriber access lines will be replaced by access lines based 
on a mixture of fibre (50%), Fibre to the Curb (FTTC) in combination with G.fast (40%) and 
Fixed Wireless Access (10%)”900.  
An SMP operator claims that the migration process is delayed due to end-user protection under 
the EECC, such as the possibility to end the contract following its change, and due to the cost 
and time required to exchange all end user modems901. 
Other concerns expressed 
A concern raised by stakeholders active in several countries relate to the transparency of the 
migration process and prevention of discrimination/anti-competitive behaviour. An example of 
such behaviour could be the self-supply of copper local access by the SMP operator if it is not 
available to access seekers. ECTA notes the examples of “for elevators, industrial machines, 
backup lines or mobile backhaul”902 that could be susceptible to such behaviour. 
Finding 54. Several comments suggest the need for a clear monitoring system to ensure 
that the migration process is non-discriminatory, as there are concerns that SMP operators 
could use a copper switch-off to gain competitive advantage. 
 
Moreover, several comments advocate an inclusive process during which the different 
stakeholders participate. Since their positions and incentives are likely to diverge, a joint 
process to identify the way forward would benefit in ensuring a more rapid migration from 
copper to fibre, while also ensuring a non-discriminatory approach. 
  
 
899 WIK-Consult (2020). Copper switch-off, European experience and practical considerations, p. 42-43. 
900 Idem, p. 12. 
901 An operator’s response to the online survey. 




PART III: FORWARD LOOKING ANALYSIS 
11. A suggested way forward 
A successor to the two Recommendations is called for in order to take subsequent market, 
legal and regulatory developments into account. Overall, our results suggest that many 
aspects of the current Access Recommendations remain fit for purpose, but with further 
refinement needed. 
All of our forward-looking recommendations must be understood in conjunction with the 
ongoing evolution of: 
• Overall EU policy goals as regards the digitalisation of the EU as a whole 
• The changes in focus embodied in the EECC itself in comparison to the previous RFEC 
• Changes that are already visible in electronic communications markets in the EU 
Member States, including changes that are visible since 2018 when the EECC was 
enacted 
To begin with, EU policy over the past twenty years has reflected the strong desire to 
progressively increase the capability of EU communications networks as a crucial underlying 
element in strengthening the productivity, sustainability and global competitiveness of the EU 
(see Sections 2.b and 2.h). Communications networks are a key enabler that can contribute to 
broad spill-over effects into the broader society and economy. The shift in focus from the goals 
of the Digital Agenda for Europe (DAE),903 which seem quite modest by today’s standards, to 
the Gigabit Society904 represented a significant raising of the bar. In 2021, the Commission’s 
Digital Compass Communication905 notes that “achieving gigabit connectivity by 2030 is key.” 
It calls for all European households to be covered by a gigabit network by 2030 (versus 59% 
today), with all populated areas covered by 5G (versus 14% today). These strategy 
pronouncements are backed up by a number of concrete measures, notably including the 
Recovery and Resilience Fund (RRF),906 which requires that 20% of funding of up to €672.5 
billion (2018 prices) be applied to promoting digitalisation and addressing its consequences, 
and explicitly identifies various forms of VHCN and 5G as candidates for funding. 
Secondly, promotion of “connectivity and access to, and take-up of, very high capacity 
networks, including fixed, mobile and wireless networks” became an explicit policy objective 
with the adoption of the EECC (Art. 3), and with it, a shift to “efficient infrastructure-based 
competition”. This was accompanied by a shift in focus to make greater use of access to 
passive civil engineering assets rather than active network services. The Recommendations 
already represented a step in that direction, but the EECC took the process further. Some of 
our suggestions in this chapter seek to take this process still further. 
Thirdly, progressively more high speed broadband has been deployed within the Member 
States. The Access Recommendations were enacted at a time when this process was still at 
 
903 European Commission (2010), A Digital Agenda for Europe, COM(2010) 245. 
904 European Commission (2016), Connectivity for a Competitive Digital Single Market - Towards a European 
Gigabit Society, COM/2016/0587 final. 
905 European Commission (2021), 2030 Digital Compass: the European way for the Digital Decade, COM(2021) 
118 final. 
906 European Union (2021), “Regulation (EU) 2021/241 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 
February 2021 establishing the Recovery and Resilience Facility”. 
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an early stage. Moreover, the nature of high speed broadband deployment and with it the 
nature of the competition is changing – with a progressive increase in consumer demand and 
willingness to pay (WTP), facilities-based network operators who are willing and able to 
compete head to head at wholesale level with SMP operators have emerged in many Member 
States (for instance, in Italy and Ireland). In Spain, Portugal and France, the use of SMP CEI 
has played a crucial role in the emergence of facilities-based competition. 
In parallel with this shift in emphasis in the EECC, the number of regulated markets (i.e. 
markets susceptible to ex ante regulation) has been progressively reduced from 18 to 2 in 
successive versions of the Relevant Markets Recommendation (RRM) as a response to 
improving competitive conditions in the Member States. 
Our task here, based on our retrospective assessment of the performance of the current 
Access Recommendations in Chapters 3 through 10, and in light of the goals expressed in the 
EECC, is to identify possible ways in which a successor recommendation might be made more 
effective, efficient, coherent, and more in line with EU added value than the current 
Recommendations. This is very much in line with the spirit of the EU’s long-standing core 
principle of Better Regulation: “Evaluate first!” 
In keeping with our treatment throughout the report, we are covering not only Market 3a/2014 
in this chapter, but also where appropriate Market 3b/2014, even though Market 3b/2014 has 
not been carried forward in the latest revision of the Relevant Markets Recommendation.907 
Market 4/2014 issues are linked to those covered here, but we are treating them as being out 
of scope for this report. 
In the sections that follow, we begin by considering the scope that should apply to each 
provision in the successor recommendation in Sections 11.a, followed by price regulation, non-
discrimination, cooperative agreements, geographic differentiation, and migration from legacy 
infrastructure in Sections 11.b through 11.g, respectively.  
a. The scope of each provision of the successor Recommendation 
The scope of each provision in a successor to the Access Recommendations should be 
carefully considered on a case by case basis. 
The Access Recommendations seek to provide guidance on the implementation of the EECC 
as it relates to broadband deployment. The scope of the current Access Recommendations is 
broader overall than NGA. This is a property that deserves to be preserved – the successor 
Recommendation should not be limited as a whole to only NGA, or only to a VHCN.  
Many of the measures in the Access Recommendations specifically deal with obligations on 
SMP operators. The successor recommendation should express a scope that reflects the 
Relevant Markets Recommendation of 2020908, which recognises that the former Market 
3b/2014 is progressively becoming more competitive. Nonetheless, many NRAs will continue 
to regulate Market 3b/2014 services until they become effectively competitive (although the 
NRA will have the burden of proof to continue to regulate). With that in mind, we propose that 
any provisions that relate to SMP should have a scope that reflects markets as defined in the 
 
907 European Commission (2020), “Commission Recommendation of 18.12.2020 on relevant product and service 
markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with Directive 
(EU) 2018/1972 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 establishing the European 





Member State in question, reflecting the Article 68 EECC process. This implies that the future 
recommendation should seek to provide guidance to NRAs on the most appropriate remedies 
to address SMP not only for Market 1, but also (where relevant) in the former Market 3b. 
Many of the measures of the current Recommendations that seek to promote high speed 
broadband deployment (i.e. NGA) can now be linked explicitly to Art. 3(2)(e), which calls on all 
relevant public authorities to “promote connectivity and access to, and take-up of, very high 
capacity networks, including fixed, mobile and wireless networks, by all citizens and 
businesses of the Union”. NGA deployment is not explicitly identified as a “general objective”. 
At the same time, Art. 74(1) calls on NRAs to “take into account the need to promote 
competition and long-term end-user interests related to the deployment and take-up of next- 
generation networks, and in particular of very high capacity networks”, when they assess 
whether price control obligations would be appropriate.909 
Taking all of this together, the EECC as a whole should be understood to reflect a political 
consensus at the EU level that the general objective is to promote the deployment and adoption 
of VHCN. Promotion of non-VHCN NGA as defined in previous instruments is positive, but is 
not a general objective. In other words, it plays a secondary role. 
On that basis, the successor Recommendation should place its primary emphasis on the 
promotion of VHCN, treating the promotion of NGA as at most a second-best alternative. 
Again, case by case analysis is required. In a number of instances in this chapter, we propose 
that the successor Recommendation explicitly refer to VHCN rather than NGA. In instances 
where current NRA measures refer to NGA, transitional measures may be needed to permit 
an orderly phasing out of arrangements that are currently in place. 
BEREC observed in its consultation response that it is not always clear whether the current 
Recommendations should apply only to VHCN, or also to other high performance networks 
that may or may not fall short of meeting the definition of VHCN. Which, for instance, are 
pertinent only to fixed networks? Which might be relevant to mobile or wireless networks? 
Among networks that fulfil the conditions identified in the BEREC VHCN Guidelines, we 
recommend that they be addressed by the successor Recommendation in as consistent a 
manner as possible.  
The BEREC Guidelines summarise their definition of the VHCN (based on the EECC) as 
comprising: 
• Any network providing a fixed-line connection with a fibre roll out at least up to the multi-
dwelling building 
• Any network providing a wireless connection with fibre roll out up to the base station 
• Any network which provides a fixed-line connection and is capable of delivering under 
usual peak-time conditions a network performance equivalent to what is achievable by 
a network providing a fixed-line connection with fibre roll-out up to the multi-dwelling 
building and meeting performance thresholds 1 as defined in the Guidelines 
• Any network which provides a wireless connection and is capable of delivering under 
usual peak-time conditions a network performance equivalent to what is achievable by 
 
909 See also Art. 22 and Recitals 193 and 209.  
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a network providing a wireless connection with fibre roll-out up to the base station and 
meeting performance thresholds 2 as defined in the Guidelines. 
Under the BEREC definition, FTTB and FTTH networks are always treated as VHCN, as well 
as wireless networks where the base station is connected by fibre (the wireless access speed 
is also important in practice, but a wireless network is classified as a VHCN irrespective of 
speed if the base station is connected by fibre). Other networks, including cable DOCSIS 3.1, 
G.Fast, and other wireless networks may constitute a VHCN depending on their performance 
characteristics. 
In sum, the applicability of each provision of a successor recommendation should be 
considered in light of (1) the range of applicability of any corresponding provisions in the 
EECC; (2) for provisions that seek to address market power, the markets where SMP has been 
found to be present; and (3) for provisions that seek to promote deployment, all forms of VHCN 
as defined in the BEREC Guidelines, which should be addressed in as technologically neutral 
a manner as possible. In a few carefully selected instances, it may be appropriate to treat NGA 
as a second-best alternative to VHCN.  
b. Price regulation and pricing flexibility 
Both Recommendations sought to strike a more suitable balance than the 2002 Regulatory 
Framework had done between (1) ensuring effective competition and thus protecting 
consumers, and (2) fostering efficient investment into innovative services, with a focus on high 
capacity broadband services. 
The economic and policy arguments in favour of striking a proper balance between the two are 
reasonably clear in the literature (see Chapter 2), and in our judgment continue to be sound. 
Price regulation and pricing flexibility do not function in isolation, but rather must be understood 
together with mechanisms that seek to prevent discrimination and market foreclosure that are 
covered in Section 11.c. 
For VHCN, pricing flexibility is preferred over price regulation, provided that a number of 
underlying conditions are fulfilled. The basic logic of price regulation and pricing flexibility, as 
initially put in place in the NDCM and then codified in part in Art. 74 EECC, are that: 
• If a lack of effective competition means that the undertaking concerned may sustain 
prices at an excessively high level, or may apply a price squeeze, to the detriment of 
end-users, price control obligations may be imposed. 
• If, however, 
a) sufficient competitive safeguards are in place; 
b) a demonstrable retail price constraint is present; and 
c) obligations imposed including any ERT ensure effective and non-discriminatory 
access, 
• Then pricing flexibility is encouraged (i.e. no price control obligations). 
• Before imposing price control obligations, NRAs should consider whether they would 
be appropriate in light of the need to promote competition and long-term end-user 
interests related to the deployment and take-up of next-generation networks, and in 




In our historical analysis in Chapter 5, we paid considerable attention to the market for 
wholesale central access (WCA) provided at a fixed location for mass-market products (the 
former Market 3b). We place somewhat less focus on WCA in this forward-looking section 
because it has been removed from the list of markets susceptible to ex ante regulation in the 
new Relevant Markets Recommendation due to the expectation that it will progressively 
become competitive in the coming years.910 In general, price control obligations will not apply 
to WCA markets at some point in the future; however, they may remain subject to SMP 
regulation in many Member States for some years to come. 
Price regulation of civil engineering infrastructure (CEI) is a special topic that we take up later 
in Section 11.d. 
We consider separately cases where price regulation is imposed on an SMP operator versus 
cases where pricing flexibility is granted in line with the NDCM (and where it could be granted 
going forward under Art. 74 EECC as transposed into national law), since they have very 
different implications relative to the Access Recommendations. 
Pricing flexibility 
As noted at the beginning of Section 2, pricing obligations should be imposed on an SMP 
operator under Art. 74 EECC if a lack of effective competition means that the undertaking 
concerned may sustain prices at an excessively high level or may apply a price squeeze to the 
detriment of end-users. If, however, (1) sufficient competitive safeguards are in place; (2) a 
demonstrable retail price constraint is present; and (3) obligations imposed including any 
Economic Replicability Test (ERT) ensure effective and non-discriminatory access, then 
pricing flexibility is encouraged (no price control obligations). 
Further, before imposing price control obligations, NRAs should consider whether they would 
be appropriate in light of the need to promote competition and long-term end-user interests 
related to the deployment and take-up of next-generation networks and, in particular, of very 
high capacity networks. 
The need for sufficient competitive safeguards is expressed mainly in terms of effective non-
discrimination. We take this up separately in Section 11.c because in addition to being a 
precondition for pricing flexibility, non-discrimination is a regulatory remedy in its own right. 
One of the price constraints is expressed in the NGA Recommendation in terms of a “copper 
anchor”. It goes without saying that the effectiveness of copper legacy products as a price 
constraint has been declining over time. These provisions continue to be relevant, but they are 
in need of an update. 
The NDCM also requires a Technical Replicability Test (TRT) “when EoI is not yet fully 
implemented”.911 This continues to be relevant. Our surveys and case studies show that the 
TRT (or at least KPIs ensuring non-discriminatory replicability) are available throughout the 
EU. However, comments received suggest that there is some room for improvement (see 
Chapter 6). 
 
910 The successor recommendation should reflect the 2020 Relevant Markets Recommendation. However, in 
applying the successor recommendation, NRAs will also need to consider the market definitions that they have 
made pursuant to Art. 64(3) EECC. 
911 Points 48 and 49 in conjunction with Points 11 through 18. 
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Non-discrimination as a precondition for granting pricing flexibility 
Our assessment is that the time has come for guidance to make clear that pricing flexibility can 
be granted based on non-discrimination regimes that are effective, including in some cases 
where full Equivalence of Input (EoI) would be disproportionate but where effective non-
discrimination can be ensured adequately through Equivalence of Output (EoO). 
This is not the case in current guidance. In Art. 48 NDCM Recommendation, non-discrimination 
based on EoI is an explicit requirement. 
Art. 74 EECC codifies the non-discrimination obligation, but not its explicit reliance on EoI. It 
requires instead that the obligations imposed ensure “effective and non-discriminatory access”. 
Recital 193 EECC clarifies that “pricing flexibility should be accompanied by additional 
safeguards to protect competition and end-user interests, such as strict non-discrimination 
obligations, [emphasis added] measures to ensure technical and economic replicability of 
downstream products, and a demonstrable retail price constraint resulting from infrastructure 
competition or a price anchor stemming from other regulated access products, or both.” Recital 
193 goes on to note: “Those competitive safeguards do not prejudice the identification by 
national regulatory authorities of other circumstances under which it would be appropriate not 
to impose regulated access prices for certain wholesale inputs …” 
As we explain in Section 11.c, the EECC recognises in Recital 185 that “[i]n order to address 
and prevent non-price related discriminatory behaviour, equivalence of inputs (EoI) is in 
principle the surest way of achieving effective protection from discrimination,” but it also 
recognises that EoI is likely to trigger higher compliance costs than other forms of non-
discrimination of access. Art. 70 EECC describes obligations for non-discrimination in terms of 
equivalence of access rather than equivalence of input. In other words, the value of EoI is 
recognised, but it is also recognised that it is not the most appropriate or the most proportionate 
solution in all cases. 
In a workshop with BEREC members conducted in support of this project on 15 April 2021, a 
number of NRAs expressed the view that a well implemented EoO non-discrimination regime 
could be as effective, or nearly as effective, as an EoI regime – the main difference being, in 
their view, that non-discrimination provisions are more self-enforcing under EoI than under 
EoO. 
Non-discrimination was discussed at length in the same workshop with BEREC members, in 
our workshop with stakeholders on 9 June 2021, in our survey and case study interviews, and 
also in the Commission’s targeted consultation. Based on that input, our belief is that hallmarks 
of a mature, effective non-discrimination regime include (1) appropriate and well-crafted KPIs, 
(2) effective monitoring on the part of the NRA, and (3) timely imposition of dissuasive penalties 
when appropriate. Of these, KPIs combined with associated penalties for consistent failure to 
adhere to them are the criteria that can most readily be used to establish measurable criteria 
to justify non-discrimination that is sufficiently effective (in conjunction with a price constraint 
and with technical and economic replicability) to justify pricing flexibility under Art. 74 EECC. 
(SLAs and SLGs are also important, but they are in principle commercial agreements between 




Recommendation 1. We recommend that the successor recommendation require effective 
non-discrimination, rather than requiring equivalence of input (EoI) as a prerequisite in all 
cases. EoI would be a sufficient condition (but not a necessary condition) for recognising 
a non-discrimination regime as being effective, and thus meeting the non-discrimination 
criteria necessary to grant pricing flexibility. The successor recommendation should set 
forth a succinct list of suggested KPIs based on NRA experience that can be presumed, 
as part of an overall effective implementation of non discrimination by the NRA, to provide 
non-discrimination sufficiently effective to meet the non discrimination criteria necessary to 
grant pricing flexibility. 
 
The “copper anchor” 
In the NDCM, one of the key preconditions for granting pricing flexibility is the presence of a 
retail price constraint. This is expressed, for instance, as “a demonstrable retail price constraint 
resulting from the infrastructure competition or a price anchor stemming from cost oriented 
wholesale copper access prices”. As we strive to drive the deployment of VHCN today, the 
relevance of legacy copper services is declining along with the usage of wholesale ULL 
services. 
This possibility was foreseen in Point (56) of the NDCM. “If the product offered by the SMP 
operator on the legacy access network is no longer able to exercise a demonstrable retail price 
constraint on the NGA product (for example in the event of a copper switch-off), it could in 
principle be replaced by an NGA-based product that is tailored to have the same product 
features. However, it is not envisaged that such an NGA-based anchor will be required in the 
immediate future or before 2020.” 
The approach is in order, but 2020 has come and gone and NRAs would benefit from some 
more specific guidance regarding suitable anchor products. While copper can still serve as an 
anchor in some Member States, an entry level fibre-based product is more appropriate today 
in other Member States. However, fibre ULL is probably not suitable because there is no upper 
limit on its performance. There are other Member States where no wholesale product can 
serve as an effective price anchor today. 
In defining the NGA product that might replace the copper anchor, an NRA will need to examine 
the chain of substitution between different access products and will need to identify a product 
that is likely to create a genuine effective downward pressure on retail broadband prices (in a 
forward-looking perspective) that is capable in turn of imposing a constraint at the wholesale 
level. The regulated broadband anchor product should be an entry-level product and not 
necessarily the most popular product. The price anchor product will typically be a product with 
less capability (and offered at a lower price) than that of the products whose retail price it 
constrains. As with the copper anchor today, an anchor product can constrain the price of 
VHCN offerings without itself having to be a VHCN service912.  
Where a fibre-based virtual access product is chosen as an anchor product, it will generally be 
appropriate to define the regulated anchor product in terms of speed and quality. Choosing a 
 
912 BEREC recalls that NRAs should consider whether there is a need for stricter regulation of any NGA product, 
response to the Targeted Consultation, Q12. 
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fibre-based anchor product might also simplify the migration from legacy copper to fibre since 
the anchor is not dependent on underlying copper-based technology913. 
It is important to bear in mind that an anchor product is not the only form of retail price constraint 
recognised by the EECC in the context of pricing flexibility. Recital 193 EECC makes it clear 
that there are many different ways in which to provide “safeguards to protect competition and 
end-user interests”. Moreover, the retail price constraint does not work in isolation – the 
combined effects of any non-discrimination obligations, measures to the ensure technical and 
economic replicability of downstream products, and the effects of any infrastructure-based 
competition or competition from non-regulated products should be taken into account. Recital 
193 EECC also makes clear that NRAs might identify “other circumstances under which it 
would be appropriate not to impose regulated access prices for certain wholesale inputs, such 
as where high price elasticity of end-user demand makes it unprofitable for the undertaking 
designated as having significant market power to charge prices appreciably above the 
competitive level or where lower population density reduces the incentives for the development 
of very high capacity networks and the national regulatory authority establishes that effective 
and non-discriminatory access is ensured through obligations imposed in accordance with this 
Directive.” 
The presence of a facilities-based competitor offering wholesale access services might also 
serve as an effective price constraint, even if the degree of competition is not sufficient for a 
finding that no SMP is present. 
Recommendation 2. The reference to the "copper anchor" should be updated to provide 
constructive guidance and criteria as to how a suitable anchor product should be identified. 
The ideal anchor product would be (1) an entry level product that is used, or amenable to 
being used, by alternative operators to provide their own retail products and (2) with a price 
that is either price regulated or else constrained in such a way that regulation is not 
necessary. If a virtual fibre-based access product is chosen, its speed and quality should 
be defined and constrained. It is important, however, to bear in mind that an anchor product 
is not the only form of retail price constraint recognised by the EECC in the context of 
pricing flexibility. 
 
The Economic Replicability Test (ERT) 
The Economic Replicability Test (ERT) continues to be highly relevant, but its use as an 
enabler for pricing flexibility, and thus as an alternative to cost orientation, has been more 
limited in practice than might have been expected. BEREC acknowledges in its 2020 
Regulatory Accounting Report that “the NDCM Recommendation on the ERT for NGA products 
as the alternative for ex ante price control is not fully applied. Summing up, margin squeeze 
tests are used mainly as a complementary measure for a price control method. The traditional 
margin squeeze test is often used complementary to cost oriented price regulation rather than 
as a substitute.”914 
 
913 As advocated by Brian Williamson (2017), “Supporting fibre rollout and infrastructure competition in Ireland via 
continued pricing flexibility", June 2017, Communications Chambers, p.33,  




The ERT has also proven to be complex to implement in practice, and there are many 
questions as to how best to apply it. 
At a workshop held on 9 June 2021 in support of this project, several participants915 argued 
that the ERT’s exclusive focus on the SMP operator has the unfortunate side-effect of 
depressing investment on the part of other network operators, including wholesale-only 
operators. 
A word about terminology is in order. As in the previous chapters, we use the term ERT to refer 
to an ex ante margin squeeze test used to implement pricing flexibility in the sense meant by 
the NDCM. We refer to any other ex ante use of a margin squeeze test as an ex ante MST. 
We refer to the use of a margin squeeze test by the national competition authority as an ex 
post MST. NRAs make extensive use of ex ante MSTs (see Figure 14 in Section 5.g), but 
fewer NRAs use the ERT as an alternative to price control in the sense meant by the NDCM. 
The areas where clarifications could be considered include (1) whether the flagship products 
assessed under the ERT should be individual products versus a portfolio of products; (2) if a 
portfolio includes unregulated services (for example, video content), then how to reflect this in 
the ERT; (3) in dealing with scale economies, whether to use a Reasonably Efficient Operator 
(REO) versus a scale-adjusted Equally Efficient Operator (EEO), and, in either case, what 
scale should be assumed; (4) how to deal with volume discounts and long term pricing in the 
ERT; (5) the time frame in which the ERT should be conducted; (6) possible use of a wholesale 
ERT (e.g. between ULL and bitstream); and (7) the process to be followed in order to ensure 
transparency and stakeholder engagement. We consider each of these in turn. 
Applying ERT to individual products versus a portfolio of products 
The NDCM calls on NRAs to implement the ERT only for “flagship” products, but provides only 
limited guidance as to what the relevant retail products might be. “The NRA need not to run 
the test for each and every new retail offer but only in relation to flagship products to be 
identified by the NRA. … NRAs should … assess the margin earned between the most relevant 
retail products including broadband services (flagship products) and the regulated NGA access 
input most used … as the most relevant for delivering the retail products for the market review 
period in question.” 
The trade-offs between portfolio versus product-by-product approaches are clear enough in 
principle. A portfolio approach provides the SMP operator with more flexibility, makes it easier 
for the SMP operator to implement welfare-enhancing Ramsey-Boiteux pricing principles,916 
and in some Member States may better reflect market realities; however, it potentially permits 
a selective price squeeze on some products and may reflect market realities less well in some 
other Member States. 
This became clear in the course of a workshop with NRAs and BEREC conducted on 15 April 
2021. Both Spain and Luxembourg implement pricing flexibility, but they implement the ERT 
very differently and each approach could be justified relative to their respective national 
 
915 Edoardo Fagiolini of Open Fiber, a wholesale-only operator in Italy; Tony Shortall of the consultancy TELAGE; 
Maurizio Mucci, of Sky, Italy; and Felipe Florez Duncan of consultancy Oxera, who questioned whether the ERT is 
needed at all when there is wholesale competition. 
916 With Ramsey-Boiteux pricing, mark-ups on different offerings reflect demand elasticity for those offerings. Note 
that the SMP operator will in general be just as strongly motivated as the NRA to impose Ramsey pricing, and is 
better able to do so because it has a better understanding of retail demand elasticities. Cf. Laffont and Tirole (2000), 
Competition in Telecommunications. 
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circumstances. Luxembourg conducts the ERT relative to relatively pure broadband access 
services,917 while Spain conducts the test against a retail portfolio that includes a range of 
services including video content.918 
Luxembourg has chosen a product-by-product approach. They have a strong SMP operator 
with a substantial market share (some 62%), but customers can easily opt in or out of optionally 
bundled services. The flagship products chosen represent some 70% of turn-over. 
In Spain, the market share of the SMP operator is much smaller and the take-up of complex 
bundles is widespread. Bundles that include pay-TV services represent a large portion of the 
market (see Figure 19); consequently, they cannot be ignored. 
Figure 19. Take-up of bundles in the Spanish broadband market. 
 
Source: Spain CNMC (2021), “Update on the current challenges faced by the NRAs regarding the ERT”. 
Geographic differentiation of wholesale products might also come into play. The NDCM 
considers this possibility, but provides limited guidance.919 We suggest that the same principles 
that are used to geographically differentiate markets or remedies (see Section 11.f) should 
apply here, and that the ERT should reflect the same geographic delineation used for 
differentiated markets or remedies. If a Member State employs geographically differentiated 
markets or remedies, it will typically be appropriate to consider wholesale costs and retail 
prices separately for each of the different markets in which SMP is present. The ERT should 
seek to ensure that the prices for the flagship retail services available in each geographically 
differentiated area leave enough economic space for competitors relative to the price or prices 
of the main SMP wholesale access products that could be used to produce them in the same 
geographic area. 
 
917 Commission Decision of 4.08.2014 concerning Cases LU/2014/1663-1664 and LU/2014/1637. 
918 Spain CNMC (2021), “Update on the current challenges faced by the NRAs regarding the ERT”, presentation. 
919 Per Point (67): “Should national competitive circumstances show a difference between geographic areas in terms 
of the NGA access input used (for example in rural and densely populated areas) NRAs should vary the test based 





Fixed voice + fixed broadband
Fixed voice + fixed broadband + pay TV
Fixed voice + fixed broadband + mobile services





Recommendation 3. Principles on which to choose ERT flagship products would appear 
to have merit. National circumstances would need to be taken into account, including the 
degree of market power of the SMP operator, and the prevalence and nature of bundled 
offerings. Factors that the NRA should take into account include (1) how the SMP operator 
packages its most popular offerings in practice (e.g. whether as individual connectivity 
offerings, versus, for instance, bundles that include unregulated elements such as content); 
and (2) whether selection of a portfolio as an ERT flagship would provide a strong SMP 
operator with too much scope to abusively price individual narrower offerings. 
 
How to reflect unregulated services within a portfolio in the ERT 
Where the ERT is conducted using a bundled flagship retail product, it will often be the case 
that some components of the bundle are regulated while others are not. This poses multiple 
challenges, including: 
• How much of the retail price should be allocated to which element of the bundle? 
• What cost should be imputed to the unregulated elements? The NRA will typically have 
limited tools for estimating these costs, and the SMP operator will not necessarily be 
legally obliged to provide information. 
• What is the risk of cross-subsidisation between the components of the bundle? 
The experience of the Spanish CNMC, which has experience in conducting the ERT on 
bundled services that include unregulated components, is instructive.920 They note that the 
analysis can become complex, both because the NRA must obtain information about many 
components of the bundle, and because non-replicability might be caused by unregulated 
components. Indeed, the regulated components might represent a small fraction of the cost 
and price of a large bundle. Further, determining whether the costs of the unregulated 
components are efficiently incurred can also be challenging. Taking all of this into account, 
they see three possible approaches to regulating these bundles: 
• Impute a price for just the regulated elements of the bundle. The stand-alone price 
of the unregulated elements of the bundle is subtracted from the total. This approach 
might not be satisfactory if for instance the stand-alone offers are not much taken up. 
Also, the price of the bundle will often be considerably less than the sum of the stand-
alone prices of its components. 
• Apportion the price of the bundle to the different components of the bundle. This 
may be difficult to do in practice. Further, it is not clear how to deal with possible cross-
subsidisation of some elements of the bundle by other elements. 
• Conduct the ERT for the bundle as a whole. The challenge in this case is that it is 
necessary to estimate the cost of all of the regulated and unregulated components.921 
There are challenges with each of these approaches, but the second seems somewhat less 
problematic than the first or the third. 
 
920 Spain CNMC (2021), “Update on the current challenges faced by the NRAs regarding the ERT”, presentation. 
921 Despite its complexity, this approach is in use in Denmark, for example. 
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Recommendation 4. Identify best practices on how to conduct the ERT when a flagship 
product is a bundle that includes unregulated elements. The most promising approach in 
general appears to be to apportion the retail price to the different elements of the bundle, 
but it is not clear that this approach is best in all Member States or in all circumstances. 
Further exchange of best practice on these issues, especially in the context of some 
relevant BEREC workstream, might be helpful. 
 
In its response to the public consultation, BEREC specifically noted that most NRAs lack legal 
authority to gather information on the unregulated components of bundled flagship products, 
and that this constitutes a limitation to their ability to conduct the ERT.922 This could be 
particularly problematic where the unregulated component is provided by an undertaking 
established outside of the EU (for instance, from a right holder of premium media content). 
However, we know from our interviews with NRAs that EU SMP operators sometimes refuse 
to provide information (or delay responding to information requests, or provide incomplete or 
misleading information) about the distribution of costs or revenues for the different components 
of a bundle that includes both regulated and non-regulated elements. BEREC specifically 
noted that they “would welcome the Commission to provide explicit support for the gathering 
of information (especially the information related to the costs of the non-regulated components) 
…, as this is essential to carry out the replicability analysis of broadband bundles. In any case, 
in this context it has to be ensured that the information required is proportional to what is strictly 
needed.”923 We think that the request is well founded. 
Art. 20(1) EECC would appear to already address this in principle. “Member States shall 
ensure that undertakings providing electronic communications networks and services, 
associated facilities, or associated services, provide all the information, including financial 
information, necessary for national regulatory authorities, other competent authorities and 
BEREC to ensure conformity with the provisions of, or decisions or opinions adopted in 
accordance with, this Directive and Regulation (EU) 2018/1971 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council.” Nonetheless, SMP operators dispute in practice whether they are obliged 
to provide information about otherwise non-regulated products, and there is a risk that NRAs 
will be unable to properly implement the ERT in consequence. Clarifying this point in the 
successor recommendation is likely to enhance legal certainty for all concerned. 
 
922 BEREC (2020), BEREC Response to the Targeted consultation on the revision of the Commission’s access 
recommendations, BoR (20) 169. “Sometimes, information on the non-regulated components included in a bundle 
are essential to determine whether a broadband bundle is replicable. Information on non-regulated components are 
also essential to identify (unfair) cross-subsidies between regulated and non-regulated services or some other 
anticompetitive practises affecting the regulated service. However, SMP operators are usually reluctant to provide 
solid information on the non-regulated component of bundles and can argue they are not obliged to do so. 
Therefore, BEREC would welcome the Commission to provide explicit support for the gathering of information 
(especially the information related to the costs of the non-regulated components) in these cases, as this is essential 
to carry out the replicability analysis of broadband bundles. In any case, in this context it has to be ensured that the 
information required is proportional to what is strictly needed.” 
923 BEREC (2020), BEREC Response to the Targeted consultation on the revision of the Commission’s access 




Recommendation 5. The successor recommendation should clarify that information 
needed to allocate the price of a flagship retail bundle across regulated elements and any 
non-regulated elements of the retail bundle for purposes of the ERT constitutes 
“information, necessary for national regulatory authorities, other competent authorities and 
BEREC to ensure conformity with the provisions of …” the EECC, and thus falls within the 
scope of Art. 20(1) EECC. The SMP operator must respond to these information requests, 
even where they involve non-regulated services. 
 
Scale economies: EEO, REO, and scale adjustments 
Recital (26) of the NGA Recommendation speaks both of an equally efficient competitor test 
and of a reasonably efficient competitor test. The former assesses whether the SMP operator’s 
own downstream operations would be able to trade profitably on the basis of the upstream 
price charged to its competitors by the upstream operating arm of the SMP operator (‘equally 
efficient competitor’ test), while the latter compares the same upstream to the downstream 
operations of a reasonably efficient competitive service provider (reasonably efficient 
competitor test). 
Points (64) and (65) of the NDCM speak only of an equally efficient operator (EEO) test, but 
provide for the possibility of scale adjustments. “Where specific market circumstances apply, 
such as where market entry or expansion has been frustrated in the past, NRAs may make 
adjustments for scale to the SMP operator’s costs, in order to ensure that economic replicability 
is a realistic prospect. In such cases, the reasonably efficient scale identified by the NRA 
should not go beyond that of a market structure with a sufficient number of qualifying operators 
to ensure effective competition.” 
In its response to the public consultation, BEREC advocated “the consideration of both tests 
(EEO and REO/scale adjusted EEO) on the same level in the new access recommendation”.924 
This text implicitly links the ERT to the market review, and explicitly links it to a sought-after 
number of competitors (“the reasonably efficient scale identified by the NRA should not go 
beyond that of a market structure with a sufficient number of qualifying operators to ensure 
effective competition”). The value chosen potentially has an important impact on prospects for 
competitive entry. If, for instance, the EEO is scaled to assume a market share of 25%, it would 
tend to suggest that not more than three competitors to the SMP operator have enough 
economic space between their costs and their retail revenues to successfully achieve 
competitive entry. 
In practice, the relationship between the scaling factor and the number of competitors is not 
straightforward. Furthermore, this relationship might be different at different levels of the value 
chain, might be different for facilities-based competitors versus access seekers that are not 
facilities-based, and will tend to evolve over time. 
It is clear that the scale factor must be chosen with care. If it is set too high, it limits the number 
of competitors that can be expected to successfully enter or maintain themselves in the market. 
If, on the other hand, the scale adjustment is set too low, it might possibly lead to inefficient 
 
924 BEREC (2020), BEREC Response to the Targeted consultation on the revision of the Commission’s access 
recommendations, BoR (20) 169, page 18. 
Study on Regulatory Incentives for the Deployment of Very High Capacity Networks in the 
Context of the Revision of the Commission’s Access Recommendations 
270 
 
competitive entry. If it were to be set so low as to result in setting the price of wholesale 
products below the SMP operator’s costs, it can be expected to lead to economic distortions. 
We observe that practice among NRAs that use the ERT in order to provide pricing flexibility 
is diverse. In the case of Luxembourg, for instance, the ILR has reported that it assumes a 
reasonably efficient competitor with a market share of 15% (even though market shares of the 
alternative operators are lower in practice).925 
In light of comments made by NRAs at the workshop held with BEREC in support of this project, 
together with follow-up discussions with one of the NRAs, the link to the desired number of 
competitors may be too narrow and thus too restrictive. We suggest instead that the scale 
adjustment should be based on a general assessment of the competitive situation in the 
Member State in question. The number of competitors can be a factor in that assessment, but 
it is only one of many. Other measures of competition can be taken into account as appropriate, 
including for instance the current HHI at each level of the value chain and its expected evolution 
over time, the size of the largest competitors relative to that of the SMP operator, and the size 
of the broadband and VHCN markets in the Member State (which might influence the number 
of competitors that can be economically viable).   
Recommendation 6. The successor recommendation should provide principles for 
determining the market share to be used in any scale adjustment to the scale of the SMP 
operator. The scale adjustment should reflect the overall level of competition for broadband 
and for VHCN in the Member State, taking into account (as appropriate) factors which for 
instance might include (1) the number of competitors that are likely to be viable at each 
level of the value chain, (2) the current HHI at each level of the value chain and its expected 
evolution over time, (3) the size of the largest competitors relative to that of the SMP 
operator, and (4) the size of the broadband and VHCN markets in the Member State (which 
might influence the number of competitors that can be economically viable). A scale 
adjustment will not necessarily be required in every Member State. 
 
Negotiated volume discounts and long term pricing and the ERT 
The use for purposes of calculating the ERT of long term discounts, volume discounts and 
commercial agreements that have been negotiated between the SMP operator and one or 
more alternative operators would tend to imply a lower wholesale price for analysis, and thus 
once again implies that some constellations would pass the ERT that otherwise might fail. In 
effect, smaller alternative operators might not have enough economic space to operate 
profitably. 
For this reason, it would appear to be simpler in most cases for the NRA to base the ERT on 
the non-discounted price of wholesale services, and to use the scale adjustment to the 
EEO/REO test to ensure that the market is sufficiently open to competition; however, a number 
of additional factors should be considered. 
The need for a case by case assessment is not a departure from Annex II of the NDCM 
Recommendation, which says that “in order to ensure the right balance in national 
 
925 Commission Decision of 13.02.2019 concerning Cases LU/2019/2137-2138 and LU/2014/163, footnote 13: 
"There are 16 alternative operators present on the Luxembourgish retail market, the largest alternative operator has 




circumstances between incentivising efficient and flexible pricing strategies at the wholesale 
level and at the same time ensuring a sufficient margin for access seekers to maintain 
sustainable competition, NRAs should give due weight [emphasis added] to the presence of 
volume discounts and/or long-term access pricing agreements between the SMP operator and 
access seekers.” This suggests that there is a need to reflect on how to most appropriately 
handle these discounts in the context of the ERT. 
There are a number of instances where reflecting the discounts in the ERT might be 
appropriate. First, there are some markets, e.g. Germany and Spain, where most alternative 
operators achieve some level of wholesale discounts. For such markets, the NRA may need 
to explicitly reflect discounts in order to accurately reflect market realities in conducting the 
analysis. 
Second, if the discount structure is imposed by the NRA as a price control measure, it will 
generally be appropriate to explicitly reflect it in the ERT. 
Recommendation 7. The handling of long term discounts and volume discounts in the ERT 
requires a case by case analysis. In most cases, long term discounts and volume discounts 
to wholesale prices should be ignored when conducting the ERT. Guidance should reflect 
the fact that in most cases, scale adjustments to the EEO/REO based on undiscounted 
wholesale prices will be the simplest and best way to ensure that the ERT is effective in 
protecting competition. If, however, the discount structure is imposed by the NRA as a price 
control measure, or if the market is such that most alternative operators achieve some level 
of wholesale discounts in practice, then it will typically be appropriate to reflect them in the 
ERT. 
 
The time frame in which the ERT should be conducted 
Point (56(b)) of the NDCM sets forth the time frame in which an ERT must be completed. “The 
procedure that the NRA will follow to conduct an ex ante economic replicability test, specifying 
that the NRA can start the procedure on its own initiative or at the request of third parties, at 
any time but no later than three months after the launch of the relevant retail product, and will 
conclude it as soon as possible and in any case within four months from starting the 
procedure.” 
In practice, the NRA’s choice of timing for conducting an ERT (if one is needed at all) is likely 
to depend on many factors, including the degree to which the retail product is entirely new 
versus being a minor adaptation of an existing retail product. 
The fact that the NRA has the option to apply the test ex post appears to be positive inasmuch 
as it can provide useful flexibility to the SMP operator. The SMP operator can avoid needlessly 
delaying product introduction, and thus can hasten the time to market for new retail offers. 
Even so, the time frame could easily be problematic. In particular, if a product were to fail the 
ERT months after it has been released, it is not clear what should happen. Our case studies 
turned up at least one instance where this happened (Lithuania) and was problematic. 
There is also an argument to be made that, if a TRT is also required, the timing should be 
aligned as much as possible. 
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In its consultation response, BEREC asked for additional time to complete the ERT. “BEREC 
agrees with the Commission that the determination of replicability must be carried out rapidly, 
but a new access recommendation should also consider that the NRA follow up the evolution 
of existing flagship products (price modifications, temporary discounts, incorporation of new 
bundled services, etc.) as the mapping of those is complex and subject to change over time. 
In case relevant changes are detected, NRAs can update the list of flagship products or revise 
the result of replicability analysis according to updated information more rapidly. Hence, the 
limits set out in [a successor to Point 56 of the NDCM Recommendation] should be compatible 
with a follow-up activity.” One BEREC official indicated that BEREC would appreciate having 
six months to complete the ERT instead of four months. There appears to be a trade-off here 
between providing the NRAs with time that they might occasionally need (but not always), 
versus possibly introducing delay into an already lengthy process. 
Recommendation 8. Permitting the NRA to initiate the ERT up to three months after the 
launch of the relevant retail product and completed within four months thereafter continues 
to be appropriate. If the TRT is conducted in advance of the launch of the SMP operator’s 
new retail offering, however, it will often be desirable that the ERT be conducted at the 
same time. 
 
Use of a wholesale margin squeeze test (MST) 
There are instances of a wholesale Margin Squeeze Test (MST) being implemented (for 
instance in Ireland926, France, and the Czech Republic, and it is in the process of being 
implemented in Italy). The typical intent is to ensure an adequate spread between the 
wholesale price of LLU or VULA products (the former Market 3a) versus bitstream (the former 
Market 3b). 
The NDCM already recognises the possibility of a wholesale margin squeeze text in Recital 
63: “NRAs may also apply an ex ante margin squeeze test to regulated wholesale inputs in 
order to ensure that wholesale access pricing of copper-based access products does not 
hinder competition at retail level or to ensure an adequate economic space between the 
different copper access inputs.” 
Given that the 2020 Relevant Markets Recommendation no longer treats the former Market 3b 
as being susceptible to ex ante competition, this possible concern has taken on a very different 
character. It was probably never a major issue for the EU overall, but there is still some 
possibility going forward that the price of SMP offers for VULA and unregulated bitstream might 
not leave enough economic space for competitors to offer bitstream service in certain Member 
States. There is also the possibility of misalignment between the price of SMP CEI and the 
price of VULA from the same SMP operator. 
The existing guidance remains generally fit for purpose, but should be updated to reflect the 
considerations just noted.  
 
926 ComReg Ireland (2018), “Pricing of wholesale broadband services: Wholesale Local Access (WLA) market and 
the Wholesale Central Access (WCA) markets: Response to Consultation Document 17/26 and Final Decision”, 




Ensuring transparent process and stakeholder engagement 
The ERT is an important procedure for which transparency and stakeholder engagement are 
important. Points (66) and (67) of the NDCM provide basic guidance: “The NRA should set out 
and make public in advance in its adopted measure following a market analysis the procedure 
and parameters it will apply when running the ex ante economic replicability test. … The 
economic replicability test set out by the NRA in advance should be adequately detailed and 
should include as a minimum a set of relevant parameters in order to ensure predictability and 
the necessary transparency for operators.” 
Our survey and case studies have flagged a number of alleged NRA shortcomings regarding 
the transparency of the process of designing the ERT. We also heard complaints regarding 
the transparency and alleged lack of predictability of the ERT process in the course of the 
stakeholder workshop held in support of this project on 9 June 2021. 
One SMP operator alleged that lack of transparency about which data the NRA would use to 
conduct the ERT, or how it would use the data, led to unexpected penalties when the ERT was 
implemented retrospectively after a new retail product had been introduced. They specifically 
alleged that their NRA chose to use 2018 data in an ERT, even though the SMP operator had 
already provided more up-to-date data in 2019. We cannot judge the merits of this specific 
case, but the issue raised is fair as a general proposition – the NRA must be transparent about 
the data that it will employ in the ERT, in line with Point 66 of the NDCM Recommendation: 
“The NRA should set out and make public in advance in its adopted measure following a 
market analysis the procedure and parameters it will apply when running the ex ante economic 
replicability test.” In cases where an ERT is applied retrospectively, it is particularly important 
that the NRA refrain from changing the rules with retrospective effect unless there is a 
compelling need to do so. 
Recommendation 9. Transparency continues to be important for the conduct of the ERT. 
Point 56(a) and Annex II NDCM identify a number of aspects of the ERT that must be 
subject to public consultation in advance: (1) the relevant downstream costs taken into 
account; (2) the relevant cost standard; (3) the relevant regulated wholesale inputs 
concerned and the relevant reference prices; (4) the relevant retail products; and (5) the 
relevant time period for running the test. The successor recommendation should expand 
the list to include, where applicable: (6) how flagship products will be determined, (7) 
whether flagship products are intended to be individual versus portfolio products, and (8) 
what approach will be taken to any unregulated products that are part of the flagship bundle 
 
Flexibility and measures to protect facilities-based competition by preventing unfair price 
competition 
Pricing flexibility permits the SMP operator to price at a level different from that of BU-LRIC 
cost. The arrangements in the NDCM Recommendation and in the EECC provide extensive 
protection against prices that are too high, but do nothing to protect against prices that are too 
low. 
At the public workshop held on 9 June 2021 in support of this project, a few participants argued 
that price cap controls were totally inappropriate in light of the EECC’s shift in emphasis away 
from active wholesale access products, and instead toward facilities-based competition based 
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where feasible on the use of passive wholesale access products.927 And we also heard that “if 
there is the prospect of entry and a desire to encourage infrastructure competition, then 
detailed price regulation is inconsistent with that objective - that is where price flexibility can 
play a role when there is the prospect of entry.”928  
The introduction of new measures to prevent the SMP operator from introducing 
inappropriately low prices for wholesale access  would appear, however, to be in line with the 
views that we heard at the workshop 929 (which we share) that the thrust of the EECC is to shift 
the focus to efficient facilities-based competition, based in many cases on CEI rather than on 
active wholesale products. 
A number of Member States have firms that are deploying substantial volumes of VHCN, 
usually over limited geographic areas (as for instance in Italy or Ireland), often on a wholesale-
only basis. They are typically competing with an SMP operator to offer wholesale services to 
network operators who will offer retail services to end-users. They face an uphill battle to 
establish themselves in the face of an established SMP operator with scale economy 
advantages and a significant installed base. The SMP operator may also have sufficient overall 
profitability to be able to offer low wholesale prices on a product or in a geography where it 
faces a competitive threat.930 
Indeed, a recent paper by Prof Carlo Cambini on behalf of Open Fiber (a wholesale-only 
provider in Italy) provides useful insights for the case where a vertically integrated network 
operator competes with a wholesale-only provider in the same geographic area (or overlapping 
areas). The paper finds (1) that the analysis of competition should consider not only the 
coverage of wholesale competition, but also the relative market shares of any facilities-based 
competitors; (2) the analysis should be geographically differentiated; (3) the incremental 
willingness-to-pay (WTP) of consumers is important, but appears to be low; and (4) the 
elasticity of retail demand for VHCN services relative to their price increment versus the price 
of legacy services is crucial. Cambini finds that “in order to avoid potential behaviours which 
could reduce competition in the initial phase and slow down the investments necessary to have 
a more distributed network on the territory, the lower the fibre take-up rate, … the higher the 
minimum price ( or floor ) must be below which it is not possible to go down in the commercial 
negotiation phase by the wholesale operators.” 
This is a significantly different problem than the one that the classic price control approach of 
the current Recommendations were designed to deal with. Classic price control seeks to 
enable retail competition in a setting where wholesale competition is impractical; it 
consequently seeks to make wholesale access products available at low prices. Enabling head 
to head competition at wholesale level, which is contemplated in the EECC, however, implies 
the opposite – the need to ensure that the price of wholesale access products is not so low as 
to make it impractical for even an efficient competitor to achieve or maintain successful market 
 
927 Tony Shortall of the consultancy TELAGE was particularly emphatic on this point. Shortall works for numerous 
clients, including the FTTH Council; however, he maintains that his remarks reflect his personal views, held over 
many years and presented in many different contexts, rather than those of any client. Edoardo Fagiolini of Open 
Fiber (Italy) also spoke of the fundamentally changed nature of competition. 
928 Felipe Florez Duncan of the consultancy Oxera. Oxera works in many sectors, and for a wide range of clients 
(see https://www.oxera.com/insights/reports/.)  
929 This thought was especially prominent in the comments of Felipe Florez Duncan of the consultancy Oxera. 
930 In one of our interviews, it was alleged that an SMP operator had made an offer to the NRA to sell access 
services in highly competitive regions “below cost”, i.e. below the BU-LRIC calculated cost. Whether this is actually 
below cost is not entirely clear – highly competitive areas will tend to be dense urban areas with a lower-than-
average unit cost to deploy. If the SMP operator were truly to price below cost, it would risk a competition law action 
alleging predatory pricing. But narrowly targeted prices might possibly be low enough to be problematic without 




entry, for instance because it has not yet developed sufficient scale economies and cannot 
cross-subsidise from revenues derived from providing copper-based access. 
The incentives of the SMP operator are crucial here. In creating pricing flexibility, it was 
assumed in the past that the SMP operator would be motivated to charge a higher price than 
it would have been entitled to under a cost orientation regime. In the face of wholesale 
competition, the SMP operator is motivated to limit the effectiveness of the competitor at the 
same time that it maximises its own profits. Following the basic logic that we know from 
predatory pricing in competition economics,931 a firm with market power will typically be 
motivated to price predatorily only if either (1) it can do so on a tightly targeted basis so as not 
to forego too much potential revenue, or else if (2) it believes that it will be able to raise prices 
enough after having weakened or eliminated a competitor to be able to compensate for the 
revenue that it sacrificed by pricing predatorily. 
The question remains as to whether some SMP operators in practice are charging 
inappropriately low wholesale prices for access products? In the course of our research, we 
heard only one well substantiated allegation, and even in that case there is room to debate 
whether the prices set by the SMP operator are in fact harmful in terms of societal welfare. So 
it is unclear whether this is a practical concern versus being only a hypothetical concern. 
If one were to grant for the sake of argument that the problem is real and requires a response, 
then the logic of predatory pricing suggests that it might be appropriate to augment pricing 
flexibility (in Member States where this might be an issue) with measures that prevent the SMP 
operator from setting wholesale access prices that are too low. Possible measures include 
(1) prohibiting the SMP operator from offering geographically differentiated prices for access 
to wholesale services, or else limiting the degree to which those prices can differ from one 
another; or else (2) in more extreme cases, by an outright price floor on the price of some of 
the SMP wholesale access products. 
Preventing the SMP operator from offering geographically differentiated prices for access to 
wholesale services (or alternatively requiring that the difference in wholesale prices cannot be 
greater than the difference in cost) might often be enough to address any real threats. 
Following the logic of predatory pricing, the SMP operator is most likely to be motivated to set 
inappropriately low prices for wholesale access if it can do so for only a small fraction of its 
customer base. The most obvious way for an SMP operator to do this is to offer lower prices 
for selected wholesale access products only in geographic areas where they perceive a threat 
from a facilities-based competitor.932 Considerable nuance is needed here in order to 
distinguish cases where this is helpful from those where it is harmful. If the areas most subject 
to competition are dense areas or urban areas, then geographically differentiated pricing for 
wholesale access services may reflect legitimate differences in unit cost to the SMP operator. 
One can also argue that for the SMP operator to offer prices with lower mark-ups in areas 
where it is subject to competition is in line with Ramsey-Boiteux pricing principles, which are 
generally beneficial for societal welfare. But if geographically differentiated wholesale prices 
are so low as to preclude competitive entry, and especially if they are below the SMP operator’s 
unit cost, then they are likely to be harmful on balance. 
In the UK (which continues to follow the principles of the EECC in general), Ofcom recently 
prohibited the SMP incumbent from offering geographically differentiated wholesale prices 
 
931 We are making a general economic point here, not necessarily claiming that any firm is pricing predatorily today. 
932 This behaviour was alleged in one of our interviews. 
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altogether, except with explicit permission.933 Ofcom was concerned that the UK SMP operator 
“may be able to deter large scale alternative network rollout (and therefore face reduced 
competition over a wider area) by reducing prices in relatively few local areas. [The SMP 
operator] intends to roll out FTTP on a large scale. Even if reducing prices locally results in 
lower returns in some areas, this may not be significant in the context of its overall FTTP 
investment.”934 In order to address concerns such as these, Ofcom “decided to restrict 
Openreach’s ability to discriminate through geographically targeted price reductions by 
imposing a specific provision [that] makes it clear that [the SMP operator] is prohibited from 
charging different prices in different geographic areas for rental services, except where 
[Ofcom] otherwise consents. … The geographic discrimination prohibition … prevents 
differentiated prices and other pricing measures which might have the same effect.”935 
The Irish NRA ComReg likewise implements a restriction on the ability of the SMP operator to 
selectively set geographically differentiated prices for wholesale: “In exceptional circumstances 
only and subject to … pre-conditions, [the SMP operator] may be allowed, subject to ComReg’s 
approval, to reduce the wholesale access price for FTTH based [virtual unbundled access] 
below its average costs provided that the price is not less than the lower of either: (a) Eircom’s 
full deployment costs for the provision of FTTH based [virtual unbundled access] in the specific 
geographic area concerned; or (b) the FTTH based VUA price of an alternative operator (i.e., 
an alternative operator’s retail price minus retail costs and relevant network costs).” The 
reasoning is in line with that in this section: “If the wholesale price is too high in areas where 
infrastructure investment is also unlikely to develop (as the deployment cost for each line is 
high i.e., in rural areas), this would not be desirable due to the detrimental long-term impact on 
end users arising from a lack of competition, as competition from operators acting as resellers 
may also be dampened while end users may pay too much for their broadband service. On the 
other hand the wholesale price should not be too low, especially in more densely populated 
areas, as it could deter investments in the long term.”936 
Prohibiting geographic discounts (or for that matter implementing a price floor) may tend in 
some cases to increase consumer prices. Any remedy that has the effect of increasing 
consumer prices needs to be undertaken with considerable care, since it effectively sacrifices 
static efficiency and consumer welfare to a limited degree in exchange for gains in dynamic 
efficiency, especially due not only to more extensive VHCN build-out, but also due to facilities-
based VHCN competition. In the ideal case, the need for remedies would be time-bounded – 
once the facilities-based competitor were sufficiently well established, these obligations would 
no longer be needed, and there might even be a basis for the NRA to find that SMP is no 
longer present. 
If a prohibition on geographic wholesale price differentiation were to prove to be insufficient to 
address a specific problem, an outright price floor on wholesale access services could be 
considered. Our feeling is that this is an extreme remedy that runs counter to the rationale for 
 
933 Ofcom (2021), “Promoting competition and investment in fibre networks: Wholesale Fixed Telecoms Market 
Review 2021 - 26: Volume 3: Non-pricing remedies”, Chapter 7. 
934 In addition, Ofcom was concerned about “commercial arrangements such as loyalty discounts or pricing 
contingent on large volume commitments from wholesale customers, which penalise access seekers for moving 
volumes from Openreach to an alternative network operator.” 
935 Idem., paragraphs 7.71 and 7.72. 
936 ComReg Ireland (2018), “Pricing of wholesale broadband services: Wholesale Local Access (WLA) market and 
the Wholesale Central Access (WCA) markets: Response to Consultation Document 17/26 and Final Decision”, 




pricing flexibility. It should be considered only in extreme cases, if at all.937 In most cases, 
restrictions on geographically differentiated pricing for wholesale access services (and on other 
discounts that have similar effect) are likely to be sufficient, less intrusive, and therefore more 
proportional. 
It is not entirely clear whether measures such as there are permitted under the EECC. Under 
Art. 74 EECC: “A national regulatory authority may, in accordance with Article 68, impose 
obligations relating to cost recovery and price control, including obligations for cost orientation 
of prices and obligations concerning cost-accounting systems, for the provision of specific 
types of interconnection or access, in situations where a market analysis indicates that a lack 
of effective competition means that the undertaking concerned may sustain prices at an 
excessively high level, or may apply a price squeeze, to the detriment of end-users [emphasis 
added]”. 
Art. 74 EECC goes on to say: “In determining whether price control obligations would be 
appropriate, national regulatory authorities shall take into account the need to promote 
competition and long-term end-user interests related to the deployment and take-up of next- 
generation networks, and in particular of very high capacity networks. In particular, to 
encourage investments by the undertaking, including in next-generation networks, national 
regulatory authorities shall take into account the investment made by the undertaking.” 
Investments made by a facilities-based competitor can presumably be relevant here, not only 
those made by the SMP operator. 
It is also worth noting that the objectives identified in Art. 3 EECC include not only the promotion 
of “connectivity and access to, and take-up of, very high capacity networks, including fixed, 
mobile and wireless networks, by all citizens and businesses of the Union”, but also the 
promotion of “competition in the provision of electronic communications networks and 
associated facilities, including efficient infrastructure-based competition”. 
These concerns are more likely to come into play (if at all) where: 
• There is at least one viable, or potentially viable, facilities-based VHCN competitor to 
the SMP operator. The NRA should be able to judge this based on information that it 
gathers through the Art. 22 EECC geographic survey. 
• Competition at the wholesale level is not (yet) sufficient to justify an overall finding of 
an absence of SMP. 
• The competitor is either a wholesale-only facilities-based VHCN provider or else a 
provider that is at least heavily dependent on VHCN wholesale revenues. 
• The SMP operator is active over large parts of the national territory, while any facilities-
based competitors have a more limited physical presence. 
 
937 This is in line with Ofcom’s findings. “We remain of the view that a prohibition on geographic discounts is a 
simpler and more proportionate means of addressing our competition concern than a price floor. A floor would 
continue to allow Openreach to target price cuts in areas where entry occurred at relatively low cost to itself. [A] 
floor set too high would risk artificially inflating prices, while a floor set too low might give Openreach more 
commercial flexibility, but would not be as effective at preventing Openreach from setting low prices selectively in 
specific areas.” 
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Recommendation 10. In specific circumstances, an SMP operator might have the incentive 
to set (geographically differentiated) prices of wholesale access services at a low level that 
makes the success of facilities-based wholesale VHCN competitors unlikely in certain 
areas. This might possibly arise in Member States where facilities-based competition is 
emerging or is likely to emerge over a portion of the national territory (which the NRA will 
typically know based on Art. 22 EECC survey data). 
 
Price regulation 
Our survey work and case studies showed that the cost orientation modelling methodology put 
forward in the NDCM Recommendation is widely supported across stakeholders and countries, 
as explained in Chapter 5. The BEREC Regulatory Accounting Report for 2020938 notes that 
NRAs generally follow this recommendation for the former Market 3a, while practice is more 
evenly split between LRIC/LRAIC and Fully Distributed Costs (FDC) (i.e. top-down analysis) 
for the former Market 3b; the use of a modelling approach appears to be increasing when 
compared to 2019 BEREC data. However, some comments suggested a possible need for 
improvements to the guidance on the valuation of the regulatory asset basis (RAB) and on the 
frequency of reviews of the parameters of cost models used. 
We explored whether there might be insufficient clarity as to the circumstances that should 
lead either to a major revision of the cost model, or to a less extensive update of parameters. 
There is clearly a trade-off to be made between, on the one hand, ensuring stable prices with 
less frequent updates, and, on the other, reflecting current conditions with more frequent 
updates. A few issues were raised. In one instance, a market player complained that changes 
in consumer demand had not been adequately reflected. Overall, however, we did not identify 
any systemic problems. 
We explored whether the approach currently recommended for legacy civil engineering assets 
that are reusable (i.e. valuation at the regulatory accounting value with adjustments to reflect 
depreciation already taken, plus appropriate CPI indexation) should be extended to other 
assets, and, if so, the criteria that such assets should fulfil to qualify for this valuation. The 
concern is that in instances where the SMP operator makes available CATV cables, or copper 
that has been sunk without ducts, NRAs generally value them on the basis of replacement 
costs according to BU-LRIC forward looking cost models. This results in a price that is arguably 
too high for an asset that has already been depreciated over a period of many years. We take 
this up later in this section. 
Other areas where we considered possible revisions are (1) revision or elimination of the price 
band provisions of the NDCM; (2) refinements to the calculation of the (NGA) risk premium; 
and (3) other possible revisions to try to motivate more rapid VHCN deployment to regions that 
otherwise are only marginally profitable. 
The price band 
Points 41 through 43 of the NDCM anticipate that implementation of the recommended 
methodology would lead to “a Union average monthly rental access price for the full unbundled 
copper local loop within a band between €8 and €10 (net of all taxes) expressed in 2012 prices 
 




(the price band)” and then uses this price band as a transitory tool for NRAs partially diverging 
from the recommended methodology. 
The provisions served a useful purpose at the time. The unbundled copper local loop served 
an important role in 2013 and constituted the anchor product for pricing flexibility. At a time 
when cost modeling methodologies were far from uniform among the Member States, the price 
band provided a simple benchmark for identifying Member States whose costing 
methodologies needed urgent attention. 
Today, we question whether this provision is required at all in a successor recommendation. 
Indications of declining relevance include: 
• The relevance of copper ULL is declining and its value as an anchor product in support 
of pricing flexibility is likewise declining. 
• Nearly all of the NRAs that do cost modeling have updated their cost modeling 
approach in line with the NDCM approach. The need for an objective standard to 
identify NRAs whose cost models need urgent revision is not very relevant today. 
The spread in wholesale prices among Member States is substantial; however, consistency of 
wholesale access prices across the Member States is not identified as an Art. 3 EECC general 
objective. We see neither an EECC requirement nor a public policy rationale for maintaining 
the price band. 
Recommendation 11. A successor recommendation should no longer provide a price band 
for wholesale access products. 
 
Pricing of SMP CEI 
As noted earlier, our evidence base suggests that pricing is one of the reasons for low take-up 
of SMP CEI in some Member States (see Chapter 0). Consequently, prices should not be 
higher than justified. 
As regards SMP CEI, the guidance in the NDCM Recommendation is complicated. For new 
CEIs, the NDCM Recommendation calls for “valuation of the assets of such an NGA network 
at current costs” (Point 33). For reusable existing SMP CEIs, however, the NDCM 
Recommendation says: “In the recommended costing methodology the Regulatory Asset Base 
(RAB) corresponding to the reusable legacy civil engineering assets is valued at current costs, 
taking account of the assets’ elapsed economic life and thus of the costs already recovered by 
the regulated SMP operator. … Therefore, the initial RAB corresponding to the reusable legacy 
civil engineering assets would be set at the regulatory accounting value, net of the accumulated 
depreciation at the time of calculation and indexed by an appropriate price index, such as the 
retail price index.” (Points 35 and 37 NDCM) 
In some of the Member States, there is little or no reusable SMP CEI. Some NRAs do not 
make a distinction between new and reusable CEI. 
As regards new SMP CEI, the guidance is in line with the typical current practice of NRAs for 
the rest of the network and is not problematic. 
Study on Regulatory Incentives for the Deployment of Very High Capacity Networks in the 
Context of the Revision of the Commission’s Access Recommendations 
280 
 
Recommendation 12. The guidance on costing methodology in Points 25 through 42 of the 
NDCM Recommendation continues to be relevant for new SMP CEI. This implies valuation 
based on the use of BU-LRIC modeling and current costs. 
 
For legacy reusable SMP CEI, Recital 187 of the EECC is key: “National regulatory authorities 
should value reusable legacy civil engineering assets on the basis of the regulatory accounting 
value net of the accumulated depreciation at the time of calculation, indexed by an appropriate 
price index, such as the retail price index, and excluding those assets which are fully 
depreciated, over a period of not less than 40 years, but still in use.” 
It is important to note at the outset that the guidance on reusable SMP CEI relates only to how 
the assets should be valued. Our understanding is that common practice among the NRAs is 
to model the network as a whole using BU-LRIC models, in line with the NDCM 
Recommendation. This means in particular that the network design, including topology and 
routing, is derived from BU-LRIC models, notably including the number of miles of ducts 
involved. The reference architecture used for the BU-LRIC model should reflect the form of 
network than an operator would choose to build today, which will, in general, be an FTTH 
network. In other words, the quantities are generated by BU-LRIC models, but not necessarily 
the asset values.  
This is appropriate and is consistent with the NDCM Recommendation and with Recital 187 
EECC. The hypothetical topology that the BU-LRIC model calculates for active network 
components is clearly the same topology that must be assumed for the underlying CEI – it is, 
after all, the same network. To do otherwise would risk introducing mutual inconsistencies and 
anomalies between the different cost models. 
When one works with a BU-LRIC model, however, one is dealing with a hypothetical network 
topology. The links generated by the model may or may not exist on the ground in the real 
world. It is not meaningful to say that one individual link is legacy reusable CEI, while another 
is new CEI. 
The initial rationale for valuing reusable civil engineering as the NDCM does is explained in 
the portion of the Impact Assessment for the NDCM that compares options: “the valuation of 
all assets according to current costs, without the adjustment for civil engineering proposed in 
[the approach that we recommend], is likely not to provide the appropriate price signal in those 
circumstances where the entry and thus the deployment of an entire parallel access network 
(or important parts of it) is neither economically feasible nor desirable in the light of the huge 
fixed sunk cost which the new entrant would incur (compared to the incumbent operator), 
especially where existing assets still have spare capacity. Under those circumstances, the 
building option would not be relevant for those assets which are unlikely to be replaced, such 
as for example the civil engineering infrastructure, and more relevant for those assets which 
are replaced, such as, for example, active equipment and, eventually, the copper lines. An 
inflationary effect would therefore be expected if assets that will not be replaced and that have 
already, to a certain extent, been depreciated, would be priced at replacement costs.” In other 
words, reusable civil engineering is not valued at replacement cost because it is highly unlikely 
that it would be replaced in practice.  
How does this change the modeled cost of the reusable civil engineering assets? For these 
assets, the shifts in unit costs over time have been far less dramatic than for active network 
components. The price indexation can likewise be assumed not to have made a great deal of 




from reflecting the degree to which the civil engineering assets have been depreciated. Given 
that the lifetime of civil engineering assets is long (on the order of forty years), and that a 
significant fraction of the civil engineering assets now in use in some Member States was 
installed a long time ago, this difference can be substantial. 
This guidance has been taken over in Recital 187 EECC for the valuation of CEI. 
Once again, irrespective of how civil engineering assets are valued, the volumes typically come 
from the same BU-LRIC models that are used to model the rest of the network. It is 
meaningless to speak of the age of individual ducts. It is, however, possible to take the number 
of miles of ducts, multiply by the fraction that are expected to represent reusable assets, and 
then to make straightforward adjustments to reflect the fraction of those that can be expected 
to be fully depreciated. For the rest, they can be valued based on the regulatory accounting 
base, with adjustments applied for the average depreciation of the SMP operator’s civil 
engineering assets. 
If it is impractical to establish a value using the regulatory accounting base (due, for instance, 
to poor record-keeping in the past by the historic incumbent), the current value should not be 
very different provided that an adjustment for depreciation is still made. In this case, no price 
index adjustment is called for since the prices are already current prices. 
Where price indexation is appropriate, a price index or a mix of price indices should be used 
that are relevant to the deployment costs of CEI. A retail price index alone will typically not 
constitute an ideal metric of the evolution of these costs. 
Average depreciation can be applied to the assets irrespective of whether they have been 
valued at current cost or at historic cost based on the regulatory accounting base. Irrespective 
of whether current costs or historic costs from the regulatory accounting base are used, it is 
important that the adjustment for depreciation is made. Otherwise, in line with the Impact 
Assessment document for the NDCM Recommendation, an “inflationary effect would be 
expected”.  
One knowledgeable interviewee recommended that NRAs use the annuity formula to amortise 
the capital cost. Key inputs in this case are the asset value (capital cost), the asset lifetime, 
and the interest rate (i.e. the WACC). This results in treating capital cost as a constant stream. 
Interviewees also spoke of instances where an SMP operator sold CEI assets, either to another 
firm or to itself, in order to try to reset the depreciation already incurred and thus to be entitled 
to compensation for the CEI asset for its full lifetime rather than its nominal remaining lifetime. 
For purposes of valuation of SMP CEI assets, the total depreciation incurred since the asset 
was built should govern. 
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Recommendation 13. The guidance on costing methodology for reusable SMP CEIs that 
appears in the current Access Recommendations and in Recital 187 EECC continues to 
be broadly fit for purpose overall. NRAs typically use a BU-LRIC model to compute the 
topology and routing of the network, and thus the quantity of reusable civil engineering 
infrastructure, but not its valuation. The adjustments to the value in the regulatory 
accounting base that are called for in Recital 187 EECC to deal with (1) the average 
accumulated depreciation of SMP CEI, (2) the fraction of SMP CEI that is fully depreciated, 
and (3) the fraction of SMP CEI that is reusable, as well as (4) an adjustment based on a 
relevant price index continue to be appropriate and fully relevant for reusable SMP CEI. If 
it is impractical to use the regulatory accounting valuation, the current valuation can be 
used as a proxy, in which case the adjustments for depreciation are still required but not 
the application of a relevant price index. In this regard, we do not see a need for the 
successor recommendation to distinguish between reusable SMP CEI built for the legacy 
copper network versus reusable SMP CEI that was built for VHCN as regards costing and 
pricing methodology, as long as the CEI in question can be used for VHCN today. 
 
Calculation of the (NGA) risk premium  
The Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) plays an important role in calculating the 
CAPEX costs of network infrastructure. Risk is an important component of the WACC, and is 
specifically reflected in the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) formula that all NRAs use to 
calculate the WACC. 
The WACC is primarily an issue in the context of cost-orientation of wholesale access prices, 
as covered in this section; however, it is also relevant for the application of the Economic 
Replicability Test (ERT). 
The NGA Recommendation recognises (point 23) that “costs of capital of the SMP operator 
for the purpose of setting access prices should reflect the higher risk of investment relative to 
investment into current networks based on copper.” 
Art 74(1) codifies this in part: “Where the national regulatory authorities consider price control 
obligations to be appropriate, they shall allow the undertaking a reasonable rate of return on 
adequate capital employed, taking into account any risks specific to a particular new 
investment network project.” 
The cost of fibre-based wholesale products will typically be greater than that of purely copper-
based wholesale products for two main reasons. First, the underlying cost to provide fibre-
based products is likely to be higher than that for copper-based wholesale products. Second, 
in cases where it is appropriate to apply an NGA/VHCN risk premium, the cost associated with 
the WACC (expressed as a percentage) can be thought of as being the product of two 
numbers, each of which is likely to be greater for fibre-based wholesale products than for 
copper-based wholesale products: the cost to provide the wholesale product multiplied by a 
WACC percentage (to which a risk premium has been added if appropriate), as is depicted in 
Figure 20.939 
 
939 For the moment, it is not necessary to distinguish whether a risk premium is part of the WACC versus being 




Figure 20. The legacy (copper-based) WACC and the NGA/VHCN (fibre-based) WACC 
plus risk premium (if any). 
 
Source: Visionary Analytics. 
NRAs seem to be reaching significantly different conclusions as regards the NGA/VHCN risk 
premium. Many NRAs do not apply a risk premium, or no longer apply one if they did in the 
past (see Chapter 5). We also note that SMP operators (who benefit from a high risk premium) 
and alternative operators (who are obliged to pay it) often have opposite views as to whether 
a risk premium is appropriate at this stage of NGA/VHCN deployment. 
The Brattle report940 recommends that only non-diversifiable (i.e. systematic) risk should be 
included in the WACC. Non-systematic risk should be taken into account, but not in the WACC 
(and they likewise argue that any “policy premium” not linked to non-diversifiable risk should 
not be included in the WACC). The Commission says the same in its 2019 WACC Notice941, 
as does BEREC in its 2020 WACC Parameters Report.942 
Point (25) of the NGA Recommendation urges NRAs to “… duly take into account additional 
and quantifiable investment risk incurred by the SMP operator when setting the price of access 
to the unbundled fibre loop. In principle, this risk should be reflected in a premium included in 
the cost of capital for the relevant investment as set out in Annex I.” Annex I then goes on to 
say that the risk premium should take into account “inter alia … the following factors of 
uncertainty: (i) uncertainty relating to retail and wholesale demand; (ii) uncertainty relating to 
the costs of deployment, civil engineering works and managerial execution; (iii) uncertainty 
 
940 Dan Harris, Richard Caldwell, Lucia Bazzucchi, and Francesco Lo Passo (2016), Review of approaches to 
estimate a reasonable rate of return for investments in telecoms networks in regulatory proceedings and options 
for EU harmonization, the Brattle Group. See especially pages 99-100. 
941 European Commission (2019), “Commission Notice on the calculation of the cost of capital for legacy 
infrastructure in the context of the Commission’s review of national notifications in the EU electronic communications 
sector”, 2019/C 375/01. Per Point (17): “In the CAPM framework, specific or diversifiable risks should not be taken 
into account to estimate the cost of capital. This is because in efficient capital markets investors should be able to 
reduce such risks by holding a diversified investment portfolio”. Note however that the WACC Notice “does not 
address the applicability or the calculation of NGA risk premiums”. 
942 BEREC (2020), BEREC Report on WACC parameter calculations according to the European Commission’s 
WACC Notice of 7th November 2019, BoR (20) 116. 
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relating to technological progress; (iv) uncertainty relating to market dynamics and the evolving 
competitive situation, such as the degree of infrastructure-based and/or cable competition; and 
(v) macroeconomic uncertainty.” In practice, the combined effect of the relevant factors, rather 
than their individual contribution to risk, should be reflected in the WACC – their individual 
contribution is not relevant. 
Which of these five factors are systematic? This is not entirely clear. The last of the five 
(macroeconomic uncertainty) is clearly non-diversifiable and thus systematic. For an 
independent financial investor, the other four might be diversifiable in varying degrees. For the 
SMP operator, however, one might well question whether the risks are diversifiable, since a 
VHCN project will often be large enough to significantly influence the value of the firm. Firms 
can and do implement contingency plans to deal with the risks that they perceive, but they do 
not necessarily place sole reliance on diversification.943 And the SMP operator, which 
ultimately serves its investors, might reasonably assume that its investors are fully diversified 
even if the firm itself cannot be. 
In a formal sense, one could thus debate the degree to which any of these five elements should 
be directly incorporated into the WACC. In practice, this fine point does not change the 
permissible wholesale price, and does not appear to be leading to any difficulties. The key 
consideration is that the incremental risk premium associated with VHCN deployment should, 
in the interest of clarity, be separately tabulated from the legacy WACC. 
Typical NRA practice today is to estimate a WACC for legacy services, and to treat any 
additional risk premium for fibre-based services as a separate value to be added to the WACC 
in computing the cost of fibre-based services. Many elements of the WACC are equally 
applicable to the firm as a whole, to both legacy and next-generation products. Treating the 
risk premium as a separate value to be added to the legacy risk premium (computed in 
accordance with the Commission’s 2020 Notice) makes the differences explicit. We therefore 
think that adding the NGA/VHCN risk premium (i.e. a risk premium that is specific to the 
NGA/VHCN deployment project, in line with Art. 74 EECC which calls on the NRA to take into 
account “taking into account any risks specific to a particular new investment network project”) 
as a separate number to the legacy WACC is a good practice that contributes to clarity and 
transparency. 
Recommendation 14. In line with current guidance in the NGA Recommendation and 
elsewhere, and in the interest of clarity, any incremental risk premium associated with 
specific fibre-based deployment projects should continue to be separately tabulated from 
the legacy WACC. In computing the price of price-controlled wholesale access services, 
the risk premium should be added to the WACC. 
 
There is considerable variation as to how different NRAs calculate the risk premium (see 
Chapter 5), and some stakeholders have argued that the risk premium has led to excessive 
margins (or has been set rather arbitrarily) in some Member States. In its consultation 
response, ECTA argued that a separate, higher risk premium for NGA was no longer 
warranted, but many other stakeholders felt that the guidance in the NGA Recommendation 
 
943 For a discussion of systematic versus non-systematic risk, see Dan Harris, Richard Caldwell, Lucia Bazzucchi, 
and Francesco Lo Passo (2016), Review of approaches to estimate a reasonable rate of return for investments in 




continues to be valid in general944. Unsurprisingly, network operators that purchase wholesale 
access services have a different view than those that provide them. 
The NGA Recommendation was enacted long before the EECC defined VHCN. It is natural, 
therefore, to ask whether the risk premium should apply to NGA versus VHCN. The NGA 
Recommendation in fact already deals with this question indirectly in Point 6 of Annex I when 
it says that criteria for a risk premium “… apply in particular to investment into FTTH. 
Investment into FTTN, on the other hand, which is a partial upgrade of an existing access 
network (such as for example VDSL), normally has a significantly lower risk profile than 
investment into FTTH, at least in densely populated areas. In particular, there is less 
uncertainty involved about the demand for bandwidth to be delivered via FTTN/VDSL, and 
overall capital requirements are lower. Therefore, while regulated prices for WBA based on 
FTTN/VDSL should take account of any investment risk involved, such risk should not be 
presumed to be of a similar magnitude as the risk attaching to FTTH based wholesale access 
products. When setting risk premia for WBA based on FTTN/VDSL, NRAs should give due 
consideration to these factors …” So the NGA Recommendation strove to promote deployment 
of FTTH, but did not rule out a risk premium for FTTN/VDSL. 
On this, the EECC provides an explicit and roughly similar approach, albeit for VHCN/non-
VHCN rather than for FTTH versus FTTN/VDSL. Art. 74 EECC obliges NRAs to “take into 
account the need to promote competition and long-term end-user interests related to the 
deployment and take-up of next-generation networks, and in particular of very high capacity 
networks. [emphasis added] In particular, to encourage investments by the undertaking, 
including in next-generation networks, national regulatory authorities shall take into account 
the investment made by the undertaking.” The EECC thus puts the primary weight on VHCN, 
but it does not absolutely preclude the promotion of deployment and take-up of non-VHCN 
NGA. 
Encouraging investment in non-VHCN NGA today would carry risks, even if done on only a 
very limited basis. At the stakeholder workshop that was held in support of this project on 
9 June 2021, several participants945 argued persuasively that the arrangements that NRA 
Ofcom had provided to the UK incumbent many years ago in support of NGA deployments 
(including the “fair bet” approach) were overly generous, and had the unintentional and 
unfortunate effect of locking the UK into VDSL networks for many years, thus stalling any 
prospect to upgrade to more modern and more capable FTTP/FTTH. This suggests that an 
NRA should not provide a risk premium for non-VHCN NGA if doing so risks delaying the 
deployment of VHCN. As a corollary, it suggests that any risk premium for non-VHCN NGA 
should be strictly bounded in terms of geography, and probably also in terms of time. In no 
case should a risk premium for non-VHCN NGA be as great as the risk premium for VHCN. 
Taking into account all of this together, we recommend that the successor recommendation 
make it clear that the purpose of the risk premium today is to promote VHCN deployment and 
to compensate the SMP operator for the extra risks that it incurs in deploying VHCN.  
Given that the EECC does not prevent the promotion of deployment and take-up of non-VHCN 
NGA, there is no need for the successor recommendation to do so. The promotion of non-
VHCN NGA by means of a risk premium should however be viewed as an exceptional 
 
944 See for instance https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/access-recommendations-factual-
summary-report-targeted-consultation-proposed-revision.  
945 Tony Shortall of consultancy TELAGE; Gita Sorensen of consultancy GOS Consulting; and Maurizio Mucci of 
Sky IT argued that there should be no risk premium for FTTC. 
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measure. As an example of circumstances that might justify a risk premium today for non-
VHCN NGA, if the NRA judges that full coverage of the national territory with VHCN is unlikely 
in the medium term, but believes that a risk premium would increase coverage of hard-to-cover 
portions of the national territory with NGA services of reasonably good quality, a case could 
perhaps be made for a risk premium for non-VHCN NGA deployment. 
Recommendation 15. The successor recommendation should emphasise that the purpose 
of the risk premium today is to promote VHCN deployments (including all forms that appear 
in the BEREC Guidelines) and to compensate the SMP operator for the extra risks that it 
incurs in deploying VHCN.   
 
While price controls appear to be effective in enabling competition, there is nonetheless a 
question as to whether the functioning of price controls (for Member States that implement 
price controls in conjunction with the NGA risk premium) are enabling a fast enough 
deployment of VHCN. In the context of the current study, this boils down to two main questions: 
• Are the prices that SMP operators are permitted to charge for wholesale access 
(reflecting price controls and the WACC), and the various wholesale and retail prices 
that flow from them, high enough to allow a profitable business case and therefore to 
encourage an appropriate level of efficient investment? 
• Are procedures for periodically reassessing risk premia consistent with providing 
investors with incentives suitable to lead to an appropriate level of efficient investment? 
As we are about to explain, a higher premium (however achieved) can be expected to increase 
the territory that an SMP operator subject to price control will cover, thus correspondingly 
reducing the territory for which coverage is possible only by means of public subsidy that is 
subject to State aid rules. Our feeling, however, is that it is appropriate to do so only when 
there is a clear justification that is linked to the risk that the SMP operator bears in light of the 
deployment of fibre-based broadband. Taking these points together implies that the 
implementation of these aspects of the EECC should strive to fully compensate the SMP 
operator for all of the risks to which it is subject in regard to deployment of fibre-based 
broadband, but no more. 
Having said this, there are at least two significant elements of SMP operator risk in deployment 
of fibre-based broadband that typically are not (fully) reflected in current practice. The 
successor recommendation could provide guidance that would effectively add new tools to the 
toolkit of the NRAs. 
We cover each of these in the sections that follow. 
Analysis of a hypothetical “policy premium” sheds light on the functioning of the risk 
premium 
Intuitively, it is natural to assume that greater expected returns on investments of the SMP 
operator are likely to lead to a more widespread deployment of VHCN. This was a key 
motivation for the NGA Recommendation to establish an NGA risk premium in the first place. 
As a thought exercise, it can be useful to explore whether returns even higher than those that 
could be justified under current practice might result in still faster VHCN deployment (which is 
in line with the objectives stated in Art. 3 EECC). Might doing so have negative impact on 





Our assessment is that the introduction of policy premium unrelated to risk should be avoided, 
for reasons that we explain in this section; however, exploring questions such as these is 
valuable to the extent that it can help to shed light on the functioning of the risk premium. 
The Brattle report946 mentions the possibility of a purely hypothetical policy premium that might 
be “granted to encourage or accelerate NGA investments for the purposes of achieving various 
policy goals, such as a minimum level of NGA network penetration”, but they do not argue for 
such a premium. There is no apparent basis in the EECC for permitting such a policy premium, 
and we do not in fact advocate it, but it is still useful as a thought exercise to consider what the 
effects on deployment might be. 
As noted in Chapter 2, Bourreau et al. (2020)947 have studied these questions in some depth. 
They make a good argument that “the imposition of an additional margin [above standard 
access charges] just set high enough to make the incumbent invest in uncovered areas … can 
be set at a level that both makes the incumbent invest and safeguards some (though less) 
entry.” Their analysis is expressed in terms of a risk premium, but the results could be expected 
to be the same irrespective of the rationale for granting the premium. 
Bourreau et al. (2020) write that this extra margin, which functions similarly to the current NGA 
risk premium, could potentially be raised arbitrarily high.948 Doing so however “then raises the 
incumbent’s expected profits all the way up to the monopoly profit, which implies that by 
choosing [the premium] high enough any coverage level up to the monopoly benchmark can 
be achieved.” This implies that the logic as regards the relationship between the premium and 
coverage can be expected to hold even for a hypothetical policy premium greatly in excess of 
the familiar risk premium.949 
The hypothetical policy premium would be promising in terms of coverage, but it would come 
at a very substantial cost. Bourreau et al. (2020) note that “additional margins on top of the 
cost-based access charge, can restore coverage incentives [to the high levels that a 
monopolist would expect] even in the most costly areas. This comes at the price, though, of 
increasing the entrant's marginal cost, reducing ex post entry and consumer surplus in the 
newly covered areas.” 
Their analysis also suggests that a geographically differentiated approach would be 
appropriate for the purely hypothetical policy premium. They observe that in flat countries such 
as Belgium and the Netherlands, other approaches may be more effective than the 
hypothetical policy premium. In countries “where deployment costs increase steeply outside of 
urban areas (mountainous countries such as Italy and Switzerland), [alternatives] are not 
feasible (investment costs cannot be covered without adding an extra margin to the access 
price) and [policy] premia need to be used instead. In other countries that have both types of 
areas, such as France and Spain, the adoption of a mix of instruments is called for.” 
 
946 Dan Harris, Richard Caldwell, Lucia Bazzucchi, and Francesco Lo Passo (2016), Review of approaches to 
estimate a reasonable rate of return for investments in telecoms networks in regulatory proceedings and options 
for EU harmonization, the Brattle Group. See especially pages 99-100. 
947 Marc Bourreau, Carlo Cambini, Steffen Hoernig, and Ingo Vogelsang (2020) “Fiber Investment and Access under 
Uncertainty: Long-Term Contracts, Risk Premia, and Access Options”, Journal of Regulatory Economics. 
948 In fact, they write of a premium that “compensates the incumbent partially for the risk it is subjected to ex post 
by the uncertain entry decision.” This would correspond to the real options value of “wait and see”; however, their 
economic analysis is not limited to this case. 
949 We confirmed our understanding of this point in private communication with the author. 
Study on Regulatory Incentives for the Deployment of Very High Capacity Networks in the 
Context of the Revision of the Commission’s Access Recommendations 
288 
 
From these considerations, it follows that the policy premium would be called for only in parts 
of the national territory where incentives with the existing approach to price regulation are not 
already sufficient to generate VHCN deployment. As Bourreau et al. (2020) have noted, there 
is no need to pay a policy premium for parts of the national territory that already have achieved 
(or predictably are going to achieve) sufficient VHCN coverage. 
The key insight gained in this way is that a premium added to the cost-based access charge 
becomes a tool to reduce the fraction of the national territory for which a subsidy subject to 
State aid rules is needed. The greater the premium, the less territory must be covered by 
subsidisation under State aid rules. This insight is equally valid for the hypothetical policy 
premium and for the familiar risk premium. 
It is also worth noting that the same argument about the premium being an alternative to 
subsidisation can be stated the other way around – depending on the specific circumstances, 
using a subsidy to achieve broader coverage rather than the VHCN risk premium might offer 
better results. But that discussion is out of scope relative to this study, and it is an option that 
in any case is generally not available to the NRA. 
With that established, we now explain briefly why it is that we do not advocate the hypothetical 
policy premium. There are two main reasons that should be obvious at this point. The first is 
that there is no obvious objective basis on which to determine the size of the policy premium. 
To introduce a policy premium that is solely at the discretion of the NRA would potentially bring 
politicisation and lobbying into the regulatory process, and might potentially undermine the 
integrity and predictability of the regulatory process. 
The second is that the hypothetical policy premium, if set at a level substantially in excess of 
risk, potentially leads to arbitrarily high prices, and to windfall profits for the SMP operator. 
Whether this represents a net loss of consumer welfare will depend on the specific 
circumstances – if the arbitrary policy premium were offered only in geographic areas that 
would otherwise be served with broadband with only limited capability, it is possible that the 
dynamic gains to consumers who enjoy better service might greatly outweigh any static loss 
in consumer welfare. 
If the level of wholesale prices for SMP access products is insufficient to motivate the SMP 
operator to cover the full national territory, other tools may be needed, including tools that are 
outside of the scope of the EECC (such as for instance public subsidy subject to state aid 
rules). 
Having established that a premium not related to risk would be ill-advised, there are two 
aspects of risk that are rarely addressed in current EU regulatory practice. The first has to do 
with ensuring that the risk to which investors were subject when they initially committed their 
investment is not prematurely disregarded the moment that the investment has been shown to 
be a success. The second relates to the “option value” to the SMP operator of delaying the 
investment, perhaps indefinitely, in order to wait for more information on risks to appear (which 
implies that the compensation for risk must be slightly higher than that required to obtain a 
zero return in the expected case, since the SMP operator must also be compensated for the 
value of the implicit option). Both of these are tied to real risk and both are quantifiable. 
Compensation for downside risk being too quickly withdrawn 
Point (6) of Annex I of the NGA Recommendation enumerates five elements of risk and goes 
on to note that they “may change over time, in particular due to the progressive increase of 
retail and wholesale demand met. NRAs should therefore review the situation at regular 




A strong argument can be made that the current approach of frequently updating the risk 
premium to reflect current market conditions, even though it is in line with the guidance of the 
NGA Recommendation, runs counter to the stated EECC goal of promoting efficient 
investment in VHCN. 
• If the investment does better than expected, the risk premium can be expected to be 
adjusted downward not later than the next review cycle (currently five years). In 
Member States that review the WACC annually, it might be adjusted downward much 
sooner.950 
• If the investment does worse than expected, investors have no obvious recompense. 
Prior to liberalisation, a state-owned monopoly operator might have expected to be 
bailed out by its government, but that is no longer the case. 
In the UK, this concern was embodied in fair bet principles. “Where an investment is risky, 
there is a significant possibility that it will fail, and there is also a possibility that it will be more 
successful than had been expected. The ‘fair bet’ principle recognises that the firm needs to 
benefit from sufficient upside potential from any investment to offset the downside risk of 
failure. The alternative, where [the SMP operator] faces the full cost of failure, but has the 
rewards of success strictly capped by the regulator, is likely to deter any form of risky 
investment. To ensure investor confidence, it is important we honour the fair bet over time.”951  
It is important to note at the outset that fair bet is not seeking to protect the investment that has 
been made. It is instead trying to ensure that the expectation that the investor made at the time 
when he or she sunk the funds is not invalidated (e.g. by regulatory action) sooner than 
investors might reasonably have expected when they made the investment, taking into account 
both optimistic and pessimistic scenarios. 
Ofcom considered investments to be risky where they (1) involved a significant step change in 
capability compared to products available in the market today (e.g. 1Gbit/s services), 
potentially leading to significant uncertainty on network deployment costs, consumer demand, 
and the prices that consumers will pay; (2) required a single, upfront commitment rather than 
allowing more incremental and cautious investment; and (3) resulted in ‘sunk’ capital costs, 
where the assets have no alternative uses following deployment.952 
Ofcom sought to implement fair bet in a way that is generally in line with EECC goals. They 
sought (1) to preserve the investment incentives faced by the SMP operator; (2) to preserve 
the investment incentives faced by competitors to the SMP operator; (3) to protect retail 
competition where necessary, based on access to the SMP operator’s network; and (4) to 
protect consumers against the risk of high prices. 
Fair bet is appealing as a general principle, and is generally in line with EECC goals, but 
challenging to apply in full in practice. Notably, NRAs are not well equipped to assess or 
 
950 For an example from the literature in a case where a price cap had been contractually committed, consider 
Laffont and Tirole (2000), Competition in Telecommunications, page 5. “Large rents are politically hard to sustain. 
A case in point is the 1995 breach of the price cap contracts with the U.K. regional electricity companies, when 
Professor Steve Littlechild, a designer of price cap regulation in the 1980s who had become the U.K. electricity 
regulatory, had to yield to intense political pressure and reduce the caps substantially because the companies were 
making large profits.” 
951 UK Ofcom (2016), “Making communications work for everyone: Initial conclusions from the Strategic Review of 
Digital Communications”, pages 41- 42. 
952 UK Ofcom (2016), “Making communications work for everyone: Initial conclusions from the Strategic Review of 
Digital Communications”. 
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quantify in advance the full probability distribution associated with the SMP operator’s 
downside risk of failure, nor, for that matter, the full probability distribution associated with its 
upside prospects for success. What is needed here in principle is not a handful of numbers, 
but rather the full probability distribution of expected outcomes. 
Unlike classic rate of return regulation (which we discuss elsewhere in this chapter), the fair 
bet in and of itself neither caps nor guarantees the SMP operator’s returns on capital 
investment.953 Fair bet seeks only to provide predictability and some sense of “fairness” on the 
likelihood of returns. 
The UK implemented fair bet primarily by granting the SMP operator flexibility in setting its 
wholesale prices, starting from 2008. By 2015, there was already a debate as to whether the 
fair bet commitment had been fulfilled and could be retired. Unsurprisingly, different 
stakeholders argued for or against maintenance of pricing flexibility based on their individual 
commercial interests. The SMP operator argued for maintaining pricing flexibility, while an 
alternative operator argued that the SMP incumbent could not have expected more than eight 
years of pricing flexibility when it made the initial investment.954 Meanwhile, it is challenging to 
compare the profits that the SMP operator made over those eight years to the profits that they 
might have made in the absence of pricing flexibility (i.e. comparison to the counter-factual), 
and impractical to compare those profits to the risk of losses had the investment gone badly. 
In other words, whether the benefit granted truly resulted in a fair bet for the SMP operator and 
its investors remains purely conjectural. 
There is, however, a possibility to address the concern that motivated the fair bet approach in 
a different and more practical way. 
The normal functioning of the risk premium would tend to lead to a reassessment of the risk 
premium at “regular intervals”, which might be annual or might be once per review period (see 
Figure 21).955 As a general rule, when an NRA reviews the WACC and the NGA/VHCN risk 
premium in view of updating wholesale access prices, the new price applies not only to new 
access requested to the SMP operator’s network, but also to existing access agreements. This 
tends to imply multiple revisions over the lifetime of a typical VHCN deployment project. 
There is a strong argument to be made that a frequent downward revision of the risk premium 
after investments have been sunk, and after the risks and rewards are known, encourages the 
NRA to reduce the risk premium too soon and thus runs counter to providing consistent 
incentives for investors. The investments will have been made ex ante (in advance), at a time 
when the downside risks were unknown, but adjustments to the risk factor come ex post, after 
 
953 UK Ofcom decided in 2018 to continue to implement fair bet principles, and decided at the same time to apply 
price caps to VULA services; however, the price caps are treated as a separate matter from fair bet, and the Ofcom 
decision demonstrates that there has been considerable debate as to whether price caps are compatible with fair 
bet principles. See UK Ofcom (2018), “Wholesale Local Access Market Review: Statement – Volume 1: Markets, 
market power determinations and remedies.” In Section 9.19, they say: “In relation to preserving BT’s investment 
incentives, we are required when setting charge controls to consider the extent of investment by the dominant 
provider in the matters to which the pricing remedy relates. We have considered this issue by reference to the ‘fair 
bet’ principle; that is, whether BT has had a fair opportunity to earn a reasonable return on its original FTTC 
investments, taking account of the risks at the time the investment was made. … [We] find that BT has had a fair 
bet on its FTTC investments and so our decision to impose price regulation on BT’s VULA 40/10 services is 
consistent with safeguarding BT’s incentives to invest.” 
954 UK Ofcom (2016), “Making communications work for everyone: Initial conclusions from the Strategic Review of 
Digital Communications”, page 41. See also UK Ofcom (2017), Wholesale Local Access Market Review – Volume 
1: Consultation on the proposed market, market power determinations and remedies”. 
955 Per point (6) of Annex 1 of the NGA Recommendation: “These factors [of uncertainty] may change over time, in 
particular due to the progressive increase of retail and wholesale demand met. NRAs should therefore review the 




the risks are known. The investor has effectively been invited to place a bet at a roulette table 
that is slanted away from him. 
Figure 21. Frequency of update of the WACC 
MS 
Fixed Market (Year of Adoption) 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 
AT  X   X   X     
BE X  X     X    X 
BG      X   X    
CY    X    X  X X X 
CZ         X   X 
DE    X      X X X 
DK        X X X X X 
EE             
EL      X  X  X X  
ES  X    X   X X X X 
FI  X    X    X   
FR     X  X  X  X  
HR      X   X    
HU        X X X X X 
IE  X     X      
IT   X     X    X 
LT        X   X X 
LU         X    
LV             
MT     X       X 
NL     X    X    
PL          X X X 
PT        X X X  X 
RO      X       
SE           X X 
SI       X     X 
SK      X   X  X X 
Source: BEREC (2020), “BEREC Report: Regulatory Accounting in Practice 2020”, BoR (20) 210, Chapter 5. 
Note: For a cell to be green means that a review of WACC parameters was conducted. An “X” in a cell means that 
the review is in the BEREC database. 
 
The UK experience suggests that investment decisions need certainty for a longer period than 
one year, and probably for a longer period than a market review cycle, particularly when one 
considers that the investment decision will not necessarily have been taken at the very 
beginning of a five year market review cycle. 
There is, however, a trade-off here. Too short a period of reassessment discourages 
investment. Too long a period of reassessment, on the other hand, is negative relative to 
consumer welfare to the extent that potential benefits of competition are deferred (i.e. prices 
are typically higher than is justified toward the end of the reassessment period). The SMP 
operator is arguably not entitled to a higher risk premium forever. At some point in time, the 
SMP operator has been adequately compensated for the initial risk that was taken when the 
investment was made and committed. 
The UK example is again instructive. Ofcom (the UK NRA) said that in deciding when to move 
away from pricing flexibility, they would take account of factors including “the date on which 
investors originally expected ‘payback’ on the investment. This is not the same as actual 
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payback i.e. whether the investment delivered on the original expectations or not; and whether 
returns earned to date and potential future regulated returns are sufficient to compensate for 
the original risk of failure…”. 
As part of this UK process, the consultancy Oxera prepared a report on behalf of the UK SMP 
operator, assessing whether Ofcom’s planned regulatory approach was in line with the fair bet 
principle of “giving investors at project inception the opportunity to earn the project-specific 
cost of capital, on an expected basis.”956 We have no quarrel with their analysis, but we 
question whether any NRA is in a position to do this analysis on a regular basis in practice. 
In principle, one could envision a rule that empowers the NRA to make credible commitments 
not to change the VHCN risk premium for investments for a pre-defined number of years after 
the investments have been made (and thus sunk). The number of years committed could 
reflect discussions with the SMP operator and broader consultation, ideally as part of the 
market review cycle. The commitment would relate only to risky investments in VHCN, not to 
all investments of the SMP operator. 
This does not align with the process that the NRAs need to follow in practice in setting the 
prices of wholesale products. The NDCM put in place pricing based on a BU LRIC+ 
methodology (points 29 and 30), and there were good reasons that continue to be valid for this 
choice. The WACC and the associated risk premium will thus be added, not to historical costs 
incurred in the past, but rather to a single forward-looking estimate of incremental cost if the 
VHCN were implemented today using Modern Equivalent Assets (MEAs). The result in each 
case will be a single price for each wholesale product offered by the SMP operator (not only 
for newly acquired wholesale access products, but also for products already acquired under 
existing contracts), and that price will take effect and remain in effect nationwide until the next 
review. At any given point in time, prices will reflect one WACC and one NGA/VHCN risk 
premium that are both in effect nationwide. 
There is the further complexity that investments in VHCN are made not all at once, but may be 
potentially spread out over a period of many years. 
Our sense is that this implies the need for a pragmatic heuristic approach that reflects the need 
to strike a balance between the risk profile at the time investments were undertaken (both 
upside and downside), and the risks that are currently present. 
We believe that a judicious use of smoothing techniques could provide a simple and pragmatic 
approach quantitative approach that would have roughly the right properties. Rather than being 
reassessed every year, or every review period, the risk that was relevant when the investments 
were made should continue to have some influence on the price that the SMP operator is 
permitted to charge, but that influence should gradually decline over time. 
Mathematical and engineering tools for smoothing are well developed. The succession of 
WACC calculations made over a succession of years can be viewed as a time series. A number 
of techniques have been developed over the years to provide insight into time series’. 
Noteworthy among these is a family of techniques known as autoregressive integrated moving 
average (ARIMA). The techniques are autoregressive in the sense that the value in previous 
periods influences the calculated value for the current period. ARIMA is a generalisation of the 
autoregressive moving average (ARMA) model. 
 




Exponential smoothing is a simple, well known form of ARMA, and we use it here for purposes 
of exposition; however, we do not rule out the possibility that other ARIMA/ARMA algorithms 
might be better. Exponential smoothing of the VHCN risk premium would appear to have the 
right general properties. The VHCN risk premium in each period would be calculated as a 
simple weighted average of the current VHCN risk premium and the most recent exponentially 
smoothed VHCN risk premium, where a smoothing factor (α) would be used as the weight. 
The choice of an appropriate smoothing factor allows the value to converge quickly, or more 
slowly, to the most recent value. 
The net effect would be to provide some “stickiness” in the VHCN risk premium. The 
understanding of both upside and downside probabilities at the time of the initial investment 
would continue to influence the VHCN risk profile indefinitely, but it would play a declining role 
over time. With a high smoothing factor, the importance of the initial risk assessment and its 
associated risk premium would play a stronger role for more review periods. 
This approach has several positive properties. 
• The risks as viewed in each successive period continue to have weight – the risk 
premium does not instantly snap to the current year’s value. 
• The risk premium likely is not fixed at the historic value, but gradual converges to reflect 
current realities. 
• The smoothing factor provides a control knob between the two. 
• The process reduces the risk of abrupt changes in the profitability of the investment; 
however, if smoothing is applied only to the VHCN risk premium, it does not avoid the 
risk to investors that the price of wholesale products changes abruptly for some other 
reason (e.g. a shift to a different Modern Equivalent Asset). 
With this approach, the frequency of review plays only a secondary role. The smoothing factor 
could be chosen such that the speed of convergence (i.e. the time constant), measured in 
years, is roughly the same irrespective of whether the reassessment of the VHCN risk premium 
is done annually versus every five years. 
In principle, smoothing could be applied either only to the risk premium, or else to the sum of 
the WACC plus the risk premium. For a number of reasons, our sense is that it is better to 
apply it only to the VHCN risk premium. Notably, the WACC is already designed to provide 
compensation for overall systematic risk and there is a risk of “double counting” if investors are 
provided with a second level of protection. 
A practical challenge is that, in principle, one might want the VHCN risk premium in the years 
when the largest investments in VHCN were made to play the largest role. It is not immediately 
clear how to do this methodologically.  
Guidance permitting the application of ARIMA-style smoothing methods to the VHCN risk 
premium would be fully in line with Art. 74 EECC, including not only the portion that calls on 
NRAs to “national regulatory authorities shall take into account the need to promote 
competition and long-term end-user interests related to the deployment and take-up of next- 
generation networks, and in particular of very high capacity networks”, but also the portion that 
calls on NRAs to “take account of the benefits of predictable and stable wholesale prices in 
ensuring efficient market entry and sufficient incentives for all undertakings to deploy new and 
enhanced networks.” 
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If smoothing is not used, we would suggest aligning the calculation of the risk premium with 
the five year market review cycle in order to provide some limited smoothing effect. (This will 
also tend to necessary if the NRA chooses to use a real options approach as described in the 
next section inasmuch as the calculation is likely to be demanding.) Note that the cycle for 
reviewing the risk premium need not be the same as the cycle for reviewing the WACC. 
Recommendation 16. Instead of requiring review of the VHCN risk premium at regular 
intervals with the implication that the new VHCN risk premium immediately supersedes the 
old, a successor recommendation might acknowledge the permissibility of the use of a 
smoothing algorithm so as to reduce the risk to investors that the expectation of return on 
capital employed disappears too quickly. In the event that smoothing is not employed, then 
reviewing the risk premium every five years in line with the market review should be 
preferred in order to provide some limited smoothing effect. 
 
Compensation for the “option value” of deploying now rather than waiting 
In the past, it was generally assumed that investors would choose to invest as soon as the 
expected revenues from an investment exceeded the expected cost. Better economic theory 
has made clear that the investor often has the option to wait for more information, which 
potentially reduces the risk of the investment. A series of books and papers have expanded 
this view into the concept of real options. It was quickly recognised that the value of these real 
options for investment or deferral of investment could be valued using techniques similar to 
those used to value options (puts and calls) in financial markets, including the Black-Scholes 
method. 
Dixit and Pindyck (1994)957 explain that, in the absence of consideration of these 
considerations, economists had assumed that the investment decision was simple: “First, 
calculate the present value of the expected stream of profits that this factory will generate. 
Second, calculate the present value of the stream of expenditures required to build the factory. 
Finally, determine whether the difference between the two - the net present value (NPV) of the 
investment - is greater than zero. If it is, go ahead and invest.” This further implies that one 
should continue to “invest until the value of an incremental unit of capital is just equal to its 
cost.” 
They argue that this view is simplistic to the extent that it “it assumes that either the investment 
is reversible, that is, it can somehow be undone and the expenditures recovered should market 
conditions turn out to be worse than anticipated, or, if the investment is irreversible, it is a now 
or never proposition, that is, if the firm does not undertake the investment now, it will not be 
able to in the future.” For most investments (including, in our view, most investments in VHCN, 
as we shortly explain), these conditions do not in fact hold. 
Dixit and Pindyck (1994)958 go on to argue that “a firm with an opportunity to invest is holding 
an ‘option’ analogous to a financial call option-it has the right but not the obligation to buy an 
asset at some future time of its choosing. When a firm makes an irreversible investment 
expenditure, it exercises, or ‘kills,’ its option to invest. It gives up the possibility of waiting for 
new information to arrive that might affect the desirability or timing of the expenditure; it cannot 
 
957 Avinash Dixit and Robert Pindyck (1994), Investment Under Uncertainty, at 
https://msuweb.montclair.edu/~lebelp/DixitPindyck1994.pdf. For the convenience of the reader, we are citing from 





disinvest should market conditions change adversely. This lost option value is an opportunity 
cost that must be included as part of the cost of the investment. As a result, the NPV rule 
‘invest when the value of a unit of capital is at least as large as its purchase and installation 
cost’ must be modified. The value of the unit must exceed the purchase and installation cost, 
by an amount equal to the value of keeping the investment option alive.” [emphasis added] 
In other words, the compensation that the SMP operator would require before embarking on 
an NGA/VHCN investment is a bit higher than traditional models have assumed. 
Compensating the SMP operator for the cost of surrendering its option to defer investment 
would be a reflection of legitimate, quantifiable risks to which the SMP operator is subject. It 
should not be viewed as an arbitrarily set “bribe” to the SMP operator. 
It is important to note that the “wait and see” option that the SMP operator holds may or may 
not have value. The option to “wait and see” might be worthless if the SMP operator is under 
substantial competitive pressure to deploy in order not to lose the ‘first mover’ advantage; in 
other cases, however, it might represent a meaningful cost for which risk is directly relevant. 
These potentially important economic considerations have not found widespread 
implementation in EU regulatory practice as regards electronic communications, but they have 
been studied at some length in the UK, and have been in place in Italy since 2015. 
Ofcom consulted959 on the principle that an adjustment to conventional NPV methods might be 
appropriate where (1) there is a meaningful option to wait and see – i.e. investments are not 
now-or-never (as might be the case if there is serious risk of a competitor moving first); (2) net 
returns are uncertain; and (3) investments are irreversible. These criteria are very much in line 
with Dixit and Pindyck (1994). 
In Ofcom’s public consultation, “incumbents tended to be in favour of the use of real options 
theory in regulation, whilst [access seeker] competitors were opposed”. It was not unexpected 
that incumbents who sold SMP wholesale access products favoured high prices for the 
products, while competitors who bought them favoured low prices. With that in mind, Ofcom 
made it clear in their Final Statement that Ofcom’s goal in any implementation of real options 
would be “seek to reflect the conditions that would prevail under competition, not to underpin 
the investment decisions and returns of a dominant firm.”960 
In the end, Ofcom concluded that its analysis “should take account of the value of real options 
where appropriate”, and they proposed “to assess the value of real options on a case-by-case 
basis, and [encouraged] stakeholders to make submissions to Ofcom on this subject in cases 
where they [felt] that wait and see options have a significant value.”961 In practice, they never 
explicitly incorporated a real options approach into their regulatory practice. 
The significant technical challenges in implementing a real options approach presumably 
played a significant role in Ofcom’s decision not to immediately incorporate real options into 
their regulatory practice.  
 
959 UK Ofcom (2005), “Ofcom’s approach to risk in the assessment of the cost of capital: Final statement”. 
960 Ibid. 
961 Ibid. 
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In Italy, AGCOM implemented a real options approach, and documented specifics of their 
implementation.962 Their work can serve as a useful reference to any NRA that seeks to 
implement a real options approach. 
In line with Dixit and Pindyck (1994)963, AGCOM began by explaining that investments in NGA, 
FTTH or FTTC networks are characterised by irreversibility, uncertainty, and an implicit option 
to delay the investment. 
They then assessed two distinct options held by the SMP operator: a wait and see option and 
a flexibility option. (In real options theory, it is clear that the investor may simultaneously hold 
multiple options, including the option to sell the entity in which the investment was made.) The 
wait and see option is familiar from basic real options theory. In the interest of brevity, we will 
not cover the flexibility option here.  
Several different methods are commonly used for evaluating real options today. The Black-
Scholes method is widely used for financial options, but not so much in practical assessment 
of real options. Binomial lattice models are preferred by some practitioners, first because they 
depend on straightforward algebra rather than calculus as with the Black-Scholes method, and 
second and relatedly because they can easily be adapted and customised since they can be 
implemented using normal Excel spreadsheets.964 A range of Monte Carlo simulation 
techniques have also been used by practitioners. 
As a benchmark in assessing the value of their SMP operator’s real options, AGCOM used 
both the Black-Scholes method and the binomial method. The Market Asset Disclaimer (MAD) 
approach was used to get around the limitation that the fibre-based deployment project was 
not yet built, and was not traded on the market (i.e. no established market value) – with MAD, 
simulated values are used instead of true market values. 
In developing the MAD values, AGCOM assumed that the three main risk factors relevant to 
investment in NGA networks were (1) the take-up rate, (2) the average revenue per customer 
(ARPU), and (3) capital expenditure (CAPEX). In the case of CAPEX, their focus was on 
estimating the level of irreversible CAPEX as it would tend to be viewed by an investor, which 
is different than the LRIC cost that is estimated by conventional bottom-up models. For each 
of these, they used Monte Carlo methods to estimate the impact on the probability distribution 
of returns on relevant real options. 
AGCOM has briefly documented965 the modelling assumptions that they used as regards (1) 
the duration of the NGA/VHCN deployment project; (2) the technology used; (3) the expected 
useful lifetime of infrastructure deployed; (4) the parts of the national territory likely to receive 
FTTH versus FTTC deployment during the relevant time period; (5) their assumption that 
building wiring costs are borne by the investor, not the customer; and (6) which customers are 
likely to have a sufficient willingness to pay (WTP) for the new services going forward. The 
analysis was based solely on consumers, not on business customers, and it ignored any 
negative impact on the SMP operator’s legacy business.  
 
962 Italy AGCOM (2015), “The calculation of the Risk Premium for investments in NGA, FTTH and FTTC”, Annex E 
to Resolution No 623/15/CONS. 
963 Dixit and Pindyck (1994). 
964 Tom Copeland and  Peter Tufano (2004), “A Real-World Way to Manage Real Options”, Harvard Business 
Review. 
965 Italy AGCOM (2015), “The calculation of the Risk Premium for investments in NGA, FTTH and FTTC”, Annex E 




On this basis, AGCOM estimated the value of the wait and see option and the flexibility option. 
They then treated the combined risk premium as a function of the two (not quite the sum) taking 
into account both the duration of contracts between the SMP operator and an alternative 
operator, and the percent of contract value that is paid in advance (both of which reduce risk 
for the SMP operator). 
This is an interesting real world application of real options; however, the degree to which this 
approach might be useful in other Member States is unknown, and the analysis would surely 
have to be adapted to Member State specificities. Nonetheless, we believe that it represents 
an important proof of concept. Other NRAs that hope to use real options to objectively estimate 
the cost of this risk factor for regulatory purposes might benefit from studying AGCOM’s 
approach. 
In employing real options methodology, AGCOM based its risk calculation on the hypothetical 
willingness of the SMP operator to deploy fibre over the different geographic areas in Italy, with 
their different risk profiles. However, the SMP operator concentrated its deployment in lower 
risk areas, allegedly leading to a discrepancy between the risk calculated by the NRA ex ante 
based on real options methodology in comparison with the risk actually incurred by the SMP 
operator966. It might be prudent to integrate any future application of real option methodology 
with concrete plans or commitments of the SMP operator to deploy VHCN, which will typically 
be known to the NRA thanks to the Art. 22 EECC process. 
We caution that real options is a complex approach, and that it is likely labour-intensive. It is 
probably more suited for NRAs with a large staff than for NRAs with only limited staff. If a 
sufficient number of NRAs were to implement the approach over time, however, it might be 
feasible for less well staffed NRAs to use the calculations of better-staffed NRAs as a 
benchmark. 
Recommendation 17. The use of real options techniques in calculating the NGA/VHCN 
risk in order to quantify additional risk-based costs to which the SMP operator is subject, 
notably for relinquishing its implicit option to wait and see, may be appropriate in some 
circumstances. Real options are typically inappropriate however if the SMP operator is 
forced by competitive factors to deploy immediately, inasmuch as the option value of 
waiting in that case is negligible. If more experience in the use of the technique is 
accumulated over time, it might be appropriate for NRAs that choose to do so (for instance, 
those that are less well staffed) to use the real option calculations of comparably situated 
NRAs as a benchmark and as an alternative to doing these complex calculations 
themselves. 
 
Other possible revisions that might be considered in order to accelerate VHCN deployment 
Two other alternative approaches to price regulation could be considered: fair and reasonable 
pricing, or a return to rate of return regulation. 
 
966 Sky Italy, stakeholders’ workshop 9 June 2021. 
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Fair and reasonable pricing does not appear in the Access Recommendations, but it appears 
at many points in the EECC (notably Art. 61(2), Art. 61(3), Art. 76, Art. 79, and Art. 80). It is 
well established in the regulatory practice of the NRAs, and rightly so. 
In Chapter 5, we found that only a few NRAs imposed fair and reasonable pricing obligations 
on SMP operators for wholesale broadband access products or in conjunction with symmetric 
access obligations. The meaning attached to the term by each of them in each of these cases 
is different. 
BEREC confirms this in its response to the targeted consultation for the Access 
Recommendations (see also the discussion of Germany, Poland and the Czech Republic in 
see Chapter 5)967. We therefore tend to share BEREC’s view, as stated in their consultation 
response, that merely requiring wholesale prices to be fair and reasonable would not properly 
substitute for providing a more detailed cost standard for wholesale products in the former 
Markets 3a and 3b in cases where price regulation is truly required. 
The real merit of a fair and reasonable pricing standard for SMP wholesale access services, 
in our view, would tend to be in a limited number of cases where strict price controls are not 
required (i.e. some form of pricing flexibility has been granted), but where the NRA still needs 
to have the ability to intervene if prices are set at levels that appear to be inappropriate or 
abusive.  
Recommendation 18. The use of fair and reasonable pricing is well established in the 
EECC and in the corresponding practice of the NRAs; however, its meaning is heavily 
dependent on the nature of the regulated service. As regards SMP wholesale access 
services subject to price control obligations, the ability of fair and reasonable pricing to 
substitute for a concrete standard for price controls in cases where an objective quantitative 
standard is truly required is questionable. Fair and reasonable pricing may nonetheless 
have value in a limited number of cases where strict quantitative price controls are not 
required (i.e. some form of pricing flexibility has been granted), but where the NRA still 
needs to have the ability to intervene if prices are set at levels that appear to be 
inappropriate or excessive. 
 
In the past, rate of return regulation was the dominant method used to regulate monopolies in 
many network industries. Laffont and Tirole (2000)968 provide a succinct summary: “The 
regulated firm was allowed to charge prices that would cover its operating costs and give it a 
fair rate of return on the full value of its capital. If costs moved out of line with those prices, the 
firm would ask for a new set of prices. The main value of this ‘regulatory contract or compact’ 
was to guarantee that the company would recover its costs. The absence of risk could attract 
capital at a low price. However, this method did not give incentives to keep its costs down.” 
Like fair bet, rate of return regulation tries to provide safety for investors; however, it does it in 
a different and nearly opposite way. The fair bet tries to provide some protection to the 
expected profitability of an investment; however, fair bet as implemented by Ofcom in the UK 
neither caps profits in case the investment earns more than expected, nor does it protect the 
 
967 BEREC (2020), BEREC Response to the Targeted consultation on the revision of the Commission’s access 
recommendations, BoR (20) 169. 




firm from losses in case the investment does worse than expected. The firm is therefore subject 
to incentives to earn as much as possible, and to avoid needless losses. 
Rate of return regulation practically eliminates investment risk, but it also leaves little scope for 
better-than-expected profits. Incentives for the firm to innovate, to strive for high customer 
satisfaction, and to perform efficiently, are consequently weak. It is mainly for these reasons 
that rate of return regulation has largely been abandoned in developed countries as a means 
of regulating electronic communications. 
The Netherlands implemented a form of rate of return regulation for fibre roll-out in 2008, and 
it appears to have worked reasonably well in the context of the specific circumstances of that 
place and time; however, we do not view a return to rate of return regulation as an attractive 
overall model for the EU today. 
We do not rule out the possibility that there might be individual cases where rate of return 
regulation is justified for SMP wholesale access products, but we have not identified any 
specific instances.  
c. Non-discrimination obligations 
As noted in Section 11.b, non-discrimination obligations serve in multiple roles. 
According to Recital (12) of the NDCM: “One of the main obstacles to the development of a 
true level playing field for access seekers to electronic communication networks is the 
preferential treatment of the downstream businesses, for example the retail arm, of a vertically 
integrated operator with significant market power (SMP operator) through price and non-price 
discrimination (for example, discrimination regarding quality of service, access to information, 
delaying tactics, undue requirements and the strategic design of essential product 
characteristics). In this respect it is particularly difficult to detect and address non-price 
discriminatory behaviour through the mere application of a general non-discrimination 
obligation.” 
As noted in Chapter 6 and discussed at greater length shortly, Recital 185 EECC treats 
Equivalence of Input (EoI) as “the surest way of achieving effective protection from 
discrimination”. The recital, however, adds that “higher compliance costs should be measured 
against the benefits of a more vigorous competition downstream, and of the relevance of non-
discrimination guarantees in circumstances where the undertaking designated as having SMP 
is not subject to direct price controls”. 
Balancing costs and benefits from imposing EOI is a challenging task. The Italian NRA has 
observed that (1) for the SMP operator, EOI requires adoption of new databases, new delivery 
systems, and possibly internal reorganisation of the firm; (2) for alternative operators, it can 
likewise require substantial modification of operational support systems, and (3) for all, it takes 
time and energy. They estimate some eighteen months from approval to implementation, 
during which time many meetings with the NRA and stakeholders are called for.969 
The EECC and the Access Recommendations deal with non-discrimination as a means of 
ensuring effective competition. Some of the NRAs have recognised, in response to concerns 
expressed by competitive operators, that equality of access alone does not ensure high quality 
 
969 Italy AGCOM (2021), “Non-discrimination obligations in Italy: EoI , EoO and KPIs”, presentation. 
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access. Some NRAs, notably including Italy970, use the same mechanisms (the Reference 
Offer, KPIs, SLAs, and SLGs) to ensure that wholesale offerings have sufficient quality to meet 
market needs.  
Based on the surveys and case studies described in Chapter 6, it has become clear that 
successful and robust implementation of effective non-discrimination requires sustained 
attention on the part of the NRA over a period of years. It has also become clear that effective 
non-discrimination imposes significant costs not only on the SMP operator, but also on the 
competitors. 
We have identified a number of issues that might merit attention in a successor 
recommendation. These include (1) whether the preference for EoI over EoO in the current 
Recommendations is warranted in comparison with measures to make EoO more effective; 
(2) how to deal with the co-existence of EoI and EoO in Member States that implement both 
for different products; (3) the process by means of which KPIs, SLAs, and SLGs are set, 
including the role that commitments by the SMP operator can play in that process; (4) the 
process by means of which KPIs, SLAs, and SLGs are monitored and enforced, including the 
Reference Offer, and any penalties that the NRA might impose; (5) the degree to which the 
same mechanisms used to ensure non-discrimination can or should be employed to ensure 
that wholesale services are offered at a quality sufficient to meet market needs; (6) how to deal 
with potential commercial agreements where an SMP operator and an alternative operator 
would like to put in place service of a higher quality than that covered in current reference 
offers, and (7) whether anything more could be done to deal with long-standing gaps in making 
“Chinese walls” fully effective. 
In the following sections, we take each of these up in turn. 
Choosing EoI versus EoO 
“In order to address and prevent non-price related discriminatory behaviour,” per Recital 185 
of the EECC, “equivalence of inputs (EoI) is in principle [emphasis added] the surest way of 
achieving effective protection from discrimination.”971 In the course of our interviews and 
workshops with NRAs and with stakeholders, however, we often heard that a well implemented 
equivalence of outputs (EoO) could in practice be as effective, or nearly as effective, as EoI 
in protecting against discrimination. Other stakeholders have argued, however, that non-
discrimination is exceedingly difficult to enforce when the SMP operator does not consumer 
the same wholesale access product as competitors – KPIs, for instance, cannot truly be cross-
comparable. 
Recital 185 goes on to note that “providing regulated wholesale inputs on an EoI basis is likely 
to trigger higher compliance costs than other forms of non-discrimination obligations. Those 
higher compliance costs should be measured against the benefits of more vigorous 
competition downstream, and of the relevance of non-discrimination guarantees in 
circumstances where the undertaking designated as having significant market power is not 
subject to direct price controls. … national regulatory authorities should also consider whether 
obligations are proportionate for affected undertakings, for example, by taking into account 
 
970 Ibid. 
971 Consider also Point 13 of the NDCM Recommendation: “The Commission considers that equivalence of inputs 
(EoI) is in principle the surest way to achieve effective protection from discrimination as access seekers will be able 
to compete with the downstream business of the vertically integrated SMP operator using exactly the same set of 
regulated wholesale products, at the same prices and using the same transactional processes. In addition, and 
contrary to an Equivalence of Output (EoO) concept, EoI is better equipped to deliver transparency and address 




implementation costs and weigh up possible disincentives to the deployment of new systems, 
relative to more incremental upgrades, in the event that the former would be subject to more 
restrictive regulatory obligations.”972 
This is the crux of the matter. To the extent that EoI might provide alternative operators with 
better protection against discrimination for a particular wholesale access product, how do any 
gains measure up against any incremental costs? Viewed in this light, is the imposition of EoI 
proportionate in a particular case?  
As noted in Chapter 6, in determining whether the imposition of EoI would (not) be 
proportionate, few NRAs do a rigorous cost-benefits analysis. 
What has become increasingly clear over the course of many years of experience with non-
discrimination mechanisms is that implementing EoI for existing wholesale products where 
processes are already in place that do not embody EoI imposes costs not only on the SMP 
operator, but also on the alternative operators.973 A rigorous cost-benefits analysis could thus 
potentially become a labour-intensive exercise for the NRA. 
At the same time, costs incurred by the NRA are also relevant to the cost-benefits analysis. As 
previously noted, a number of NRAs expressed the view974 that non-discrimination provisions 
are more self-enforcing under EoI than under even a well implemented EoO regime. EoI also 
benefits the NRA to the extent that EoI tends to mitigate information asymmetries between the 
SMP operator and the NRA. 
As new wholesale offerings appear, implementation of EoI for the new offerings might not be 
more difficult than implementation of a robust EoO approach. For existing services, however, 
it is often the case that the SMP operator has made substantial investments in a range of 
interconnected operational support systems (OSS). Comprehensive revision of these OSS can 
be time-consuming and expensive. 
Given that EoI implementation for an existing service is typically more difficult and thus more 
expensive than implementation of EoO, the degree of take-up of the wholesale service also 
plays a role. For a wholesale service that is not much used, the extra cost of implementing EoI 
(both for the SMP operator and for alternative operators) may not be warranted. 
Our interviews, case studies (see Chapter 6), and the feedback from NRAs in the BEREC 
workshop (see Annex 3) all suggest that EoO, if conscientiously applied, can be nearly as 
effective as EoI. For both EoO and EoI, effectiveness is heavily dependent on (1) the quality 
of the Reference Offer, (2) the degree to which KPIs, SLAs and SLGs are comprehensive, 
effective, and reflect the real needs of alternative operators; and (3) the effectiveness of 
monitoring and enforcement of non-discrimination obligations on the part of the NRA. The 
adoption of EoI makes this entire process more automatic and self-enforcing, but it also entails 
costs, and is not in and of itself a panacea. 
 
972 The operative language of the EECC does not specifically require EoI. Art. 70 EECC requires “that the 
undertaking applies equivalent conditions in equivalent circumstances to other providers of equivalent services, and 
provides services and information to others under the same conditions and of the same quality as it provides for its 
own services, or those of its subsidiaries or partners”, but it does not specifically require EoI. Art. 74 EECC 
conditions the granting of pricing flexibility on “effective and non-discriminatory access”. 
973 Italy AGCOM  (2021), “Non-discrimination obligations in Italy: EoI , EoO and KPIs”, presentation. 
974 At a workshop with BEREC members conducted in support of this project on 15 April 2021. 
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This implies that the choice between EoO and EoI depends heavily on a Member State’s 
circumstances, including the market structure and specificities of the particular wholesale 
access service involved.  
If an NRA is considering applying EoO to some wholesale products and EoI to others, it might 
be appropriate to consider a more nuanced approach where different inputs to the wholesale 
products (some of which might be used by more than one wholesale product) are dealt with 
using EoO versus EoI; however, this analysis will tend to be highly case-specific. It also implies 
that in many cases, strengthening the implementation of EoO can be nearly as effective, and 
possibly more cost-efficient and thus more proportionate, than implementing EoI. 
Recommendation 19. Equivalence of inputs (EoI) is in principle the surest way of achieving 
effective protection from discrimination; in practice, however, its advantages over EoO will 
vary considerably from one Member State to the next, and from one wholesale access 
product to the next. A well-crafted EoO regime, with good enforcement and suitable 
KPIs/SLAs/SLGs, can in many cases approach the effectiveness of an EoI regime. EoI 
provisions are largely self-enforcing, whereas EoO can be challenging to enforce in cases 
where the SMP operator does not itself consume the same wholesale access product that 
it offers to competitors. The successor recommendation should therefore continue to call 
for a case by case proportionality assessment of EoI versus EoO, in line with current 
practice. Both costs and benefits should be considered not only from the perspective of the 
SMP operator, but also from the perspectives of alternative operators and of the NRA. 
 
Recommendation 20. In general, NRAs should duly justify their choices between EoO and 
EoI on a wholesale product by product basis, taking Member State characteristics and 
market characteristics into account. If however a single wholesale input is used in multiple 
wholesale products, then the decision should be made on an input by input basis. 
 
The crucial role that Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) play 
For many different reasons, KPIs play a key role in ensuring effective non-discrimination. 
KPIs are set by the NRA, and monitored by the NRA. Where infractions are noted, the NRA 
plays the key role in imposing any penalties. The NRA is thus in a substantially different role 
than is the case for SLAs and SLGs, which typically are agreements between two 
undertakings, two private firms. 
KPIs should be sufficient to ensure effective non-discrimination, but nonetheless proportionate. 
They should not be so numerous or so complex as to be needlessly burdensome. 
As BEREC notes in its consultation response,975 a minimal list of KPI and SLAs/SLGs that 
should be contained in a reference offer976 is provided in its 2019 Guidelines: “SLAs should be 
available for ordering, delivery, service (availability) and maintenance (repair), including 
specific time scales for the acceptance or refusal of a request for supply and for completion, 
 
975 BEREC (2020), BEREC Response to the Targeted consultation on the revision of the Commission’s access 
recommendations, BoR (20) 169, page 15. 




testing and hand-over or delivery of services and facilities, for provision of support services 
(such as fault handling and repair). Reference offers should also include the quality standards 
that each party must meet when performing its contractual obligations, including the 
specification of KPIs with respect to SLAs, as well as SLGs for ordering, delivery, service 
(availability) and maintenance (repair). In the Guidelines KPIs, SLAs and SLGs – applied in 
both equivalence of access concepts (EoO or EoI) – are addressed adequately to remain 
further on effective tools to enforce and monitor the non-discrimination obligation.” 
The KPIs implemented by AGCOM in Italy for VULA FTTC, bitstream and WLR shared access 
under NRA Decision 395/18/CONS (Equivalence+)977 reflect many years of practical 
implementation experience and can provide an additional useful input for a list that could 
appear in the successor recommendation. They are: 
Provisioning 
• KPI 1.1 --% not workable orders (TIM responsibility) 
• KPI 1.2 migration average time 
• KPI 1.3 activation average time 
• KPI 1.4 DAC/DRO migration average time control indicator 
• KPI 1.5 DAC/DRO activation average time control indicator 
• KPI 1.6 first appointment average time 
• KPI 1.7 processing time for out sourcing of services 
• KPI 1.8 single queue average time 
• KPI 1.9 --% of postponed order (DAC postponed) 
• KPI 1.10 --% of early faults within 14 days from activation 
Maintenance 
• KPI 2.1 fault: repair average time 
• KPI 2.2 degradation: repair average time 
• KPI 2.3 crossing time disaggregation KPI 
• KPI 2.4 % fault re occurred within 14 days 
• KPI 2.5 % repaired faults in 2 working days (after submission) 
The wholesale CRM system 
• KPI 3.1 System availability 
• KPI 3.2 CRM performance Index 
Backlog 
• KPI 4.1 ––% of orders not executed at the agreed deadline 
 
977 Italy AGCOM (2021), “Non-discrimination obligations in Italy: EoI , EoO and KPIs”, presentation. 
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The process by means of which KPIs, SLAs, and SLGs are set 
NRAs will not necessarily have the detailed knowledge needed to set the provisions required 
for the KPIs, SLAs, and SLGs. Our perception is that non-discrimination has been most 
effective in Member States where the setting of KPIs, SLAs and SLGs is done through a broad 
multi-stakeholder process involving the SMP operator and alternative operators, and then 
monitored and enforced using effective mechanisms and adequate penalties. 
The NDCM Recommendation notes the need for public consultation in imposing EoI in Recital 
(18) and Point (51). As regards KPIs, Point (23) says in part: “In order to enhance transparency 
and foster market confidence, NRAs may facilitate through appropriate industry fora the 
agreement between the SMP operator and third-party access seekers on the detailed KPIs 
and ensure that such KPIs are audited and published in a manner that allows for the early 
detection of potential discriminatory behaviour. The KPIs should be related to the key activities 
in the provisioning cycle, covering all its stages i.e. the ordering process, the delivery or 
provision of the service, the quality of service including faults and fault repair times, and 
migration by access seekers between different regulated wholesale inputs.” Point (24) NDCM 
says that “NRAs should be closely involved in the development of SLAs, for instance, by 
approving the SLAs developed by the SMP operator as part of a regulatory reference offer.” 
In its consultation response,978 as previously noted, BEREC observes that they have already 
provided guidance on the question of minimally adequate KPI and SLAs/SLGs as criteria for a 
reference offer979. “The Guidelines stress that SLAs should be available for ordering, delivery, 
service (availability) and maintenance (repair), including specific time scales for the 
acceptance or refusal of a request for supply and for completion, testing and hand-over or 
delivery of services and facilities, for provision of support services (such as fault handling and 
repair). Reference offers should also include the quality standards that each party must meet 
when performing its contractual obligations, including the specification of KPIs with respect to 
SLAs, as well as SLGs for ordering, delivery, service (availability) and maintenance (repair). 
In the Guidelines KPIs, SLAs and SLGs – applied in both equivalence of access concepts 
(EoO or EoI) – are addressed adequately to remain further on effective tools to enforce and 
monitor the non-discrimination obligation.” 
Based on our interviews and case studies, our assessment is that the NDCM is right to promote 
discussion and agreement between the SMP operator and third-party access seekers, but it 
deserves more attention than it receives in the NDCM Recommendation. In particular, the 
successor recommendation would do well to replace the “may facilitate” with language that 
indicates that the NRA “should” promote this kind of discussion and agreement. 
This observation is fully in line with Orange’s response to the Commission’s public consultation 
in which they observe: “Regular meetings with all the stakeholders, under the supervision of 
the NRA, could be used in order to fine tune each item and adapt it, if necessary, to the 
environment and the technical or marketing evolutions, as well as explaining the perimeter, the 
 
978 BEREC (2020), BEREC Response to the Targeted consultation on the revision of the Commission’s access 
recommendations, BoR (20) 169, page 15. 




differences and evolution of the compared KPIs. This method has often proven to bring 
progress and the right level of transparency.”980 
It will often be efficient and practical to empower the SMP operator itself to offer detailed 
commitments, subject to comment or negotiation with alternative operators. Variants of this 
approach have been used for instance in Italy and Germany. We think that this approach is 
promising and is not sufficiently developed in the current Access Recommendations. 
The Italian NRA decided against imposing EoI on the SMP operator in 2015 because it 
considered that the benefits were not commensurate with costs; that improvements in non-
discrimination were needed to promote VHCN deployment more quickly that the time frame in 
which it would be feasible to implement EoI; that the regulatory burden would not have been 
substantially reduced; and that EoI would not in and of itself solve long-standing problems with 
the quality of the SMP operator’s wholesale offerings. They instead invited the SMP operator 
to propose an approach to improving non-discrimination. The SMP operator proposed a 
voluntary switch to EoI for LLU, SLU, and VULA FTTH/FTTB, and an enhanced EoO for other 
wholesale services. Among the improvements proposed and approved was the strengthening 
of a supervisory board internal to the SMP operator, the Organo di Vigilanza (created in 2008 
to monitor TIM commitments), to assist the NRA in monitoring and enforcing the various non-
discrimination measures. The resultant New Model of Equivalence (NME) is accompanied by 
a comprehensive set of KPIs, SLAs, and SLGs that reflect extensive discussion between the 
SMP operator and the alternative operators. Agcom approved the new equivalence model in 
multiple proceedings and made it binding.981 
In our survey of NRAs, the ILR (the Luxembourg NRA) made similar observations. “ILR opted 
for a ‘contributive’ way to implement [equivalence], meaning that all the market players were 
required to contribute to this process and also adhere to the result. Therefore, the ILR set up 
on a regular basis working groups where the SMP operator had to present the progress made 
with the implementation of EOI. This way, the access seekers understood the process and 
were able afterwards to understand how the EOI rules were implemented. During these 
meetings, alternative operators were supported by their consultants.” They go on to note the 
importance of periodic reports and of periodic external audits of the effectiveness of the 
implementation of equivalence. 
The German NRA achieves a somewhat similar outcome in a different way, in a process that 
centres around approval of the Reference Offer. There is a two-step procedure that begins 
with the publication of a draft Reference Offer by the SMP operator, and a request that access 
seekers provide comments. The NRA’s ruling chamber (Beschlusskammer 3) examines the 
draft Reference Offer, holds a public hearing, and may make comments. In a second round, a 
revised Reference Offer is published, further comments are solicited, a second hearing is held. 
 
980 Orange also observes that “… non-discrimination is a foundation of the regulation. Transparency and KPIs are 
effective tools for this aim in the case of EoO. For EoO, Orange believes that reliable and public KPIs are very 
efficient tools for achieving nondiscrimination and agrees with the necessity of setting up a list of efficient KPIs at 
the national level to be monitored and published by SMP operators. Performance results must be regularly updated 
and KPIs must be assessed from time to time in order to take into account the evolution of access products and the 
reality of the market. It is definitely important to focus KPIs on processes that are effectively used by the managers 
on the field. … It is important that, when appropriate, real and comparable KPIs are established, including provision 
effectiveness and failure ratios, as well as overall and partial provision and repair times. KPI indicators depend on 
SMP operator criteria regarding its responsibility as to the cause of failure or of the delay. In this regard, comparison 
with data provided by the operators could be used by the NRA to better understand the differences between 
wholesale process and self-provision by SMP.” 
981 Italy AGCOM (2021), “Non-discrimination obligations in Italy: EoI , EoO and KPIs”, presentation. 
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The process culminates with publication of an approved Reference Offer that includes service 
specifications, price lists, the ordering process, and procedures for fault repair and monitoring. 
As in Italy, there is a comprehensive set of KPIs, SLAs, and SLGs reflecting this multi-
stakeholder process. The NRA is of the view that the process avoids placing needless 
restrictions on the SMP operator, engages alternative operators fully, and generates a degree 
of market consensus. 
Our assessment is that collaborative multi-stakeholder processes such as these, where the 
SMP operator and alternative operators seek to achieve consensus, can potentially generate 
better and more flexible outcomes in many cases than the pure imposition of regulation by an 
NRA. It might also be appropriate for interested user advocacy groups such as BEUC or 
INTUG to be involved. Approaches like these merit serious consideration by NRAs, taking 
account of national circumstances. 
A collaborative process has value only if it leads to a timely and meaningful agreement, which 
in general must be embodied in binding commitments. These are typically reflected in the 
reference offer of the SMP operator.982 Today, Art. 79 EECC offers an additional tool by means 
of which commitments of the SMP operator could be made binding. SMP operators “may offer 
to the national regulatory authority commitments regarding conditions for access, co-
investment, or both, applicable to their networks in relation, inter alia,” a range of situations. 
The named situations include cooperative arrangements, co-investment in VHCN, and 
voluntary separation. There is a mention of “effective and non-discriminatory access”, but it is 
in the context of voluntary separation. In principle, these provisions could empower NRAs to 
make SMP operator commitments binding and to impose penalties when necessary, both of 
which are essential to effective implementation. 
A not-fully-resolved question is the degree to which these provisions can be applied in cases 
that do not involve cooperative arrangements, co-investment in VHCN, or voluntary separation. 
We would argue that the “inter alia” in the EECC implies that the listed instances are not 
intended to be exhaustive, and that Art. 79 should be applicable in this case.983  
Recommendation 21. The successor recommendation could encourage NRAs to consider 
enabling the SMP operator to offer comprehensive commitments in order to implement 
effective non-discrimination, subject to a consultation and approval process designed to 
seek consensus with alternative operators and overseen by the NRA. The potential 
advantages of such a multi-stakeholder process are obvious. 
 
Recommendation 22. The frequency with which KPIs are updated (and SLAs and SLGs 
where appropriate) should be set by means of the same multi-stakeholder process 




982 See also BEREC (2019), BEREC Guidelines on the minimum criteria for a reference offer, BoR (19) 238. 
983 The NRA should however verify that the transposition of “inter alia” into national law in its Member State has 





Point 24 NDCM says that “In order to fully ensure non-discrimination, KPIs should be 
complemented by SLAs and SLGs”. However, the NDCM has little to say about regulatory 
tools to preserve Quality of Service (QoS) of regulated wholesale products. This reticence is 
understandable in light of long-standing concerns among regulatory authorities in developed 
countries that regulation of QoS can sometimes have the unwanted effect of leading to “gold 
plated” offerings, and of driving lower quality services that some consumers want out of the 
market. 
Non-discrimination is crucial, but our case studies suggest that merely assuring equality of 
access is not sufficient in all cases – even ideal non-discrimination could sometimes lead to 
treatment that is equally bad for the SMP operator and the alternative operators. 
The Italian NRA AGCOM recently noted that a key reason why they rejected a non-
discrimination scheme based solely on EoI, but instead encouraged the SMP operator to 
provide a more comprehensive solution, was that they found that full equivalence of access 
would not have guaranteed per se a higher QoS (Quality of the Service), which is a major issue 
for the competitors, especially while investing in NGA. They argue persuasively that many of 
the mechanisms that are used to ensure non-discrimination can also be profitably be employed 
to ensure suitable QoS in wholesale products by NRAs who perceive the need to do so. “KPIs 
are useful not just for non-discrimination but for quality performance monitoring.”984 
This concern is also in line with a 2016 observation by BEREC: “In the UK [which was a 
Member State at the time], the NRA has imposed minimum quality of standards for the 
provision of WLR, LLU and Ethernet leased lines as it found that EoI alone was insufficient to 
improve QoS. It found that performance levels from the SMP operator were not reflective of a 
competitive market and that the incumbent had insufficient incentive to improve under a 
general EoI framework.”985 
We suggest that the same consensus-driven multi-stakeholder process that is used to set 
KPIs, SLAs and SLGs (see Recommendation 21) could be used to ensure that competitive 
market needs for QoS are met. 
Recommendation 23. When designing or refining the non-discrimination framework, the 
NRA should consider utilising the same consensus-based multi stakeholder process 
described in Recommendation 21 to establish KPIs, SLAs and SLGs to ensure that the 
Quality of Service of wholesale products is in line with competitive market needs in the 
Member State. 
 
The process by means of which KPIs, SLAs, and SLGs are monitored and enforced 
Our observations about the means by which KPIs, SLAs and SLGs are set apply fully to their 
monitoring and enforcement as well. A multi-stakeholder process that involves both the SMP 
operator and the alternative operators will sometimes lead to better outcomes than a direct 
 
984 Italy AGCOM (2021), “Non-discrimination obligations in Italy: EoI , EoO and KPIs”, presentation. 
985 BEREC (2016), Monitoring implementation of the BEREC Common Positions on Wholesale Local Access (WLA), 
Wholesale Central Access (WCA) and Wholesale High Quality Access at a Fixed Location (WHQAFL): Phase 3, 
BoR (16) 219, page 8. 
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imposition of obligations by the NRA. NRAs should consider this possibility in light of national 
circumstances. 
Our evidence base makes clear that effective non-discrimination does not happen overnight. 
It requires sustained attention on the part of the NRA; comprehensive and well-crafted KPIs, 
SLAs, and SLGs; and effective monitoring and enforcement. 
Indeed, while BEREC has made clear that NRAs require KPIs, SLAs and SLGs in most of the 
cases where they should,986 their publications shed only limited light on the crucial question of 
whether KPIs, SLAs, and SLGs as implemented are enforceable and effective in practice. 
Under Point 26 of the NDCM Recommendation, where “the results of the KPIs indicate that 
the SMP operator may not comply with its non-discrimination obligation, the NRA should 
intervene by investigating the matter in more detail, and where necessary enforce compliance. 
NRAs should make public, for example on their website, their decision to remedy non-
compliance”. Nonetheless, our case studies suggest that NRAs do not always make clear how 
they will monitor KPIs, or how they will respond when KPI standards are not met. In particular, 
we suggest that the current “should make public, for example on their website” language is too 
loose and too vague. Once again, these process details can be important in achieving good 
outcomes. 
Our cases studies indicate that the penalties imposed by SLGs and by NRAs in cases of 
consistent non-conformity with KPIs are too small in some Member States to be dissuasive. If 
the fine is too small, the SMP operator may simply view it as a cost of doing business, and 
may continue its abusive practices. 
According to Point 29 of the NDCM Recommendation, “The level of such penalties [i.e. SLG 
payments] should be sufficiently dissuasive to ensure that the SMP operator complies with its 
delivery obligations.” It appears that current practice does not fully adhere to this guidance.  
The Italian association of Internet providers (AIIP) reported in its response to the Commission’s 
public consultation, for instance, that despite recent improvements implemented by the NRA, 
“penalties approved … are yet not effective: often below the mandatory (according to the same 
NRA) indemnities due by providers at the retail level for the same (consequent) 
delay/malfunctioning; their application is complicated and without automatisms, therefor rare 
(especially for SME providers).” 
The NRA plays a different and more limited role in SLAs and SLGs, however, than in KPIs. 
The NRA has primary responsibility for establishing and enforcing KPIs as a key tool for 
monitoring compliance with the non-discrimination remedy, but SLAs/SLGs are primarily 
agreements between two private parties. The NRA should however be involved in the process 
of establishing SLAs and SLGs where they are explicitly reflected in the referenced offer, as is 
called for in the BEREC Guidelines.987 Among the BEREC minimum criteria for the reference 
offer is that it should include “service level guarantees (SLGs) for ordering, delivery, service 
(availability) and maintenance (repair), including the amount of compensation payable by one 
party to another for failure to perform contractual commitments as well as the conditions for 
eligibility for compensation.” 
 
986 See for instance BEREC (2016), Monitoring implementation of the BEREC Common Positions on Wholesale 
Local Access (WLA), Wholesale Central Access (WCA) and Wholesale High Quality Access at a Fixed Location 
(WHQAFL): Phase 3, BoR (16) 219, Tables 22, 23, and 24 and the related text. 




As a practical matter, stakeholders tell us that courts are reluctant to enforce large penalties 
for SLG violations. In practice, KPI penalties imposed by the NRA are more likely to be 
effective, especially where they are indicative of discrimination on the part of the SMP operator. 
NRAs will also be involved in setting SLGs to the extent that they are established by means of 
a collaborative process (as in Recommendation 21) to reflect effective access needs by 
alternative operators required to provide retail products, but once again in a legal sense they 
are agreements between two commercial parties. 
In the previously cited AIIP consultation response to the public consultation, the AIIP urged the 
Commission to “…confirm and strengthen its recommendation to National Regulatory 
Authorities to impose strict obligations on SMP operators, with regard to SLAs/SLGs and 
empower the NRAs to directly impose dissuasive penalties on SMP operators where they are 
found not to comply with SLAs/SLGs. On this regard AIIP points out that: (1) the system of 
SLA and penalties (aimed at ensuring compliance with the SLAs) should be such as to allow 
easy verification and the automatic payment of penalty due; on this regard it is very important 
to ensure 100% parameters; (2) it is important to ensure consistency between the wholesale 
penalties included in the [reference offer] by SMP operator according to its wholesale 
obligations and the indemnities that are imposed by the same NRA at the retail level; (3) the 
amount of penalties should be “progressive” as to exclude recidivism by the SMP operator, 
and the right to greater damages should remain unaffected.” 
Recommendation 24. It is important that the process of monitoring KPIs is fully 
transparent. The successor recommendation should make clear that the NRA “shall” make 
public on its website any decision to remedy non-compliance. 
 
Recommendation 25. Penalties related to KPIs must be proportional, but should be large 
enough to be dissuasive. In Member States where it is feasible to do so, the NRA should 
encourage the SMP operator and the alternative operators to establish in advance a level 
of SLG penalties that are likewise proportional but dissuasive. In assessing whether the 
level of wholesale penalties is sufficiently dissuasive, the NRA should bear in mind that a 
breach of wholesale obligations on the part of the SMP operator may cause the alternative 
operator that uses the wholesale access product to be subject to indemnities imposed by 
the same NRA for problems at the retail level – the wholesale penalty should be large 
enough to cover the retail indemnity. 
 
Recommendation 26. If the NRA identifies a pattern of repetitive breaches of non-
discrimination obligations (as demonstrated for instance by means of monitoring of KPIs) 
on the part of the SMP operator, the NRA should consider imposing periodic penalty 
payments as referred to in Art. 29 EECC in order to motivate the SMP operator to refrain 
from repeating the breaches. Penalties that progressively increase in response to a pattern 
of repeated infractions could be appropriate in some circumstances. 
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In some instances, the processes are essentially appropriate, but much too slow. As 
Nineteenth Century UK Prime Minister Gladstone, said, “Justice delayed is justice denied.” Put 
differently, if regulatory remedies are too slow, competitive entry is impossible – that is in fact 
the reason why we have ex ante regulation in the first place, rather than placing sole reliance 
on ex post competition law. 
This reality is in contrast to many of the stated or implicit goals of the Access 
Recommendations. The guidance in Annex II, point 6 NGA Recommendation for instance calls 
on NRAs to ensure that “a fast-track ex-post procedure is available to settle disputes” relating 
to reference offers for access to CEI. Point 29 of the NDCM Recommendation seeks to ensure 
prompt payment of SLG penalties: “NRAs should ensure that SLG payments are, in principle, 
made among the operators without undue delay and through a pre-established process for 
payment and billing.” 
Periodic (e.g. annual) NRA reporting on the magnitude of penalties that it imposes, and the 
duration from complaint to payment where relevant, would appear to be reasonable in order to 
permit at least first-order monitoring. 
In most Member States, SLG penalties are imposed and/or adjudicated by the courts rather 
than by the NRA. Other penalties, notably those associated with failure to satisfy KPIs or with 
discriminatory treatment as evidenced by the KPIs, may be more under control of the NRA and 
the Member State. 
We see little prospect for a successor recommendation to solve the problem of the apparently 
slow administrative and judicial process in some Member States. We perceive a slow process 
in the imposition and adjudication of penalties related to non-discrimination as indeed 
constituting a problem in Member States such as these, but it is a problem that could only fully 
be addressed by the Member States in question. 
We do, however, see at least one possibility for substantially accelerating the dispute resolution 
process. According to BEREC Guidelines, the reference offer should include “a dispute 
resolution procedure to be used between the parties”.988 It is quite possible that a clause in the 
reference offer committing to use a fair but accelerated dispute resolution procedure – for 
example, an agreement in advance to resort to use some form of alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR) such as binding arbitration in the event of SLG penalties and/or other payment disputes, 
rather than recourse to the courts – might save time and avoid legal needless expense, to the 
benefit of all parties. It is perhaps not possible under EU law to prevent parties from taking 
disputes to the courts if they so choose, but it might nonetheless be possible to establish an 
alternative, less burdensome mechanism for the majority of cases. 
This is not a particularly radical proposal. In the context of access to SMP CEI, Point 6 of Annex 
II of the NGA Recommendation already calls for this: “… NRAs should ensure that a fast-track 
ex-post procedure is available to settle disputes.” 
 




Recommendation 27. The successor recommendation could urge the NRA, for payment 
of penalties that are largely under its control (such as repeated discrimination as identified 
by KPIs), to strive to ensure that dissuasive payments are made without undue delay 
through a pre-established process for payment and billing. It could also require the NRA to 
report on the level of penalties that it has imposed and on the delay, where relevant, from 
complaint to payment of the penalty. The NRA should consider the promotion of alternative 
dispute resolution provisions (e.g. in the reference offer) that seek to accelerate the dispute 
resolution process. 
 
Recommendation 28. We encourage Member States to monitor any delays in payment of 
penalties so as to ensure that their dissuasive effect is not lost. To the extent feasible, 
Member States should design administrative and/or judicial enforcement procedures 
related to the payment of penalties (for instance, SLGs) so as to avoid unreasonable delay. 
 
The Technical Replicability Test (TRT) 
Point 20 of the NDCM Recommendations tells us that the goal of the Technical Replicability 
Test (TRT) is “to ensure that alternative access seekers can technically replicate the retail offer 
of the SMP operator on the basis of the regulated wholesale input they receive.” 
Points 11 through 18 of the NDCM Recommendation define a Technical Replicability Test 
(TRT), but Points 48 and 49 of the NDCM Recommendation make it a precondition of pricing 
flexibility only “when EoI is not yet fully implemented”. If however the successor 
recommendation takes on board our suggestion to permit pricing flexibility under conditions of 
effective non-discrimination, not necessarily synonymous with equivalence of input (see 
Recommendation 1), then the TRT regains its importance for pricing flexibility, and not just as 
a transitional measure. 
The EECC makes only limited reference to technical replicability and does not explicitly 
reference the TRT by name; however, it seems clear that a TRT or equivalent assurances of 
technical replicability are essential to ensuring the “effective and non-discriminatory access” 
that is required as a precondition for pricing flexibility under Article 74. 
We are discussing the TRT here primarily in conjunction with pricing flexibility, but the TRT is 
also important as a general nondiscrimination tool in order to ensure that alternative access 
seekers can technically replicate the full range of regulated services that comprise the retail 
offer of the SMP operator on the basis of the regulated wholesale inputs that they receive (see 
Recital 20 of the NDCM Recommendation). 
For purposes of pricing flexibility, technical replicability can be presumed to be ensured where 
EoI is in place, so a TRT is not required as a prerequisite for pricing flexibility for regulated 
services for which EoI is in place.  
As regards timing, the logic of the NDCM Recommendation still holds. Points 21 and 22 of the 
NDCM state in part that “[w]hen carrying out the technical replicability test or assessing the 
results of the test carried out by the SMP operator, NRAs should also take into account the 
risk of monopolisation of the downstream market through the new offer and the impact on 
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innovation. For example, the relevant wholesale access product should be available to access 
seekers within a reasonable time prior to the launch of a corresponding retail offer by the SMP 
operator to avoid any undue timing advantage for the SMP operator taking into account the 
need for an efficient alternative operator to develop and adapt its own systems and processes 
in order to be able to offer a competitive new retail service. Given the importance for 
competition of ensuring technical replicability, it is crucial that the regulated SMP provider 
ensures technical replicability of new retail offers before their launch and at all times 
thereafter.”989 [emphasis added] 
If a TRT is performed before the launch of the new SMP operator retail offering, it may be 
desirable (but need not be required) that the ERT is performed at the same time, and this is 
envisioned as a possibility in Point 66 of the NDCM Recommendation. Point 66 states that the 
NRA “may run the [ERT] test before the launch of a new retail offer by the SMP operator, e.g. 
if the NRA considers it appropriate to align the timing of the economic replicability test with the 
technical replicability test if also undertaken before launch.” 
Recommendation 29. The TRT should serve to ensure that alternative access seekers 
can technically replicate the retail offer of the SMP operator on the basis of the regulated 
wholesale input they receive. In the interest of proportionality, it need not be required for 
minimal changes to an existing retail offer of the SMP operator that prima facie do not imply 
a risk to technical replicability (such as for instance changes to price or to contract 
duration). Where a flagship retail product is a bundle that includes both regulated and 
unregulated elements, the TRT should be applied only to the regulated elements. 
 
Recommendation 30. The TRT should continue to be implemented in advance, wherever 
feasible, of the SMP operator launching a new retail offer that depends on a new relevant 
wholesale input being available. If the TRT is conducted in advance of the launch of the 
SMP operator’s new retail offering, it is desirable (but not required) that the ERT be 
conducted at the same time. 
 
How to deal with potential commercial agreements where an SMP operator and an 
alternative operator would like to put in place a service at higher quality than that 
covered in current reference offers 
We know from our interviews and case studies (see Chapter 6) that there have been instances 
where an alternative operator has wanted to deliver a service at a better or higher level of 
quality than that currently possible under existing Reference Offers, and where the SMP 
operator was willing to offer the necessary wholesale product on commercial terms that were 
mutually acceptable. 
Business services that used to be offered as Market 4/2014 services are a case in point. Local 
branch banks generally require faster repair service (i.e. Mean Time to Repair, or MTTR) than 
 
989 But Point 22 of the NDCM goes on to say: “Consequently, a technical replicability test may be carried out prior 
to and after the launch of a new retail offer, depending on when the NRA finds it appropriate. For example, when 
an NRA’s ability to make public the SMP operator’s business data is limited by confidentiality rules under its national 





residential consumers. Under the 2020 RRM, the broadband services that they employ are 
likely to be classified as Market 1/2020 services. An overly rigid implementation of non-
discrimination might actually interfere with the ability of the SMP operator to provide services 
for which there is legitimate demand. 
Requirements such as these can be very diverse from one business to the next, and the 
administrative burden of creating a Reference Offer can be substantial – it is not practical to 
require a Reference Offer for every conceivable variant. 
One can envision circumstances where an SMP operator might use the ability to offer services 
with QoS different from (better than) that of the standard residential consumer-oriented offer 
for discriminatory purposes, but our assessment is that this risk is fairly remote. The presence 
of Reference Offers that correspond to the most common services needed by residential 
consumers provides good protection against abuse of these special offers reached outside of 
the Reference Offers. 
There is a trade-off here. Regulation should not prevent the introduction of new services for 
which there appears to be market demand.  
Recommendation 31. Commercial agreements between the SMP operator and alternative 
operators to offer additional wholesale access services with QoS beyond that covered by 
existing Reference Offers should not be prohibited. The SMP operator should be 
encouraged to meet reasonable requests for such services. 
 
How to deal with information asymmetry 
Point (7) of Annex II of the NGA Recommendations already obliges the NRA to ensure that the 
SMP operator does not use information about the deployment plans of alternative operators 
for its own competitive advantage. “The incumbent has prior knowledge of third-party access 
seekers’ deployment plans. To prevent such information from being used to gain undue 
competitive advantage, the SMP operator in charge of operating the civil engineering 
infrastructure should not share such information with its downstream retail arm. NRAs at a 
minimum should ensure that those persons involved in the retail arm activities of the SMP 
operator may not participate in company structures of the SMP operator responsible, directly 
or indirectly, for managing access to civil engineering infrastructure.” 
Our case studies suggest that this is a real problem in some Member States (including France, 
Lithuania, and Italy – see Chapter 6), not only for CEI, and that the NRAs recognise that this 
is an area that needs further work. 
These information asymmetries are of much less concern where the SMP operator is 
wholesale-only, and might be of only limited concern where EoI has been fully implemented. 
The guidance in the NGA Recommendation continues to be appropriate and necessary, but it 
does not appear to be sufficient to fully address the underlying problem. Enforcement in some 
(non-EoI) Member States appears to be inadequate. 
We suggest, at a minimum, that the SMP operator should be obliged to annually submit a short 
report documenting its practices to avoid misuse of its knowledge of the plans of alternative 
operators. The report should include any alleged violations that have been reported, and any 
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corrective actions that the SMP operator has taken. The reporting obligation might not be 
necessary in cases where the risk of misuse of information is low, as for instance in the case 
of a wholesale-only SMP operator. 
Recommendation 32. In crafting non-discrimination plans, NRAs should be sensitive to 
the need to ensure that the SMP operator does not use information about the deployment 
plans of alternative operators for its own competitive advantage. In particular, NRAs should 
ensure that the retail arm of a vertically integrated SMP operator is not informed in advance 
of network deployments and/or the evolution of competitors in cases where this knowledge 
might provide the SMP operator with a competitive advantage. We recommend that the 
successor recommendation oblige SMP operators (except for those where the risk of 
abuse of information is low, such as wholesale-only operators) to provide an annual report 
documenting its practices in this regard, any known allegations of violation, and any 
corrective actions that it has taken. Beyond this, NRAs must have both the authority and 
the responsibility to investigate any allegations that the SMP operator has improperly used 
information about the plans of competitors for its own competitive advantage, and to 
impose dissuasive penalties if and as appropriate. 
 
d. Access to Civil Engineering Infrastructure 
The need for access to Civil Engineering Infrastructure (CEI) has been a long-standing 
challenge in EU electronic communications policy. Given that the deployment of new fibre 
typically relies on civil engineering that tends to be very expensive, cost-effective deployment 
of new NGA and VHCN networks (and mobile networks as well) is heavily dependent on the 
ability to access civil engineering assets of the SMP operator, or assets of other network 
operators or of entirely different infrastructure such as electricity. Responsibility for deploying 
civil works if further complicated because responsibility for the granting of necessary permits 
in the Member States is typically delegated to public authorities that are not responsible for 
electronic communications, and is often delegated down to the regional or municipal level.990 
Our overall sense is that current guidance in the Recommendations as regards access to SMP 
CEI subject to cost orientation remains broadly fit for purpose. Nonetheless, our interviews and 
case studies have shown that implementation faces a great many challenges, and these limit 
the actual effectiveness of the measures. This suggests that there are opportunities for further 
refinement in a successor recommendation. 
The new provisions in Arts. 72-73 EECC to the effect that SMP CEI “can be used as a self-
standing remedy for the improvement of competitive and deployment dynamics in any 
downstream market”, provide NRAs with important, valuable new tools. How broadly this is 
applicable absent definition of a relevant market for physical infrastructure (PIA) remains to be 
seen. Nonetheless, the call in Recital 187 EECC for access to SMP CEI “to be considered 
before assessing the need to impose any other potential remedies, and not just as an ancillary 
 
990 J. Scott Marcus, Ulrich Stumpf, Peter Kroon, Stefano Lucidi, Lorenz Nett, Veronica Bocarova, Philippe Defraigne, 
Peter Dunn, Christian Hocepied, Hervé Jacquemin, and Robert Queck (2017), Substantive issues for review in the 
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remedy to other wholesale products or services” might prove to be quite important in the long 
term. 
There are essentially three mechanisms at EU level for enabling network operators to access 
the civil infrastructure of other firms: 
• Regulated access to the CEI of the SMP operator (see Art. 72 EECC) 
• Regulated symmetric access  (see Art. 61 EECC) and  
• Access to civil engineering of a range of different infrastructures under the Broadband 
Cost Reduction Directive (BCRD). 
These provisions co-exist, but their objectives are different. The goal of Art. 72 EECC is 
primarily to address competition problems, while that of the BCRD is to reduce the deployment 
costs for new broadband networks. Art. 72 EECC applies only to operators of electronic 
communications networks who have been found to possess SMP, while the BCRD applies not 
only to all operators of electronic communications networks, but also to providers of other 
infrastructures (electricity, water, sewage, …) to the extent that they possess infrastructure that 
may be of interest to network operators. Recital 187 EEC expands on the Access 
Recommendations to note the need “to ensure that access to such assets can be used as a 
self-standing remedy for the improvement of competitive and deployment dynamics in any 
downstream market, to be considered before assessing the need to impose any other potential 
remedies, and not just as an ancillary remedy to other wholesale products or services”, in line 
with Art. 72(2) EECC. A further difference is that the imposition of SMP CEI access must be 
based on an assessment of proportionality, while the BCRD does not require a proportionality 
assessment. 
Another major difference is that SMP access to CEI is on a cost-orientation basis, while access 
under the BCRD is based on fair and reasonable prices (and often significantly more expensive 
in consequence). 
Regulated access to SMP CEI is robust in some Member States, but weak in others. Reasons 
can include (1) limited availability of ducts and other CEI; (2) mismatch between the 
capabilities of existing CEI and the requirements of network operators; and (3) pricing and 
other access conditions (see Chapter 0). 
A clear finding is that restrictive labour practices on the part of the SMP operator sometimes 
inflate the price of access to SMP operator CEI (see for instance the statement of the Polish 
NRA in Chapter 0). 
An assessment of the BCRD is out of scope for this study. In this study, we take the BCRD 
into account to the extent that it interacts with the provisions of the Access Recommendations 
in general and their CEI access provisions in particular, but we refrain from making any 
recommendations about the BCRD. 
We have identified a number of areas where refinement of current practice in regard to access 
to CEI through the Access Recommendations might be improved in a successor 
recommendation. Changes that might be considered include (1) dealing with failures of the 
SMP operator to undertake work on CEI or to expand capacity on behalf of the alternative 
operators in a timely fashion; (2) refinements to pricing such as volume discounts; (3) 
expanding the scope of elements of CEI to which alternative operators could gain access; 
(4) improving the quality of databases and ordering processes; and (5) dealing with 
interactions between the Access Recommendations and the BCRD. 
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We consider each of these in turn. 
Effective access to legacy ducts and other SMP CEI 
This section is written primarily in terms of ducts, but most aspects are equally applicable in 
principle to all forms of CEI. 
In this section, we consider first the elements of CEI to which alternative operators should be 
able to gain regulated access; then the technologies for which alternative operators should be 
able to use SMP regulated access; and finally the options that should be available to alternative 
operators in the event that the SMP operator “drags its heels” as regards performing necessary 
repairs or renovation to regulated CEI, or to an expansion of capacity. 
Expanding the scope of elements of SMP CEI to which alternative operators could gain access 
Some NRAs impose CEI access only to limited portions of the CEI controlled by the SMP 
operator. 
One NRA emphasised the importance of providing access to ducts in the curb section (from 
just outside the private property to inside the private property).991 This appears indeed to be a 
best practice to follow.  
Imposing an access obligation where proportionate for ducts beyond the central office and the 
local loop on the operator that has been found to have SMP in market 1/2020  under Art. 72/73 
EECC is not excluded in principle but may raise legal difficulties in practice, in particular in 
countries where ducts from other utilities might potentially be available.  In that case, the NRA 
may wish to examine the opportunity to define a separate market for access to physical 
infrastructure as envisioned in Points 25 through 28 of the Recommendation on Relevant 
Markets (RRM) of 2020 instead of imposing the access remedy under Art. 72/73 EECC. 
Recommendation 33. The successor recommendation should urge NRAs to assess 
whether mandating SMP operators to provide access to all sections of their civil 
engineering that may be needed in order for alternative operators to deploy their fibre 
network between their ODFs and their end-users  would be proportionate to address the 
market power of the SMP operator, taking into account the feasibility for alternative 
operators to use alternative civil engineering infrastructure such as ducts. Where relevant, 
NRAs should also identify different points of delivery at which the physical infrastructure 
could be accessed. Such an access obligation could where appropriate and proportionate 
also encompass ducts of the backhaul networks, and shelters susceptible to host 
operators’ passive and active equipment, to the extent that such related facilities have 
enough capacity. Where the conditions are met, the NRA might find it appropriate to define 
a separate market for access to physical infrastructure as envisioned in the 2020 RRM 
rather than attempting to impose the access remedy under Art. 72/73 EECC. 
 
Expanding the technologies for which alternative operators could use SMP CEI access 
Another issue is whether the SMP operator should grant access only for the deployment of 
fibre networks. In the case of France, while acknowledging that scarce available space must 
 




be utilised in the most efficient and future proof way, the Commission nonetheless invited the 
NRA “to ensure that the scope of the access obligation is technologically neutral by extending 
it to deployments of networks other than fibre, unless such access request would objectively 
lead to exhaustion of available space for future fibre deployments on that specific route”.992 
Expanding the guidance in this way seems appropriate, and might be of particular use to cable 
operators. It would seem to be appropriate to recall this principle in the successor 
recommendation. 
Recommendation 34. In line with the principle of technological neutrality, under a 
successor recommendation, the SMP operator should not be allowed to refuse access 
solely because the access seeker intends to use the access to deploy VHCN based on 
technologies other than FTTH unless such access would objectively lead to exhaustion of 
available space for future fibre deployments on that specific route. The burden of proof 
should be on the SMP operator. 
 
Expanding the options of alternative operators if the SMP operator fails to undertake repairs or 
renovation on CEI or to expand capacity in a timely fashion 
As already noted, an absence of ducts, poor quality of ducts, or a mismatch of CEI 
characteristics with market needs are a major impediment to the use of these CEI access 
provisions in many Member States. BEREC’s comments are to the point: “Aging, damaged or 
no longer used infrastructures, as well as infrastructures with no longer available space or 
capacity can impede the deployment of new and enhanced networks, in particular VHCN.”993 
But BEREC goes on to emphasise that it is sometimes possible to rehabilitate decrepit CEI, 
and they note that the needs of all network operators should be considered (in a symmetric 
fashion) when renovating CEI. They also note the possible importance of ancillary or 
associated facilities to CEI as conventionally defined. 
The SMP operator may be slow to respond to requests to provide access to CEI – perhaps 
wilfully, perhaps due to lack of sufficient motivation, or perhaps due to poor process or 
insufficient staff. In these cases, it might make sense for the alternative operator to be 
empowered to undertake the work itself, using well-qualified staff and authorised procedures. 
BEREC argues that when an SMP operator needs to repair or renovate its own civil 
engineering infrastructure, or needs to free up more space or capacity in its infrastructure for 
its own VHCN rollouts, the non-discrimination obligation should entail the same possibility for 
any infrastructure user deploying VHCNs. “This can be fulfilled appropriately if a non-
discrimination obligation (primarily EoI) is imposed (…) When the SMP operator has the 
obligation of granting reasonable access requests to physical infrastructure, the NRA can also 
impose on the SMP operator an obligation to grant reasonable requests of renovation of 
infrastructure elements necessary to deploy new and enhanced networks, in particular VHCN. 
Therefore, a reasonable request for renovation of regulated civil engineering infrastructure has 
to be assessed in terms of its technical and financial complexity, proportionality and of its 
expected outcome for the concerned undertakings. In order to ensure transparency and non-
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993 BEREC (2020), BEREC Response to the Targeted consultation on the revision of the Commission’s access 
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discrimination and pursuant to the adopted principle of EoI or EoO, the modalities of 
renovations’ requests, processes and appreciation, should be clear and should apply to all 
undertakings deploying new and enhanced networks, in particular VHCNs (…). Otherwise, the 
SMP operator may have the incentive of prioritizing the available capacities for its own needs, 
and thus unduly restrict alternative undertakings’ access to the existing physical 
infrastructure”994. BEREC suggests that, in principle, interventions to make space available, 
where possible, should be undertaken by the SMP operator. However, the need to rely on 
timely intervention by the staff of the SMP operator, or from its subcontractors, could be a 
delaying factor for the deployment of fibre by access seekers. 
The approach followed by the Italian, Spanish, Portuguese and UK NRAs are therefore worthy 
of consideration in Member States where the SMP operator is consistently unable or unwilling 
to provide timely repairs and renovation to CEI. In these countries, access seekers can 
“undertake decongestion work themselves after informing the incumbent, or request the 
incumbent to undertake such work. In Spain, alternative operators must first request the 
incumbent to reorganize cables but can proceed to undertake the work itself if the incumbent 
has not carried out the decongestion within 12 days” 995. 
Rather than having the alternative operator do the maintenance itself, it will typically be less 
intrusive (and therefore more proportionate) to oblige the SMP operator to identify and certify 
a list of third party contractors that are competent to do the necessary work, and to empower 
alternative operators to choose among the certified contractors, at least in cases where the 
SMP operator cannot or will not perform the work promptly. In Italy, for instance, “(w)ith a 
decision of 2017, Agcom imposed on TIM some obligations to permit alternative operators to 
choose their preferred network technicians' company (the so-called “System”) to provide 
provisioning and assurance services for their customers. An [alternative operator] may choose 
its preferred System in a list of authorized companies (by the SMP operator]. Systems may 
provide specific customised additional services to the [alternative operators]. An [alternative 
operator] may decide if a specific wholesale order has to be or not be outsourced. When an 
order is out sourced, TIM is responsible only of dispatching the order to the right System 
company. For such orders, only the processing time for dispatching which is under control of 
[the SMP operator] wholesale division has to be measured by a specific KPI.”996 
At a stakeholder workshop held on 9 June in support of this project, however, consultant Gita 
Sorensen997 claimed that there has been good experience with alternative operators having 
their own people authorised to repair or renovate SMP CEIs. This led to some debate (with a 
representative of Orange) as to whether the incentives of the SMP operator and the alternative 
operators in ensuring that repairs and renovation are of good quality are sufficiently aligned. It 
was also noted (by CETIN) that if delays are caused by a general shortage of qualified staff, 
that empowering alternative operators will not necessarily solve the problem (since alternative 
operators are likely to be dependent on the same contractors as the SMP operator). 
If the third party contractor is truly independent of the SMP operator (a key consideration that 
the NRA should carefully reflect on), it should be motivated both to please the alternative 
operator that pays for the work, and to do the work to the satisfaction of the SMP operator. 
 
994 BEREC (2020), BEREC Response to the Targeted consultation on the revision of the Commission’s access 
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Similar considerations apply in cases where it is technically and economically feasible and 
practical to enable an alternative operator to reuse a currently crowded duct, and where the 
SMP operator is not motivated to undertake the work in a timely fashion. Note that Point 3 of 
Annex II of the NGA Recommendation says that the SMP operator “should include measures 
aimed at de-congestioning currently used ducts.” If SMP operator ducts are crowded with 
copper wires, it would seem to make sense to oblige the SMP operator to remove the copper 
so as to make room for fibre. More generally, given the important role that access to SMP 
operator CEI plays in some Member States, it seems to be worthwhile to have a robust 
procedure in place that the SMP operator cannot easily block. 
In Member States where the NRA chooses to follow the procedure outlined above, the NRA 
will need to set rules as to who pays for improvements that were requested by an alternative 
operator, and who owns the results of that work. Possible best practices are the UK, France 
and Spain, where (1) the SMP operator or (2) a contractor approved by the SMP operator 
builds a branch or bypass to avoid a saturated section at the request of an alternative operator, 
“the alternative operator must meet the cost, and it is clear, at least in the case of the UK, that 
the new duct section becomes the property of the incumbent following construction and is 
incorporated into its network”998. Any detailed rules along these lines are likely to be Member 
State specific and case specific. 
Recommendation 35. In Member States where there is history of unsatisfactory responses 
by the SMP operator (a) to reasonable requests for renovation, repair or bypass of SMP 
CEI, or (b) to reasonable requests request to expand the capacity of a duct, pole, or other 
similar element of CEI; and to the extent that it is deemed to be proportionate, the 
successor recommendation should encourage NRAs to require SMP operators (1) to 
establish procedures for the certification of qualified workers or subcontractors authorised 
to make such interventions; and (2) to define the procedure to be followed for such 
interventions. At a minimum, the SMP operator must be informed of all work undertaken in 
this way. Where work is undertaken on behalf of an alternative operator, the NRA will need 
to set rules to who pays for work, and who owns the resultant infrastructure (typically the 
SMP operator), in instances where (1) the SMP operator or (2) a contractor approved by 
the SMP operator makes improvements to the SMP operator’s infrastructure at the request 
of an alternative operator. 
 
As noted earlier, restrictive labour practices on the part of the SMP operator sometimes inflate 
the price of access to SMP operator CEI (see for instance the statement of the Polish NRA in 
Chapter 0). For example, the Portuguese NRA ANACOM reports that their SMP operator 
“supervises in general ALL the cable installations, even the ones where supervision couldn’t 
be required”. This appears to be an abusive practice that the NRA should prevent, but it is not 
clearly addressed in Annex I NGA Recommendation which asks NRAs to “estimate the 
incremental costs required to provide access to the facilities concerned” including the cost of 
“provisioning of access to civil engineering infrastructure”, but does not specify to limit these 
costs to those of indispensable interventions. More generally, the NGA Recommendation is 
silent on the assessment by the NRA of the opportunity of interventions by the SMP operator.  
In practice, such an assessment should take place on the occasion of the review of the 
reference offer, and the future access recommendation should likely recall this, since no such 
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reminder is included in the BEREC guidelines on the minimum criteria for a reference offer999 
of June 2019.  
Recommendation 36. NRAs should be vigilant against unreasonable SMP operator labour 
practices that require SMP staff to be present, and paid for, even where their presence is 
superfluous. 
 
Improving the quality of databases and ordering processes 
Point 17 of the NGA Recommendation states that NRAs should work with other authorities 
with a view to establishing a database containing information on geographical location, 
available capacity and other physical characteristics of all civil engineering infrastructure which 
could be used for the deployment of optical fibre networks in a given market or market 
segment. Such a database should be accessible to all operators. 
Our case studies suggest that better online directories of the CEI of SMP are needed in some 
Member States. The interviews and case studies addressed in Chapter 7 make clear that this 
database is not always available, and that even if it is, the quality often leaves much to be 
desired. Interviews in several different Member States suggested that it was not terribly 
unusual for an order for CEI to be place and accepted, but in the end the promised duct or pole 
does not exist. 
This appears to have been a long-standing concern. In 2016, BEREC observed: “Regarding 
the setting up of a civil infrastructure database, the record is mixed with some NRAs requiring 
the setting up of a civil infrastructure database containing information on the ducts of the SMP 
operator while the majority do not.”1000 
As yet another example, in the Czech Republic, civil engineering “is not used in practice as it 
is set rather ineffective. Mostly the lack of information about existing and or build infrastructure 
make its use difficult along with wide options for gaining exemption from this obligation based 
on non-transparent criteria.”1001 
There are likely to be practical limits to what can be achieved. If the SMP operator’s CEI 
database contains incorrect information (due, perhaps, to poor bookkeeping decades in the 
past), it might well be the case that the error is not discovered until an attempt is made to order 
the CEI in question. But the NRA should nonetheless seriously reflect on what is realistic and 
proportionate. 
There are Member States where orders for SMP CEI are rare. If the lack of a good database 
is a major contributor to the lack of orders, then measures to improve the quality of the 
database are likely to be warranted and proportionate. If the lack of orders is not remediable 
by database improvements, for instance because little or no reusable SMP CEI exists, then 
efforts to improve the quality of the database might not be proportionate or appropriate. 
 
999 BoR (19) 95 
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(WLA), Wholesale Central Access (WCA) and Wholesale High Quality Access at a Fixed Location (WHQAFL): 
Phase 3, BoR (16) 219, page 7. 




Recommendation 37. The provisions on the quality of databases and ordering processes 
that are already visible in Point (17) of the NGA Recommendation should be strengthened 
so as to substantially increase the likelihood that the database of SMP CEI is fully current 
and up to date. The expected updating of the BCRD might already address this; if not, the 
successor to the Access Recommendations should do so. The NRA should however 
consider the causes of any defects in the current database (taking into account the number 
of orders for SMP CEI currently placed, and the number that could be expected if the 
database were improved) in order to assess whether more effort invested would be 
proportionate and warranted. 
 
A few of our alternative operator interviewees indicated dissatisfaction with the fact that the 
database of CEI was available only to potential access seekers in their Member State, but not 
to the general public. 
Our perception is that the issue is a bit more complicated than this. It might well be appropriate 
to make more information about CEI available to the public than is visible today (and doing so 
would be broadly in line with the goals of EU law as regards Public Sector Information), but not 
all. There is a valid public interest in ensuring that certain characteristics of infrastructure not 
be disclosed. For instance, the location of central offices might be of interest to terrorists. 
At a stakeholders’ workshop held in support of this study on 9 June 2021, CETIN expressed 
the view that making more information about SMP CEI might be seriously counter-productive 
in some of the eastern Member States. They worry about competitors using their CEI without 
a contract and without compensation. To the extent that this concern can be substantiated, we 
would tend to view it as more of a civil law problem than an electronic communications 
regulation problem; nonetheless, it would be necessary for any guidance to take the concern 
into account. 
Recommendation 38. A successor recommendation for the Access Recommendations 
should provide principles-based guidance as to which elements of the public database on 
SMP CEI should be publicly visible. 
 
In Germany, the need for end-to-end provisioning rather than segment-by-segment was raised 
during some interviews1002. If requests must be made segment by segment, it is often the case 
that CEI is available for some stretches but not for others, but the alternative operator discovers 
this only after having invested time and effort. This is a slightly different problem than the lack 
of a reliable database, but the issues are interrelated – both reflect weaknesses in the 
operational support systems (OSS) that underlie the ordering process for SMP operator CEI. 
 
1002 Case study interviews. 
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Recommendation 39. The successor recommendation should reinforce the importance of 
providing end-to-end ordering of CEI such as ducts where proportionate, as a complement 
to any point-to-point ordering processes that may already exist. Those Member States that 
currently have CEI ordering procedures that allow only point-to-point orders potentially 
waste time and effort, and consequently depress take-up of SMP CEI. The same legal and 
implementation considerations that were raised in Recommendation 37 are also relevant 
here. 
 
Aligning the successor to the Access Recommendations with the BCRD 
There are instances where the legal provisions that provide regulated asymmetric access to 
the CEI of the SMP operator (notably under national law transposing Art. 72 EECC), regulated 
symmetric access to building wiring or outside wiring up to the concentration point (notably  
national measures adopted under Art. 61(3) EECC), and regulated access to civil engineering 
infrastructures under the BCRD or the national framework regarding  broadband networks that 
benefitted from State aid potentially relate to the very same infrastructure. In Poland, the SMP 
operator reports having to publish two different reference offers for access to the same 
infrastructure, while in Spain, the SMP operator says it receives access requests from 
alternative operators for the same infrastructure both under its regulated MARCo offer and 
under the Spanish transposition of the BCRD1003. 
In principle, one would think that this should not be happening. Recital 12 of the BCRD already 
establishes that, in line with the lex specialis principle, the BCRD should be without prejudice 
to the Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications and thus by extension with the 
EECC. We presume that any successor to the BCRD will carry this principle forward. 
Nonetheless, these isolated instances appear to exist. They create the possibility of 
inconsistencies or inefficiency, and may invite access seekers to engage in “forum shopping” 
that might be counter-productive. 
Recommendation 40. A successor recommendation should reinforce the principle that CEI 
that is subject to an SMP access obligation should not simultaneously be subject to the 
national transposition of the BCRD or its successor. This is primarily a matter for the 
successor to the BCRD to consider, but those drafting the successor to the Access 
Recommendations should be cognizant of the issue. 
 
It goes without saying that the successor to the Access Recommendations and any successor 
to the BCRD will need to be closely aligned with one another. 
 




e. Cooperative arrangements and other structural arrangements 
There are a range of structural solutions in this category, including wholesale-only networks 
and a range of other cooperative arrangements that may reflect some but not all of the 
elements envisioned in Art. 76 EECC and therefore fall outside of its scope.1004 
There are many examples of wholesale-only networks, including municipal fibre networks in 
Sweden, SIRO in Ireland (a joint venture between Vodafone and an electric utility firm), and 
Open Fiber in Italy (a joint venture created by ENEL and the CdP which now seeks to bring 
the Italian SMP operator into the partnership). A number of these arrangements appear to be 
functioning well. 
Separation arrangements and wholesale-only arrangements seek to solve the need for non-
discrimination, and for avoidance of favouring the SMP operator’s own retail operations, either 
by not having a retail operation at all or else by ensuring that coordinated conduct is not 
possible. Many of the new networks built in rural areas using state aid may also fall in this 
category to the extent that they operate solely as wholesale providers. Arrangements such as 
these can provide a basis for much lighter regulation than would otherwise be possible for an 
SMP operator.  
NRAs have been able to reflect cooperative agreements reasonably well to date, and to apply 
the logic of the EECC and the Recommendations and of the new EECC (which has only been 
in force since December 2020). The EECC provides a number of additional tools to the NRAs, 
including the ability to accept “commitments regarding conditions for access, co-investment, 
or both” from the SMP operator in cases that for instance involve cooperative arrangements, 
co-investment (Art. 76 EECC), or voluntary separation (Art. 78 EECC). The NRA is thus 
empowered to make the commitments wholly or partially binding. 
Consistent with our approach in Chapter 8, we consider long term commitments and volume 
purchase agreements to fall within the scope of cooperative arrangements only in cases where 
they represent substantially more than an agreement in price. This is in line with the focus in 
Art. 76(1) on SMP operators that open up VHCN deployment “by offering co-ownership or long-
term risk sharing through co-financing or through purchase agreements giving rise to specific 
rights of a structural character by other providers of electronic communications networks or 
services.” 
In this report, we do not address co-investment agreements in the sense meant by Art. 76 
EECC, and we make no recommendations in relation to them. They do not fall within the 
requested scope for this study, and the BEREC Guidelines1005 to foster the consistent 
application of the conditions and criteria for assessing new very high capacity network 
elements (Article 76 (1) and Annex IV EECC) already deals with them comprehensively in any 
case. 
Going forward, we see the possibility for a future recommendation to provide more 
comprehensive guidance as to (1) the conditions under which the NRA should consider 
granting a degree of regulatory relief to the SMP operator, (2) the conditions under which an 
out-of-cycle review of the obligations of the SMP operators is warranted, and (3) NRA 
 
1004 Functional separation and voluntary separation have somewhat similar effect as well, but we are treating them 
as being out of scope for this study. 
1005 BoR (20) 232. 
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engagement in the process of forming cooperative arrangements. We address these in the 
sections of the report that follow. 
The conditions under which the NRA should consider granting a degree of regulatory 
relief to the SMP operator 
There is a huge degree of variation among cooperative arrangements; however, principles-
based guidance to market players would appear to be positive as a means of promoting 
certainty in the market. There appear to be opportunities to provide guidance both at EU and 
at Member State level. 
At EU level, Art. 79 EECC envisions a procedure where the SMP operator offers commitments 
relating to “cooperative arrangements relevant to the assessment of appropriate and 
proportionate obligations pursuant to Article 68”, where Art. 68 EECC relates to the imposition, 
amendment or withdrawal of obligations on undertakings that have been found to have SMP. 
Further, Art. 68(6) EECC goes on to say that NRAs must “consider the impact of new market 
developments, such as in relation to commercial agreements, including co-investment 
agreements, influencing competitive dynamics.” We view these provisions as representing the 
bedrock of any guidance at EU or Member State level. In essence, cooperative arrangements 
are relevant to asymmetric regulatory obligations on the SMP operator only to the extent that 
they influence competitive dynamics. 
A successor recommendation might perhaps provide more extensive guidance; however, it is 
important that the NRA have considerable freedom to adapt any guidance to national 
circumstances.   
The conditions under which an out-of-cycle review of the obligations of the SMP 
operators is warranted 
How to handle cooperative arrangements that come into force outside of the planned review 
cycle is not clear. In their consultation response, BEREC notes that there is no experience with 
non-routine review of cooperative arrangements or long term commitments; moreover, not 
every cooperative arrangement would warrant a re-evaluation. BEREC also expresses 
concern that some cooperative arrangements might be problematic – they might lead to the 
emergence of multi-SMP operator environments.1006 
A key concern is that out-of-cycle reviews risk introducing regulatory uncertainty, which runs 
counter to the objective of promoting efficient investment in VHCN. 
BEREC is correct in observing that not every cooperative arrangement will “change 
competitive dynamics” (in the sense meant by Art. 68 EECC) in such a way as to significantly 
change the position of the SMP operator. For instance, cooperative arrangements to which the 
SMP operator is not a party will not necessarily change its competitive position. 
This implies that, in deciding whether out-of-cycle action is warranted, the NRA will need to 
make a reasoned judgment following good process as to whether competitive dynamics have 
changed enough to warrant out-of-cycle action. In doing so, the NRA would be well advised to 
remember that not every claim made by the SMP operator can be assumed to be entirely 
plausible or credible, and the same is true for the claims made by its competitors. 
 
1006 BEREC (2020), BEREC Response to the Targeted consultation on the revision of the Commission’s access 




BEREC suggests that, where a cooperative arrangement with large impact is anticipated at 
the time of a market review, the NRA would be well advised to signal in advance how it might 
deal with such a cooperative arrangement, and whether changes to remedies are likely before 
the next scheduled market review. 
BEREC raises a fair point, but it arguably places far too little emphasis on the General 
Objectives embodied in the EECC, as expressed in particular in Art. 3(4)(d): NRAs and other 
competent authorities shall “promote efficient investment and innovation in new and enhanced 
infrastructures, including by ensuring that any access obligation takes appropriate account of 
the risk incurred by the investing undertakings and by permitting various cooperative 
arrangements between investors and parties seeking access to diversify the risk of investment, 
[emphasis added] while ensuring that competition in the market and the principle of non-
discrimination are preserved …” Depending on where the Member State is in its five year 
review cycle, the next cycle might be far in the future – far enough away to eliminate any 
immediate incentive for undertakings to enter into a cooperative arrangement. This delay might 
hinder or prevent cooperative arrangements that might otherwise have had positive impact on 
societal welfare. 
In all of these aspects, the process followed could be similar to that followed for out-of-cycle 
revision to geographically differentiated remedies. With that in mind, we return to this theme in 
Section 11.f. 
Recommendation 41. Where a proposed cooperative arrangement is credibly expected to 
lead to a noteworthy change in competitive dynamics in line with Art. 3(4)(d) EECC, the 
NRA should consider whether regulatory changes are warranted outside of the normal 
market review period. In assessing the possible need for out-of-cycle changes, the NRA 
should also consider the importance of fostering regulatory predictability. Where an 
anticipated cooperative arrangement that is expected to lead to a noteworthy change in 
competitive dynamics is known at the time of a market review, the NRA should signal 
whether it considers an out-of-cycle adjustment likely, and how it intends to proceed to 
assess the arrangement. 
 
In revising remedies, the NRA should align the criteria used in the market analysis with those 
used to determine the remedies required; however, it will often be the case that a cooperative 
arrangement that does not fundamentally change the finding of SMP is nonetheless sufficiently 
significant to warrant a lighter application of remedies (see Chapter 0). This observation is fully 
in line with Art. 68(6), which says in part: “National regulatory authorities shall consider the 
impact of new market developments, such as in relation to commercial agreements … 
influencing competitive dynamics. If those developments are not sufficiently important to 
require a new market analysis …, the national regulatory authority shall assess without delay 
whether it is necessary to review the obligations imposed on undertakings designated as 
having significant market power and amend any previous decision, including by withdrawing 
obligations or imposing new obligations …” 
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Recommendation 42. In conducting an out-of-cycle review of remedies (whether in the 
context of a new cooperative agreement or an updating of geographically differentiated 
remedies), the NRA should take a consistent view in its assessment of the market and its 
imposition of remedies. There will be instances where changes in market dynamics are 
insufficient to support a finding that SMP is no longer present, but sufficient to justify 
differentiated remedies. NRAs may wish to offer prospective guidance as to how they 
expect to interpret anticipated changes in the competitive environment. 
 
NRA engagement in the process of forming cooperative arrangements 
As noted in Chapter 8, the NGA Recommendation provides (limited) guidance as to how the 
NRA should respond to cooperative arrangements; however, Art.(3)(4)(d) EECC goes beyond 
this and encourages the NRA to “[permit] various cooperative arrangements between investors 
and parties seeking access to diversify the risk of investment.” The successor recommendation 
must reflect the new language in the EECC.  
The NRA has a legitimate interest in ensuring that stakeholders are well informed as to likely 
impact of any proposed major arrangement, but it is not the function of the NRA to encourage 
or discourage transactions among commercial parties. The Member State government (e.g. 
ministry) may have a valid industrial policy interest in a particular cooperative arrangement, 
which can be permissible in light of its political role. The NRA must steer clear of this in order 
to avoid possibly having political or commercial considerations interfere with its perceived or 
actual objectivity and neutrality. 
It is however entirely appropriate and desirable for an NRA to proactively meet or engage with 
parties to a prospective arrangement and with other interested parties to discuss how it might 
possibly react to such an arrangement (but not to advise the parties on how to structure the 
arrangement). If the NRA has already issued prospective guidance (in line with 
Recommendation 37), this task might be greatly simplified. All of this is in line with the NRA 
permitting cooperative arrangements that are in line with the objectives of Art.(3)(4)(d) EECC. 
In doing so, the NRA should be appropriately attentive to all interested parties, potentially 
including the SMP operator, other participants in the cooperative arrangement, competitors to 
participants in the arrangements, consumer advocacy groups, and more. 
Recommendation 43. In the interest of promoting regulatory predictability, the NRA should 
proactively engage in a balanced way with stakeholders if a cooperative arrangement with 
large impact on competitive dynamics is anticipated. NRAs may wish to offer prospective 
guidance as to how they expect to interpret anticipated changes in the competitive 
environment. 
f. Geographic differentiation 
In the past, it was common to define markets that corresponded to an entire Member State; 
however, it was always possible to define markets at a more granular level, and the 
Commission has provided guidance in various Recommendations. The tendency in regulation 
is to focus on supply side differences, but demand side differences can sometimes be equally 




The use of geographic differentiation by NRAs has been limited to date, and their 
implementation approaches differ substantially; however, differentiation is arguably more 
important for VHCN than it was in the past due to greater diversity of circumstance from region 
to region, and from urban to rural, within many of the Member States.  
A key practical question for an NRA is whether it is more appropriate under a particular set of 
circumstances to define geographically differentiated markets accompanied with differentiated 
remedies or to differentiate remedies within the same geographical market. Differentiating 
remedies within the same geographic market tends to be simpler to implement than delineating 
distinct market geographic markets, but each has its domain of applicability. 
Moreover, as we note in Chapter 0, stakeholders advocate a cost/benefits assessment before 
implementing geographic segmentation of remedies, because segmentation is likely to 
increase administrative costs and to reduce predictability for access seekers. 
Point 50 and Annex II1007 NDCM Recommendation provide some examples of the ways in 
which differences in geographical areas can be addressed at the remedies stage. They say 
among other things that NRAs should differentiate remedies within geographical markets, 
which includes removing price control, in cases where only in certain areas of the national 
market has retail competition emerged from the effective infrastructure-based competition, or 
EoI been implemented by the SMP operator.  
There are a few opportunities to improve the clarity of this guidance of the NDCM 
Recommendation in a successor recommendation: (1) guidance among the multiple sources 
as to the relative applicability of market definition versus differentiated remedies could be 
consolidated with a particular focus on the challenges that VHCN poses for geographic 
differentiation; and (2) the conditions under which an out-of-cycle revision is warranted could 
be clarified. The out-of-cycle issues for geographically differentiated remedies have some 
commonality with possible out-of-cycle reviews due to cooperative arrangements, a fact that 
we have attempted to capture in our Recommendations.  
The methods to be used for geographically differentiated market definition versus 
differentiated remedies 
As previously noted, there is no shortage of current guidance from the Commission and 
BEREC. Notably, the Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the 2020 
Recommendation on Relevant Markets1008 states that “differentiation at the level of remedies 
should be limited to less significant or less stable variations of competitive conditions (…). It 
might for instance be used by NRAs for a periodical or punctual update of remedies, in 
accordance with Article 68(6) of the Code. The market review may foresee such reviews and 
the criteria to be used for that purpose.” The 2018 SMP guidelines1009 and the BEREC 
 
1007 More specifically, Annex II which deals with the economic replicability test, states that NRAs may need to adapt 
the test according to the differences in the competition conditions detected at geographical level, e.g. to take into 
account the fact that what is deemed to be the most relevant NGA access input needed to perform the test may be 
different in rural and densely populated areas. 
1008 See in particular p.19. The guidance in the relevant section relates nevertheless mainly to the criteria to be used 
for operating the geographic segmentation in order to assist NRAs in proceeding to a robust market definition. 
1009 “If regional differences are found, but not considered to be sufficient to warrant different geographic markets or 
SMP findings, NRAs may pursue geographically differentiated remedies (43). The stability of the differentiation — 
specifically the degree to which the boundary of the competitive area can be clearly identified and remains 
consistent over time — is the key to distinguishing between a geographical segmentation at market-definition level 
and remedy segmentation”, OJ C159 of 7.5.2018, p.8, point 50.  
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Common Position on geographical aspects of market analysis (definition and remedies) of 5 
June 20141010 also provide guidance. 
However, as reflected in Chapter 0, none of these documents deal with the issue of the 
respective methods to be used for the geographic differentiation of remedies and definition of 
separate markets.  There would be merit in having the successor recommendation provide a 
clear and current position on this, drawing on all of the previous work and integrating it, with a 
specific focus on VHCN (where regional and urban-rural differences within the Member States 
tend to be greater than with legacy networks in the past). 
Recommendation 44. The successor recommendation should summarise the 
circumstances under which differentiated market definition versus differentiated remedies 
should be preferred, with a specific focus on VHCN. 
 
The conditions under which an out-of-cycle revision is warranted 
The use of differentiated remedies enables the NRA to incentivise investments that are not yet 
implemented (and may never materialize in the absence of the perspective of remedy 
differentiation). It consists in providing in its market reviews that remedies imposed will be 
reviewed in case certain parameters are fulfilled in certain geographic areas during the time 
between market reviews (which is now five years instead of the previous three); however, this 
comes with some risk of causing regulatory uncertainty for access seekers.  
Dramatic geographically differentiated changes during the five year cycle will nevertheless  
seldom occur, because it takes years before VHCN deployment alters competitive dynamics 
in retail markets, while positive or negative economic shock that dramatically alters willingness-
to-pay (WTP) for broadband in a portion of the national territory are not frequent. 
These issues are very similar to those posed by the emergence of a new cooperative 
arrangement, and are amenable to nearly the same treatment. 
Recommendation 45. In the interest of fostering VHCN investment by means of 
predictability, NRAs should refrain from adjusting geographic differentiated remedies out-
of-cycle unless the geographically differentiated changes in competitive dynamics are 
substantial. If a substantial shift is known at the time of a market review, the NRA should 
signal whether it considers an out-of-cycle adjustment likely, and how it intends to proceed. 
 
Updates should always require at least the explicit confirmation by the NRA that the criteria 
have been fulfilled, i.e. an administrative decision susceptible to appeal by stakeholders 
concerned. 
 
1010 In particular in Point 165 “(…) where the available evidence suggests that the scope of the relevant market is 
national (any differences in the conditions of competition between geographical areas are not yet sufficiently stable 
or sustainable to justify the definition of regional or local markets), market power will have to be assessed within 
this national market. In case of geographical variations in competitive conditions within this national market, it may 
be appropriate to vary remedies within that national market, despite the fact that an operator is found to have SMP 




At the same time, a specific timing of the NRA assessment whether criteria are fulfilled is 
desirable.  For example, Telecom Italia, invoking regulatory certainty, suggests that “it would 
be better that the criteria are set in the market analysis and applied at least annually in order 
to review/withdraw remedies accordingly”1011. 
g. Migration from legacy infrastructure 
Points 40 and 41 of the NGA Recommendation deal with migration from legacy infrastructure. 
They deal with notice to alternative operators that may depend on legacy infrastructure that is 
going to be decommissioned, and on transparency as regards planning. The NGA 
Recommendation has brought about a degree of consistency in the overall approach to 
migration; however, implementation is highly diverse among the Member States, primarily due 
to huge differences in the degree to which regulated SMP operators are prepared to migrate 
to NGA or VHCN in the various Member States. 
Art. 81 EECC provides general requirements for migration in order to safeguard competition 
and the interest of end-users, including notification to the NRA of plans to decommission 
existing infrastructure, “including legacy infrastructure necessary to operate a copper network”. 
It requires “a transparent timetable and conditions, including an appropriate notice period for 
transition, and establishes the availability of alternative products of at least comparable quality 
providing access to the upgraded network infrastructure substituting the replaced elements if 
necessary to safeguard competition and the rights of end-users.” It also provides conditions 
under which the NRA may lift existing asymmetric obligations to which the SMP operator is 
subject. 
The opportunities that we see where possible refinements to the Access Recommendations 
might be considered include (1) clearly delineation of fibre-based services that are roughly 
equivalent to the legacy services that are being de-commissioned; (2) revising and shortening 
the recommended five-year notice period that the SMP operator is supposed to give to 
alternative operators before shutting down a legacy Main Distribution Frame (MDF), together 
with possibly closing the MDF to new customers (i.e. commercial closure) prior to requiring the 
removal of legacy facilities that serve existing customers; (3) whether it is appropriate to depart 
from the principle of cost-orientation for legacy services to hasten the migration; and (4) the 
degree to which the NRA needs to oversee the migration process. 
Once again, we consider each of these in turn. We benefit in particular from the experience of 
the French NRA ARCEP because the French SMP operator has already committed to a fairly 
fast migration, ARCEP has developed a comprehensive set of plans for dealing with the 
migration, and their plans are well documented. 
Delineation of fibre-based services that are roughly equivalent to the legacy services 
that are being decommissioned 
Where legacy facilities are phased out, the replacement fibre-based capabilities are expected 
to be much better in general, but the substitution will not be one for one. In many cases, 
services that are more or less functionally equivalent will be offered as replacements for 
discontinued legacy wholesale services. Art. 81 EECC empowers the NRA to withdraw 
obligations on the SMP operator, thus permitting facilities to be decommissioned or replace, 
only after having ascertained inter alia that the SMP operator “has established the appropriate 
 
1011 Telecom Italia response to the Targeted Consultation, Q41. 
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conditions for migration, including making available an alternative access product of at least 
comparable quality as was available using the legacy infrastructure enabling the access 
seekers to reach the same end-users”. 
The migration from copper to fibre is not as simple as replacing a small diameter pipe with a 
larger diameter pipe. Quality of Service is more complicated than that. 
In its response to the Commission’s Targeted Consultation, BEREC1012 recommended that a 
wholesale service substitution matrix be drawn up before the migration process starts (see 
Chapter 10). For each wholesale legacy service (such as LLU, Shared Access, analogue 
leased lines, and DSL copper bitstream), the matrix would identifying the corresponding 
wholesale fibre-based NGA service. BEREC identified1013 the following parameters as possibly 
relevant: 
• downstream and upstream bandwidth speeds; 
• SLG/SLA parameters and KPIs such as provisioning time, service availability and 
repair time;1014 
• the details of operational processes in the reference offers concerned, e. g. elements 
referred to migration from legacy products and infrastructure; and 
• locations of Points of Handover (PoHs) of the new services. 
 
The French NRA ARCEP expanded on this framework to indicate the number of alternative 
operators that must make use of the wholesale product; the minimum number of consumer 
customers that must be served by the replacement wholesale service (not counting the SMP 
operator’s own retail customers); and that at least one such FTTH offer must be available for 
all connectable premises in the area.1015 
Art. 81 EECC appears to be adequate on this point. NRAs that are facing a migration from a 
legacy copper-based network to a fibre-based network would be well advised to take note of 
the examples of best practice identified in this section.  
Re-thinking the recommended five-year notice period  
Point (39) of the NGA Recommendation put in place a default notice period for de-
commissioning of legacy facilities. “In the absence of [an agreement reached on an appropriate 
migration path between the SMP operator and operators currently enjoying access to the SMP 
operator’s network], NRAs should ensure that alternative operators are informed no less than 
5 years, where appropriate taking into account national circumstances, before any de-
 
1012 BEREC (2020), Response to the Targeted Consultation, BoR (20) 169, Q35.  
1013 BEREC (2020), BEREC Response to the Targeted consultation on the revision of the Commission’s access 
recommendations, BoR (20) 169, Q35. 
1014 BEREC provides the example of Layer 2 wholesale access products on market 4/2014 (now 2/2020), which are 
used for retail business services. In that case, relevant QoS parameters apart from the bandwidth are Frame Loss 
Ratio, Frame Delay and Frame Delay Variation and regarding SLAs provisioning time, service availability and repair 
time. BoR (20) 169, p.54. 
1015 Decision n° 2020-1446 of 15 December 2020 portant sur la définition du marché pertinent de fourniture en gros 
d'accès local en position déterminée, sur la désignation d’un opérateur exerçant une influence significative sur ce 




commissioning of points of interconnection such as the local loop exchange. This period may 
be less than 5 years if fully equivalent access is provided at the point of interconnection.” 
In most cases, the SMP operator can be expected to be strongly motivated to bring the 
migration to a successful conclusion once it has begun; otherwise, the SMP operator must 
bear the cost of maintaining two networks in parallel. There is also a societal rationale for 
favouring quick rather than slow closure, in addition to the more obvious ones: Operating the 
two networks in parallel presumably represents a larger carbon footprint than operating a single 
VHCN network, and is thus less ecologically appropriate.1016 
The five year notice period plays a positive role in protecting alternative operators from 
stranded investments, but it represents a very long delay in a fast-moving industry. As 
mentioned in Chapter 0, more NRAs agreed (13) than disagreed (8) with the proposition that 
a five-year period, set as the notification period by default in the NGA, should be shortened1017.  
To date, there is a substantial spread among the notice periods implemented, with the 
recommended five year default notice period lying at the upper end of the range that actually 
came into force. 
In 2019, BEREC held a workshop to discuss the experience of six NRAs that had fairly well 
developed practice as regards migration to fibre. The report summarising the results1018 lists 
the following default notice periods (in the absence of an explicit agreement on an appropriate 
migration path reached between the SMP operator and operators currently enjoying access to 
the SMP operator’s network) in each of the six European countries (see also Table 32 and 
Table 33 in Chapter 0): 
Estonia 
• 6 months 
Italy  
• Conditions: subject to the SMP operator having achieved: 
a) 100% NGA coverage and  
b) 60% retail take-up: 
• 18 months in areas with copper LLU, copper SLU and VULA 
• 12 months in areas with only bitstream 
Norway 
• 3 years’ notice of changes in its access network in cases that result in the loss of 
accesses used by access seekers 
• 6 months if a relevant replacement product is supplied 
Portugal 
• 5-year notice period for total switch-off of a MDF, a local exchange or an access 
point/connection with co-located operators 
 
1016 Cf. comments of consultant Tony Shortall at the 9 June 2021 workshop conducted in support of this project. 
1017 Online survey data. 
1018 BEREC (2019). BEREC summary report on the outcome of an internal workshop on “Migration from legacy 
infrastructures to fibre-based networks”. BoR (19) 236. 
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• 3-year notice period if fully equivalent WBA is provided 
Spain 
• 5 years if ULL 
• 1 year if bitstream 
• 6 months if no wholesale 
• After the notice period, there is a six month guard period 
Sweden 
• 5 years (subsequently shortened to 18 months) 
• Orderly winding down of consumer arrangements 
A few key observations are in order. First, none of these six NRAs is currently maintaining a 
five year notice period for all services in practice. Second, the degree to which high speed 
broadband has already been made available and adopted in the area served by the MDF can 
be an important factor here. Third, de-commissioning can be greatly accelerated for MDFs 
where no services have been sold to alternative operators, or where the SMP operator has 
reached a commercial agreement with the alternative operators that purchase services from 
it. Fourth, in three of the six countries, the notice period is much longer for ULL than for 
bitstream services. This last point is logical when one considers that a key motivation for the 
notice period is to reduce the risk of stranded investment on the part of alternative operators – 
this risk is far greater for a traditional ULL service (where a DSLAM might very well be sitting 
in a location that is about to be de-commissioned) than for bitstream services. 
Recommendation 46. A successor recommendation should envision a shorter notice 
period than five years, and should allow for more differentiated treatment to reflect areas 
where a no-longer needed location serves alternative operators who purchase ULL, VULA, 
or bitstream. A shorter notice period could be possible where suitable alternatives are 
promptly available, where the deployment is high in the area served by the MDF, and 
especially where the wholesale offerings that have been sold are centralised products such 
as bitstream rather than product that require local infrastructure such as ULL. We suggest 
that the default notice period be set to two years in light of Art. 105 EECC, which prevents 
most contracts concluded between consumers and providers of publicly available 
electronic communications services from imposing a commitment period longer than 24 
months. 
 
The approach undertaken by the French NRA ARCEP also included implementing commercial 
closure of an MDF (i.e. not accepting new orders for sale of wholesale broadband services) in 
advance of closing the MDF for existing customers. In 2020, ARCEP changed the notice period 
for the SMP operator from the previous five years to an 18 or 36-month notification period for 
residential products and a 36-month notification period for business products, except in areas 
where the 4 main commercial operators are yet present on the FTTH network. In those areas, 
the SMP operator may proceed to the commercial closure of the corresponding copper lines 
with a 2-month notification period for residential products and a 6-month notification period for 
business products.1019 
 




In the stakeholders’ workshop held in support of this study, some participants expressed the 
concern that the SMP operator might continue to use the legacy copper network to provide 
services (e.g. alarm services and backup services to business customers) long after the legacy 
network has been technically closed. We think that this is a valid concern as it relates to SMP 
services other than mass market consumer broadband (i.e. Market 1/2020); however, we are 
not convinced that it is appropriate for any non-SMP services that might be delivered using the 
copper network. 
Recommendation 47. In revising the notice period that the SMP operator must give prior 
to de-commissioning legacy facilities, the successor recommendation should envision 
commercial closure of an MDF (i.e. not accepting new orders for legacy wholesale 
services) prior to point in time at which the MDF is closed for all existing SMP services. 
 
Possible departure from the principle of cost-orientation for legacy services 
There have been proposals by the French NRA ARCEP (and also by the UK NRA Ofcom) to 
possibly depart from cost orientation for legacy copper wholesale services in an attempt to 
accelerate the transition to fibre-based services and the shutdown of the legacy copper-based 
network. As we explain in Section 10.i, the French NRA envisioned the possibility1020 of 
increasing the price cap on the unbundling monthly fee where the SMP operator comes up 
with a detailed plan for the switch-off of its copper network1021. The UK NRA decided to remove 
price controls1022 on LLU from June 2023 onwards in areas where FTTH was completed and 
within minimum two years from the stop sell date1023, which will likely lead to price increases. 
The debate over the impact of changes in regulated prices for wholesale broadband on the 
take-up of high-speed broadband, whether NGA or VHCN, has been intense and has been 
going on for many years. We summarise some of the main papers in Section 10.i, but with a 
focus on prices for legacy access products in the steady state. (Prices for legacy wholesale 
access products during migration has not been studied nearly as much.) 
The proposals over the years to change the price of legacy copper-based SMP wholesale 
access products in the steady state, where VHCN and copper-based legacy services co-exist 
over an extended period of time (and in the absence of an ongoing or imminent migration from 
copper-based to fibre-based services), have not been convincing. The economic analysis is 
not definitive one way or the other, and stakeholder opinions are divided. A shift in this direction 
would have to be viewed as being somewhat radical and risky. 
 
1020 In the 2019 public consultation, the NRA suggested that either the SMP would be subject to a “non-excessive” 
pricing obligation or defining price caps which could be expressed in dependence of cost-based calculations in form 
of mark-ups. In addition, a maximum yearly increase percentage of LLU fees would be implemented. 
1021 Decision n° 2020 1446 of 15 December 2020 states however that the NRA “ ne dispose toutefois pas à ce stade 
d’éléments permettant de démontrer l’efficacité d’une éventuelle modulation géographique du tarif pour inciter à 
une migration vers la fibre ou au vidage du réseau cuivre. La migration du cuivre vers la fibre optique accélère alors 
même que le tarif du dégroupage n’a subi ces dernières années que des variations modérées. (…) Néanmoins, 
l’Autorité se réserve la possibilité de reconsidérer sa position, y compris au cours du cycle d’analyse de marché, si 
la situation venait à évoluer ou en cas d’obtention de nouveaux éléments à ce sujet. » 
1022 Except where FTTP is not available. 
1023 OFCOM, Promoting competition and investment in fibre networks: Wholesale Fixed Telecoms Market Review 
2021-26, Volume 1: Overview, summary and structure, 18 March 2021, p.18. 
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In the same vein, there have been proposals over the years to accelerate the switch from 
copper-based services to fibre-based services by forcing the SMP operator to shut down the 
copper network. Once again, we view this approach as radical, and uncertain in its impacts. 
The SMP operator is better positioned to decide when to shut its copper network down than is 
the NRA or the government. In the course of the public workshop on 9 June 2021, we likewise 
heard calls for the NRA to determine in which portions of the national territory the SMP operator 
should be obliged to upgrade its network, but the wisdom of doing so seems dubious. 
Returning to the question of the price of copper-based legacy services for a legacy SMP 
network that is in the process of being phased out, there are valid arguments that can be made 
for and against de-regulating the price. One can argue that the impact on competition is limited 
if three conditions are met: (1) If commercial closure of the legacy network has already been 
announced, (2) if the SMP operator’s VHCN network has already been rolled out, and (3) if 
alternative operators have realistic prospects to offer service over the SMP operator’s VHCN 
network (which can be expected to be the case if permission to switch off the copper network 
has been granted pursuant to Art. 81 EECC). In this case, the transitory price signal would 
accelerate the migration without harming competition. Moreover, cost-oriented unit prices for 
the legacy copper-based network would likely increase anyway as the remaining and 
unavoidable costs of the legacy network would be spread among fewer and fewer users. 
Conversely, if the SMP operator were forced to continue to offer copper-based wholesale 
access services at a significantly lower price than VHCN-based counterparts, alternative 
operators might be motivated to maintain the old services for as long as possible, thus 
potentially putting the migration at risk and undermining the business case for the SMP 
operator to invest in VHCN. 
At a stakeholder workshop in support of this project that was held on 9 June 2021, this led to 
a lively debate, with some participants warning of serious consequence for alternative 
operators if prices are deregulated during the migration. The concern is valid, as far as it goes; 
however, if these products are going to be discontinued in any case, then an increase in the 
wholesale price for these SMP legacy wholesale access products could be necessary in any 
case due to declining usage. The NRA should be able to manage any competitive concerns 
by establishing suitable conditions and timeframes.  
Guidance to the NRA as to how best to do this might be counter-productive due to the wide 
variety of Member State circumstances as regards the migration.  
Recommendation 48. There have been suggestions over the years that the SMP operator 
should be forced to shut down its copper network in order to accelerate migration to a fibre-
based infrastructure. Even though the proposals are well-meaning, doing so would appear 
to be ill-advised. In particular, the SMP operator should be free to build or to decommission 
where it sees fit. Other than in the context of a migration from copper-based to fibre-based 
services, artificially raising or lowering the price of copper-based wholesale access 
services likewise seems inadvisable. The successor recommendation should, however, 
permit the NRA to deregulate (or allow for an increase of) the wholesale price of legacy 
copper services as a transitory measure until the copper switch off takes place and when 
sufficient safeguards against abuse are present, such as (1) commercial closure of the 
legacy network has already been firmly committed, (2) the SMP operator’s VHCN network 
has already been rolled out, and (3) alternative operators have realistic prospects to offer 





The degree to which NRAs should oversee the migration process 
The NGA Recommendation provides only minimal guidance as to the process that an NRA 
should follow in regard to stewardship of the process of migration from copper-based services 
to fibre-based services. Point (40) of the Recommendation says that “NRAs should put in place 
a transparent framework for the migration from copper to fibre-based networks.” 
As with many other policy areas, our perception is that NRAs should be encouraged to play a 
proactive role in the migration process, encouraging dialogue between the SMP operator, 
alternative operators, and other stakeholders including, for instance, consumer or user 
advocacy organisations (e.g. BEUC, INTUG), in order to promote a harmonious migration. 
Recommendation 49. The successor recommendation could encourage NRAs to engage 
in the migration process by proactively promoting a multi-stakeholder process that seeks 
to ensure that alternative operators are well aware of the plans of the SMP operator and 
that stakeholders have ample opportunity to find solutions to the challenges of the 
migration that are in line with overall societal welfare. As in other aspects of broadband 
policy, the potential advantages of such a multi-stakeholder process are obvious. 
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ANNEX 2: SUMMARY OF NRA WORKSHOP 
 
Study on regulatory incentives for the deployment of Very High Capacity Networks 
NRA workshop 
April 15, 2021 
Summary of key discussion points 
Introduction 
The NRA workshop was opened by the representatives of DG CONNECT and the Contractor, 
opening floor to the day of discussions on four topics: 
• Approaches towards price regulation 
• Non-discrimination obligations 
• Access to civil engineering infrastructure (CEI) 
• Migration from copper to fibre 
The summary below provides the main points discussed and the views expressed by the 
participants. All discussed views were expressed by individual participants and do not 
constitute official positions of the NRAs. 
Approaches towards price regulation 
The discussion on approaches towards price regulation focused on several issues ranging 
from risk premium and WACC to pricing flexibility. First, concerns were expressed regarding 
the applicability of the ‘fair bet’ approach. It was noted that adding a policy premium would 
create methodological risk. A ‘policy premium’ mixes the market-based and cost-based 
approaches, leading to a mix of cost-orientation with policy instruments. This could give the 
regulators the role of ‘guessing the market’ and acting as investors, which should not be their 
function. It was also noted that predictability is a key factor for investment. It is possible to 
maintain predictability and take into account for changes in the market and technology. 
Furthermore, a suggestion was raised that pricing flexibility could be granted only if ERT is 
used a competitive safeguard. Relating to ERT, it was noted that factoring in long-term pricing 
into the ERT may create challenges for smaller operators and new entrants, because it is 
mostly large operators that have volume discounts or long-term pricing. 
The discussion then turned to noting more specific points. Firstly, to address possible 
incentives for non-efficient operators if a rate-of-return regulation is applied, a principle of 
efficiency (of the operator) could be applied where non-efficient costs are adjusted by the 
regulator. Secondly, that the NDCM Recommendation discusses the assumptions for 
competition used for market analysis. However, the guidance can be seen as being at a 
disadvantage when setting scale adjustments to EEO, as the regulators are limited in terms of 
the minimum number of market players.  
More time was spent discussing the portfolio and product-by-product approaches. The portfolio 
approach was noted as having certain advantages, such as leaving market participants more 
flexibility in setting prices. Meanwhile, the product-by-product approach could create problems 
due to the number of products or varying prices of the same SMP operator’s product for 
different types of consumers. It was discussed that initially, when a new product enters the 




Nonetheless, it was also noted that national circumstances might dictate whether a product-
by-product or a portfolio approach is more appropriate. Where competition is higher, the latter 
approach may be more suitable, while the existence of a strong incumbent could favour the 
former approach. Finally, while these approaches are mainly discussed in terms of retail 
products, they may also be relevant for wholesale products under ERT (e.g. mirroring it against 
the flagship product or different tariff variants). In this case the Recommendations provide no 
guidance so far. 
The topic of ‘cooper anchor’ was also addressed. It was noted that there likely is a need to 
replace the ‘copper anchor’ with a more relevant definition. The concept of an ‘anchor’ itself 
might still be relevant even if copper is less important and needs replacement by something 
that is not purely fibre. It would allow to define a better and more relevant competitive 
constraint. 
Finally, it was noted that the Recommendation should apply to all markets, since the EECC 
applies to all markets and not just the current Market 1. Any mismatches between the EECC 
and the Recommendations create difficulties for the NRAs. 
Non-discrimination obligations 
The discussion on non-discrimination obligations began with an exchange of views on the 
boundary between EoI and EoO, which may be difficult to define. For example, the requirement 
to have the same systems and processes could imply that all same interfaces are used or that 
a special ordering interface could be enough. This openness for interpretation leaves the issue 
less clear. One way to approach this could be by starting with EoO and transitioning towards 
EoI, if problems with discrimination remain. However, the flexibility to use EoO or EoI is key, 
furthermore not everyone is convinced that the link between EoI and price flexibility should be 
made. 
It was noted that since EoI might be disproportionate in some cases, an even stricter approach 
to non-discrimination might be problematic. Retrofitting systems to introduce EoI may create 
high costs and burden for both SMP operators and access seekers, as systems require 
investments by both of these groups. The SMP operator needs to invest as per regulatory 
requirements, while the access seekers may be reluctant to invest to change their legacy 
systems despite the benefits. 
It can be considered that in the majority of cases EoO is enough, but it depends on the 
circumstances. It is also important to consider safeguards for quality that may prevent 
misinterpretation of EoO. Sanctions accompanied by effective monitoring should also be in 
place to encourage compliance. A more active monitoring is especially important in the case 
of EoO. It was also noted that Quality of Service could be improved overall by requiring the 
SMP operator to apply better QoS to all access seekers if it negotiates better QoS with a 
particular access seeker (similar to a Most Favoured Nation type of clause). This could also 
stop the SMP operators from favouring specific operators. 
Relating to the EECC, it was noted that the provisions of Art. 79 envisioning SMP operator’s 
commitments to the NRA could be a helpful instrument to ensure effective non-discrimination, 
especially in the case of separation of an SMP operator. 
Access to CEI 
During the discussion on access to CEI, it was noted that regulation of access to CEI is often 
built progressively and refined over the years. Access to information is key for effective access 
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to CEI. The SMP operator must have the information and must be obliged to share the 
information. Arguments may arise along the way on what information should be shared and 
which not so that the environment is not discriminatory. Thus, the changes take time, especially 
since the market develops and regular improvements are needed. It was also noted that the 
prices of access to the information system may be separate from the prices of access to CEI, 
because it could be argued that the creation/maintenance of the database has costs that are 
too distinct from other components comprising the access price to be included into the price of 
access to CEI. 
There have also been several more specific points made in relation to access to CEI.  Firstly, 
the criteria used to determine whether access to CEI could be used as a stand-alone remedy 
should be country-specific, as CEI varies from one Member State to another. Secondly, the 
differentiation of pricing of new and legacy ducts could be interesting, because it relates to 
incentivising operators to leave sufficient duct space for other operators to use. In relation to 
duct space, it was noted that keeping unused copper cables in the duct segment is an issue, 
as it may limit capacities for new roll out in these segments, and there should possibly be 
obligations to remove unused cables. Thirdly, the wording of Art. 72 EECC (on access to CEI) 
is such that it likely makes it possible to include infrastructure that is beyond MDF/ODF only if 
it is parallel to access infrastructure. It was also noted that access to CEI will remain relevant 
in the context of 5G, since ducts and poles can play a role there as well. Finally, one more 
take-away is that a shift from covering urban areas with VHCN to extending VHCN coverage 
of rural areas might imply the need to shift emphasis from ducts more to poles. 
Migration from copper to fibre  
The final part of the workshop focused on migration from copper to fibre. The discussion here 
was shorter and more focused. One of the discussed issues related to migration was how to 
be not too intrusive at the retail level, since closure of legacy networks leads to migration to 
NGA services. However, it was also noted with market development it could be that these 





ANNEX 3: SUMMARY OF STAKEHOLDER WORKSHOP 
 
Study on regulatory incentives for the deployment of Very High Capacity Networks 
Stakeholder workshop 
June 9, 2021 
Overview of main inputs provided relating to key points of the current 
recommendations 
Approaches towards price regulation 
Where is Pricing flexibility appropriate? 
What can be done to achieve wider use by NRAs of these arrangements instead of cost 
orientation for NGA/VHCN wholesale products? 
Luc Hindryckx (ECTA) questions the objective to push for pricing flexibility. He argues that 
precedents of fixing wholesale prices based on the level of retail prices created lots of problems 
in the past (e.g. for the regulation of access to cable networks). Such pricing regulation finds 
no support in fundamental principle of corporate finance. Moreover, linking access prices to 
retail prices will bring about higher retail prices by preventing ANOs to pass on part of the 
producer’s surplus to the consumers and impact negatively overall welfare. Consequently, he 
pleads to give priority to cost orientation. Cost orientation means also that incumbents have a 
return in line with their risk profile. He challenges the view that pricing flexibility would foster 
investments. Competition drives investment. ANOs invest relatively more than incumbents: 
Iliad 37% of revenues, Fastweb – 25%.  ERT is not able to address the access needs for the 
B2B segment. In this segment, transparency is limited. Boris Schmidt (1&1) concurs that strict 
cost orientation is important. 
Maurizio Mucci (Sky Italy) also warns against pricing flexibility. The interest of new entrants 
is to have stable and predictable regulatory conditions. Pricing flexibility is based on the 
assumptions that it will boost investment, while in reality, it is infrastructure based competition 
that is the triggering factor for investment in widespread VHCN coverage. This was also 
recognised by BEREC in its study on the determinants of investment into VHCN.  
Felipe Florez Duncan (Oxera) argues that pricing flexibility can work alongside price controls. 
The NRA does not give up the possibility to impose cost orientation. Pricing flexibility can be a 
commitment to experimentation. Moreover, pricing flexibility goes together with some 
constraints (anchor, other network based competition) and NRAs can allow it the period of a 
single market review to allow investors to deal with risks and uncertainties. The NRA can then 
look at the outcome, when uncertainties have cleared up and replace pricing flexibility by cost 
controls, if there was a negative impact on competition.  
Edoardo Fagiolini (Open Fibre) pleads for geographic differentiation. Pricing flexibility is 
appropriate in monopoly situation. Seeking to facilitate competition by making retail prices 
replicable, however, boils down to reduce wholesale prices which on its turn impacts negatively 
investment incentives from new operators, including wholesale only operators, in areas where 
infrastructure competition is feasible. While pricing flexibility may provide investment incentives 
for the SMP-operator, it may remove incentives for others to invest. The SMP operator should, 
in those areas, never be allowed to apply wholesale access prices below cost level + sufficient 
margin to remunerate investment risk. Tony Shortall (TELAGE consultancy) supports this 
view recalling that the two recommendations were written at a time when the focus of the EU 
policy was access-based competition. Now it is infrastructure competition. The risk of 
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maintaining the old approach is to crowd out investment in alternative networks. Felipe Florez 
Duncan (Oxera) adds that when dominance is being challenged at the wholesale level, then 
there may be less need for an ERT. He advocates therefore geographically differentiated 
ERTs, where wholesale competition is less likely. Tony Shortall (TELAGE) warns that this 
should not concern areas where there is a credible threat of entry competition. 
Is there a need for a wholesale margin squeeze test? 
Felipe Florez Duncan (Oxera) says that the guidance should distinguish between pricing 
flexibility to price higher vs. pricing flexibility to price lower. Today, the ERT constrains the SMP 
operator only as regards pricing higher. But one could envisage price flexibility enabling to 
price relatively high at the start (when risk is highest) if there is retail replicability but 
complemented with price floors to avoid the risk of predatory or discriminatory pricing which 
could affect infrastructure rivals. Ofcom has adopted an approach based on these principles 
when it prohibited Open Reach from offering geographic discounts on its superfast broadband 
wholesale services and required to give at least 90 days’ notice of the introduction of certain 
commercial terms (such as volume discounts) that might prevent retail ISPs from using 
competing networks, so stifling investment, allowing Ofcom to assess those deals before they 
take effect. Roel van Kessel (Eurofiber) also considers that price floors are an underused 
tool to promote infrastructure competition 
Should the current ERT parameters be reviewed? 
Chiara Catini (Fastweb) considers that the economic replicability test plays a fundamental 
role in ensuring effective and non-discriminatory access. Wholesale access services prices 
based on a Bottom-up Long-Run Incremental Cost (BULRIC) model based on the replacement 
costs for an efficient operator; still leaves room for the incumbent to discriminate. At the same 
time, Gita Sorensen (GOS Consulting) considers that there is need for new guidelines to 
assist NRAs to achieve a more consistent approach to applying the ERT/MST. GOS Consulting 
has reviewed how different NRAs have applied ERT and there is a very wide range of 
application methods, sometimes alongside cost-orientation.  
Jana Hays (CETIN) considers that wholesale only providers should not be subject to ERT. 
Wholesale only operators have no power over flagship products and very little control over 
what kind of bundles are offered in the retail market. Moreover, she flags the high workload for 
NRAs if they have to define ERTs for multiple SMP operators in a geographically segmented 
market.  
Gonzalo (Telefonica) warns that the current guidance leaves too much margin for discretion 
for NRAs on the implementation of the ERT. The outcome of the test is not predictable, due 
among other to the lack of transparency (ex ante) of the model and the data that will be 
eventually used. As was the case for the WACC calculation, where the Commission issued 
detailed calculation guidance, the new recommendation should define the parameters of the 
ERT in detail. Maria Cristina IETTO (TIM) says that prior information notification requirement 
are hampering ‘time to market’. Time periods should be very short. Could be disproportionate 
in areas where there is infrastructure competition, by stifling the ability of the regulated 
infrastructure operator to compete with its competitor(s). Volcy Lesca (Orange) says that 
testing individual products is likely to be excessive. She favours instead an ‘arena of 
competition’ test, encompassing the products that are important for entry and exit decisions 
(portfolios of products). Moreover, the time period considered should be longer than the lifetime 
of the customer. The duration of the amortisation of investment should be considered. For 
bundles, the test should include all incremental costs and revenues, while sunk costs and 




ERT entails prior information notification, this will in some cases hamper flexibility in retail 
markets. 
Luc Hindryckx (ECTA) says that the ERT is focussed on flagship products and limit the ability 
of access seeker to launch innovative product based on the same inputs, but with a different 
structure of pricing. Also as regards the WACC to be used for discounting purposes, he 
considers that using the SMP parameters is methodologically wrong. 
Maurizio Mucci (Sky Italy) says the ERT should be undertaken technology-by-technology. 
Otherwise, ANOs are forced to follow the mix and the commercial strategy of the incumbent 
and .e.g. an operator willing to focus only on FTTH, would be a struggling to replicate SMP 
pricing and remain competitive on market. This would negatively affect VHCN take-up.  
How to adjust scale when applying ERT? 
Chiara Catini (Fastweb) says the Equally Efficient Operator approach favours the SMP 
operators because the latter have often lower costs than ANOs. Adjustments is therefore a 
very important topic on which she will follow up with written observations.  
Are there circumstances not contemplated in the recommendations justifying pricing 
flexibility? 
Maria Cristina IETTO (TIM) says that when effective non-discrimination is ensured and EoI 
implemented, pricing flexibility should be granted, even in the absence of ERT. 
Implementation of price control 
Is the guidance on the calculation of the NGA risk premium in the NGA rec still fit for 
purpose? 
Tony Shortall (TELAGE) says that both the use of risk premiums and option values presume 
that there is no meaningful prospect of entry. That's not really consistent with the code, or the 
BCRD or the other actions being undertaken. He asks whether we want to (1) encourage entry 
or (2) to strictly price control a single infrastructure. The EECC/BCRD and everything the 
Commission is doing says we go for option 1. The NGA and NDCM are too much focussed on 
option 2 and need to be updated. Felipe Florez Duncan (Oxera) agreed on the fact that if 
there is the prospect of entry and a desire to encourage infrastructure competition, then 
detailed price regulation is inconsistent with that objective. The challenge is if entry doesn't 
materialise, and the NRA needs to regulate. The new recommendation should set out the 
framework for how to do so - e.g., at what point to intervene, at what level to intervene, how to 
recognise the risk that competition may have materialised but didn’t? That is where the concept 
of the fair bet comes in and provides a framework to answer these questions (the objective is 
to ensure returns are equal to the WACC in expected terms) 
Yves Blondeel (T-REGS) pleads for distinguishing between the notion of risk and the ability 
to exploit market power.1024 A real question to examine is the actual extent to which there is 
risk. Luc Hindryckx (ECTA) adds that the pandemic has demonstrated that the risk might be 
much lower than one thought. 
 
1024 Blondeel is an independent consultant who frequently represents alternative operators. 
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Felipe Florez Duncan (Oxera) says that this is an empirical question. If the evidence is that 
there is no risk, then a risk premium or price flexibility wouldn't be warranted. But where there 
are downside risks, then regulatory framework needs a tool to recognise that. Particularly when 
currently regulation through price controls imposes a cap on the upside – this brings about an 
asymmetric risk.  
Tony Shortall (TELAGE) however considers that Ofcom’s risk premium approach has not 
yielded good outcomes to date in terms of VHCN investment: the UK has one of the worst 
outcomes in EU27+UK (though it is picking up now). Gita Sorensen (GOS Consultancy) also 
considers that the fair bet principle applied by Ofcom for FTTC investment, is one of the 
reasons why the UK is so far behind on FTTP deployment. When an NRA applies a risk 
premium or fair bet, it is important that the NRA would have a strategic perspective on how it 
is doing it. What we see in the UK is potentially it being applied in a manner that could be seen 
to have been counterproductive for the long-term interest of the sector. Felipe Florez Duncan 
(Oxera) replies that this is partly because BT have been 'waiting and seeing' how this will end. 
In theory, he expects the UK climbing up the rankings quickly. Tony Shortall (TELAGE) 
however repeats that where there is a prospect for meaningful entry, any price regulation will 
undermine ANO’s incentives to invest. At the same time, if ANOs invest in infrastructure, the 
option value calculation for the incumbent will yield different outcomes (first mover advantage). 
The risk premium debate does therefore make no sense in potentially competitive areas. The 
BCRD revision, the connectivity toolbox, the EECC, all refer to infrastructure-based 
competition. The existing recommendation are still about managing access to a monopoly 
infrastructure and preserving access competition (MST, etc.). We’re in new paradigm, which 
is about driving infra based competition and it driving VHCN investment. The new 
recommendation needs to take that into account. Maria Cristina Ietto (TIM) agrees that in the 
presence of infrastructure competition. Price controls should be removed and that in such case 
risk premia would no longer be relevant. She also acknowledges that the need for a risk 
premium is reduced in case of co-investment, but adds that in such situation also the need for 
cost orientation must be revisited. 
Luc Hindryckx (ECTA) warns that applying a risk premium on top if the WACC might distort 
the investment market and reduce the ability for altnets to get capital. When NRAs artificially 
increase return on investment (RoI) of SMP operators, they distort the capital markets. Indeed, 
potential investors can choose between investing in (i) wholesale only operators (low risk 
probably, based on RoI they are low), (ii) invest in an SMP operator – with the same risk but 
where one can expect higher RoI as a consequence of the risk premium and (iii) invest in an 
alternative operator of which the margin will be reduced due to higher access prices in the 
areas where the ANO does not control own infrastructure. Where RoI is similar – the investor 
will prefer investing in the SMP operator, which bears lower costs.  
He also points to the difficulty for any operator that is quoted on the stock market. If one 
estimates share price by discounting all expected future dividends, the risk premium will only 
lead to higher share price valuation of the SMP operator. Investors have a preference for short 
term incomes, not for CAPEX that yield revenues in the medium term. If an ANO changes its 
investment policy, its share price drops. However, SMP operators can explain CAPEX to 
investors when they are facing the risk of competitors acquiring a first mover advantage. Luc 
Hindryckx (ETNO) adds that the concept of reasonable rate of return does not exist as 
concept in corporate finance.  
On the other hand, Volcy Lesca (Orange) argues that there is currently underestimation of 




on the WACC Notice of the European Commission of January 20211025. If you have an incorrect 
WACC, having a risk premium will not solve the problem. Moreover, the Commission should 
consider different WACC for different areas, to reflect the potential different risks in deploying 
new networks. She also pleads that the Ofcom’s fair bet and risk premium approach should be 
followed for all pricing obligations over the lifetime of the project. Pricing conditions should be 
transparent and clear from beginning, stable over the lifetime of the investment. Updated 
parameters should only apply to new investments and with sufficient notice (legal certainty). 
Anton Horshkov (Deutsche Telekom) also criticises the methodology to set the WACC in 
the Commission November 2019 Notice for legacy assets. He anticipates that inflation in the 
US, will bring about an increase in interest rates. As a consequence, EU telcos investing will 
be increasingly less attractive targets to invest given that margins on regulated prices are 
capped at WACC values (based on EU values), which are sometimes negative in mid-term.  
Maurizio Mucci (Sky Italy) pleads for a wholistically approach to address the risk premium 
concept: first, determine where it is needed, whether it worked, what are the side-effects on 
the market. The Bourreau study says that the risk premium can incentivize investment, but it 
also says that it distorts retail pricing. Did it work? We have enough data to analyse this from 
an empirical analysis. Input-output analysis. He can speak about Italy, where one of the higher 
risk premium for FTTH, currently it is highest, was calculated by the NRA. But the boost in 
terms of VHCN coverage materialized when infrastructure competition emerged and not due 
to risk premium. Also today it is not a mystery that despite the highest risk premium the Italian 
incumbent is seeking other regulatory incentives through co-investment in order to expand its 
FTTH footprint. 
In any case, there must be no risk premium on FTTC. And there should not be any risk premium 
in case there are other risk mitigating factors, such as in case of public subsidies or co-
investment. 
He finds that AGCOM’s methodology for setting risk premium goes in the right direction by 
looking at real risks incurred by the SMP operator. But real options are based on hypothetical 
investment plans. AGCOM used different kind of geographies with different densities, which 
led to identification of certain risk reflecting different types of areas covered. What happens. if 
one sets this ex ante, is that the incumbent will be in the position to choose to roll out only in 
most dense areas (where lower risk is present). This is what happened in IT which is leading 
to discrepancies between risk calculated by NRA ex ante and the risk actually incurred by 
incumbent. The new recommendation should change the parameters so that risk premium 
would not be granted on hypothetical willingness to invest, but on the basis of commitments. 
This way you have certainty, and regulator is in the position to define the real risk that the SMP 
op would incur. Such amendment of the approach in the NGA rec is also supported by 
Edoardo Fagiolini (Open Fiber), who adds that as soon the SMP operator starts applying 
volume discounts –the debate on a risk premium becomes less relevant. There is no 
justification for setting cost-oriented prices above market prices. Maria Cristina Ietto (TIM) 
replies that volume discounts reflect a lower risk and she pleads therefore for maintaining the 
possibility for SMP to use such discounts, be it under supervision of the NRA. 
Florence Bailly-Monthury (Bouygues Telecom) states that there is hardly any risk of 
deploying FTTH in countries like France, where full fibre coverage is already decided according 
to a clear timetable. In France, “le Plan France Très Haut Débit” has detailed the deployment 
phases of full fibre coverage and set the date of 2025, for full optical fiber coverage. Therefore, 
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the deployment of the fiber no longer justifies any premium on top of the standard ERP.  
 
Non-discrimination obligations 
Should the current preference for EoI be maintained? 
Tony Shortall (TELAGE) says that EoO is the principal mechanism used by NRAs (see BoR 
(20) 210)- so making it work better would seem to be the best option. However, Gita Sorensen 
(GOS Consulting) considers that it is unlikely that EoO would constitute a sufficient safeguard 
against (non-price) discrimination, as it is extremely difficult to compare outputs when the 
regulated operator does not have to use the same services and processes as the access 
seekers. If the regulated party does not consume the same inputs, then you do not have 
comparative KPIs. In the UK, the NRA struggled for years to get EoO to function as regards 
access to PIA. Boris Schmidt (1und1) adds that EoO is not working in Germany. Florence 
Bailly-Monthury (Bouygues Telecom) also considers that EoO is not efficient and requires 
continued NRA monitoring that is often insufficient in practice. 
Gita Sorensen (GOS Consulting), acknowledges on the other hand, that EOI is a 
sledgehammer which is costly and lengthy to implement. it might be possible to identify where 
EoI could be applied and, conversely, where KPIs can be meaningfully applied and monitored. 
For active products, it is easier to apply EoI. Jana Hays (CETIN) says that during a brief period 
when they were subject to KPIs and that this worked on large numbers, not small ones. In the 
latter case, deviations are statistically not relevant. 
According to Gita Sorensen (GOS Consulting) NRAs should carefully consider whether they 
want to put lots of things on hold because they need to go through the implementation of EoI.  
She therefore advocates moving to EOI over time. If you have EoO and consider a transition 
to EoI, the burden of proof that implementation cost is disproportionate must be on the provider. 
Volcy Lesca (Orange) replies that before imposing EoI, especially for PIA, cost calculation 
must be done by the NRA. 
Jana Hays (CETIN) says that given that CETIN is wholesale-only, EoI is in our nature. 
Although we are an SMP operator, we consider that EoI is certainly the only way to ensure 
effective service and non-discrimination. BUT NRAs should dedicate great care to consider on 
which products and where it is applied. While on an active wholesale product it is an 
appropriate remedy to impose, the effect on EoI on access to CEI could be detrimental to the 
deployment of VHCN because it would stifle the deployment of new networks since it would 
require sharing complete information with anyone about CEI deployment. Access to CEI is not 
guarded. In the Czech Republic, some ANOs use CEI without notice and without paying any 
compensation. This freeriding complicates planning for future development reserves.  
How to improve the implementation EoO? 
Volcy Lesca (Orange) says that NRAs should consider using KPIs alongside efficient 
information exchange processes such as regular multi-operator meetings with NRA to deal 
with operational issues. Orange has experiences in that domain. The KPIs defined must allow 
easy comparison for NRAs and wholesale customer. Their definition must occur in through an 
accurately designed processes to make system credible, i.e. by the SMP operators under 
supervision of NRA and shared with access seeker. Once they are defined, they must be 
updated from time to time, again under supervision of NRA and discussion between the parties. 
Gita Sorensen (GOS Consulting) warns that multi-stakeholders approaches can be very 
effective, but can also take a long time and even be used to delay the process. The framework 




as such, otherwise the investment is not meaningful. She also advocates meaningful penalties. 
Where access seekers must prove the harm, this is often almost impossible to do due to the 
absence of factual evidence. On the other hand, there is not really a yardstick to set penalties 
independently from proven access seeker harm. 
Luc Hindryckx (ECTA) stresses that penalties for breaches of allowed deviation on KPIs 
should be really dissuasive. The SMP operator should feel the pain and never do it again. If 
there is an SLA, and the SMP operator has only to forsake the rental for the line for the period 
when the SLA is not fulfilled– what is the point? SMP operators will prefer forsaking the revenue 
and not make life easier for the access seeker. The way to fix it – to be strong on KPIs, SLAs 
and SLGs and penalties. Also EoI. He also advocate favouring passive products (VULA does 
not work well). For passive products, one is less dependent of quality of the service 
parameters. 
Is the guidance on SLAs fit for purpose? 
Volcy Lesca (Orange) recalls that the question of SLAs/SLGs is a different question than the 
publication of KPIs to monitor non-discrimination. KPIs may not be based on the same 
perimeter of the wholesale products for which SLAs/SLGs exist, nor be linked to the 
commercial conditions attached. Thus, this topic should be totally excluded, even though the 
topic of appropriate SLAs/SLGs is a key element of the access provided by the SMP operator, 
especially for addressing the Business segment of the market. 
Is the guidance on Long-term pricing and volume discounts still fit for purpose? 
Gita Sorensen (GOS Consulting) says that the current guidance enables NRAs to look at 
both downstream (distortion of competition between larger and smaller ISPs) and upstream 
impact (where alternative networks are deployed). but does not put that explicitly. The 
Commission should recommend that they do both before they approve the types of discounts. 
Applying a Wholesale MST is a good thing to do but she advocates that NRAs should not 
perform such test as an additional layer to other remedies. In the UK, there is cost orientation 
for PIA and for dark fibre. But dark fibre pricing is set at a level that cannot be replicated via 
own infrastructure. Alternative operators that build PIA are foreclosed from the dark fibre 
market, because the regulated dark fibre product is cheaper than what they can offer, since 
the cost for the SMP operator is lower. Edoardo Fagiolini (Open Fiber) confirms that 
discounts can be used to squeeze out wholesale competitors. Conditional rebates should be 
strictly limited.  
Volcy Lesca (Orange) advocates that NRAs would look at the pricing structure of the discount 
since in some agreements there is an initial payment plus then recurrent fees and in other 
there is only a discount. The outcome of the test will not be the same. The MST should be on 
a prospective basis corresponding to the duration of the commitment.  
Access to CEI 
Is the guidance in the NGA Rec still fit for purpose? 
Tony Shortall (TELAGE) acknowledges that cost orientated access to SMP existing CEI is 
important, but this will likely also be addressed in the revision of the BCRD and pleads for 
harmonizing pricing rules in the future recommendation and the revised BCRD. 
Luc Hindryckx (ECTA) regrets that since the adoption of the NDCM we saw an increased 
focus on virtual products – as opposed to the focus on access to CEI in the NGA rec. Tony 
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Shortall (TELAGE) considers that this is partly because not all NRAs believed there could be 
entry (and so did not plan for it). Access to CEI is a complex process and so it likely to take 
time to bed in that process (just as what happened with LLU long ago where it took years to 
bed in, even in MS that did it well). In this regard, Valerio Usella (Open Fiber) says that in 
Italy, the RO of the SMP operator contains different limitations in terms of number of accesses 
to CEI that can be ordered. E.g. no more than 30 infrastructure access per month/10 per week. 
This limitation in practice hinders usage of SMP CEI to deploy FTTH for the mass market. Luc 
Hindryckx (ECTA) reports of cases where the SMP operator prefilled its ducts to refuse 
access because of lack of space. John Gunnigan (National Broadband Ireland) says that 
effective use of CEI is also hampered by administrative requirements (local permits etc) and 
that these requirements often raise the cost of deployment (e.g. obligations on reinstatement). 
The measures set out in the Connectivity Toolbox could be of help here but only if these result 
in tangible action at national level.     
How to tackle the current bottlenecks? 
Gita Sorensen (GOS Consulting) says that in the UK, the NRA allowed ANOs to make repairs 
in the SMP CEI themselves. They are not obliged to use a list of authorised contractors but 
can having their own people authorised. Moreover, they get compensated by the SMP operator 
at the same rate as they would have to pay if the SMP operator would have done it. This puts 
an interesting constraint on ancillary services as ANO must pay SMP, and vice versa. In the 
UK, everything underground can be done by ANOs. Overground not yet, but there are 
improvements. Moreover, OFCOM has set clear rules of who owns improvements. If an ANO 
repairs the CEI, the latter remains the ownership of the SMP operator. If the ANO builds new 
CEI, e.g. new duct around collapsed infrastructure, the rule is that the ownership of the new 
assets also accrue to the SMP operator. It is in the interest of the sector to avoid the 
fragmentation of CEI in bits and pieces owned by various network operators.  
Jana Hays (CETIN) expresses however concerns as to the authorisation/certification of ANO 
staff for performing works in the SMP operator’s CEI. This is a complex solution when there 
are multiple ANOs. An obligation to certify staff of each and to monitor works implemented 
could put an excessive burden on the owner of infrastructure.  
Conversely, Luc Hindryckx (ECTA) reports a positive effect on CEI usage in countries where 
certified technicians are allowed to intervene in SMP CEI, e.g. in Italy. He advocates that the 
Commission would give clear guidance to simplify the certification process. He refers to the 
Belgian SMP operator which introduced very complex processes for certification, even for 
subcontractor that the former used itself.  
Volcy Lesca (Orange) flags the issue of the responsibility in case third parties are allowed to 
perform works in the SMP operator’s CEI. In this regard, Luc Hindryckx (ECTA) advocates 
that the Commission would ask NRAs to prevent excessive liability clauses. He refers to a 
precedent where the SMP operator was asking ANOs to take an insurance that was excessive 
in relation to the value of the assets at stake. As a consequence, ANOs were unable to find an 
insurance company that would cover the risk for a reasonable price.  
Gita Sorensen (GOS Consulting) says that pricing stability is another issue. Setting cost-
based prices on SMP CEI can be done in many ways. One allocation rule is how much space 
is relatively occupied by the ANO and the SMP operator. But the ratio suddenly changes when 
copper is removed from the ducts. ANOs relative share can jump to 50 % against 10-15% 
when there was still copper in the ducts. This goes against the continuity and predictability of 
underlying costs required to foster FTTH deployment. This could have significant implications 




Migration from copper to fibre  
Is the guidance in the NGA Rec still fit for purpose? 
Gita Sorensen (GOS Consulting) argues that the migration process should cover not only 
physical network issues and assess to equivalent products, but also customer communications 
and the impact migration communications could have on both downstream and upstream 
competition. There is a risk that the dominant provider could use the migration communications 
to harm downstream competition and also that they could foreclose infrastructure competition 
by entering into arrangements with large downstream providers in a manner that actively 
discourages those downstream providers for using competing infrastructures. Valerio Usella 
(Open Fiber) says that there is a risk that the SMP operator will select areas where competition 
is in place or is emerging as first areas where legacy switches are closed. NRAs should 
supervise the selection of the area and the order of closure. They should set criteria that have 
to be satisfied in order to select area.  
Should guidance be provided on ‘commercial closure’ in addition to the technical 
closure? 
Luc Hindryckx (ECTA) flags that commercial closure could have discriminatory effects. For 
example, in the B2B segment, copper is sometimes used for backup. Will the SMP operator 
also cease to use copper for such purpose after the commercial closure? Imagine you are a 
big corporate customer. The ANO will need to disclose that it can no longer provide the same 
backup solution, while the SMP can continue to provide backup on copper. That will distort 
competition. Yves Blondeel (T-REGS consultancy) says that it should be written in the 
recommendation that commercial closure is not the same as decommissioning or migration. 
In the 2010 Rec, the advanced notice period refers to the decommissioning. The NGA Rec 
does not say anything about whether SMP stops providing wholesale access on an earlier 
date. The future recommendation needs to be very precise to avoid that SMP operator shuts 
down wholesale access and keeps using the copper network for itself. The backup example is 
a real one. There is a risk here that the way this will be worded in the future recommendation, 
could mean that wholesale services are no longer offered but internal provision might be 
maintained.  
Revision of the advanced notice period 
Volcy Lesca (Orange) says in France, the NRA allows for the commercial closure in advance 
of the technical closure. It is appropriate to deal differently with the two steps. For the 
commercial closure, very limited advanced notice is required when there are 4 competitive 
operators present in the area concerned: only 2 months of advanced notice. That will allow 
commercial closure of substantial numbers of exchanges in a short term. The French 
precedent shows that it is important to differentiate advanced notice periods according to 
different zones (dense, less dense). Florence Bailly-Monthury (Bouygues Telecom) says 
that it is essential that the NRA ensures conditions are respected. Information must be shared 
by the SMP-operator with the ANOs, the same level of info and well in advance in order so as 
to plan for the migration.  
Luc Hindryckx (ECTA) says that the migration from ATM based leased lines to IP lines had 
severe discriminatory effects for altnets, which often were not able to maintain contracts with 
customers, because were pushed into rapid migration. This stresses the importance of 
advanced notice periods and involvement of regulator with weekly/monthly meetings to monitor 
migration, for example to look if some customer is left behind without solution etc.  
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Jana Hays (CETIN) says that the future recommendation should also consider the case of 
forced decommissioning that is driven e.g. by denial of permits from third parties or cancellation 
of PIA that was used. In such case, the timing is out of the hands of SMP operator.  
Should the pricing of copper be relaxed after full FTTH deployment? 
Luc Hindryckx (ECTA) says that what ARCEP is proposing is not acceptable. SMP operators 
should not be rewarded to come up with ambitious migration plans. It is in the interest of 
everyone to migrate as soon as possible. Florence Bailly-Monthury, Bouygues Telecom, 
stresses the importance of pricing stability. Passing on wholesale tariff increases to retail 
clients will give them the right to cancel their contract and have the effect of weakening 
competition at the advantage of the SMP operator.  Moreover, maintenance and quality of 
service of the copper loops should be warranted. The approach by ARCEP to allow the SMP 
operator to ensure a lower quality of service after commercial shutdown should not be followed 
at EU level. 
Tony Shortall (TELAGE) acknowledges the rationale for relaxing pricing obligations on 
copper lines after commercial closure, when there is full substitutability with fibre and a 
regulated access product of at least comparable quality allows to migrate all retail clients 
concerned, that would become the new anchor product. However, the situation is trickier where 
the fibre networks in the area have been (partly) deployed by ANOs and are thus not regulated. 
Can in such circumstance copper be deregulated in the absence of a finding that the area is 
competitive?  
Volcy Lesca (Orange) says that everyone knows that with fibre deployment the cost of copper 
network that will be less and less used will increase. There is a cost logic to review and increase 
LLU price together with the progress of the migration. After commercial closure, copper 
regulation should be removed.  
Alternative products of at least comparable quality 
Luc Hindryckx (ECTA) flags the importance of QoS. – Functional equivalence and 
comparable QoS are not enough. Access to a passive copper wire is not the same as active 
transmission service (even if it is VULA). We need to pay attention to this. If a passive product 
is removed, the replacement should have similar characteristics. We cannot move from ULL 
to crappy bitstream. 
Several operators have frustrations -NRAs have declared things substitutable which operators 
in real world do not consider substitutable (in terms of innovations they want to put into the 
market), and they are forced to move from innovator to replicator positions.  
Yves Blondeel (T-REGS) says that in some Member States there are reasonably acceptable 
SLAs for ULL in terms of repair times. However, a majority of NRAs accepted repair times 
SLAs that are awful like 80% after 2 days of down time. What we seen in some migrations is 
that while SLAs for ULL was 4 hour repair time, while it is longer for fibre. We need to be certain 
there will be an NRA decision at the end of the stakeholder process and there must be visibility 
on when the decision will occur. In the B2B segment we had frustrations where after 
discussions on KPIs, SLAs and SLGs, we only obtained incremental improvements and NRAs 
signed off on these. There needs to be on clear framing. Explicit in NRA decision that modifies 
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